There is certainly a tension in the early church fathers between human free will (which they universally affirm) and foreordination. Moreover, the pre-Nicenes allude to the topic of foreordination, but they do not really elucidate their beliefs concerning it: predestination does not become a major issue until Augustine's time period (see Berkhof, Louis. Systematic Theology. London: Banner of Truth, 1971, page 109).
In his authoritative work, The Christian Tradition (1:280), historian Jaroslav Pelikan points out that Augustine's spiritual predecessors [i.e. the pre-Nicenes and post-Nicenes] "leaned noticeably to one side of the dilemma, namely, the side of free will and responsibility rather than the side of inevitability and original sin."
Augustine argued that the reason those who preceded him did not adequately deal with the issue of human free will and divine foreordination was because their historical circumstances did not necessitate that they deal with the issue in a satisfactory manner (On the Predestination of the Saints 14.27; On the Gift of Perseverance 2.4). In other words, heresy had not yet made it necessary to deal with this problematic question (according to Augustine of Hippo).
One important caveat to mention at this point, however, is that Augustine did not reject free will in toto. According to what he writes in De Civitate Dei 5.9, God "knows all things before they come to pass," yet we will or act freely, of our own choosing. Nevertheless, the ancient bishop claims, free will is included in "a certain order of causes" that has been determined or decreed by God. Such a view can be aptly described as "soft determinism" since it does not affirm a libertarian version of human voluntas. William Hasker discusses these points in God, Time, and Knowledge (pp. 5-6).
Saturday, June 14, 2008
Steven Ozment on Calvin and Servetus
The following quote is taken from Steven Ozment's The Age
of Reform:1250-1550 (page 371):
of Reform:1250-1550 (page 371):
In the controversy that followed the execution [of
Servetus], Castellio memorably summarized what to many
contemporaries became the simple truth of the episode.
'To kill a man,' he wrote, 'is not to defend a
doctrine, but simply to kill a man.' Although that
assessment has also proved to be history's view of the
matter, another century of religious warfare would be
required before this principle became firmly
established in law.
Lactantius on the Freedom of Religion in Worship
Lactantius writes:
"These things may indeed be said with justice. But who will hear, when men of furious and unbridled spirit think that their authority is diminished if there is any freedom in the affairs of men? But it is religion alone in which freedom has placed its dwelling. For it is a matter which is voluntary above all others, nor can necessity be imposed upon any, so as to worship that which he does not wish to worship" (Epitome of the Divine Institutes LIV).
"These things may indeed be said with justice. But who will hear, when men of furious and unbridled spirit think that their authority is diminished if there is any freedom in the affairs of men? But it is religion alone in which freedom has placed its dwelling. For it is a matter which is voluntary above all others, nor can necessity be imposed upon any, so as to worship that which he does not wish to worship" (Epitome of the Divine Institutes LIV).
Thursday, June 05, 2008
A Dialogue on Gender, Metaphor and God the Father
I am posting another dialogue that transpired privately between me and an interlocutor who shall remain nameless. I have replaced his actual name with a pseudonym:
[Edgar]
If cultures or societies decide what gender is, then
the phenomenon is somewhat arbitrary. But I would not
categorize what I believe about gender as arbitrary.
According to my paradigm, God created man as a
masculine being, woman as a feminine creature; he also
created masculine and feminine pairs of animals.
Nevertheless, sociologists and anthropologists tend to
define the term "gender" (used in a non-grammatical
sense) as a sociogenic or anthropological phenomenon. My
earlier comments reflected this common practice of the
social sciences.
[Jim]
Further, I deny that there can be no gender without
a bilogical entity of some kind. The sky is
masculine. The sea is feminine. Day is masculine.
Night is feminine.
[Edgar]
Are they? How do you know (in the sense of justified true belief) that the sky is masculine or the sea is
feminine?
[Jim]
You may be inclined to follow the pervasive nominalism
of our society in declaring this eisegetical. But on
what basis? What's to prevent this from being
exegetical--reading it out of nature? The linguistic
consensus surely seems near unanimous across history
and historical cultures.
[Edgar]
If the sky's gender, for example, can be read out of
nature, exactly how does one go about reading it thus?
And, as I see it, the onus probandi
is not on me to say what prevents your approach from being
eisegetical. Do you not have the responsibility to
provide justificatory utterances that logically
validate your position? ;-0 Finally, IMHO, linguistic
consensus is just that.
[Jim]
I don't follow your point about James 1:17.
Further, I don't deny that God in Himself contains
both masulinity and femininity, since He lacks
nothing. But I would insist that (1) in relation to
us He is properly masculine, and (2) that this
masculinity is not an arbitrary or merely human,
cultural development, but revealed as properly
His nature.
[Edgar]
My point about James 1:17 is that it seems nigh or
even downright impossible to construe the text as
saying God literally fathered the celestial lights.
Maybe you view the matter differently.
I agree that God is masculine (not sure about the term
"properly") in relation to us. And I've never denied
that the conceptual association of "God" with "Father"
in Scripture is catalogical (i.e. emanates from
above). So I'm not contending that the divine appellation
"Father" is arbitrary or merely human. What I am
arguing is that God evidently inspired humans to speak in such
human cultural terms so that "He" might be mentally
grasped, to an extent, in order that we might come to
understand (somewhat) the divine functions and
beneficences. But the word "Father" does not tell us whether God
is ontologically masculine or feminine. I tend to think God is
above gender, however, for reasons hitherto delineated.
Please explain to me how such a view is "arbitrary."
[Jim]
I refer you to my previous discussion in the
foregoing paragraphs. You may think that we human
beings read non-biotically based gender INTO nature,
but on what basis do you assume that? On what basis
do you assume it couldn't be read OUT of nature.
[Edgar]
Keep in mind that we're talking about how humans press
their respective natural languages into service. I thus
make my previously mentioned claims on the basis of my
ongoing studies in human language. For example, abstract
and impersonal attributes are spoken of in feminine
terms at times (e.g. SOPHIA or hOKHMAH). A man, that
is, the Son of David is referred to in feminine terms
(e.g. QOHELETH). Both a male child and a male lamb are
described with neuter nouns (e.g. PAIDION and ARNION).
These examples could be multiplied, but I think the
point I'm trying to make is somewhat established.
Grammatical gender is largely a social construct:
it doesn't necessarily tell us
anything about a particular animate or inanimate
referent's natural gender, although it might.
Even in times of antiquity, Arnobius of Sicca wrote:
"Yet, if you consider the true state of the case, no
language is naturally perfect, and in like manner none
is faulty. For what natural reason is there, or what
law written in the constitution of the world, that
paries
should be called ['used with'] hic, and sella
['used with'] haec?--since neither have they sex
distinguished by male and female, nor can the most
learned man tell me what hic and haec are, or why one
of them denotes the male sex while the other is
applied to the female. These conventionalities are
man's, and certainly are not indispensable to all
persons for the use of forming their language; for
paries might perhaps have been called haec, and sella
hic, without any fault being found, if it had been
agreed upon at first that they should be so called,
and if this practice had been maintained by following
generations in their daily conversation" (Adversus
Gentes 1.59).
None of the foregoing means that I deny God's role
in gifting us with language.
[Edgar]
If cultures or societies decide what gender is, then
the phenomenon is somewhat arbitrary. But I would not
categorize what I believe about gender as arbitrary.
According to my paradigm, God created man as a
masculine being, woman as a feminine creature; he also
created masculine and feminine pairs of animals.
Nevertheless, sociologists and anthropologists tend to
define the term "gender" (used in a non-grammatical
sense) as a sociogenic or anthropological phenomenon. My
earlier comments reflected this common practice of the
social sciences.
[Jim]
Further, I deny that there can be no gender without
a bilogical entity of some kind. The sky is
masculine. The sea is feminine. Day is masculine.
Night is feminine.
[Edgar]
Are they? How do you know (in the sense of justified true belief) that the sky is masculine or the sea is
feminine?
[Jim]
You may be inclined to follow the pervasive nominalism
of our society in declaring this eisegetical. But on
what basis? What's to prevent this from being
exegetical--reading it out of nature? The linguistic
consensus surely seems near unanimous across history
and historical cultures.
[Edgar]
If the sky's gender, for example, can be read out of
nature, exactly how does one go about reading it thus?
And, as I see it, the onus probandi
is not on me to say what prevents your approach from being
eisegetical. Do you not have the responsibility to
provide justificatory utterances that logically
validate your position? ;-0 Finally, IMHO, linguistic
consensus is just that.
[Jim]
I don't follow your point about James 1:17.
Further, I don't deny that God in Himself contains
both masulinity and femininity, since He lacks
nothing. But I would insist that (1) in relation to
us He is properly masculine, and (2) that this
masculinity is not an arbitrary or merely human,
cultural development, but revealed as properly
His nature.
[Edgar]
My point about James 1:17 is that it seems nigh or
even downright impossible to construe the text as
saying God literally fathered the celestial lights.
Maybe you view the matter differently.
I agree that God is masculine (not sure about the term
"properly") in relation to us. And I've never denied
that the conceptual association of "God" with "Father"
in Scripture is catalogical (i.e. emanates from
above). So I'm not contending that the divine appellation
"Father" is arbitrary or merely human. What I am
arguing is that God evidently inspired humans to speak in such
human cultural terms so that "He" might be mentally
grasped, to an extent, in order that we might come to
understand (somewhat) the divine functions and
beneficences. But the word "Father" does not tell us whether God
is ontologically masculine or feminine. I tend to think God is
above gender, however, for reasons hitherto delineated.
Please explain to me how such a view is "arbitrary."
[Jim]
I refer you to my previous discussion in the
foregoing paragraphs. You may think that we human
beings read non-biotically based gender INTO nature,
but on what basis do you assume that? On what basis
do you assume it couldn't be read OUT of nature.
[Edgar]
Keep in mind that we're talking about how humans press
their respective natural languages into service. I thus
make my previously mentioned claims on the basis of my
ongoing studies in human language. For example, abstract
and impersonal attributes are spoken of in feminine
terms at times (e.g. SOPHIA or hOKHMAH). A man, that
is, the Son of David is referred to in feminine terms
(e.g. QOHELETH). Both a male child and a male lamb are
described with neuter nouns (e.g. PAIDION and ARNION).
These examples could be multiplied, but I think the
point I'm trying to make is somewhat established.
Grammatical gender is largely a social construct:
it doesn't necessarily tell us
anything about a particular animate or inanimate
referent's natural gender, although it might.
Even in times of antiquity, Arnobius of Sicca wrote:
"Yet, if you consider the true state of the case, no
language is naturally perfect, and in like manner none
is faulty. For what natural reason is there, or what
law written in the constitution of the world, that
paries
should be called ['used with'] hic, and sella
['used with'] haec?--since neither have they sex
distinguished by male and female, nor can the most
learned man tell me what hic and haec are, or why one
of them denotes the male sex while the other is
applied to the female. These conventionalities are
man's, and certainly are not indispensable to all
persons for the use of forming their language; for
paries might perhaps have been called haec, and sella
hic, without any fault being found, if it had been
agreed upon at first that they should be so called,
and if this practice had been maintained by following
generations in their daily conversation" (Adversus
Gentes 1.59).
None of the foregoing means that I deny God's role
in gifting us with language.
Friday, May 30, 2008
Updated Version of Origen and the Eternal Generation
B. Origen and the Eternal Generation of the Son
There is some debate to what extent Origen affirms God’s paternity. Does he teach the eternal generation doctrine? In what sense is God “Father” in Origenian thought? While the ancient writer is not altogether clear in this respect, there probably is a sense in which Hall’s analysis of Origen aptly encapsulates his thought: “God was however always Father; he could not change from one condition (not-Father) to another (Father). So the Son exists in God’s timeless eternity.” Origen himself possibly affirms the eternal generation of the Son in view of his sentential locution “There was not when he was not.” Nonetheless, his theological account suggests that the Son is not intrinsically God (autotheos), but God by derivation only (Commentary on the Gospel of John 2.2). The Son is not “self-sufficiently” God ; only the Father is Godself (autotheos) in Origen’s theological paradigm. The Son is God in a strictly predicative manner or to a lesser degree than the Father is. But in what sense is the Father greater than the Son in Origen’s system?
Hall indicates that Origen possibly balances his alleged subordinationism by means of the eternal generation doctrine, which would mean that the inferiority which he evidently ascribes to the Son is not ontological in nature. On the other hand, William J. Hill observes: “Still, eternal generation does not of itself give divine status because Origen views all spiritual beings, both what he calls theoi and human souls, as eternal.” Similarly, Brown laments Origen’s problematic approach to Christology and the Trinity since “he also taught the preexistence of individual human souls and spoke of those who are in Christ as eternally begotten.” Nevertheless, it has been argued that this speculation about eternal souls does not diminish Origen’s trinitarian contribution to the church. Nevertheless, Brown acknowledges that while Origen’s eternal generation doctrine seemingly defeated the notion that the Son is temporally posterior to the Father, it “did not entirely throw off the assumptions of earlier Christian thinkers that the Son is subordinate to the Father” or not fully divine. Studer equally concludes that Origen “does not succeed in ruling out subordinationism.” He points to Origen’s belief that there are hierarchical grades in deity with the Son possibly being one of the Seraphim in Isaiah’s vision of YHWH’s glory (Peri Archon 1.3.4). Yet, certain scholars attempt to resolve the intricacies of Origen’s scheme by positing the Son’s subordination to the Father in an economic sense. What makes matters more problematic, however, is that the extant writings of Origen suggest that he himself may have inconsistently formulated his doctrine of the Father and the Son. It is possible that Origen views the Son as ontologically subordinate to the Father (Contra Celsum 8.15) whereas other passages appear to teach that he does not think the Son is lesser in relation to his Father. The treatises of Origen accordingly tend to be aporetic.
Another factor lending itself to the aporetic tendencies of Origen's theology is his use of the term “creature” (kti,sma) for the Son. This usage has generated many discussions in Origen studies, discussions that have not led to wholly satisfactory conclusions. The first systematic theologian evidently derives kti,sma from Proverbs 8:22-25 (LXX). Neoplatonism may also influence what seems to be an idiosyncratic utilization of “creature” (kti,sma). Crouzel in fact believes that “creation” (kti,sij) for Origen applies to “everything that comes from God.” Along with Prestige and Wiles, he notes the fluid synonymity that existed between the words “generate” (genna,w) and “create” (gi,nomai) prior to Nicea. If this line of reasoning corresponds with the speech strategy of Origen, there would appear to be no genuine conflict between his supposed affirmation of the eternal generation doctrine and his manifest employment of “creature.” Yet although the Father putatively generates the Son timelessly in the thought of Origen, he clearly adheres to the notion that there are grades of being in the divine. Bulgakov thinks that Origen does not master cosmological subordinationism “with reference to the mutual relations of the hypostases, with reference to their equal dignity and divinity.” Even if he did posit a timeless or eternal generation for the Son, Origen also argues that other “created” rational spirits are eternal. In the final analysis, if “Father” is a metaphor for Christianity’s first systematic theologian, it is a rather curious trope that appears in his writings.
There is some debate to what extent Origen affirms God’s paternity. Does he teach the eternal generation doctrine? In what sense is God “Father” in Origenian thought? While the ancient writer is not altogether clear in this respect, there probably is a sense in which Hall’s analysis of Origen aptly encapsulates his thought: “God was however always Father; he could not change from one condition (not-Father) to another (Father). So the Son exists in God’s timeless eternity.” Origen himself possibly affirms the eternal generation of the Son in view of his sentential locution “There was not when he was not.” Nonetheless, his theological account suggests that the Son is not intrinsically God (autotheos), but God by derivation only (Commentary on the Gospel of John 2.2). The Son is not “self-sufficiently” God ; only the Father is Godself (autotheos) in Origen’s theological paradigm. The Son is God in a strictly predicative manner or to a lesser degree than the Father is. But in what sense is the Father greater than the Son in Origen’s system?
Hall indicates that Origen possibly balances his alleged subordinationism by means of the eternal generation doctrine, which would mean that the inferiority which he evidently ascribes to the Son is not ontological in nature. On the other hand, William J. Hill observes: “Still, eternal generation does not of itself give divine status because Origen views all spiritual beings, both what he calls theoi and human souls, as eternal.” Similarly, Brown laments Origen’s problematic approach to Christology and the Trinity since “he also taught the preexistence of individual human souls and spoke of those who are in Christ as eternally begotten.” Nevertheless, it has been argued that this speculation about eternal souls does not diminish Origen’s trinitarian contribution to the church. Nevertheless, Brown acknowledges that while Origen’s eternal generation doctrine seemingly defeated the notion that the Son is temporally posterior to the Father, it “did not entirely throw off the assumptions of earlier Christian thinkers that the Son is subordinate to the Father” or not fully divine. Studer equally concludes that Origen “does not succeed in ruling out subordinationism.” He points to Origen’s belief that there are hierarchical grades in deity with the Son possibly being one of the Seraphim in Isaiah’s vision of YHWH’s glory (Peri Archon 1.3.4). Yet, certain scholars attempt to resolve the intricacies of Origen’s scheme by positing the Son’s subordination to the Father in an economic sense. What makes matters more problematic, however, is that the extant writings of Origen suggest that he himself may have inconsistently formulated his doctrine of the Father and the Son. It is possible that Origen views the Son as ontologically subordinate to the Father (Contra Celsum 8.15) whereas other passages appear to teach that he does not think the Son is lesser in relation to his Father. The treatises of Origen accordingly tend to be aporetic.
Another factor lending itself to the aporetic tendencies of Origen's theology is his use of the term “creature” (kti,sma) for the Son. This usage has generated many discussions in Origen studies, discussions that have not led to wholly satisfactory conclusions. The first systematic theologian evidently derives kti,sma from Proverbs 8:22-25 (LXX). Neoplatonism may also influence what seems to be an idiosyncratic utilization of “creature” (kti,sma). Crouzel in fact believes that “creation” (kti,sij) for Origen applies to “everything that comes from God.” Along with Prestige and Wiles, he notes the fluid synonymity that existed between the words “generate” (genna,w) and “create” (gi,nomai) prior to Nicea. If this line of reasoning corresponds with the speech strategy of Origen, there would appear to be no genuine conflict between his supposed affirmation of the eternal generation doctrine and his manifest employment of “creature.” Yet although the Father putatively generates the Son timelessly in the thought of Origen, he clearly adheres to the notion that there are grades of being in the divine. Bulgakov thinks that Origen does not master cosmological subordinationism “with reference to the mutual relations of the hypostases, with reference to their equal dignity and divinity.” Even if he did posit a timeless or eternal generation for the Son, Origen also argues that other “created” rational spirits are eternal. In the final analysis, if “Father” is a metaphor for Christianity’s first systematic theologian, it is a rather curious trope that appears in his writings.
