"For to say a thing is produced, and yet that there is no cause at all of that production, is to say that something is effected, when it is effected by nothing; that is, at the same time when it is not effected at all.—Whatever exists, has a cause, a reason, a ground of its existence; (a foundation, on which its existence relies; a ground or reason why it doth exist rather than not exist;) either in the necessity of its own nature, and then it must have been of itself eternal; or in the will of some other being, and then that other being must, at least in the order of nature and causality, have existed before it" (Samuel Clarke).
Naturalists might argue that things in the cosmos have a cause, but were not designed. Yes, that's possible logically but how probable is it that all things in the cosmos and the cosmos itself were not designed? Again, it's logically possible that Biltmore House was not made by intelligent designers or that it did not have human builders, but how likely is it?
8 comments:
Off topic, but do you have any information on why Elisha lay on the dead boy in 2 kings 4:32?
I've often wondered about this point, but remember that Elijah did a similar act, according to 1 Kings 17:21. The Bible doesn't go into great detail about the significance of these actions, but see the Anchor Bible Commentary on 2 Kings: it suggests that Elisha did not spread himself out completely over the child. Compare how the LXX reads in 2 Kings 4.
Is this from Clarke's wonderful cosmological proof? I read it years ago and loved it (helps that I agree with him on Christology too).
I personally am a bit suspicious about some design arguments all that much, or at least not how they're sometimes put (analogous to how humans design things, which is not analogous because humans have finite means to to impost their will on an already existing and structured world, a world which does not necessarily conform to their will, they must therefore use their intelligence to manipulate the world by their means in order to bring about their ends .... none of this is true for an infinite God who creates ex-nihilo).
However one way one could put it is if an effect is brought about by a first cause, i.e. not by a cause within some chain, such that the causal effevaciousness of the cause is fully accounted for and determined in the higher causes (speaking of essential causation), then the cause must be effecated in and by the cause itself for some final cause, otherwise the causal act would be without explanation, but if this is the case then the first cause can only be an agent, if it is an agent acting for a final cause then the final cause might be something we could analogously call "design."
Roman, see https://biblehub.com/library/clarke/a_discourse_concerning_the_being_and_attributes_of_god/i_proposition_i_first_then.htm
I see what you're arguing with the agent acting for a final cause apart from some chain, but could you give an example where that happens?
I agree that design arguments can have limitations. However, I wonder how we avoid it while making arguments from analogy.
Thanks for the link, that's what I had read years ago (perhaps over a decade now).
An example of an agent acting for a final cause apart from some chain would be all free human action ... of course it's not fully apart from a chain, but although the agent finds oneself within a pre-given world, with a pre-given state of affairs, all of which delimit and orientate the agents will, ultimately the will is not fully determined by those pre-given factors but is finally determined by the agent, as a first-cause (of sorts) acting for a final cause, I would say that libertarian free will requires that this act is not reducible to the prior causal efficient chains, so the agent, within major limitations, and given all kinds of prior conditions, does bring about an end de-novo ... I would claim.
The argument for design is strange for me, at what point are we arguing for some giant creature working within creation rather than one who creates ex-nihilo, in other words, if one is arguing this appearance of design could not have come about naturally, then we are not arguing for a God who created ex-nihilo.
If one is arguing it couldn't come about by chance, then I wonder on what basis we are distinguishing chance, necessity, or agency (i.e. chance or necessity given what?), and if the argument doesn't collapse into a cosmological argument.
Cool that you read Clarke; it's one of my favorite works. Thanks for giving the agential example: I think it's logically possible for a human agent to will freely in the sense you've outlined and I don't want to focus too much on freedom, but I no longer hold that libertarian free will is factually possible. To be clear, I still affirm that the will is free in some sense of the word, but I cannot see how human agents will without being determined somehow by external and pre-existing factors.
