Philemon 14-ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἑκούσιον

Greek (SBLGNT): χωρὶς δὲ τῆς σῆς γνώμης οὐδὲν ἠθέλησα ποιῆσαι, ἵνα μὴ ὡς κατὰ ἀνάγκην τὸ ἀγαθόν σου ᾖ ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἑκούσιον·

"but I preferred to do nothing without your consent in order that your goodness might not be by compulsion but of your own accord" (Philemon 14 ESV).

κατὰ ἑκούσιον only appears in the NT here. 

Stephen H. Levinsohn explains that in Philemon 14b, "the focal constituent ὡς κατὰ ἀνάγκην is preposed in order to set off κατὰ ἑκούσιον to advantage by contrast" since the slave's ceding assent to the apostle Paul is made salient earlier in the verse. 

See Levinsohn, "Analysis of Non-Narrative Texts with particular reference to Paul’s Letter to Philemon in Koine Greek" (SIL International), 2008. Page 33.

For more about κατὰ + the accusative, see Daniel B. Wallace, GGBB, page 377.

A Quote From Duns Scotus About the Will (Nothing Too Heavy Per Theology)

"Nihil aliud a voluntate est causa totalis volitionis in voluntate" (Duns Scotus).

I don't totally agree with this Latin saying, but it just sounds so cool when pronounced. :-)

Determinism, Free Will, and Neuroscience

I believe that neuroscience tends to be deterministic. Now to be clear, I would not say that all neuroscientists are determinists but it seems that neuroscience continuously moves in that direction. This point seems to be substantiated by what I've read in one book that covers four views of free will. Furthermore, the late Francis Crick suggested that free will is an illusion created by the brain such that we have a sense of free will, which is not the same thing as having free will:

"The Astonishing Hypothesis is that 'You,' your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules" (Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis, page 3).

Owen Flanagan (a philosopher and Duke professor of neurobiology) appears to reject free will and views it as a disease while Joel B. Green provides evidence that science is leading us to believe "free won't" is more likely than free will: he too works in neuroscience. Many other examples could be given of neuroscientists who affirm determinism rather than free will. Even the notable Churchlands (Patricia and Paul) are known as "eliminative materialists," which means they want to replace talk of emotions (mental states) with neuroscientific terminology (brain states) and flatten any distinction between the two categories. I would be very surprised if either Patricia or Paul believed in libertarian free will.

To summarize, it is my contention that neuroscience largely tends to be deterministic and increasingly so; on the other hand, there are many neuroscientists who affirm free will for one reason or another. But none of what I say here is meant to be a repudiation of neuroscience in toto: I greatly appreciate its useful insights.

Sources Consulted: Watson, Gary (editor). Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Flanagan, Owen J. The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

Green, Joel B. Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academics, 2008. Print.

See also https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/18958759-investigating-life-s-meaning

Duns Scotus and the Will

Duns Scotus scribit: "In potestate voluntatis nostrae est habere nolle et velle, quae sunt contraria, respectu unius obiecti" 

Hannah Arendt translates this Latin sentence: "It is in the power of our will to nill and to will, which are contraries, with respect to the same object."

Doctor Subtilis evidently advocates counterfactual freedom here. Is it possible that while a rational subject wills or nills in relation to one object, the contrary option remains possible such that one could have willed otherwise? 

The language of contraries reminds me of logic's square of opposition where two statements (a universal affirmative and a universal negative) cannot both be true but they can both be false. E.g., "All whales are marine mammals" (universal affirmative) versus "No whales are marine mammals" (universal negative). Therefore, it's fitting for Scotus to juxtapose nilling and willing as contraries with respect to the same object. 

See the discussion in John Duns Scotus 1265-1965 on page 88 (note 22), edited by John K. Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea (CUA Press, Mar 2, 2018).

Note 22 states in part:  Oxon., II, d. 25, q. un., n. 6; XIII, p. 201a: "In potestate voluntatis nostrae est habere nolle et velle, quae sunt contraria respectu unius obiecti"; Ord., I, d. I, n. 149 II, p. 100: "In potestate voluntatis est non tantum sic et sic velIe, sed etiam velle et non velle, quia libertas eius est ad agendum vel non agendum."