Sunday, May 18, 2008
Plato on Homosexuality (Laws 1.636c)
Plato argues (in his work Laws) that two men having coitus with one another or the practice of lesbianism violates natural law. The views expressed in this Platonic work antedate the Christian New Testament or writings of the church fathers.
"And whether one makes the observation in earnest or in jest, one certainly should not fail to observe that when male unites with female for procreation the pleasure experienced is held to be due to nature, but contrary to nature when male mates with male or female with female, and that those first guilty of such enormities were impelled by their slavery to pleasure. And we all accuse the Cretans of concocting the story about Ganymede."
"And whether one makes the observation in earnest or in jest, one certainly should not fail to observe that when male unites with female for procreation the pleasure experienced is held to be due to nature, but contrary to nature when male mates with male or female with female, and that those first guilty of such enormities were impelled by their slavery to pleasure. And we all accuse the Cretans of concocting the story about Ganymede."
Friday, April 25, 2008
Dialogue on God's Infinity
The following dialogue took place between a member of my formerly active Greektheology yahoogroup and me. I have edited some parts of the dialogue to render it more coherent. Our debate centered around a passage that I quoted from Louis Berkhof's systematic theology. I have replaced my interlocutor's name with a pseudonym.
[Edgar]
I thought you had a copy of Berkhof. I was therefore
surprised when you described God's infinity as being
"quantitative," when Berkhof clearly shows that it
is not. Rather, God's unlimitedness is qualitative in
nature. Aquinas, Scotus and Berkhof all agree that
God's boundlessness is not quantitative.
[Earl]
Did you read the following sections on eternity and
immensity? It is clear their that with respect to God's being,
Berkhof sees God's infinity as quantitative,
and with respect to his attributes, from the section you partially
cited, as qualitative. I am simply saying that the
two (God's attributes and being) cannot be separated
except for the purposes of discussion.
[Edgar]
Yes, I've read what Berkhof has to say about God's
eternity, immensity and putative omnipresence. I can
therefore point out that he clearly does not view
God's infinity as "quantitative," nor does he even
conscript the term in his section on God's immensity
or eternity, as far as I can tell. As I demonstrated
earlier, if God's infinitude were quantitative in
nature, it could be counted or measured. But it cannot be
quantified; ergo, it is not quantitative. Berkhof most
definitely does not support you here. I don't know how
you're using or construing the adnominal "quantitative," but it
manifestly is not applicable to God's
infinity (whether He is incorporeal or not).
[Earl]
I don't agree because you are drawing an invalid
inference from what Berkhof actually writes.
[Edgar]
Can you demonstrate how I am drawing an "invalid
inference" from what Berkhof writes in Systematic
Theology? Where does he state that the infinity of
God is quantifiable? How much clearer could Berkhof be when
he writes that God's infinity "should not be
understood in a quantitative, but in a qualitative
sense; it qualifies all the communicable attributes of
God"?
[Edgar continued]
There appears to be no doubt that you and Berkhof
concur in the respect you have outlined. You are
apparently referring to the SIMPLICITAS DEI here,
when you speak of God's attributes being coextensive
with His being, a belief that I have not seen good
reason to affirm for biblical, logical and theological
reasons. Don't get me wrong. I do not believe that
God's attributes are parts or accidental modes of
the divine being. However, it appears to me that there
is both a conceptual and probably even a formal
distinction (at the very least)--that is to say, a
Scotistic-like DISTINCTIO FORMALIS--between, for
instance, divine omnipotence and divine
omniscience.
[Earl]
And that distinction would be?
[Edgar]
It is easy to see how these two divine incommunicable
attributes are conceptually distinct. Analytically
(i.e. by definition), omnipotence cannot be the same
attribute as omniscience without a severe
contradiction obtaining. I don't think you dispute
this point. The more controversial proposal might be
the notion that there is a "formal distinction"
(DISTINCTIO FORMALIS) that obtains between divine
omnipotence and divine omniscience. By this, I mean
that these two essential properties of God *may* be
two different aspects of one divine perfection. I'm
not sure about this idea though. In any event, if
there is a formal distinction between omniscience and
omnipotence, it would mean that the distinction is not
merely conceptual but much the same as the DISTINCTIO
between head/tails or space/time or matter/energy. If
we are careful with our speech and concepts, we do not
wholly conflate the foregoing things, one with
another, because they are not reducible, one to
another.
[Earl]
As long as you realize that these distinctions are
theoretical. We may speak of God's essence and existence,
but the former essentially (!) implies the latter.
[Edgar]
How does the former entail the latter? I define the
essence of an entity as its "quiddity" (QUIDDITAS),
nature or whatness. Existence, on the other hand,
refers to the lived actuality of an essence (Thomas
Aquinas uses the expression ACTUS ESSENDI). Scotus
makes a helpful distinction between the essence,
existence and HAECCEITAS of a RES. In other words, it
is possible to posit an essence for an entity (RES)
that does not actually exist. For example,
unicornality in no way implies that unicorns exist.
Essence does not imply existence. This is even the
case when God is the "essence" that we have in mind.
Regards,
Edgar
[Edgar]
I thought you had a copy of Berkhof. I was therefore
surprised when you described God's infinity as being
"quantitative," when Berkhof clearly shows that it
is not. Rather, God's unlimitedness is qualitative in
nature. Aquinas, Scotus and Berkhof all agree that
God's boundlessness is not quantitative.
[Earl]
Did you read the following sections on eternity and
immensity? It is clear their that with respect to God's being,
Berkhof sees God's infinity as quantitative,
and with respect to his attributes, from the section you partially
cited, as qualitative. I am simply saying that the
two (God's attributes and being) cannot be separated
except for the purposes of discussion.
[Edgar]
Yes, I've read what Berkhof has to say about God's
eternity, immensity and putative omnipresence. I can
therefore point out that he clearly does not view
God's infinity as "quantitative," nor does he even
conscript the term in his section on God's immensity
or eternity, as far as I can tell. As I demonstrated
earlier, if God's infinitude were quantitative in
nature, it could be counted or measured. But it cannot be
quantified; ergo, it is not quantitative. Berkhof most
definitely does not support you here. I don't know how
you're using or construing the adnominal "quantitative," but it
manifestly is not applicable to God's
infinity (whether He is incorporeal or not).
[Earl]
I don't agree because you are drawing an invalid
inference from what Berkhof actually writes.
[Edgar]
Can you demonstrate how I am drawing an "invalid
inference" from what Berkhof writes in Systematic
Theology? Where does he state that the infinity of
God is quantifiable? How much clearer could Berkhof be when
he writes that God's infinity "should not be
understood in a quantitative, but in a qualitative
sense; it qualifies all the communicable attributes of
God"?
[Edgar continued]
There appears to be no doubt that you and Berkhof
concur in the respect you have outlined. You are
apparently referring to the SIMPLICITAS DEI here,
when you speak of God's attributes being coextensive
with His being, a belief that I have not seen good
reason to affirm for biblical, logical and theological
reasons. Don't get me wrong. I do not believe that
God's attributes are parts or accidental modes of
the divine being. However, it appears to me that there
is both a conceptual and probably even a formal
distinction (at the very least)--that is to say, a
Scotistic-like DISTINCTIO FORMALIS--between, for
instance, divine omnipotence and divine
omniscience.
[Earl]
And that distinction would be?
[Edgar]
It is easy to see how these two divine incommunicable
attributes are conceptually distinct. Analytically
(i.e. by definition), omnipotence cannot be the same
attribute as omniscience without a severe
contradiction obtaining. I don't think you dispute
this point. The more controversial proposal might be
the notion that there is a "formal distinction"
(DISTINCTIO FORMALIS) that obtains between divine
omnipotence and divine omniscience. By this, I mean
that these two essential properties of God *may* be
two different aspects of one divine perfection. I'm
not sure about this idea though. In any event, if
there is a formal distinction between omniscience and
omnipotence, it would mean that the distinction is not
merely conceptual but much the same as the DISTINCTIO
between head/tails or space/time or matter/energy. If
we are careful with our speech and concepts, we do not
wholly conflate the foregoing things, one with
another, because they are not reducible, one to
another.
[Earl]
As long as you realize that these distinctions are
theoretical. We may speak of God's essence and existence,
but the former essentially (!) implies the latter.
[Edgar]
How does the former entail the latter? I define the
essence of an entity as its "quiddity" (QUIDDITAS),
nature or whatness. Existence, on the other hand,
refers to the lived actuality of an essence (Thomas
Aquinas uses the expression ACTUS ESSENDI). Scotus
makes a helpful distinction between the essence,
existence and HAECCEITAS of a RES. In other words, it
is possible to posit an essence for an entity (RES)
that does not actually exist. For example,
unicornality in no way implies that unicorns exist.
Essence does not imply existence. This is even the
case when God is the "essence" that we have in mind.
Regards,
Edgar
Saturday, April 05, 2008
YHWH (Jehovah) and Theological Metaphors
Gerald O'Collins and Daniel Kendall argue that theological metaphors "refer to and describe reality." Concurring with Soskice, they reason that metasememes speak about one thing in terms that appear suggestive of another thing. For example, God does not instantiate the literal mind-independent properties of a crag, but the ancient Hebrew prophets articulate speech regarding YHWH in ways that appear suggestive of a rock. Likewise, YHWH is called "a sun and shield" in Psalm 84:11(12). Yet, he apparently does not exemplify the matter-of-fact predicates that structurally constitute the Sun or a shield. In these instances, the Bible writers presumably are employing tropes to speak about one entity (God) in terms suggestive of other entities (rock, Sun or shield). Metaphor seemingly permits the writers of Scripture to describe the supreme reality adequately, though indirectly. Far from being linguistically insufficient or vulnerable, theological metaphors seem to accomplish what "proper terminology" (De oratore 3.152-155) cannot achieve; they convey truths that non-tropic expressions attributing matter-of-fact properties to a particular subject are incapable of communicating.
Saturday, March 22, 2008
The Memorial as a Communion Sacrifice
One Scriptural passage that has really helped me to
appreciate tonight's upcoming Memorial of Christ's
death on Nisan 14 is 1 Cor 10:18:
"Look at that which is Israel in a fleshly way: Are
not those who eat the sacrifices sharers with the
altar?"
When posing this rhetorical query, Paul alludes to the
OT practice of communion sacrifices. One can find a
lovely description of such offerings in Leviticus
7:1-38. I want to briefly recount what that Biblical
chapter says and apply it to Paul's words found in 1
Corinthians 10:18ff.
The communion sacrifices were peace offerings designed
to restore a broken relationship that might obtain
between God and His ancient worshipers. It was a holy
presentation to Almighty God (YHWH), and when offering
a communion sacrifice, the Israelites were fittingly
obligated to give their best to Jehovah (YHWH).
Leviticus 7:28-30 mandates that one presenting a
communion sacrifice to Jehovah should offer the 'fat
upon the breast' to Him as a wave offering.
(Leviticus 7:30 briefly explains what a wave offering
entailed.) In addition to offering the fat and the
blood to YHWH or Jehovah(Leviticus 7:33), the one presenting
peace offerings to God was also commanded to give 'the
right leg' of his sacrifice as 'a sacred portion' to
the officiating priests. Furthermore the High Priest
and his sons were to have a share in this communion
offering. What a privilege all those who offered
communion presentations enjoyed! Paul aptly stated
that those who sacrificed upon the altar in Israel became
(by means of their respective gifts to God) sharers in the altar.
But how does this Levitical practice apply to
Christians today?
As Paul intimates, the Lord's Evening Meal (1
Corinthians 11:20) is the antitype of the OT peace
offerings. Just as ancient worshipers of God brought
their sacrifices to Jehovah in order to repair a
breach that might have obtained between themselves and God,
so anointed Christians (2 Corinthians 1:21-22; 1 John 2:20, 27)
annually observe the Memorial of Jesus' death
in order to memorialize how God repaired the
figurative breach between God and sinful humanity and
thus fully reconciled humans to Himself.
Anointed Christians share in the antitypical communion
meal by figuratively partaking of Christ's blood (the cup of wine)
and his sacrificed body (the bread). The emblems at the Memorial
are symbols of the reality effectuated by God
through Christ. Yet those who partake of the cup and wine
today nonetheless share with God's altar as they partake
of a meal (in effect) with Jehovah, His High Priest
(Jesus) and other fellow anointed ones (i.e. underpriests).
It is still an inestimable privilege to have a figurative
meal with God. Anointed Christians therefore esteem
the undeserved kindness that has been shown to them
through the Son of God's ransom sacrifice. However,
they are not the only ones who benefit from being
present at the yearly communion meal.
The great crowd of other sheep who possess a hope of
living forever, while not partaking of the emblems and
thus sharing in the altar, still have their
appreciation for Christ's sacrifice deepened as they
listen to the discourse given about Jesus' death and
watch the symbols of his death being passed around the
Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. I thus hope that everyone
attending the Memorial this year reflects on what Christ's death
means in terms of a communion sacrifice. May you all continue to grow
in love and appreciation for Jehovah and His Son.
Brotherly love,
Edgar
appreciate tonight's upcoming Memorial of Christ's
death on Nisan 14 is 1 Cor 10:18:
"Look at that which is Israel in a fleshly way: Are
not those who eat the sacrifices sharers with the
altar?"
When posing this rhetorical query, Paul alludes to the
OT practice of communion sacrifices. One can find a
lovely description of such offerings in Leviticus
7:1-38. I want to briefly recount what that Biblical
chapter says and apply it to Paul's words found in 1
Corinthians 10:18ff.
The communion sacrifices were peace offerings designed
to restore a broken relationship that might obtain
between God and His ancient worshipers. It was a holy
presentation to Almighty God (YHWH), and when offering
a communion sacrifice, the Israelites were fittingly
obligated to give their best to Jehovah (YHWH).
Leviticus 7:28-30 mandates that one presenting a
communion sacrifice to Jehovah should offer the 'fat
upon the breast' to Him as a wave offering.
(Leviticus 7:30 briefly explains what a wave offering
entailed.) In addition to offering the fat and the
blood to YHWH or Jehovah(Leviticus 7:33), the one presenting
peace offerings to God was also commanded to give 'the
right leg' of his sacrifice as 'a sacred portion' to
the officiating priests. Furthermore the High Priest
and his sons were to have a share in this communion
offering. What a privilege all those who offered
communion presentations enjoyed! Paul aptly stated
that those who sacrificed upon the altar in Israel became
(by means of their respective gifts to God) sharers in the altar.
But how does this Levitical practice apply to
Christians today?
As Paul intimates, the Lord's Evening Meal (1
Corinthians 11:20) is the antitype of the OT peace
offerings. Just as ancient worshipers of God brought
their sacrifices to Jehovah in order to repair a
breach that might have obtained between themselves and God,
so anointed Christians (2 Corinthians 1:21-22; 1 John 2:20, 27)
annually observe the Memorial of Jesus' death
in order to memorialize how God repaired the
figurative breach between God and sinful humanity and
thus fully reconciled humans to Himself.
Anointed Christians share in the antitypical communion
meal by figuratively partaking of Christ's blood (the cup of wine)
and his sacrificed body (the bread). The emblems at the Memorial
are symbols of the reality effectuated by God
through Christ. Yet those who partake of the cup and wine
today nonetheless share with God's altar as they partake
of a meal (in effect) with Jehovah, His High Priest
(Jesus) and other fellow anointed ones (i.e. underpriests).
It is still an inestimable privilege to have a figurative
meal with God. Anointed Christians therefore esteem
the undeserved kindness that has been shown to them
through the Son of God's ransom sacrifice. However,
they are not the only ones who benefit from being
present at the yearly communion meal.
The great crowd of other sheep who possess a hope of
living forever, while not partaking of the emblems and
thus sharing in the altar, still have their
appreciation for Christ's sacrifice deepened as they
listen to the discourse given about Jesus' death and
watch the symbols of his death being passed around the
Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. I thus hope that everyone
attending the Memorial this year reflects on what Christ's death
means in terms of a communion sacrifice. May you all continue to grow
in love and appreciation for Jehovah and His Son.
Brotherly love,
Edgar
Friday, March 21, 2008
Herold Weiss on John 5:17ff
Herold Weiss writes:
"Since the discourse that follows [John 5:18] denies the 'Jewish' understanding of the equality of the Father and the Son, is the 'Jewish' charge that Jesus had broken the sabbath to be taken seriously? I suggest that in John's view the 'Jews' are wrong both in their understanding of the equality of the Father and the Son and of Jesus as a sabbath breaker."
See "The Sabbath in the Fourth Gospel," Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 110, No. 2. (Summer, 1991): 311-321.
Regards,
Edgar
"Since the discourse that follows [John 5:18] denies the 'Jewish' understanding of the equality of the Father and the Son, is the 'Jewish' charge that Jesus had broken the sabbath to be taken seriously? I suggest that in John's view the 'Jews' are wrong both in their understanding of the equality of the Father and the Son and of Jesus as a sabbath breaker."
See "The Sabbath in the Fourth Gospel," Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 110, No. 2. (Summer, 1991): 311-321.
Regards,
Edgar
More on God and Time
The following is taken from a discussion I had with someone on another forum. I have edited some parts of my response in order to improve the sense and clarity of my response. My interlocutor wrote:
[Interlocutor]
The main point I was trying to raise (and I admit my
explnation did
not make this as clear as it could have) was that an
action initiated
in heaven does not correspond to any particular time
on earth.