Of course, you qualify your language by saying it would be "a first-cause (of sorts) acting for a final cause," because by the time we add in all these other qualifications and the things that condition and shape our freedom, I find it difficult to see how a human agent finally determines a teleological act. This is why I favor Aquinas' "free choice" more than I do "free will" in a libertarian sense. But I appreciate you giving an example and did not want to get sidetracked. However, if you want to give input on what I've said here, please feel free.
On the second point above, I don't believe that theistic arguments, of which the design argument is a species, can get us to a deity who creates ex nihilo. I don't think Anselm, Aquinas, Scotus, Paley or any of the major theistic arguments endeavor to demonstrate a creator deity per se. IMO, design arguments simply try to show that chance or a natural mechanism in all probability could not account for nature's design, but that it likely took an intelligent designer. Whether we can call that designer the Creator, who made things ex nihilo, is a separate question.
You ask some good questions at the end. I personally would not say that design (e.g., earth's atmosphere) could not come about by chance but I find it highly improbable. One thing chance could mean is that something occurs by happenstance without any rhyme or reason. This gets us into the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason. If this cosmos or things in it came about by chance, then there is no sufficient reason why earth's atmosphere is 78% nitrogen, 21% oxygen, and 1% other gases. It's simply a brute fact and could have been otherwise. However, then the atmosphere would not be conducive for human/animal life. And there are different versions of the cosmological just as variants of the ontological argument exists, as you know.
Well I believe in libertarian free will, but the argument for it would require us to go into metaphysics (for me all efficient causation must ultimately go back to a first cause, and first causes are agential causes, also the rational relations that undergird any scientific/mechanistic understanding of nature are ultimately mental relations, so my idealism would say that reality is fundamentally agential and mental, and that the material world is derived from that, and our understanding of the material world as a world of material and mechanistic efficient causation is more the result of our abstracting from the world than the world just being that way ... I have more to say there, but this is a side point that could go on forever). That being said, I know it's a contentious issue and that much of the classical philosophical tradition would probably be on your side.
Isn't Aquinas/Scotus's argument for God an argument for a first cause based on the impossibility of an infinite set of per se causes? That's what I mean by creation ex-nihilo, perhaps the better term would be first cause (rather than teleological).
I think the dichotomy between natural mechanism or chance and design can only apply when we are talking about a situation where there already exists a natural process, or a state of affairs in which there could be chance events, and then a potential designer besides those states of affairs, that would be more an argument for a Demiurge (perhaps the Logos of the Logos theologians), rather than God with a capital G. That's at least one issue I have with some design arguments.
What I've said about freedom has probably been too compressed, but I don't want to make it seem that I deny freedom of the will because I don't, but it's just a question of what we mean by "free ill" or is it "free choice"? I'm merely trying to account for all of the things that seem to condition our will like genetics, our socio-economic environment, brain states, hormones and so forth.
I don't envision myself as an idealist, but I think reality is rooted in a God, who is rational, an agent, intelligent and omnisubjective (etc.). I guess that God is the first cause in my view and he's established/works through secondary causes. I believe that efficient causation is real and measurable, but I respect your way of viewing things. In the past, I went through various phases that included Platonic/Hegelian ways of viewing the world. I also like phenomenological realism, but would ultimately describe myself as a Christian physicalist.
I think you're correct about Aquinas and Scotus and see what you mean by ex nihilo. I guess my point was that arguments like those made by Aquinas or Scotus are designed to prove the possibility of divine existence without getting into the particulars of whether he is a Creator God or brings thing forth ex nihilo. But I would agree that they're attempting to establish a first cause.
When I brought up design arguments, I was envisioning a scenario where nothing exists and if we prescind from God in that case, what causes a drop of water or anything else to ha the structure it does? Did earth's atmosphere get that way without being designed? To put it another way, I'm looking at matters from the perspective of the naturalist, who might think a prior state of affairs does not have to exist for something to come about by chance. For example, see the book Mathematical Universe by Max Tesler (I believe). He thinks a lot of stuff is possible for mathematical reasons and things will eventually happen for mathematical reasons.
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