Duns Scotus scribit: "In potestate voluntatis nostrae est habere nolle et velle, quae sunt contraria, respectu unius obiecti"
Hannah Arendt translates this Latin sentence: "It is in the power of our will to nill and to will, which are contraries, with respect to the same object."
Doctor Subtilis evidently advocates counterfactual freedom here. Is it possible that while a rational subject wills or nills in relation to one object, the contrary option remains possible such that one could have willed otherwise?
The language of contraries reminds me of logic's square of opposition where two statements (a universal affirmative and a universal negative) cannot both be true but they can both be false. E.g., "All whales are marine mammals" (universal affirmative) versus "No whales are marine mammals" (universal negative). Therefore, it's fitting for Scotus to juxtapose nilling and willing as contraries with respect to the same object.
See the discussion in John Duns Scotus 1265-1965 on page 88 (note 22), edited by John K. Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea (CUA Press, Mar 2, 2018).
Note 22 states in part: Oxon., II, d. 25, q. un., n. 6; XIII, p. 201a: "In potestate voluntatis nostrae est habere nolle et velle, quae sunt contraria respectu unius obiecti"; Ord., I, d. I, n. 149 II, p. 100: "In potestate voluntatis est non tantum sic et sic velIe, sed etiam velle et non velle, quia libertas eius est ad agendum vel non agendum."
7 comments:
Would you say Duns Scotus has a voluntarist libertarian view of free will? This is the predominant view I believe, what do you think? If so, what do you think about that model of free will?
I think that's a good way to describe his position since he advocates the primacy of the will like Augustine does unlike Aquinas, who gives primacy to the intellect. I used to lean toward the advocacy of this position, but with some tweaks, I might be closer to Aquinas now.
Aquinas espouses free choice over Scotistic voluntarism, thus allowing for divine influence on our will and another difference is whether will or intellect has primacy. Why not both working equally together?
Here is also something I once wrote about Scotus:
Scotus nonetheless views the will as "the seat of love and ethical action in the human person" (51). He argues that the will is rational, it's the locus of choice that is capable of acting in harmony with reason. Since for Scotus, the will's object is the good (bonum), the will "is inclined to self-determine in accordance with the good" (53). He also believes that we have no greater obligation than to love God (Deus diligendus est).
Interesting. This is something I've been thinking about lately, it's interesting how this dichotomy comes up often in philosophy, I say that because I've been revisiting Hegel vrs Schelling, in which the same dichotomy shows up: Intellect (Hegel) vrs Will (Schelling).
Btw, I agree with you that in the end the will and intellect cannot be seperated (other than conceptually), they always work together, and perhaps equally.
For me the question is always "can someone will the evil as the evil," i.e. not mistaking the evil for the good, not willing something due to some failure in the intellect, but willing something with full intellectual grasp of what one is willing.
To me the question (theologically) must be yes.
Like most western philosophical issues, the intellect and will discussion is rooted in Aristotelian psychology, but it became a major theme during the middle ages and later, Descartes kept the issue going with a different method. In addition to Hegel and Schelling, I see it in Kant and Schopenhauer: The World as Will and Idea.
I tend to agree about willing evil as evil. Aquinas and Scotus both have interesting discussions about such questions.
On the question of willing apparent versus real goods, see McInerny, Ralph. Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 1997.
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