[Edgar]
This is, at best, speculation, is it not? We have no
immediate experience with the realms above (i.e.
heaven). Therefore, how could we apodictically know
whether an action initiated in heaven failed to
correspond to any specified time here in the realms
below? Nicholas Wolterstorff, in an essay entitled
"God is Everlasting," makes an argument based on his
preferred form of divine cognizance (i.e. divine way
of knowing) that is loosely formulated thus:
(1) No one can know about some temporal event (E) that
it is occurring except when it is occurring.
(2) Before E begins to occur, one cannot know that E
is occurring, for it is not.
(3) After E ceases to occur, one cannot know that it
is occurring, for it is not.
(4) Every case of knowing that E is occurring
therefore seems to be infected by the temporality of
E.
(5) Therefore, the act of knowing about E that it was
occurring and that it is occurring and the act of
knowing about E that it will be occurring are all
infected by the temporality of E.
(6) God (according to Scripture) performs all of these
acts of knowing since He knows what has happened, what
is happening and what will happen. Hence, some of
God's acts (His acts of knowing) are themselves
temporal events. Consequently, God is not timeless.
Now what I have presented is a very compact form of
Wolterstorff's argument. But I think it suffices to
show that what he is arguing is that if God knows about
some temporal event (E) and its occurring, then His
time-strand must (in some respects) correspond to
ours. Moreover, one of the strongest arguments for God's
temporality or sempiternality (in this regard) is the
divine response to prayer, which I may touch on later.
[Interlocutor]
There
is often much confusion because we imagine the
material universe was
created in a preexisting vacuum of space within a
given timeframe in
a preexisting passage of time. This is completely
untrue. Space and
time are part of the material world and until its
creation space and
time did not exist.
[Edgar]
With all due respect, sir, the foregoing
propositions are mere assertions and not arguments.
People generally assume that time and space are only
associated with the material universe. But how do we
really know this idea conforms to reality? Einstein's theory
won't tell us because it does not deal with conditions as they exist
in the spiritual heavenlies.
Subscribing to a positivistic theoretical framework
or Weltanschauung might
convince one that time is not a spiritual phenomenon at all.
But asseverations based on positivistic theories hardly seem convincing
when spiritual realities are the topic of discussion.
I'm still inclined to espouse William Lane Craig's
argument that God must be temporal, if an A-theory of
time (as opposed to a B-theory) is correct.
[Interlocutor]
Many of the supposed contradictions of the
belief in God proposed by nonbelievers (involving
omniscience and
omnipotence) are based upon this confusion and have
led to the "less
than God" version of God proposed in open theism.
However, when we
understand the material categories are not justifiably
applied to the
heavenly realm (doing so implicitly makes God an
object in the material world), the contradictions
vanish. This also means any act initiated in heaven
is not subject to earthly limitations.
[Edgar]
(1) It has yet to be demonstrated that time is a
"material category" only. How does one go about
demonstrating this point logically or scientifically ?
(2) I am a sempiternalist and yet I can assure you
that I do not believe God is "an object in the
material world." God completely transcends the created
cosmos or is antecedently related to it.
Nevertheless, it is possible that time is an
everlasting aspect of God's nature. If so, by creating
the universe in time, the Maker of all things lovingly
permitted rational creaturely essences to share in His
everlasting divine nature.
[Edgar]
In one of his Gedanken,
Einstein mentally explores
the question of relative simultaneity. He uses the
example of a train and lightning striking in the view of
observers on the train. Now, according to Einstein's
theory, if the train is traveling West, then
lightning seems to strike first in the West and then in the
East. On the other hand, if the train is headed
East, the lightning strikes first in the East and then in
the West for the observers. If the train is in a
position of rest, the bolts of lightning seems to
strike simultaneously, in the East and the West.
Therefore, Einstein's theory did not really abolish
the notion of simultaneity altogether. It only says
that a "rigid reference body" or co-ordinate system
must be shared in order for simultaneity to occur.
The train is just such a co-ordinate system. Simultaneity
for Einstein is thus relative and not absolute.
[Interlocutor]
Exactly my point. If there is no absolute
simultinaity on earth, events on earth cannot be
temporally mapped to events in heaven.
[Edgar]
That is a big "if." I tend to prefer Einstein's
interpretation, but I don't know if I buy the no
absolute simultaneity argument ex toto.
At any rate, I think it is wrong-headed to use Einsteinian relativity
to solve the problem of divine timelessness or
temporality.
In "Divine Timelessness and Necessary Existence" (an
article you can find online), William Lane Craig
criticizes one of Brian Leftow's arguments for God's
atemporality based on relativity theory. Here is part
of Craig's rejoinder:
"This argument is, however, unsound. In the first
place, one could dispute the argument on purely
physical grounds alone in that it fails to take
sufficient cognizance of the difference between
coordinate time and parameter time. It is true that
insofar as time plays the role of a coordinate, it is
connected with a system of spatial coordinates, so
that anything to which a temporal coordinate can be
assigned is such that spatial coordinates are
assignable to it as well. But insofar as time
functions as a parameter, it is independent of space,
and something which possesses temporal location and
extension need not be held to exist in space as well
as time. In Newtonian mechanics time plays the role of
a parameter, not a coordinate, and, interestingly, the
same is true of Einstein's formulation of the Special
Theory of Relativity (STR)--the now familiar
space-time formulation derives later from Minkowski.
STR can be validly formulated in either way. Moreover,
since STR is a local theory only, we must, in order to
achieve a global perspective, consider time as it
functions in cosmological models based on the General
Theory of Relativity (GTR), on which matter Leftow is
silent."
[Interlocutor]
When I spoke of "time as we know it", I was not
referring to a
subjective time in the mind of the user but time in
the material
world as a whole. The "as we know it" was used to
underline the fact
that time is material in nature and not separate from
material
reality.
[Edgar]
I did not interpret your "as we know it" statement to
mean you had subjective time in mind. But I was
underlining the fact that we can only (confidently)
speak about our experience with time and it thus seems
somewhat ill-advised to conclude that because our
experience with tempus or xronos is material that all
such experiences must be associated with material
conditions. This is akin to saying that since all
bodies that we know of are fleshly and extended in
space (res extensa)
that a non-fleshly body cannot exist in possible world W1.
Tertullian certainly thought
otherwise and with good reason, I think, in light of
what Paul wrote in 1 Cor 15:42-44.
[Interlocutor]
The verse in Psalm 90 you cited is not intended to
tell us anything
about metaphysics. The phrase speaks of God existing
from
everlasting to everlasting.
[Edgar]
Literally, the phrase says that God is from "time
indefinite to time indefinite" or from boundless time
to boundless time. Gesenius, if I remember correctly,
prefers the definition "hidden time" for olam:
"The commonest word for boundless time is olam;
according to the most widespread and likeliest
explanation the word is derived from alam meaning 'hide, conceal'" (Thorleif Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, page 151).
I agree that the thrust of the writer's words is that
God has always existed and will always exist. But I
believe we miss his general thesis if we weaken the
translation and eviscerate the temporal element in the
text.
[Interlocutor]
The main point I was trying to raise (and I admit my
explnation did
not make this as clear as it could have) was that an
action initiated
in heaven does not correspond to any particular time
on earth.
[Edgar]
This is, at best, speculation, is it not? We have no
immediate experience with the realms above (i.e.
heaven). Therefore, how could we apodictically know
whether an action initiated in heaven failed to
correspond to any specified time here in the realms
below? Nicholas Wolterstorff, in an essay entitled
"God is Everlasting," makes an argument based on his
preferred form of divine cognizance (i.e. divine way
of knowing) that is loosely formulated thus:
(1) No one can know about some temporal event (E) that
it is occurring except when it is occurring.
(2) Before E begins to occur, one cannot know that E
is occurring, for it is not.
(3) After E ceases to occur, one cannot know that it
is occurring, for it is not.
(4) Every case of knowing that E is occurring
therefore seems to be infected by the temporality of
E.
(5) Therefore, the act of knowing about E that it was
occurring and that it is occurring and the act of
knowing about E that it will be occurring are all
infected by the temporality of E.
(6) God (according to Scripture) performs all of these
acts of knowing since He knows what has happened, what
is happening and what will happen. Hence, some of
God's acts (His acts of knowing) are themselves
temporal events. Consequently, God is not timeless.
Now what I have presented is a very compact form of
Wolterstorff's argument. But I think it suffices to
show that what he is arguing is that if God knows about
some temporal event (E) and its occurring, then His
time-strand must (in some respects) correspond to
ours. Moreover, one of the strongest arguments for God's
temporality or sempiternality (in this regard) is the
divine response to prayer, which I may touch on later.
[Interlocutor]
There
is often much confusion because we imagine the
material universe was
created in a preexisting vacuum of space within a
given timeframe in
a preexisting passage of time. This is completely
untrue. Space and
time are part of the material world and until its
creation space and
time did not exist.
[Edgar]
With all due respect, sir, the foregoing
propositions are mere assertions and not arguments.
People generally assume that time and space are only
associated with the material universe. But how do we
really know this idea conforms to reality? Einstein's theory
won't tell us because it does not deal with conditions as they exist
in the spiritual heavenlies.
Subscribing to a positivistic theoretical framework
or Weltanschauung might
convince one that time is not a spiritual phenomenon at all.
But asseverations based on positivistic theories hardly seem convincing
when spiritual realities are the topic of discussion.
I'm still inclined to espouse William Lane Craig's
argument that God must be temporal, if an A-theory of
time (as opposed to a B-theory) is correct.
[Interlocutor]
Many of the supposed contradictions of the
belief in God proposed by nonbelievers (involving
omniscience and
omnipotence) are based upon this confusion and have
led to the "less
than God" version of God proposed in open theism.
However, when we
understand the material categories are not justifiably
applied to the
heavenly realm (doing so implicitly makes God an
object in the material world), the contradictions
vanish. This also means any act initiated in heaven
is not subject to earthly limitations.
[Edgar]
(1) It has yet to be demonstrated that time is a
"material category" only. How does one go about
demonstrating this point logically or scientifically ?
(2) I am a sempiternalist and yet I can assure you
that I do not believe God is "an object in the
material world." God completely transcends the created
cosmos or is antecedently related to it.
Nevertheless, it is possible that time is an
everlasting aspect of God's nature. If so, by creating
the universe in time, the Maker of all things lovingly
permitted rational creaturely essences to share in His
everlasting divine nature.
[Edgar]
In one of his Gedanken,
Einstein mentally explores
the question of relative simultaneity. He uses the
example of a train and lightning striking in the view of
observers on the train. Now, according to Einstein's
theory, if the train is traveling West, then
lightning seems to strike first in the West and then in the
East. On the other hand, if the train is headed
East, the lightning strikes first in the East and then in
the West for the observers. If the train is in a
position of rest, the bolts of lightning seems to
strike simultaneously, in the East and the West.
Therefore, Einstein's theory did not really abolish
the notion of simultaneity altogether. It only says
that a "rigid reference body" or co-ordinate system
must be shared in order for simultaneity to occur.
The train is just such a co-ordinate system. Simultaneity
for Einstein is thus relative and not absolute.
[Interlocutor]
Exactly my point. If there is no absolute
simultinaity on earth, events on earth cannot be
temporally mapped to events in heaven.
[Edgar]
That is a big "if." I tend to prefer Einstein's
interpretation, but I don't know if I buy the no
absolute simultaneity argument ex toto.
At any rate, I think it is wrong-headed to use Einsteinian relativity
to solve the problem of divine timelessness or
temporality.
In "Divine Timelessness and Necessary Existence" (an
article you can find online), William Lane Craig
criticizes one of Brian Leftow's arguments for God's
atemporality based on relativity theory. Here is part
of Craig's rejoinder:
"This argument is, however, unsound. In the first
place, one could dispute the argument on purely
physical grounds alone in that it fails to take
sufficient cognizance of the difference between
coordinate time and parameter time. It is true that
insofar as time plays the role of a coordinate, it is
connected with a system of spatial coordinates, so
that anything to which a temporal coordinate can be
assigned is such that spatial coordinates are
assignable to it as well. But insofar as time
functions as a parameter, it is independent of space,
and something which possesses temporal location and
extension need not be held to exist in space as well
as time. In Newtonian mechanics time plays the role of
a parameter, not a coordinate, and, interestingly, the
same is true of Einstein's formulation of the Special
Theory of Relativity (STR)--the now familiar
space-time formulation derives later from Minkowski.
STR can be validly formulated in either way. Moreover,
since STR is a local theory only, we must, in order to
achieve a global perspective, consider time as it
functions in cosmological models based on the General
Theory of Relativity (GTR), on which matter Leftow is
silent."
[Interlocutor]
When I spoke of "time as we know it", I was not
referring to a
subjective time in the mind of the user but time in
the material
world as a whole. The "as we know it" was used to
underline the fact
that time is material in nature and not separate from
material
reality.
[Edgar]
I did not interpret your "as we know it" statement to
mean you had subjective time in mind. But I was
underlining the fact that we can only (confidently)
speak about our experience with time and it thus seems
somewhat ill-advised to conclude that because our
experience with tempus or xronos is material that all
such experiences must be associated with material
conditions. This is akin to saying that since all
bodies that we know of are fleshly and extended in
space (res extensa)
that a non-fleshly body cannot exist in possible world W1.
Tertullian certainly thought
otherwise and with good reason, I think, in light of
what Paul wrote in 1 Cor 15:42-44.
[Interlocutor]
The verse in Psalm 90 you cited is not intended to
tell us anything
about metaphysics. The phrase speaks of God existing
from
everlasting to everlasting.
[Edgar]
Literally, the phrase says that God is from "time
indefinite to time indefinite" or from boundless time
to boundless time. Gesenius, if I remember correctly,
prefers the definition "hidden time" for olam:
"The commonest word for boundless time is olam;
according to the most widespread and likeliest
explanation the word is derived from alam meaning 'hide, conceal'" (Thorleif Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, page 151).
I agree that the thrust of the writer's words is that
God has always existed and will always exist. But I
believe we miss his general thesis if we weaken the
translation and eviscerate the temporal element in the
text.
Thursday, March 20, 2008
The Trinity Doctrine and Personhood: An Outline
I. Trinity Doctrine and Ethics
A. God is supposedly three persons in one substance (i.e. Father, Son and Holy Spirit).
B. The term "person" is used analogically (i.e. God is both like and unlike human persons) when one applies it to God. God does not have a body or God has intuitive rather than discursive knowledge.
II. What "Person" Means when Applied to God
A. The modern conception of person implies a distinct center of consciousness (e.g. Rene Descartes' cogito ergo sum).
B. This usage becomes problematic when one speaks of the divine persons in terms of distinct centers of consciousness. The terminology then implies tritheism (the belief in three gods). Yet, to speak of one center of consciousness obtaining in the triune Godhead implies modalism (= God reveals Godself in three successive modes), not Trinitarianism.
C. In any event, Trinitarians argue that one needs to avoid defining "person" (in this case) as a distinct center of consciousness or rationality. Some other definition must be more suitable.
III. Definitions of "Person" for God
A. Boethius (circa 475-525 CE): "an individual substance of a rational nature" (rationalis naturae individua substantia).
B. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) contends that the term "person" when applied to God does refer to "an individual substance of a rational nature" (rationalis naturae individua substantia) as long as one carefully nuances or qualifies what is meant by "individual" (i.e. incommunicable) "rational" (non-discursive, but intellectual) and "substance" ('self-grounded existing'). Aquinas views God as ipsum esse or self-subsistent being.
C. Richard of St. Victor (died 1173) defines "person" (in relation to God) as "an incommunicable existence of the divine nature." Persons have a certain property that distinguishes them from other persons (Fortman, The Triune God, 191-192).
D. Some believe that the Trinity doctrine possibly helps us to understand what personhood entails. Maybe a "person" is an individual substance of a rational nature, one who either actually reasons or who has the potential to deploy reason (i.e. the faculty of inference or intelligence). The term "persons" may also have reference to entities that intelligently relate to one another as Father, Son and Holy Spirit putatively relate to one another in the Godhead.
E. But one difficulty with the Trinity doctrine concerns the problem of identity. For instance, consider the following set of propositions:
(1) The Father is God.
(2) The Son is God.
(3) The Holy Spirit is God.
(4) The Father is not the Son.
Number (4) appears to be inconsistent with propositions 1-3. Let us also consider this example using the planet Venus:
(a) Venus is the morning star.
(b) Venus is the evening star.
(c) The morning star is not the evening star.
To solve this apparent difficulty, certain Trinitarians appeal to the concept of relative (rather than absolute) identity. The definition of absolute identity = "X = Y → Y = X"; relative identity = "X and Y are the same F but not the same G," where F and G are both predicates. Hence, the Father or the Son are not absolutely identical to "God," but only relatively identical to the divine substance. One question remains, however. Does relative identity actually resolve the putative tensions obtaining between the Trinity doctrine and absolute identity?
F. Another seeming difficulty with using the Trinity doctrine to determine what it means to be a person might also be the fact that God's purported triunity seems to transcend our phenomenal experiences (a Kantian argument). Whether God is triune or not appears to be noumenal concern, not a phenomenal one. God's triune nature just might be thinkable but not knowable like Kant's Dinge-an-sich.
A. God is supposedly three persons in one substance (i.e. Father, Son and Holy Spirit).
B. The term "person" is used analogically (i.e. God is both like and unlike human persons) when one applies it to God. God does not have a body or God has intuitive rather than discursive knowledge.
II. What "Person" Means when Applied to God
A. The modern conception of person implies a distinct center of consciousness (e.g. Rene Descartes' cogito ergo sum).
B. This usage becomes problematic when one speaks of the divine persons in terms of distinct centers of consciousness. The terminology then implies tritheism (the belief in three gods). Yet, to speak of one center of consciousness obtaining in the triune Godhead implies modalism (= God reveals Godself in three successive modes), not Trinitarianism.
C. In any event, Trinitarians argue that one needs to avoid defining "person" (in this case) as a distinct center of consciousness or rationality. Some other definition must be more suitable.
III. Definitions of "Person" for God
A. Boethius (circa 475-525 CE): "an individual substance of a rational nature" (rationalis naturae individua substantia).
B. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) contends that the term "person" when applied to God does refer to "an individual substance of a rational nature" (rationalis naturae individua substantia) as long as one carefully nuances or qualifies what is meant by "individual" (i.e. incommunicable) "rational" (non-discursive, but intellectual) and "substance" ('self-grounded existing'). Aquinas views God as ipsum esse or self-subsistent being.
C. Richard of St. Victor (died 1173) defines "person" (in relation to God) as "an incommunicable existence of the divine nature." Persons have a certain property that distinguishes them from other persons (Fortman, The Triune God, 191-192).
D. Some believe that the Trinity doctrine possibly helps us to understand what personhood entails. Maybe a "person" is an individual substance of a rational nature, one who either actually reasons or who has the potential to deploy reason (i.e. the faculty of inference or intelligence). The term "persons" may also have reference to entities that intelligently relate to one another as Father, Son and Holy Spirit putatively relate to one another in the Godhead.
E. But one difficulty with the Trinity doctrine concerns the problem of identity. For instance, consider the following set of propositions:
(1) The Father is God.
(2) The Son is God.
(3) The Holy Spirit is God.
(4) The Father is not the Son.
Number (4) appears to be inconsistent with propositions 1-3. Let us also consider this example using the planet Venus:
(a) Venus is the morning star.
(b) Venus is the evening star.
(c) The morning star is not the evening star.
To solve this apparent difficulty, certain Trinitarians appeal to the concept of relative (rather than absolute) identity. The definition of absolute identity = "X = Y → Y = X"; relative identity = "X and Y are the same F but not the same G," where F and G are both predicates. Hence, the Father or the Son are not absolutely identical to "God," but only relatively identical to the divine substance. One question remains, however. Does relative identity actually resolve the putative tensions obtaining between the Trinity doctrine and absolute identity?
F. Another seeming difficulty with using the Trinity doctrine to determine what it means to be a person might also be the fact that God's purported triunity seems to transcend our phenomenal experiences (a Kantian argument). Whether God is triune or not appears to be noumenal concern, not a phenomenal one. God's triune nature just might be thinkable but not knowable like Kant's Dinge-an-sich.
Monday, March 17, 2008
Smile, Everything is Getting Better. Not!
This story can be found in its entirety at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080317/ap_on_bi_ge/oil_prices
By JOHN WILEN, AP Business Writer 2 hours, 11 minutes ago
NEW YORK - Oil prices fell sharply Monday, pulling back at least temporarily from record levels as investors feared that the financial crisis that forced the sale of Bear Stearns Cos. is a sign of deep economic troubles.
Crude's plunge came even as diesel prices rose to a new record above $4 a gallon, and gas prices remained high. Diesel, used to transport the vast majority of the nation's goods, rose 1.3 cents to a national average of $4.002 a gallon Monday, according to AAA and the Oil Price Information Service. The national average price of a gallon of gas, meanwhile, dipped slightly to $3.283 a gallon, but remains 73 cents higher than a year ago.
Oil's steep decline — falling $4.17 to $106.04 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange — came hours after futures rose to a new trading high of $111.80 on the Federal Reserve's surprise Sunday move to lower a key interest rate by a quarter point. In the past several months, Fed rate cuts have fueled rallies in oil prices.
Crude futures offer a hedge against a falling dollar, and oil futures bought and sold in dollars are more attractive to foreign investors when the dollar is weak. Interest rate cuts, and even the prospect of future cuts, tend to weaken the dollar further.
But the mass selling Monday — despite the Fed's Sunday rate cut, the prospect of another cut at the Fed's regular Tuesday meeting, and the fact that the dollar dropped to new lows against the euro on Monday — could be a sign that the oil market's momentum has turned negative, analysts say.
"People are saying, well, things are a lot worse than we thought," said Phil Flynn, an analyst at Alaron Trading Corp. in Chicago.
By JOHN WILEN, AP Business Writer 2 hours, 11 minutes ago
NEW YORK - Oil prices fell sharply Monday, pulling back at least temporarily from record levels as investors feared that the financial crisis that forced the sale of Bear Stearns Cos. is a sign of deep economic troubles.
Crude's plunge came even as diesel prices rose to a new record above $4 a gallon, and gas prices remained high. Diesel, used to transport the vast majority of the nation's goods, rose 1.3 cents to a national average of $4.002 a gallon Monday, according to AAA and the Oil Price Information Service. The national average price of a gallon of gas, meanwhile, dipped slightly to $3.283 a gallon, but remains 73 cents higher than a year ago.
Oil's steep decline — falling $4.17 to $106.04 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange — came hours after futures rose to a new trading high of $111.80 on the Federal Reserve's surprise Sunday move to lower a key interest rate by a quarter point. In the past several months, Fed rate cuts have fueled rallies in oil prices.
Crude futures offer a hedge against a falling dollar, and oil futures bought and sold in dollars are more attractive to foreign investors when the dollar is weak. Interest rate cuts, and even the prospect of future cuts, tend to weaken the dollar further.
But the mass selling Monday — despite the Fed's Sunday rate cut, the prospect of another cut at the Fed's regular Tuesday meeting, and the fact that the dollar dropped to new lows against the euro on Monday — could be a sign that the oil market's momentum has turned negative, analysts say.
"People are saying, well, things are a lot worse than we thought," said Phil Flynn, an analyst at Alaron Trading Corp. in Chicago.
Friday, March 14, 2008
Geza Vermes-Part II
This post is so long that I'm starting another thread. The following remarks constitute my final word on this subject for now. I will then reply to the questions about time. But my time is limited. Therefore, I'll let Jason have the last word on the Vermes' subject. I've made a clear distinction below in terms of my remarks and Jason's.
Hello Jason:
[Jason]
Regarding John 5:18, I am failing to see how your responses answer the question as to how Jesus' first century Jewish opponents managed to construe (whether rightly or wrongly is besides the point) His statement in John 5:17 as a claim to equality with God if Geza Vermes is correct that first century Jews had no concept of any such thing as natural divine sonship? If Vermes is correct would it not follow then that it would have been contrary to their categories of thought for them to have taken Jesus' statement as affirming something more than a claim to be at the very most either the Messiah or to having pre-existed as a created angel?
[Edgar]
I do not agree that a possible misconstrual of Jesus' words is tangential. But (to answer your question) Vermes does not say that the first century Jews had no concept of "natural divine sonship." He writes that a Jew would not have applied the noun phrase "son of God" to the offspring of deities, defied kings or to apotheosized rulers; moreover, he argues that Jews understood the phrase "son of God" to be metaphorical-a term that Vermes does not define but the context of his statement indicates that the speaker meaning of the term "metaphor" does not simply refer to rhetorical tropes or to conceptual domains (as that term is understood in cognitive semantics).
[Jason]
However, if Jesus' response in the verses which follow John 5:18 was intended for the purpose of clarifying that He was not breaking the Sabbath and that He was not calling God His own Father in such a way that would entail His being in some sense equal with God, then it would seem to me that He did a very poor job of expressing Himself here. For, given the conclusion His opponents drew from what He said in John 5:17, why would they be less inclined to take the words: "the Son can do nothing of his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing" as an affimation that the Son has no will or operation of His own distinct and independent from that of that Father, and is therefore essentially inseparable from the Father? (Certainly, the angels can do things of their own accord: if they were not able to do so, how could it be that some of them have sinned?)
[Edgar]
I don't think you want to say that Christ was actually "making himself" equal to God. Christ legitimately would have been considered a blasphemer by making himself equal to God: "In rabbinic teaching a rebellious son is said to make himself equal [with] his Father (Lightfoot). Breaking the Law concerning the Sabbath was serious, but claiming God as his own Father was blasphemy" (Cleon L. Rogers, Jr. and Cleon L. Rogers III, The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament, p. 193). If Jesus was/is equal to God, I don't think that the writer of the Fourth Gospel desires to portray him as making himself equal to the Father. Additionally, it is important not to read post-4th century meanings into 1st century texts. Jesus was not necessarily stating that he had no will or operation of his own in the sense that you ascribe to him.
In The Christology of the Fourth Gospel, Paul N. Anderson (pp. 3, 267) observes that Jesus is asserting that he "can do nothing on his own authority" or is "totally dependent" on his Father. For Anderson, John 5:19 is a Johannine "subordinationist" passage; in other words, Christ is evidently stating that he does not have the ability (OU DUNATAI) or authority to act on his own initiative. He is not suggesting that he could never act on his own. Such an understanding of the text is much too strong and misrepresents the intentional (i.e. pragmatic) meaning of Jesus' words. Moreover, when Jesus says that he does that which he beholds the Father doing, hA (in the Greek text) is delimited by the context. In particular, the things that Jesus' Father does have to do with sustaining the creation: hA does not refer to all things in an absolute sense. A. T. Robertson also offers these remarks:
"Can do nothing by himself (OU DUNATAI POIEIN AF' hEAUTOU OUDEN). True in a sense of every man, but in a much deeper sense of Christ because of the intimate relation between him and the Father. See this same point in Joh_5:30; Joh_7:28; Joh_8:28; Joh_14:10. Jesus had already made it in Joh_5:17. Now he repeats and defends it" (Word Pictures).
[Jason]
"...whatever [the Father] does, that the Son does likewise." Interpretation: Just as the Father "works" on the Sabbath, not being bound to keep it, so also the Son works on the Sabbath, not being bound to keep it either. There is nothing that the Father can do that the Son also cannot do: Claim to equality of power with God."
[Edgar]
The Son is Lord of the Sabbath (Matthew 12:1-8). Hence, he could probably labor on the Sabbath--doing God's work--without being considered a violator of this sacred day (Genesis 2:2-3). However, Jesus did not limit working on the Sabbath to the Father or himself. He demonstrated that works of mercy could be performed on the Sabbath by devout Jews or by men accomplishing God's will like the Levitical priests of old or men such as his ancestor David. Christ had been given the authority to work on the Sabbath by his Father (John 5:20-22). Without being given that authority, the Son would objectively have been a blasphemer.
[Jason]
Why would they not conclude from the words in John 5:21 that Jesus is asserting an equality of authority with God, making the giving of life just as dependent upon His will as it is dependent upon the Father's will? From verse 22, they could easily misconstrue Jesus' words as a claim that the Father has relinquished His own authority in giving it to the Son, leading to the charge that Jesus was claiming to be in at least one respect actually greater than God. Why would they not charge him with claiming to be worthy of equal honor with God, in view of the statement in verse 23: "that all may honor the Son, EVEN AS they honor the Father"? Finally, verse 26: The very unoriginated life of Father is communicated by the Father to the Son, and thus the Son has the same unoriginated life equally with the Father.
[Edgar]
John does not tell us how the Jews reacted to the rest of Jesus' words in chapter five of the Fourth Gospel. It is a little difficult to make an argument from silence. But none of what Jesus says in John 5 has to be interpreted as you suggest. While God (YHWH) is the one who grants life to men of all sorts (1 Samuel 2:6; Psalm 36:9), it is nonetheless his prerogative to allow others to perform resurrections or bring others back to life (e.g. God used Elijah and Elisha to bestow life on others) by means of the Holy Spirit. Luke relates that Christ was able to perform miracles or heal others because he was anointed with Holy Spirit and power (Luke 10:38). Christ resurrected others in his capacity as Messiah (Isaiah 11:1-5). As for John 5:23, compare John 6:57; 17:20-22. With all due respect, it seems that you are reading Nicene Christology into John 5:26. The context of 5:26 does not indicate that God has communicated his "unoriginated life" to his Son. What is at issue is bringing humans back to life by means of a resurrection; what is not at issue is God communicating his unoriginated life to the Son. See the chapter on aseity in my work Christology and the Trinity.
[Jason]
It would seem to me that the most natural reading of John 5:19-26 is that Jesus is affirming that as the Son of God He is not only equal but also identical with the Father in every respect EXCEPT that of being unoriginated. (I do not accept the implied interpretation of John 14:28 in the Athanasian Creed as being adequate to account for Jesus' statement about the Father being greater than the Son. Following Alexander, Athanasius, Hilary, Chrysostom, and the Cappadocians, I hold that the Father is eternally greater than the Son in that He alone is Unoriginated and in that He is the Cause of the Son's existence.)
[Edgar]
The text cannot bear the weight that you're assigning to it: John did not wear 4th century doctrinal lenses. Why not try appealing to the grammar or historical circumstances of the text? Jesus does not claim (ontological) equality with God nor does he imply that he is identical with the Father in every respect (ontologically) with the exception of being unoriginated (John 5:28-30; 17:3).
[Jason]
In view of Heb. 1:5, how can you maintain that Jesus is the Son of God in the same sense as the angels are? Does not 'only-begotten' imply 'without brothers or sisters' so that, even if Jesus' sonship were metaphorical, it would still have to be a category of metaphorical sonship unique to Him?
[Edgar]
I've addressed Hebrews 1:5 in my book Christology and the Trinity. As for the term "only-begotten" (MONOGENHS), there is much debate concerning its semantics. Does it mean "unique, one-of-a-king" or "only" or the only child born to X or Y? Without getting into that debate now, for which I recommend BDAG Greek-English Lexicon as a good start. Suffice it to say that "without brothers or sisters" is not a definition per se of MONOGENHS. For how the term is used in the LXX, see Genesis 22:2, 12, Judges 11:34 and see Ps. Solomon 18:4.
[Jason]
In all of Luke 3:23-38 the term 'son' occurs but once, it being understood only by implication after its initial occurence. Since this is the case, how can its definition change in verse 38? Does this not necessitate understanding Luke 3:23-38 (as opposed to Matt. 1 which due to the word beget can only be taken as a biological genealogy) as giving a 'legal' genealogy, so that one and the same definition of the term 'son' can be consistently applied all throughout the passage, including its final statement? Doesn't the genealogy in Gen. 5 appear to purposely avoid speaking of Adam as being 'begotten' by God?
[Edgar]
Are you insisting that Luke means to imply that God is the literal father of Adam in Luke 3:38? Is that what you really want to say here? My point was merely that the term "son" can be employed metaphorically. I also appealed to the book of Job, where the angels seem to be called "sons of God" as well (Job 38:1-7, etc.). I believe that there is a different contextual setting in Genesis 5:1ff. Notice how the term "Adam" is used in the first two verses of that chapter. The first pentateuchal work also concentrates on who begat whom; it does not employ the understood term "son" throughout the text.
[Jason]
Given the inherent nature of poetry, it is not surprising that the term 'born' would be used in place of the more accurate 'made' or 'created' in Ps. 90:2 in reference to the origin of the mountains? (But is not the expression itself 'before the mountains' a metaphor for 'from olam', so that the literal origin of literal mountains is not directly in view here?) Are there any non-poetic passages in Scripture in which 'made' or 'created' can justifiably be substituted for 'born' or 'begotten'?
[Edgar]
Why should we construe "before the mountains" as a metaphor? What contextual indicators suggest that we have a metaphor in this psalm? I don't see why the writer would not have literal mountains in mind since we read: "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world . . . (KJV). For uses of "born" for "created," see Genesis 2:4 (consult the Hebrew text); Deuteronomy 32:6, 18; Psalm 7:14 (RSV); Proverbs 27:1; Isaiah 33:11; Zephaniah 2:2 (YLT). See Gesenius' Hebrew-Chaldee Lexicon and BDB Lexicon.
Hello Jason:
[Jason]
Regarding John 5:18, I am failing to see how your responses answer the question as to how Jesus' first century Jewish opponents managed to construe (whether rightly or wrongly is besides the point) His statement in John 5:17 as a claim to equality with God if Geza Vermes is correct that first century Jews had no concept of any such thing as natural divine sonship? If Vermes is correct would it not follow then that it would have been contrary to their categories of thought for them to have taken Jesus' statement as affirming something more than a claim to be at the very most either the Messiah or to having pre-existed as a created angel?
[Edgar]
I do not agree that a possible misconstrual of Jesus' words is tangential. But (to answer your question) Vermes does not say that the first century Jews had no concept of "natural divine sonship." He writes that a Jew would not have applied the noun phrase "son of God" to the offspring of deities, defied kings or to apotheosized rulers; moreover, he argues that Jews understood the phrase "son of God" to be metaphorical-a term that Vermes does not define but the context of his statement indicates that the speaker meaning of the term "metaphor" does not simply refer to rhetorical tropes or to conceptual domains (as that term is understood in cognitive semantics).
[Jason]
However, if Jesus' response in the verses which follow John 5:18 was intended for the purpose of clarifying that He was not breaking the Sabbath and that He was not calling God His own Father in such a way that would entail His being in some sense equal with God, then it would seem to me that He did a very poor job of expressing Himself here. For, given the conclusion His opponents drew from what He said in John 5:17, why would they be less inclined to take the words: "the Son can do nothing of his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing" as an affimation that the Son has no will or operation of His own distinct and independent from that of that Father, and is therefore essentially inseparable from the Father? (Certainly, the angels can do things of their own accord: if they were not able to do so, how could it be that some of them have sinned?)
[Edgar]
I don't think you want to say that Christ was actually "making himself" equal to God. Christ legitimately would have been considered a blasphemer by making himself equal to God: "In rabbinic teaching a rebellious son is said to make himself equal [with] his Father (Lightfoot). Breaking the Law concerning the Sabbath was serious, but claiming God as his own Father was blasphemy" (Cleon L. Rogers, Jr. and Cleon L. Rogers III, The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament, p. 193). If Jesus was/is equal to God, I don't think that the writer of the Fourth Gospel desires to portray him as making himself equal to the Father. Additionally, it is important not to read post-4th century meanings into 1st century texts. Jesus was not necessarily stating that he had no will or operation of his own in the sense that you ascribe to him.
In The Christology of the Fourth Gospel, Paul N. Anderson (pp. 3, 267) observes that Jesus is asserting that he "can do nothing on his own authority" or is "totally dependent" on his Father. For Anderson, John 5:19 is a Johannine "subordinationist" passage; in other words, Christ is evidently stating that he does not have the ability (OU DUNATAI) or authority to act on his own initiative. He is not suggesting that he could never act on his own. Such an understanding of the text is much too strong and misrepresents the intentional (i.e. pragmatic) meaning of Jesus' words. Moreover, when Jesus says that he does that which he beholds the Father doing, hA (in the Greek text) is delimited by the context. In particular, the things that Jesus' Father does have to do with sustaining the creation: hA does not refer to all things in an absolute sense. A. T. Robertson also offers these remarks:
"Can do nothing by himself (OU DUNATAI POIEIN AF' hEAUTOU OUDEN). True in a sense of every man, but in a much deeper sense of Christ because of the intimate relation between him and the Father. See this same point in Joh_5:30; Joh_7:28; Joh_8:28; Joh_14:10. Jesus had already made it in Joh_5:17. Now he repeats and defends it" (Word Pictures).
[Jason]
"...whatever [the Father] does, that the Son does likewise." Interpretation: Just as the Father "works" on the Sabbath, not being bound to keep it, so also the Son works on the Sabbath, not being bound to keep it either. There is nothing that the Father can do that the Son also cannot do: Claim to equality of power with God."
[Edgar]
The Son is Lord of the Sabbath (Matthew 12:1-8). Hence, he could probably labor on the Sabbath--doing God's work--without being considered a violator of this sacred day (Genesis 2:2-3). However, Jesus did not limit working on the Sabbath to the Father or himself. He demonstrated that works of mercy could be performed on the Sabbath by devout Jews or by men accomplishing God's will like the Levitical priests of old or men such as his ancestor David. Christ had been given the authority to work on the Sabbath by his Father (John 5:20-22). Without being given that authority, the Son would objectively have been a blasphemer.
[Jason]
Why would they not conclude from the words in John 5:21 that Jesus is asserting an equality of authority with God, making the giving of life just as dependent upon His will as it is dependent upon the Father's will? From verse 22, they could easily misconstrue Jesus' words as a claim that the Father has relinquished His own authority in giving it to the Son, leading to the charge that Jesus was claiming to be in at least one respect actually greater than God. Why would they not charge him with claiming to be worthy of equal honor with God, in view of the statement in verse 23: "that all may honor the Son, EVEN AS they honor the Father"? Finally, verse 26: The very unoriginated life of Father is communicated by the Father to the Son, and thus the Son has the same unoriginated life equally with the Father.
[Edgar]
John does not tell us how the Jews reacted to the rest of Jesus' words in chapter five of the Fourth Gospel. It is a little difficult to make an argument from silence. But none of what Jesus says in John 5 has to be interpreted as you suggest. While God (YHWH) is the one who grants life to men of all sorts (1 Samuel 2:6; Psalm 36:9), it is nonetheless his prerogative to allow others to perform resurrections or bring others back to life (e.g. God used Elijah and Elisha to bestow life on others) by means of the Holy Spirit. Luke relates that Christ was able to perform miracles or heal others because he was anointed with Holy Spirit and power (Luke 10:38). Christ resurrected others in his capacity as Messiah (Isaiah 11:1-5). As for John 5:23, compare John 6:57; 17:20-22. With all due respect, it seems that you are reading Nicene Christology into John 5:26. The context of 5:26 does not indicate that God has communicated his "unoriginated life" to his Son. What is at issue is bringing humans back to life by means of a resurrection; what is not at issue is God communicating his unoriginated life to the Son. See the chapter on aseity in my work Christology and the Trinity.
[Jason]
It would seem to me that the most natural reading of John 5:19-26 is that Jesus is affirming that as the Son of God He is not only equal but also identical with the Father in every respect EXCEPT that of being unoriginated. (I do not accept the implied interpretation of John 14:28 in the Athanasian Creed as being adequate to account for Jesus' statement about the Father being greater than the Son. Following Alexander, Athanasius, Hilary, Chrysostom, and the Cappadocians, I hold that the Father is eternally greater than the Son in that He alone is Unoriginated and in that He is the Cause of the Son's existence.)
[Edgar]
The text cannot bear the weight that you're assigning to it: John did not wear 4th century doctrinal lenses. Why not try appealing to the grammar or historical circumstances of the text? Jesus does not claim (ontological) equality with God nor does he imply that he is identical with the Father in every respect (ontologically) with the exception of being unoriginated (John 5:28-30; 17:3).
[Jason]
In view of Heb. 1:5, how can you maintain that Jesus is the Son of God in the same sense as the angels are? Does not 'only-begotten' imply 'without brothers or sisters' so that, even if Jesus' sonship were metaphorical, it would still have to be a category of metaphorical sonship unique to Him?
[Edgar]
I've addressed Hebrews 1:5 in my book Christology and the Trinity. As for the term "only-begotten" (MONOGENHS), there is much debate concerning its semantics. Does it mean "unique, one-of-a-king" or "only" or the only child born to X or Y? Without getting into that debate now, for which I recommend BDAG Greek-English Lexicon as a good start. Suffice it to say that "without brothers or sisters" is not a definition per se of MONOGENHS. For how the term is used in the LXX, see Genesis 22:2, 12, Judges 11:34 and see Ps. Solomon 18:4.
[Jason]
In all of Luke 3:23-38 the term 'son' occurs but once, it being understood only by implication after its initial occurence. Since this is the case, how can its definition change in verse 38? Does this not necessitate understanding Luke 3:23-38 (as opposed to Matt. 1 which due to the word beget can only be taken as a biological genealogy) as giving a 'legal' genealogy, so that one and the same definition of the term 'son' can be consistently applied all throughout the passage, including its final statement? Doesn't the genealogy in Gen. 5 appear to purposely avoid speaking of Adam as being 'begotten' by God?
[Edgar]
Are you insisting that Luke means to imply that God is the literal father of Adam in Luke 3:38? Is that what you really want to say here? My point was merely that the term "son" can be employed metaphorically. I also appealed to the book of Job, where the angels seem to be called "sons of God" as well (Job 38:1-7, etc.). I believe that there is a different contextual setting in Genesis 5:1ff. Notice how the term "Adam" is used in the first two verses of that chapter. The first pentateuchal work also concentrates on who begat whom; it does not employ the understood term "son" throughout the text.
[Jason]
Given the inherent nature of poetry, it is not surprising that the term 'born' would be used in place of the more accurate 'made' or 'created' in Ps. 90:2 in reference to the origin of the mountains? (But is not the expression itself 'before the mountains' a metaphor for 'from olam', so that the literal origin of literal mountains is not directly in view here?) Are there any non-poetic passages in Scripture in which 'made' or 'created' can justifiably be substituted for 'born' or 'begotten'?
[Edgar]
Why should we construe "before the mountains" as a metaphor? What contextual indicators suggest that we have a metaphor in this psalm? I don't see why the writer would not have literal mountains in mind since we read: "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world . . . (KJV). For uses of "born" for "created," see Genesis 2:4 (consult the Hebrew text); Deuteronomy 32:6, 18; Psalm 7:14 (RSV); Proverbs 27:1; Isaiah 33:11; Zephaniah 2:2 (YLT). See Gesenius' Hebrew-Chaldee Lexicon and BDB Lexicon.
Wednesday, March 12, 2008
Reply to Jason on Time and God
Jason posted some thoughts at the evangelicals and jws yahoogroup. I wish to interact with some of his remarks.
[Jason]
At one time I also conceived of God's eternal
existence in terms of 'unbounded temporality'.
Whereas I now speak of God (and His Son) as being
'ageless', back then I spoke of God (and His Son) as
having an 'infinite age.' The transition from
thinking in terms of 'unbounded temporality' to
'timelessness' occured for me through the realization
that God's 'age' is a constant; it always remains the
same; it does not increase with the passing of time;
and so, also, it is indivisible. Whatever the correct
answer is to the question: 'How old is God?' the exact
same answer will still be true ten minutes, ten years,
or ten thousand years from now. (Infinity + 1 =
Infinity; Infinity + 2 = Infinity; ect.)
[Edgar]
Job 36:26 states: "How great is God—beyond our understanding!
The number of his years is past finding out (NIV)."
Most theologians would probably contend that the language used in Job is metaphorical. God literally does not have years that can be counted, even AD INFINITUM. One might reason that the author of Job is employing poetic turns of phrase. While there is probably the use of metaphor or poetic imagery in Job, I believe that it might make sense to speak of God's "years" in terms of his infinite or boundless existence. Talk of infinity quickly becomes problematic. Aristotle makes a distinction between a potential and actual infinite. He argues that the former may exist, but the latter most assuredly does not for the very reason that Jason states (among other reasons). Since it is possible to successively add numbers AD INFINITUM, Aristotle suggests that potential infinites exist. However, actual [quantitative] infinites do not exist. I would thus content that God's "age" cannot constitute an actual quantitative infinite. At best, the "years" of God represent a potential infinite that can be counted potentially AD INFINITUM.
[Jason]
By reflecting further on this, I came to the
conclusion that God exists both 'independently' of
time (for his 'age' is unaffected by the passing of
time) and 'within' every individual moment of time
'simultaneously' and 'ever-presently' (for, whereas
infinity is indivisible, and the 'present' - i.e., the
unmeasurable, elusive 'instant' of time that 'now' is
- is also indivisible, the past and the future are, by
contrast, divisible, so that what is temporally
indivisible cannot have a past or a future distinct
from its 'present' existence). In other words, I
believe that God is both 'timeless' and 'temporally
omnipresent'. I also hold that it not despite God's
timelessness that He is temporally omnipresent, but
rather that it is precisely because of His
timelessness that He is able to be simultaneously
ever-present in every individual moment of time. I
believe that the one implies the other, and that,
therefore, the question as to how a timeless God can
act in time has no force as an argument against the
position that God is timeless and ageless. I do
believe, however, that the question: 'How can a
time-bound God know the future free actions of His
creatures?" does present a major difficulty for the
'unbounded temporality' conception of God's eternity.
For, I believe that the Scriptures teach both the
omniscience of God (which I understand is denied by
Open Theists and Jehovah's Witnesses) and the free
will of rational creatures.
[Edgar]
PACE Jason's position, I submit that the foregoing account that he has presented is a confused delineation of God's temporality or His atemporality. It seems to me that one cannot have it both ways. Either God is atemporal or God is temporal (i.e. sempiternal). It is confusing to posit both that God is timeless and within time. Nelson Pike and Stephen T. Davis argue that a timeless God has neither temporal location (it does not make sense to posit a "before" or "after" of a timeless being) nor temporal extension (a timeless being does not have any duration). Yet, it seems that anything existing within time does have duration of some kind such that it makes sense to say that a temporal entity has lived for 80 years or existed during the entire tenure of the Bush administration. See Davis, Logic and the Nature of God, pp. 10-24.
I'm not going to enter into a discussion of God's foreknowledge and free will now. I believe that this question has already been addressed on the evangelicals and jws board.
[Jason]
Regarding Ps. 90:2, I think that the 'unbounded
temporality' interpretation would be more convincing
if the verse had said: "from olam you have (always)
been God and to olam you will (continue to) be God."
As the text stands however, with its present tense
verb 'are' I believe supports the 'timelessness'
interpretation by way of affirming God's 'temporal
omnipresence'. Don't you think it would be an odd
manner of expression if I were to state: 'from 1977 to
2008, I am Jason'?
[Edgar]
First, I believe that the lexical semantics of the text (i.e. the meaning of words used in a text) are on the side of those who believe in an limitlessly temporal or sempiternal God. OLAM can mean hidden or concealed time, that is, concealed from the standpoint of the present. In the case of God, it most certainly does not refer to God's timelessness. Second, you are placing the verb of the text in the wrong place. Psalm 90:2 actually says "from OLAM to OLAM, you ARE God." The writer is not attempting to tell us that God IS from OLAM to OLAM per se. The verb should be construed with the words "you" and "god." Do you see the difference regarding where one places the verb in the text?
To conclude, I offer some observations from Dr. Allan Padgett:
"the OT knows nothing of a timeless God in the Boethian sense” (God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, p. 29).
Padgett even makes the stronger claim that "the Bible knows nothing of an absolute timeless divine eternity" (p. 35). He settles for what he calls "relative divine timelessness" which he admits the Bible does not explicitly teach. Yet, Padgett believes that his view is compatible with biblical statements about God's "eternity" (OLAM) or everlasting nature.
Padgett also writes:
"The everlasting (or at best relatively timeless) nature of God's eternity has been clearly implied in Ps. 90:2,Isa. 40:28, 41:4, 43:10, and 44:6; while Isa. 48:3 allows any view. Eccl. 3:11, too, will not support an absolute timelessness. Thus Schmidt's thesis that the OT supports a Boethian understanding of non-durational timeless eternity cannot be maintained. We can conclude with the vast majority of scholars that Yahweh is understood by OT writers to be everlasting, or at best 'timeless' in a relative sense" (God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time, p. 29).
Best regards,
Edgar
[Jason]
At one time I also conceived of God's eternal
existence in terms of 'unbounded temporality'.
Whereas I now speak of God (and His Son) as being
'ageless', back then I spoke of God (and His Son) as
having an 'infinite age.' The transition from
thinking in terms of 'unbounded temporality' to
'timelessness' occured for me through the realization
that God's 'age' is a constant; it always remains the
same; it does not increase with the passing of time;
and so, also, it is indivisible. Whatever the correct
answer is to the question: 'How old is God?' the exact
same answer will still be true ten minutes, ten years,
or ten thousand years from now. (Infinity + 1 =
Infinity; Infinity + 2 = Infinity; ect.)
[Edgar]
Job 36:26 states: "How great is God—beyond our understanding!
The number of his years is past finding out (NIV)."
Most theologians would probably contend that the language used in Job is metaphorical. God literally does not have years that can be counted, even AD INFINITUM. One might reason that the author of Job is employing poetic turns of phrase. While there is probably the use of metaphor or poetic imagery in Job, I believe that it might make sense to speak of God's "years" in terms of his infinite or boundless existence. Talk of infinity quickly becomes problematic. Aristotle makes a distinction between a potential and actual infinite. He argues that the former may exist, but the latter most assuredly does not for the very reason that Jason states (among other reasons). Since it is possible to successively add numbers AD INFINITUM, Aristotle suggests that potential infinites exist. However, actual [quantitative] infinites do not exist. I would thus content that God's "age" cannot constitute an actual quantitative infinite. At best, the "years" of God represent a potential infinite that can be counted potentially AD INFINITUM.
[Jason]
By reflecting further on this, I came to the
conclusion that God exists both 'independently' of
time (for his 'age' is unaffected by the passing of
time) and 'within' every individual moment of time
'simultaneously' and 'ever-presently' (for, whereas
infinity is indivisible, and the 'present' - i.e., the
unmeasurable, elusive 'instant' of time that 'now' is
- is also indivisible, the past and the future are, by
contrast, divisible, so that what is temporally
indivisible cannot have a past or a future distinct
from its 'present' existence). In other words, I
believe that God is both 'timeless' and 'temporally
omnipresent'. I also hold that it not despite God's
timelessness that He is temporally omnipresent, but
rather that it is precisely because of His
timelessness that He is able to be simultaneously
ever-present in every individual moment of time. I
believe that the one implies the other, and that,
therefore, the question as to how a timeless God can
act in time has no force as an argument against the
position that God is timeless and ageless. I do
believe, however, that the question: 'How can a
time-bound God know the future free actions of His
creatures?" does present a major difficulty for the
'unbounded temporality' conception of God's eternity.
For, I believe that the Scriptures teach both the
omniscience of God (which I understand is denied by
Open Theists and Jehovah's Witnesses) and the free
will of rational creatures.
[Edgar]
PACE Jason's position, I submit that the foregoing account that he has presented is a confused delineation of God's temporality or His atemporality. It seems to me that one cannot have it both ways. Either God is atemporal or God is temporal (i.e. sempiternal). It is confusing to posit both that God is timeless and within time. Nelson Pike and Stephen T. Davis argue that a timeless God has neither temporal location (it does not make sense to posit a "before" or "after" of a timeless being) nor temporal extension (a timeless being does not have any duration). Yet, it seems that anything existing within time does have duration of some kind such that it makes sense to say that a temporal entity has lived for 80 years or existed during the entire tenure of the Bush administration. See Davis, Logic and the Nature of God, pp. 10-24.
I'm not going to enter into a discussion of God's foreknowledge and free will now. I believe that this question has already been addressed on the evangelicals and jws board.
[Jason]
Regarding Ps. 90:2, I think that the 'unbounded
temporality' interpretation would be more convincing
if the verse had said: "from olam you have (always)
been God and to olam you will (continue to) be God."
As the text stands however, with its present tense
verb 'are' I believe supports the 'timelessness'
interpretation by way of affirming God's 'temporal
omnipresence'. Don't you think it would be an odd
manner of expression if I were to state: 'from 1977 to
2008, I am Jason'?
[Edgar]
First, I believe that the lexical semantics of the text (i.e. the meaning of words used in a text) are on the side of those who believe in an limitlessly temporal or sempiternal God. OLAM can mean hidden or concealed time, that is, concealed from the standpoint of the present. In the case of God, it most certainly does not refer to God's timelessness. Second, you are placing the verb of the text in the wrong place. Psalm 90:2 actually says "from OLAM to OLAM, you ARE God." The writer is not attempting to tell us that God IS from OLAM to OLAM per se. The verb should be construed with the words "you" and "god." Do you see the difference regarding where one places the verb in the text?
To conclude, I offer some observations from Dr. Allan Padgett:
"the OT knows nothing of a timeless God in the Boethian sense” (God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, p. 29).
Padgett even makes the stronger claim that "the Bible knows nothing of an absolute timeless divine eternity" (p. 35). He settles for what he calls "relative divine timelessness" which he admits the Bible does not explicitly teach. Yet, Padgett believes that his view is compatible with biblical statements about God's "eternity" (OLAM) or everlasting nature.
Padgett also writes:
"The everlasting (or at best relatively timeless) nature of God's eternity has been clearly implied in Ps. 90:2,Isa. 40:28, 41:4, 43:10, and 44:6; while Isa. 48:3 allows any view. Eccl. 3:11, too, will not support an absolute timelessness. Thus Schmidt's thesis that the OT supports a Boethian understanding of non-durational timeless eternity cannot be maintained. We can conclude with the vast majority of scholars that Yahweh is understood by OT writers to be everlasting, or at best 'timeless' in a relative sense" (God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time, p. 29).
Best regards,
Edgar
CREATIO EX NIHILO
The following is a reproduction of something that I posted to a yahoogroup forum.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Dear list-members,
A couple of years ago--I do not remember the exact
year--Rob Bowman and I engaged in a dialogue
concerning CREATIO EX NIHILO. Since then I have given
the subject a lot of thought and engaged in extensive
research on this topic. The present author has
subsequently concluded that the expression CREATIO EX
NIHILO is permissible as long as we qualify what we
mean by such language. This point is forcefully
brought out by Richard Creel, who argues that
something can never come from an absolute void (i.e.
nothing) as Athanasius argued. Such a process is ruled
out by the basic principle of logical necessity [EX
NIHILO NIHIL FIT].
On the other hand, if one interprets CREATIO EX NIHILO
as creating from nothing except God's "omnipotent
resources" then I find no personal objection to the
terminology. (See Creel's _Divine impassibility: an
essay in philosophical theology_, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986. The one downside to this work
is Creel's unnecessary postulation of a "plenum" of
uncreated possibilities to explain how God creates TA
PANTA without doing so EX NIHILO or EX DEO.)
Now Rob argued that Jehovah's Witnesses may
(unwittingly) teach that the cosmos is a product of
God's very being since JWs say that God created the
universe by means of His own dynamic energy (i.e. His
omnipotent resources). Rob finds the idea of God using
His personal emanative energies to create the cosmos,
seemingly unorthodox and problematic. The Witnesses
obviously [seem to] disagree.
While I do not plan on resolving this issue now, I
wonder what Rob thinks of the words from Tertullian's
treatise Against Hermogenes (section 45.1ff). Does he
think that Tertullian is also some type of pantheist
or panentheist since he writes:
"Do not be willing so to cover God with flattery, as
to contend that He produced by His mere appearance and
simple approach so many vast substances, instead of
rather forming them by His own energies. For this is
proved by Jeremiah when he says, 'God hath made the
earth by His power, He hath established the world by
His wisdom, and hath stretched out the heaven by His
understanding.' These are the energies by the stress
of which He made this universe. His glory is greater
if He laboured. At length on the seventh day He rested
from His works. Both one and the other were after His
manner. If, on the contrary, He made this world simply
by appearing and approaching it, did He, on the
completion of His work, cease to appear and approach
it any more. Nay rather, God began to appear more
conspicuously and to be everywhere accessible from the
time when the world was made."
Tertullian adds that God also made the world by
"applying the almighty efforts of His mind, His
wisdom, His power, His understanding, His word, His
Spirit, His might. Now these things were not necessary
to Him, if He had been perfect by simply appearing and
approaching."
Yet Tertullian can still affirm the truthfulness of
CREATIO EX NIHILO in the sense that God did not employ
any primordial matter to bring forth all things:
"Now what clearer truth do these words indicate, than
that all things were made out of nothing? They are
incapable of being found out or investigated, except
by God alone."
Regards,
Edgar
__________________________________________________________________________________
Dear list-members,
A couple of years ago--I do not remember the exact
year--Rob Bowman and I engaged in a dialogue
concerning CREATIO EX NIHILO. Since then I have given
the subject a lot of thought and engaged in extensive
research on this topic. The present author has
subsequently concluded that the expression CREATIO EX
NIHILO is permissible as long as we qualify what we
mean by such language. This point is forcefully
brought out by Richard Creel, who argues that
something can never come from an absolute void (i.e.
nothing) as Athanasius argued. Such a process is ruled
out by the basic principle of logical necessity [EX
NIHILO NIHIL FIT].
On the other hand, if one interprets CREATIO EX NIHILO
as creating from nothing except God's "omnipotent
resources" then I find no personal objection to the
terminology. (See Creel's _Divine impassibility: an
essay in philosophical theology_, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986. The one downside to this work
is Creel's unnecessary postulation of a "plenum" of
uncreated possibilities to explain how God creates TA
PANTA without doing so EX NIHILO or EX DEO.)
Now Rob argued that Jehovah's Witnesses may
(unwittingly) teach that the cosmos is a product of
God's very being since JWs say that God created the
universe by means of His own dynamic energy (i.e. His
omnipotent resources). Rob finds the idea of God using
His personal emanative energies to create the cosmos,
seemingly unorthodox and problematic. The Witnesses
obviously [seem to] disagree.
While I do not plan on resolving this issue now, I
wonder what Rob thinks of the words from Tertullian's
treatise Against Hermogenes (section 45.1ff). Does he
think that Tertullian is also some type of pantheist
or panentheist since he writes:
"Do not be willing so to cover God with flattery, as
to contend that He produced by His mere appearance and
simple approach so many vast substances, instead of
rather forming them by His own energies. For this is
proved by Jeremiah when he says, 'God hath made the
earth by His power, He hath established the world by
His wisdom, and hath stretched out the heaven by His
understanding.' These are the energies by the stress
of which He made this universe. His glory is greater
if He laboured. At length on the seventh day He rested
from His works. Both one and the other were after His
manner. If, on the contrary, He made this world simply
by appearing and approaching it, did He, on the
completion of His work, cease to appear and approach
it any more. Nay rather, God began to appear more
conspicuously and to be everywhere accessible from the
time when the world was made."
Tertullian adds that God also made the world by
"applying the almighty efforts of His mind, His
wisdom, His power, His understanding, His word, His
Spirit, His might. Now these things were not necessary
to Him, if He had been perfect by simply appearing and
approaching."
Yet Tertullian can still affirm the truthfulness of
CREATIO EX NIHILO in the sense that God did not employ
any primordial matter to bring forth all things:
"Now what clearer truth do these words indicate, than
that all things were made out of nothing? They are
incapable of being found out or investigated, except
by God alone."
Regards,
Edgar
Sunday, March 09, 2008
Geza Vermes on the Expression "Son of God"
I found this quote from Geza Vermes to be informative:
"To a Greek speaker in Alexandria, Antioch or Athens
at the turn of the eras, the concept hUIOS QEOU, son
of God, would have brought to mind either one of the
many offspring of the Olympian deities, or possibly a
deified Egyptian-Ptolemaic king, or the divine emperor
of Rome, descendant of the apotheosized Julius Caesar.
But to a Jew, the corresponding Hebrew or Aramaic
phrase would have applied to none of these. For him,
son of God could refer, in an ascending order, to any
of the children of Israel; or to a good Jew; or to a
charismatic holy Jew; or to the king of Israel; or in
particular to the royal Messiah; and finally, in a
different sense, to an angelic or heavenly being. In
other words, 'son of God' was always understood
metaphorically in Jewish circles. In Jewish sources,
its use never implies participation by the person
so-named in the divine nature. It may in consequence
safely be assumed that if the medium in which
Christian theology developed had been Hebrew and not
Greek, it would not have produced an incarnation
doctrine as this is traditionally understood" (Jesus
in His Jewish Context, page 66).
"To a Greek speaker in Alexandria, Antioch or Athens
at the turn of the eras, the concept hUIOS QEOU, son
of God, would have brought to mind either one of the
many offspring of the Olympian deities, or possibly a
deified Egyptian-Ptolemaic king, or the divine emperor
of Rome, descendant of the apotheosized Julius Caesar.
But to a Jew, the corresponding Hebrew or Aramaic
phrase would have applied to none of these. For him,
son of God could refer, in an ascending order, to any
of the children of Israel; or to a good Jew; or to a
charismatic holy Jew; or to the king of Israel; or in
particular to the royal Messiah; and finally, in a
different sense, to an angelic or heavenly being. In
other words, 'son of God' was always understood
metaphorically in Jewish circles. In Jewish sources,
its use never implies participation by the person
so-named in the divine nature. It may in consequence
safely be assumed that if the medium in which
Christian theology developed had been Hebrew and not
Greek, it would not have produced an incarnation
doctrine as this is traditionally understood" (Jesus
in His Jewish Context, page 66).
Thomas Aquinas and Divine Paternity
In the Summa Theologica I.33.2, reply to objection 3, Thomas Aquinas writes:
"In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is something subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father."
Aquinas contends that the Logos is a Son "properly" not metaphorically. The implication is that the Word of God literally is God's Son. Thomas clarifies this point by noting that the Father is the Son's "principle" or "origin" (i.e. loosely speaking, the Father is the "cause" of the Son or the one who communicates the divine nature to the Son. Hence, there is no doubt that Thomas thinks of God as a "proper" or literal Father of the Son. I will concede that Aquinas is not imputing the biological status of paternity to God. But what does it mean to say that God the Father communicates the divine nature to God the Son? How does God communicate the divine nature to the Son timelessly or continuously such that God never began to communicate the divine nature nor will God ever cease to communicate the divine nature? Moreover, is this how the earliest Christians understood God's paternity? The argument in my dissertation is that most early Christian writers thought of "Father" as a metaphor; in fact, it was a very familiar metaphor used in Judaism and in writings penned by Greeks and Romans. LSJ and BDAG Greek-English lexica document these uses. It appears to me that Thomas' treatment of the term "Father" raises more questions that it solves. The utilization of divine atemporality just deepens the mystery of eternal generation.
"In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is something subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father."
Aquinas contends that the Logos is a Son "properly" not metaphorically. The implication is that the Word of God literally is God's Son. Thomas clarifies this point by noting that the Father is the Son's "principle" or "origin" (i.e. loosely speaking, the Father is the "cause" of the Son or the one who communicates the divine nature to the Son. Hence, there is no doubt that Thomas thinks of God as a "proper" or literal Father of the Son. I will concede that Aquinas is not imputing the biological status of paternity to God. But what does it mean to say that God the Father communicates the divine nature to God the Son? How does God communicate the divine nature to the Son timelessly or continuously such that God never began to communicate the divine nature nor will God ever cease to communicate the divine nature? Moreover, is this how the earliest Christians understood God's paternity? The argument in my dissertation is that most early Christian writers thought of "Father" as a metaphor; in fact, it was a very familiar metaphor used in Judaism and in writings penned by Greeks and Romans. LSJ and BDAG Greek-English lexica document these uses. It appears to me that Thomas' treatment of the term "Father" raises more questions that it solves. The utilization of divine atemporality just deepens the mystery of eternal generation.
Metaphor and God the Father
It is my position that the term "Father" when used of God in relation to His only-begotten Son (John 3:16; 14:28) or when employed with respect to those whom God has imbued with His Spirit (Galatians 4:6-7) is a metaphor or as-if structure. While it is not always feasible to contrast the metaphorical with the literal, I would contend that God is not the literal Father of His only-begotten Son nor is God the literal Father of those whom He has regenerated through the Holy Spirit (Titus 3:5-6). Some have wondered why I would deny that God is literally the Father of the Son since the Trinity brochure published by Jehovah's Witnesses clearly appears to state that God is literally the Father of the Logos.
It is not my intent to take exception to what the Trinity brochure expresses. Much depends on what is meant by the term "literal." By "literal," (in this context), I mean "a usage of speech whereby the properties that are predicated of a subject actually are exemplified by the subject." For instance, if I attribute the property "burgundy" to my 2001 Ford Focus (the subject in this case), then I am using the predicate "burgundy" in a literal manner. Conversely, if I say that my 2001 Ford Focus is "cool," I'm probably not employing the predicate "cool" in the same way that I utilize the predicate "burgundy." One word is being used literally whereas the other term is metaphorical; that is, my car does not actually exemplify or instantiate the property of being cool. It does not exemplify the property of coolness in a matter-of-fact way. Similarly, when I utter the words, "God is the Father of the Son," my contention is that the proposition is not attributing properties to the subject "God" that God (as the subject of the proposition) literally exemplifies since the definition of a literal "father" in English is "A man who begets or raises or nurtures a child; a male parent of an animal; A male ancestor" (American Heritage Dictionary).
But God is not a male (Numbers 23:19; Hosea 11:9) nor does God literally beget, raise or nurture children. As Paul Ricoeur has pointed out, there is a dialectical tension that exists between the "is" and the "is not" when we talk about God the Father: there is a sense in which God both is and is not Father. In English, to speak of a literal father pretty much equates to speaking of a biological male who either nurtures or engenders children. But these descriptions do not appertain to Almighty God.
It is not my intent to take exception to what the Trinity brochure expresses. Much depends on what is meant by the term "literal." By "literal," (in this context), I mean "a usage of speech whereby the properties that are predicated of a subject actually are exemplified by the subject." For instance, if I attribute the property "burgundy" to my 2001 Ford Focus (the subject in this case), then I am using the predicate "burgundy" in a literal manner. Conversely, if I say that my 2001 Ford Focus is "cool," I'm probably not employing the predicate "cool" in the same way that I utilize the predicate "burgundy." One word is being used literally whereas the other term is metaphorical; that is, my car does not actually exemplify or instantiate the property of being cool. It does not exemplify the property of coolness in a matter-of-fact way. Similarly, when I utter the words, "God is the Father of the Son," my contention is that the proposition is not attributing properties to the subject "God" that God (as the subject of the proposition) literally exemplifies since the definition of a literal "father" in English is "A man who begets or raises or nurtures a child; a male parent of an animal; A male ancestor" (American Heritage Dictionary).
But God is not a male (Numbers 23:19; Hosea 11:9) nor does God literally beget, raise or nurture children. As Paul Ricoeur has pointed out, there is a dialectical tension that exists between the "is" and the "is not" when we talk about God the Father: there is a sense in which God both is and is not Father. In English, to speak of a literal father pretty much equates to speaking of a biological male who either nurtures or engenders children. But these descriptions do not appertain to Almighty God.
Wednesday, March 05, 2008
John 17:3 and ALHQINOS
Here are some brief thoughts on the ALHQINOS/ALHQHS:
Louw-Nida Greek-English Lexicon points out that ALHQHS and ALHQINOS may possibly denote that which pertains to actual existence, "real, really, true, truly" (see John 6:55).
This source comments on John 17:3 (semantic domain 70.3), noting that this passage could be rendered "that they may know you, the only one who is really God." We are then told that the rendering "the only one who is really God" could be understood in some languages as "the only God who exists" or "who is God and there are no other gods."
In semantic domain 72.1 of Louw-Nida, we also read that ALHQHS may signify: "pertaining to being in accordance with historical fact" or "true, truth" (cf. John 4:18). Compare John's use of ALHQINHOS (ALHQINH) in John 19:35.
LSJ observes that ALHQHS (the Doric form of the word is ALAQHS) can mean "unconcealed, true, real" with its opposite being "false" or "apparent." On the other hand, in classical Greek, ALHQINOS can mean "agreeable to truth." When used of persons, it may denote "truthful, trusty"; when employed with respect to things, its denotation may be "true, genuine."
Louw-Nida Greek-English Lexicon points out that ALHQHS and ALHQINOS may possibly denote that which pertains to actual existence, "real, really, true, truly" (see John 6:55).
This source comments on John 17:3 (semantic domain 70.3), noting that this passage could be rendered "that they may know you, the only one who is really God." We are then told that the rendering "the only one who is really God" could be understood in some languages as "the only God who exists" or "who is God and there are no other gods."
In semantic domain 72.1 of Louw-Nida, we also read that ALHQHS may signify: "pertaining to being in accordance with historical fact" or "true, truth" (cf. John 4:18). Compare John's use of ALHQINHOS (ALHQINH) in John 19:35.
LSJ observes that ALHQHS (the Doric form of the word is ALAQHS) can mean "unconcealed, true, real" with its opposite being "false" or "apparent." On the other hand, in classical Greek, ALHQINOS can mean "agreeable to truth." When used of persons, it may denote "truthful, trusty"; when employed with respect to things, its denotation may be "true, genuine."
Sunday, March 02, 2008
Galatians 5:22
Concerning Galatians 5:22 and ἀγάπη:
(1) The postpositive δὲ likely functions as a "switch-reference" or transitional device in this verse; notice the presence of the article ὁ which when accompanying δὲ in such contexts normally signals transition. Therefore, the NWT (1984 and 2013) renders the passage: "On the other hand . . ."
"The Spirit, on the other hand, brings a harvest of love, joy, peace; patience towards others, kindness, benevolence" (Weymouth NT)
(2) ὁ καρπὸς is nominative singular masculine. Ergo, strictly speaking, Paul is not listing the "fruits" of the spirit, but the "fruit" or fruitage of God's spirit of holiness. Commentators (including Martin Luther) have pointed out that all other "fruits of the spirit" are simply manifestations of the first fruit mentioned, that is, ἀγάπη. This point seems to be borne out when one compares Galatians 5:22-23 with 1 Corinthians 13:1-8.
(3) The fruit or fruitage listed in Galatians 5:22-23 can only be produced via the activity of God's holy spirit: note the contrast that Paul makes with his use of τὰ ἔργα in 5:19-21. So Jehovah God works in his people that we may both will and act to his praise and glory (Philippians 2:13).
(4) God is ἀγάπη with respect to His essence; He is love (1 John 4:8). Some theologians have thus called ἀγάπη, God's "primal ethical attribute" (I. Dorner). That is, some who study God's essence/nature perceive the need to distinguish between God's "ethical" and His "ontological" attributes. While God cannot not love, there is a sense in which He shows divine love freely (Hosea 14). YHWH does not merely love on "automatic pilot" as it were. The Bible and the pre-Nicenes affirm God's free will, not just the freedom of humans, which includes the divine ability to love because Jehovah God voluntarily demonstrates affection for His creatures.
(5) Love is the hallmark of true Christianity (John 13:34-35). No one has greater love than that someone should lay down his or her life for friends (especially other worshipers of God). See John 15:13; 1 John 3:16-18.
(1) The postpositive δὲ likely functions as a "switch-reference" or transitional device in this verse; notice the presence of the article ὁ which when accompanying δὲ in such contexts normally signals transition. Therefore, the NWT (1984 and 2013) renders the passage: "On the other hand . . ."
"The Spirit, on the other hand, brings a harvest of love, joy, peace; patience towards others, kindness, benevolence" (Weymouth NT)
(2) ὁ καρπὸς is nominative singular masculine. Ergo, strictly speaking, Paul is not listing the "fruits" of the spirit, but the "fruit" or fruitage of God's spirit of holiness. Commentators (including Martin Luther) have pointed out that all other "fruits of the spirit" are simply manifestations of the first fruit mentioned, that is, ἀγάπη. This point seems to be borne out when one compares Galatians 5:22-23 with 1 Corinthians 13:1-8.
(3) The fruit or fruitage listed in Galatians 5:22-23 can only be produced via the activity of God's holy spirit: note the contrast that Paul makes with his use of τὰ ἔργα in 5:19-21. So Jehovah God works in his people that we may both will and act to his praise and glory (Philippians 2:13).
(4) God is ἀγάπη with respect to His essence; He is love (1 John 4:8). Some theologians have thus called ἀγάπη, God's "primal ethical attribute" (I. Dorner). That is, some who study God's essence/nature perceive the need to distinguish between God's "ethical" and His "ontological" attributes. While God cannot not love, there is a sense in which He shows divine love freely (Hosea 14). YHWH does not merely love on "automatic pilot" as it were. The Bible and the pre-Nicenes affirm God's free will, not just the freedom of humans, which includes the divine ability to love because Jehovah God voluntarily demonstrates affection for His creatures.
(5) Love is the hallmark of true Christianity (John 13:34-35). No one has greater love than that someone should lay down his or her life for friends (especially other worshipers of God). See John 15:13; 1 John 3:16-18.
Sunday, February 17, 2008
Deaths in the 20th Century
Professor R. J. Rummel writes:
<<
I have changed my estimate for colonial democide from 870,000 to an additional 50,000,000. Details here.
Thus, the new world total: old total 1900-1999 = 174,000,000. New World total = 174,000,000 + 38,000,000 (new for China) + 50,000,000 (new for Colonies) = 262,000,000.
Just to give perspective on this incredible murder by government, if all these bodies were laid head to toe, with the average height being 5', then they would circle the earth ten times. Also, this democide murdered 6 times more people than died in combat in all the foreign and internal wars of the century. Finally, given popular estimates of the dead in a major nuclear war, this total democide is as though such a war did occur, but with its dead spread over a century.>>
See http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/
<<
I have changed my estimate for colonial democide from 870,000 to an additional 50,000,000. Details here.
Thus, the new world total: old total 1900-1999 = 174,000,000. New World total = 174,000,000 + 38,000,000 (new for China) + 50,000,000 (new for Colonies) = 262,000,000.
Just to give perspective on this incredible murder by government, if all these bodies were laid head to toe, with the average height being 5', then they would circle the earth ten times. Also, this democide murdered 6 times more people than died in combat in all the foreign and internal wars of the century. Finally, given popular estimates of the dead in a major nuclear war, this total democide is as though such a war did occur, but with its dead spread over a century.>>
See http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/
Monday, January 21, 2008
Dialogue on Christmas and Birthdays
[My interlocutor]
"Jesus may not have been born on Dec. 25, but for all we know He was born on Dec. 25, or on a date close to that. But then it makes no difference whether or not Jesus was born on Dec. 25. The Catholic Church still has a divine right to institute a nativity festival if it deems fit, and the date of Dec. 25 is founded on an ancient tradition that reportedly is attested to as early as Tertullian and possibly St. Hippolytus in the first half of the 200s A.D., so that date is as good as any."
[Foster]
If you do not know the date that someone was born, then any date will do, right? The whole system for deriving December 25 in ancient times was faulty. First, Bible prophecy (Daniel 9:24-27) suggests that Christ was not born on December 25 or in the winter season. If Christ was 33 1/2 years old when he died, then he could not have been born in December. The account found at Luke 2:8-11 also indicates that Christ was not born in winter since the shepherds are spoken of as having their flocks out of doors then. What sane shepherd would have been keeping his flock in the fields during rough Palestinian winters? M'Clintock and Strong's _Cyclopaedia_ wisely observes:
"The day of Christ's birth cannot be ascertained from the NT, or indeed, from any other source" (II:276).
[My interlocutor]
"Wow. What are you talking about?? Saturn wasn't the sun god, Fos, and Saturnalia wasn't celebrated on Dec. 25. Even that Kelly quote doesn't make that mistake. "Christians" also didn't worship the sun god, though sometimes Christians apostatised during persecutions."
[Foster]
Maybe you need to give the inet a rest in order to do some research. The Saturnalia was a festival to Saturn and the unconquered sun. Moreover, it took place on December 25 and many of its customs are evidently retained in the Christmas celebration. The NET Bible (a non-JW source found at bible.org) notes:
"December 25 as the celebrated date of Jesus' birth arose around the time of Constantine (ca. a.d. 306-337), though it is mentioned in material from Hippolytus (a.d. 165-235). Some think that the reason for celebration on this date was that it coincided with the pagan Roman festival of Saturnalia, and Christians could celebrate their own festival at this time without fear of persecution."
While the NET Bible does not give an opinion one way or the other on this issue, it does mention that it some scholars do associate Christmas with the Roman Saturnalia.
[My interlocutor]
"Oh, I agree that the fact that Origen's opinions about birthdays are erroneous has no bearing on the point at hand. I do wonder, though, why you seemed to suggest that Origen's erroneous arguments were correct, if you don't think Origen was right."
[Foster]
I did not say that Origen's arguments were erroneous or incorrect. If you will read carefully, you will find that my point was that it does not matter whether his arguments are sound or valid (TERMINI TECHNICI in logic). The point is that Origen, Arnobius and other Christians manifested antipathy toward birthdays. That is the salient *historical* point.
[My interlocutor]
"Yes, I know what your argument is. We know that the early Christians did not usually celebrate birthdays, and therefore it is likely they did not celebrate the birth of Jesus during those early times. However, we don't know that the early Christians opposition to celebrating birthdays was universal, and we don't know that, even if they didn't celebrate birthdays, they didn't begin to make an exception in the case of Jesus' birth, say, by 250-300 A.D. In fact it would be surprising if Christians waited until 300 A.D. to start celebrating Christmas, given the fact that even in the early 200s A.D. Christians were quite interested in determining the date of His birth. To make the dogmatic and bold claim that "it is ludicrous to contend that they would have celebrated the feast of Jesus' birth at this time" is simply going much, much, much further than the evidence can justify."
[Foster]
You have it all wrong. Show me evidence that Christians prior to the fourth century celebrated birthdays at all. Indeed, their opposition to birthdays does seem to have been universal. The practice of observing Christ's birthday evidently began with fourth century Christians, who considered the sun an object of veneration or who saw a nexus between the Son and the Sun. You cannot successfully date the observance of Christ's birth before the fourth century. Read Paul Johnson's work [referenced in an earlier dialogue] for an account of how sun worship affected the "Christian" observance of Jesus' supposed birthday. The [historical] evidence from the time of Constantine and Julian the Apostate favors Johnson's narratival account.
"Jesus may not have been born on Dec. 25, but for all we know He was born on Dec. 25, or on a date close to that. But then it makes no difference whether or not Jesus was born on Dec. 25. The Catholic Church still has a divine right to institute a nativity festival if it deems fit, and the date of Dec. 25 is founded on an ancient tradition that reportedly is attested to as early as Tertullian and possibly St. Hippolytus in the first half of the 200s A.D., so that date is as good as any."
[Foster]
If you do not know the date that someone was born, then any date will do, right? The whole system for deriving December 25 in ancient times was faulty. First, Bible prophecy (Daniel 9:24-27) suggests that Christ was not born on December 25 or in the winter season. If Christ was 33 1/2 years old when he died, then he could not have been born in December. The account found at Luke 2:8-11 also indicates that Christ was not born in winter since the shepherds are spoken of as having their flocks out of doors then. What sane shepherd would have been keeping his flock in the fields during rough Palestinian winters? M'Clintock and Strong's _Cyclopaedia_ wisely observes:
"The day of Christ's birth cannot be ascertained from the NT, or indeed, from any other source" (II:276).
[My interlocutor]
"Wow. What are you talking about?? Saturn wasn't the sun god, Fos, and Saturnalia wasn't celebrated on Dec. 25. Even that Kelly quote doesn't make that mistake. "Christians" also didn't worship the sun god, though sometimes Christians apostatised during persecutions."
[Foster]
Maybe you need to give the inet a rest in order to do some research. The Saturnalia was a festival to Saturn and the unconquered sun. Moreover, it took place on December 25 and many of its customs are evidently retained in the Christmas celebration. The NET Bible (a non-JW source found at bible.org) notes:
"December 25 as the celebrated date of Jesus' birth arose around the time of Constantine (ca. a.d. 306-337), though it is mentioned in material from Hippolytus (a.d. 165-235). Some think that the reason for celebration on this date was that it coincided with the pagan Roman festival of Saturnalia, and Christians could celebrate their own festival at this time without fear of persecution."
While the NET Bible does not give an opinion one way or the other on this issue, it does mention that it some scholars do associate Christmas with the Roman Saturnalia.
[My interlocutor]
"Oh, I agree that the fact that Origen's opinions about birthdays are erroneous has no bearing on the point at hand. I do wonder, though, why you seemed to suggest that Origen's erroneous arguments were correct, if you don't think Origen was right."
[Foster]
I did not say that Origen's arguments were erroneous or incorrect. If you will read carefully, you will find that my point was that it does not matter whether his arguments are sound or valid (TERMINI TECHNICI in logic). The point is that Origen, Arnobius and other Christians manifested antipathy toward birthdays. That is the salient *historical* point.
[My interlocutor]
"Yes, I know what your argument is. We know that the early Christians did not usually celebrate birthdays, and therefore it is likely they did not celebrate the birth of Jesus during those early times. However, we don't know that the early Christians opposition to celebrating birthdays was universal, and we don't know that, even if they didn't celebrate birthdays, they didn't begin to make an exception in the case of Jesus' birth, say, by 250-300 A.D. In fact it would be surprising if Christians waited until 300 A.D. to start celebrating Christmas, given the fact that even in the early 200s A.D. Christians were quite interested in determining the date of His birth. To make the dogmatic and bold claim that "it is ludicrous to contend that they would have celebrated the feast of Jesus' birth at this time" is simply going much, much, much further than the evidence can justify."
[Foster]
You have it all wrong. Show me evidence that Christians prior to the fourth century celebrated birthdays at all. Indeed, their opposition to birthdays does seem to have been universal. The practice of observing Christ's birthday evidently began with fourth century Christians, who considered the sun an object of veneration or who saw a nexus between the Son and the Sun. You cannot successfully date the observance of Christ's birth before the fourth century. Read Paul Johnson's work [referenced in an earlier dialogue] for an account of how sun worship affected the "Christian" observance of Jesus' supposed birthday. The [historical] evidence from the time of Constantine and Julian the Apostate favors Johnson's narratival account.
Tuesday, January 15, 2008
The Divine Triangle
The third key doctrine of historical Christianity or Christendom (in addition to the Atonement and Incarnation) is the Trinity doctrine. The Trinity is the foundational teaching of so-called orthodox Christianity. It is putatively the mystery of God and the mystery of salvation (mysterium dei et mysterium salutis). This teaching is a mystery in that it is supposedly a product of divine revelation. In the words of Karen Armstrong, the triune Godhead lies "beyond words, concepts and human powers of analysis" (Armstrong 1993:118). God's triunity is utterly incapable of being understood by human reasoning.
a) The Trinity is not explicitly taught in the Old or the New Testament. Nevertheless, those who consider themselves orthodox Christians believe that there are subtle intimations of the doctrine in the Holy Scriptures of both Judaism and Christianity (Genesis 1:26; John 1:1). For example, the creation account recorded in Genesis depicts God uttering the words: "Let us make humankind in our image." Why is the Hebrew deity depicted as utilizing the plural pronouns "us" and "our"? Is the Genesis text suggesting that God is not a bare monad but a differentiated triad? Those who consider themselves orthodox Christians generally answer this question in the affirmative.
b) Despite such scriptural "intimations," however, the Trinity as a doctrine qua doctrine did not become a historical reality until 381 A. D. In that fateful year, the First Council of Constantinople (modern Istanbul) decided that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit eternally have a "single Godhead, power and substance in three divine persons." In other words, God is ontologically (in his very being) triangular. Nevertheless, in what sense is the Christian God triangular?
c) A triangle by definition has three sides or angles. According to most logicians, triangularity is a necessary property of a triangle. Trinitarians similarly insist that God is necessarily Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The "Christian" God did not gradually come to possess three sides, as it were. He is immutable and atemporal (i.e., timeless), Trinitarians contends. God thus has always been "three-sided" in the estimation of orthodox Christians: he is eternally triangular.
a) The Trinity is not explicitly taught in the Old or the New Testament. Nevertheless, those who consider themselves orthodox Christians believe that there are subtle intimations of the doctrine in the Holy Scriptures of both Judaism and Christianity (Genesis 1:26; John 1:1). For example, the creation account recorded in Genesis depicts God uttering the words: "Let us make humankind in our image." Why is the Hebrew deity depicted as utilizing the plural pronouns "us" and "our"? Is the Genesis text suggesting that God is not a bare monad but a differentiated triad? Those who consider themselves orthodox Christians generally answer this question in the affirmative.
b) Despite such scriptural "intimations," however, the Trinity as a doctrine qua doctrine did not become a historical reality until 381 A. D. In that fateful year, the First Council of Constantinople (modern Istanbul) decided that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit eternally have a "single Godhead, power and substance in three divine persons." In other words, God is ontologically (in his very being) triangular. Nevertheless, in what sense is the Christian God triangular?
c) A triangle by definition has three sides or angles. According to most logicians, triangularity is a necessary property of a triangle. Trinitarians similarly insist that God is necessarily Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The "Christian" God did not gradually come to possess three sides, as it were. He is immutable and atemporal (i.e., timeless), Trinitarians contends. God thus has always been "three-sided" in the estimation of orthodox Christians: he is eternally triangular.
Saturday, January 12, 2008
The Focal Point of My Dissertation
The Focal Point of Study for My Dissertation
This study's focal point is the Lactantian concept of God the Father in the light of classical and contemporary metaphor theory. Accordingly, it has four primary goals: (1) This investigation will determine the possible conceptual or ecclesiastical antecedents that motivated Lactantius to apply the paternal metaphor "Father" to God; (2) it will explore what Lactantius and other Christian writers possibly mean by "Father"; (3) moreover, this study will scrutinize how Lactantius conceives the relationship between the Father and the Son; (4) it will probe the eschatological significance that "Father" possibly has for Lactantius.
The introductory portion of this study is structured as follows. First, it is necessary to provide an overview of Lactantian studies. In the overview, a marked contrast between common preoccupations of patristic scholars or historians and the focus of this work will be established. Second, the overview will supply an outline of Lactantius' conception of God the Father. In that portion of this investigation, the seeming heterodox Christology of Lactantius will also be contextualized. Third, a synopsis of each chapter contained in this study will be furnished. In contrast to other works that have elected to research non-theological aspects of the early apologist's work, this study will scrutinize Lactantian thought pertaining to God the Father. Its chief aim is to ascertain whether Lactantius employs "Father" as a metaphor for God rather than as a proper name for an immutable and eternal distinction of the triune Godhead. Furthermore, this study proposes that by using the divine epithet "Father" as a metaphor, Lactantius apparently downplays the role of gender in his conceptualization of God. It is possible that Lactantius believes that gender is not an intrinsic property of God or a category of being whose primordial exemplar is divine. Therefore, while it might not be possible to apodictically discern Lactantian intent regarding divine gender, this investigation will argue that at the very least Lactantius is not preoccupied with the reputed gender of God the Father when he employs this venerable concept.
This study's focal point is the Lactantian concept of God the Father in the light of classical and contemporary metaphor theory. Accordingly, it has four primary goals: (1) This investigation will determine the possible conceptual or ecclesiastical antecedents that motivated Lactantius to apply the paternal metaphor "Father" to God; (2) it will explore what Lactantius and other Christian writers possibly mean by "Father"; (3) moreover, this study will scrutinize how Lactantius conceives the relationship between the Father and the Son; (4) it will probe the eschatological significance that "Father" possibly has for Lactantius.
The introductory portion of this study is structured as follows. First, it is necessary to provide an overview of Lactantian studies. In the overview, a marked contrast between common preoccupations of patristic scholars or historians and the focus of this work will be established. Second, the overview will supply an outline of Lactantius' conception of God the Father. In that portion of this investigation, the seeming heterodox Christology of Lactantius will also be contextualized. Third, a synopsis of each chapter contained in this study will be furnished. In contrast to other works that have elected to research non-theological aspects of the early apologist's work, this study will scrutinize Lactantian thought pertaining to God the Father. Its chief aim is to ascertain whether Lactantius employs "Father" as a metaphor for God rather than as a proper name for an immutable and eternal distinction of the triune Godhead. Furthermore, this study proposes that by using the divine epithet "Father" as a metaphor, Lactantius apparently downplays the role of gender in his conceptualization of God. It is possible that Lactantius believes that gender is not an intrinsic property of God or a category of being whose primordial exemplar is divine. Therefore, while it might not be possible to apodictically discern Lactantian intent regarding divine gender, this investigation will argue that at the very least Lactantius is not preoccupied with the reputed gender of God the Father when he employs this venerable concept.
Wednesday, January 02, 2008
The Didache and Baptism
One question that arises with regard to the Didache is, when was it
written? Is it a first or second century document? While there
is no unanimous consensus on this question--I note that a number of scholars
believe that the Didache was actually produced in the second century. If this belief is accurate, this fact would comport with either Origen or Tertullian's comments regarding the subject of infant baptism.
Stanley Burgess observes that the Didache is "an early second century
document" (The Holy Spirit: Ancient Christian Traditions, page 21).
Howard Vos simply writes that the Didache "is also believed to have
originated in Alexandria (though some think it came from Syria), probably
during the first decades of the second century" (Exploring Church History,
page 12).
Moreover, The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology states that the Didache "comes from the late first to mid-second century, and is more in the style of a compilation of practices for a group of churches than the work of a single theologian-author" (page 100).
But the magisterial study by W. H. C. Frend dates the Didache circa A.D. 70
(See The Rise of Christianity, page 29). So we have respected scholars from both sides offering possible, but contrary opinions on this important matter. Personally, I think that the evidence favors the second century dating. (I am certain that some would heavily dispute this conclusion or question my motivation in deciding on that date. But the contents in the work make me incline toward the second century dating for the Didache. This along with what other writers say about the practice of infant baptism in antiquity influences my perspective.)
I believe that Christian baptism first involved the immersion of believing adults (Mt 28:18-20; Acts 8:12-13). However, in time, infants began to be baptized on what Jaroslav Pelikan calls "biblical warrants that [are] somewhat ambiguous." He argues that "the first incontestable evidence for the practice [of infant baptism] appeared around the end of [the second] century" (See The Christian Tradition 1:290-292 and 1:316-318). As is well known, Tertullian vehemently rejected the practice of infant baptism (Baptism 18.5).
So I would say that the historical evidence indicates that different kinds of baptism occurred from the second century onward, though it seems that Primitive Christians started out immersing new believers under water when they baptized them (Acts
8:34-39).
I would add that the Didache does help us to understand what was happening
in second century Christianity. This does not mean, however, that all
Christians practiced infant baptism in the second century. Therefore, it seems
highly unlikely that all Christians practiced sprinkling then (Compare Hermas, ANF Series, 2.49; Apostolic Constitutions 7.53). The Bible itself appears to clearly teach baptism by water immersion.
Regards,
Edgar
written? Is it a first or second century document? While there
is no unanimous consensus on this question--I note that a number of scholars
believe that the Didache was actually produced in the second century. If this belief is accurate, this fact would comport with either Origen or Tertullian's comments regarding the subject of infant baptism.
Stanley Burgess observes that the Didache is "an early second century
document" (The Holy Spirit: Ancient Christian Traditions, page 21).
Howard Vos simply writes that the Didache "is also believed to have
originated in Alexandria (though some think it came from Syria), probably
during the first decades of the second century" (Exploring Church History,
page 12).
Moreover, The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology states that the Didache "comes from the late first to mid-second century, and is more in the style of a compilation of practices for a group of churches than the work of a single theologian-author" (page 100).
But the magisterial study by W. H. C. Frend dates the Didache circa A.D. 70
(See The Rise of Christianity, page 29). So we have respected scholars from both sides offering possible, but contrary opinions on this important matter. Personally, I think that the evidence favors the second century dating. (I am certain that some would heavily dispute this conclusion or question my motivation in deciding on that date. But the contents in the work make me incline toward the second century dating for the Didache. This along with what other writers say about the practice of infant baptism in antiquity influences my perspective.)
I believe that Christian baptism first involved the immersion of believing adults (Mt 28:18-20; Acts 8:12-13). However, in time, infants began to be baptized on what Jaroslav Pelikan calls "biblical warrants that [are] somewhat ambiguous." He argues that "the first incontestable evidence for the practice [of infant baptism] appeared around the end of [the second] century" (See The Christian Tradition 1:290-292 and 1:316-318). As is well known, Tertullian vehemently rejected the practice of infant baptism (Baptism 18.5).
So I would say that the historical evidence indicates that different kinds of baptism occurred from the second century onward, though it seems that Primitive Christians started out immersing new believers under water when they baptized them (Acts
8:34-39).
I would add that the Didache does help us to understand what was happening
in second century Christianity. This does not mean, however, that all
Christians practiced infant baptism in the second century. Therefore, it seems
highly unlikely that all Christians practiced sprinkling then (Compare Hermas, ANF Series, 2.49; Apostolic Constitutions 7.53). The Bible itself appears to clearly teach baptism by water immersion.
Regards,
Edgar
Monday, December 03, 2007
New HIV Cases Could be Increasing
This report was taken from http://tinyurl.com/3xwmry
When reading this report, we encourage you to consult Revelation 6:1-8.
According to data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for 2001 to 2005 (the latest years available), the number of new cases of HIV infection diagnosed among 15-to-19-year-olds in the United States rose from 1,010 in 2001, held steady for the next three years, then jumped 20 percent in 2005, to 1,213 cases.
For young people aged 20 to 24, cases of new infection have climbed steadily, from 3,184 in 2001 to 3,876 in 2005.
Newer infection numbers set to be released soon by the CDC may be even higher, the Washington Post reported Saturday. According to the Post, sources close to scientists preparing the new statistics have confirmed that rates of new infection in the United States may be 50 percent higher than previously believed -- a jump from 40,000 new infections per year to up to 60,000. The increase is based on new blood testing methods, the Post said, and whether it signifies a growth in actual cases remains to be seen.
Experts say a number of factors may be at play, including the fact that many HIV-infected patients are now being kept healthy with powerful drugs -- making AIDS seem like less of a threat to young people than it did in the past.
When reading this report, we encourage you to consult Revelation 6:1-8.
According to data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for 2001 to 2005 (the latest years available), the number of new cases of HIV infection diagnosed among 15-to-19-year-olds in the United States rose from 1,010 in 2001, held steady for the next three years, then jumped 20 percent in 2005, to 1,213 cases.
For young people aged 20 to 24, cases of new infection have climbed steadily, from 3,184 in 2001 to 3,876 in 2005.
Newer infection numbers set to be released soon by the CDC may be even higher, the Washington Post reported Saturday. According to the Post, sources close to scientists preparing the new statistics have confirmed that rates of new infection in the United States may be 50 percent higher than previously believed -- a jump from 40,000 new infections per year to up to 60,000. The increase is based on new blood testing methods, the Post said, and whether it signifies a growth in actual cases remains to be seen.
Experts say a number of factors may be at play, including the fact that many HIV-infected patients are now being kept healthy with powerful drugs -- making AIDS seem like less of a threat to young people than it did in the past.
Saturday, November 24, 2007
Russians, Drug Abuse and Death
In addition to factors (crime and alcohol abuse) that account for a life expectancy of 59 years for males and 73 years for females, Russia is now faced with another problem that is wiping out its population. According to Wikipedia, Russia has the highest growth rate of HIV/AIDS outside of Sub-Saharan Africa. But that is not what I am going to say is wiping out its population. Drug addiction is killing approximately 80,000 Russians per year. Because of its geography, Russia is an optimum place for drug trafficking to occur. As a result, many people are becoming addicted to drugs and dying from the abuse of controlled substances. Human Rights Watch is very concerned about the situation in Russia. They want the government of Russia to improve drug treatment schemes which include counseling and medicating patients in an appropriate manner. The death rate from drug abuse in Russia is evidently just another indication that we are living in the last days of this depraved world (2 Timothy 3:1-5).
See http://tinyurl.com/2nxbje
See http://tinyurl.com/2nxbje
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
Infant Deaths and the United States
The Associated Press has reported that the United States is among the worst nation in terms of infant deaths. Despite the fact that America has "more neonatologists and newborn intensive care beds per person than Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom," the death rate for infants is still among the worst. Granted, the rate for infant mortality in the United States has decreased over the past 50 years. However, it seems hard to believe that a developed nation like America has 7 babies to die for every 1,000 births. Why is infant death such a problem in the United States? Experts attribute the problem to socioeconomic disparities which affect the type of health care that minorities and other poor folks receive. Despite the bleak picture in the United States, however, Africa has an even worse situation when it comes to infant mortality. In some parts of Africa, the infant mortality rate is 144 per 1,000 births. Could infant mortality be another indication that the times in which we live are "critical"?
See http://tinyurl.com/yo5bfy
See http://tinyurl.com/yo5bfy
Sunday, November 11, 2007
World War II and Matthew 24:6-7
Some people think that the world is getting better. They argue that we are far from seeing the fulfillment of Jesus' eschatological prophecy contained in Matthew 24. However, historians and other students of world events think that something momentous happened in the twentieth century, even if these academics do not agree on the significance of particular events that transpired during the twentieth century. For instance, we read:
"Although World War I has been described as a total war, World War II was even more so and was fought on a scale unprecedented in history. The entire populations of warring countries were involved: as combatants; as workers in wartime industries; as civilians who suffered invasion, occupation, and aerial bombing; or as victims of persecution and mass extermination. The world had never witnessed such widespread human-made death and destruction" (_Western Civilization_, Jackson J. Spielvogel, 973).
Not only were World Wars I or II signs that humanity was in for a drastic change, but subsequent events would imply that we are living in a significant time period. In the future, I will submit other posts that will demonstrate that life in this world is not getting qualitatively better.
"Although World War I has been described as a total war, World War II was even more so and was fought on a scale unprecedented in history. The entire populations of warring countries were involved: as combatants; as workers in wartime industries; as civilians who suffered invasion, occupation, and aerial bombing; or as victims of persecution and mass extermination. The world had never witnessed such widespread human-made death and destruction" (_Western Civilization_, Jackson J. Spielvogel, 973).
Not only were World Wars I or II signs that humanity was in for a drastic change, but subsequent events would imply that we are living in a significant time period. In the future, I will submit other posts that will demonstrate that life in this world is not getting qualitatively better.
Sunday, November 04, 2007
Lewis Ayres on the Cappadocian Use of TROPOS hUPARXEWS
One of the most recent historical studies on the Trinity doctrine has this to say about the terminology TROPOS hUPARXEWS as it is utilized by the Cappadocians:
"In Chapter 8 I noted that in Basil the phrase TROPOS hUPARXEWS served
to identify not a metaphysically dense notion of personhood but merely
the mode of origination of the persons. In Gregory of Nyssa the phrase
is more frequently used, but with equal austerity of meaning (and
directly still only of Son and Spirit). What we know of the persons is
their modes of origination and the characteristics attributed to them
by Scripture--as long as all attributes are understood to be those of
the one simple Godhead" (Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An
Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology, Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004, page 359).
"In Chapter 8 I noted that in Basil the phrase TROPOS hUPARXEWS served
to identify not a metaphysically dense notion of personhood but merely
the mode of origination of the persons. In Gregory of Nyssa the phrase
is more frequently used, but with equal austerity of meaning (and
directly still only of Son and Spirit). What we know of the persons is
their modes of origination and the characteristics attributed to them
by Scripture--as long as all attributes are understood to be those of
the one simple Godhead" (Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An
Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology, Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004, page 359).
Friday, November 02, 2007
PAROUSIA and ERXOMAI
My studies have suggested that PAROUSIA and ERXOMAI
are not semantically identical nor are they interchangeable per se.
But I do believe that PAROUSIA, like ERXOMAI, may mean "arrival" in
certain contexts. It certainly refers to the visit of
important personages in the papyri.
BDAG points out that PAROUSIA can mean (1) "the state
of being present at a place, presence" or (2) "arrival
as the first stage in presence, coming, advent."
Sense (1) is clearly found at Phil 2:12 where Paul
contrasts his own PAROUSIA with his APOUSIA. 1 Cor
16:17; 2 Cor 10:10 also seem to be examples of
PAROUSIA being used to mean "presence," though some
think it may signify "arrival" in Paul's first letter
to the Corinthians. See _The New Linguistic and
Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament_, pg. 391.
But compare Marion L. Soards _1 Corinthians_ (New
International Biblical Commentary), p. 364.
BDAG suggests that PAROUSIA in 2 Cor 7:6 and Phil 1:26
refers to the "coming" of Titus or Paul. However, one
can just as well understand PAROUSIA in the said
verses as "presence" or "the state of being present at
a place." See Moises Silva's _Philippians (The
Wycliffe Exegetical Commentary), pp. 86-87. To see
examples of PAROUSIA employed as a TECHNICUS TERMINUS
for both Christians and non-Christians, consult
Moulton-Milligan, p. 497.
Regarding the use of PAROUSIA as a TECHNICUS TERMINUS
for the "presence" of Jesus Christ, I find N.T.
Wright's comments enlightening:
"But why should we think--except for reasons of
ecclesiastical and scholarly tradition--that PAROUSIA
means 'the second coming,' and/or the downward
travel on a cloud of Jesus and/or the 'son of man'?
PAROUSIA means 'presence' as opposed to APOUSIA,
'absence'; hence it denotes the 'arrival' of
someone not at the moment present; and it is
especially used in relation to the visit 'of a royal
or official personage.' Until evidence for a different
meaning is produced, this should be our starting-point"
(_Jesus and the Victory of God_, page 341).
What does Wright mean by the "arrival" of Christ,
however. In that same publication, he makes it clear
that he is referring to the "enthronement" of Christ
and not to his Second Advent:
"For the ordinary sense of 'arrival', cf. 1 Cor.
16:17; 2 Cor. 7:6, 7; 10:10; Phil. 1:26; 2:12. From
this, the most natural meaning for the word as applied
to Jesus would be something like 'arrival on the
scene,' in the sense of enthronement" (ibid).
TDNT makes the point even clearer in its treatment of
PAROUSIA.
Finally, Louw-Nida shows that ERXOMAI can denote: "to
move from one place to another, either coming or
going." Abbott-Smith has similar comments.
Regards,
Edgar
are not semantically identical nor are they interchangeable per se.
But I do believe that PAROUSIA, like ERXOMAI, may mean "arrival" in
certain contexts. It certainly refers to the visit of
important personages in the papyri.
BDAG points out that PAROUSIA can mean (1) "the state
of being present at a place, presence" or (2) "arrival
as the first stage in presence, coming, advent."
Sense (1) is clearly found at Phil 2:12 where Paul
contrasts his own PAROUSIA with his APOUSIA. 1 Cor
16:17; 2 Cor 10:10 also seem to be examples of
PAROUSIA being used to mean "presence," though some
think it may signify "arrival" in Paul's first letter
to the Corinthians. See _The New Linguistic and
Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament_, pg. 391.
But compare Marion L. Soards _1 Corinthians_ (New
International Biblical Commentary), p. 364.
BDAG suggests that PAROUSIA in 2 Cor 7:6 and Phil 1:26
refers to the "coming" of Titus or Paul. However, one
can just as well understand PAROUSIA in the said
verses as "presence" or "the state of being present at
a place." See Moises Silva's _Philippians (The
Wycliffe Exegetical Commentary), pp. 86-87. To see
examples of PAROUSIA employed as a TECHNICUS TERMINUS
for both Christians and non-Christians, consult
Moulton-Milligan, p. 497.
Regarding the use of PAROUSIA as a TECHNICUS TERMINUS
for the "presence" of Jesus Christ, I find N.T.
Wright's comments enlightening:
"But why should we think--except for reasons of
ecclesiastical and scholarly tradition--that PAROUSIA
means 'the second coming,' and/or the downward
travel on a cloud of Jesus and/or the 'son of man'?
PAROUSIA means 'presence' as opposed to APOUSIA,
'absence'; hence it denotes the 'arrival' of
someone not at the moment present; and it is
especially used in relation to the visit 'of a royal
or official personage.' Until evidence for a different
meaning is produced, this should be our starting-point"
(_Jesus and the Victory of God_, page 341).
What does Wright mean by the "arrival" of Christ,
however. In that same publication, he makes it clear
that he is referring to the "enthronement" of Christ
and not to his Second Advent:
"For the ordinary sense of 'arrival', cf. 1 Cor.
16:17; 2 Cor. 7:6, 7; 10:10; Phil. 1:26; 2:12. From
this, the most natural meaning for the word as applied
to Jesus would be something like 'arrival on the
scene,' in the sense of enthronement" (ibid).
TDNT makes the point even clearer in its treatment of
PAROUSIA.
Finally, Louw-Nida shows that ERXOMAI can denote: "to
move from one place to another, either coming or
going." Abbott-Smith has similar comments.
Regards,
Edgar
Thursday, October 11, 2007
Notes on Colossians 2:9
Notes on Colossians 2:9
Robertson's Word Pictures states: "Paul here asserts that 'all the
PLHRWMA of the Godhead,' not just certain aspects, dwells in Christ
and in bodily form (SWMATIKWS, late and rare adverb, in Plutarch,
inscription, here only in N.T.), dwells now in Christ in his glorified
humanity (Philippians 2:9-11), 'the body of his glory' (TWi SWMATI THS
DOXHS)."
Louw-Nida (8.2) notes: "SWMATIKWS: EN AUTWi KATOIKEI PAN TO PLHRWMA
SWMATIKWS: 'in him all the fullness of deity dwells bodily' or . . .
in physical form' Col 2.9. It is also possible to interpret SWMATIKWS
in Col 2.9 as meaning 'in reality,' that is to say, 'not symbolically'
(see 70.7)."
BDAG suggests that SWMATIKWS (adverbial of SWMATIKOS) bears the
potential sense "bodily, corporeally" and probably should be
understood from Col 2:17 "as = in reality, not fig." See page 984.
Roger and Rogers New Linguistic and Exegetical Key agrees with
Robertson concerning SWMATIKWS: "The word [in Col 2:9] refers to the
human body of Christ (Johnson, 310), indicating also the full humanity
of Jesus a humanity which was not simply a covering for His deity
(Lohse; TDNT; Moule; Lohmeyer; O'Brien).
But Petr Pokorny is most certainly right when he concludes: "The
concept SWMA has a further meaning that comes to light especially in
---> 2:17. SWMA is also the archetype (---> 1:15), the reality in
contrast to the shadow and copy. This is the most probable meaning
here, given the framework of the interpretation of 2:19" (Colossians:
A Commentary, 122).
Regards,
Edgar
Robertson's Word Pictures states: "Paul here asserts that 'all the
PLHRWMA of the Godhead,' not just certain aspects, dwells in Christ
and in bodily form (SWMATIKWS, late and rare adverb, in Plutarch,
inscription, here only in N.T.), dwells now in Christ in his glorified
humanity (Philippians 2:9-11), 'the body of his glory' (TWi SWMATI THS
DOXHS)."
Louw-Nida (8.2) notes: "SWMATIKWS: EN AUTWi KATOIKEI PAN TO PLHRWMA
SWMATIKWS: 'in him all the fullness of deity dwells bodily' or . . .
in physical form' Col 2.9. It is also possible to interpret SWMATIKWS
in Col 2.9 as meaning 'in reality,' that is to say, 'not symbolically'
(see 70.7)."
BDAG suggests that SWMATIKWS (adverbial of SWMATIKOS) bears the
potential sense "bodily, corporeally" and probably should be
understood from Col 2:17 "as = in reality, not fig." See page 984.
Roger and Rogers New Linguistic and Exegetical Key agrees with
Robertson concerning SWMATIKWS: "The word [in Col 2:9] refers to the
human body of Christ (Johnson, 310), indicating also the full humanity
of Jesus a humanity which was not simply a covering for His deity
(Lohse; TDNT; Moule; Lohmeyer; O'Brien).
But Petr Pokorny is most certainly right when he concludes: "The
concept SWMA has a further meaning that comes to light especially in
---> 2:17. SWMA is also the archetype (---> 1:15), the reality in
contrast to the shadow and copy. This is the most probable meaning
here, given the framework of the interpretation of 2:19" (Colossians:
A Commentary, 122).
Regards,
Edgar
Tuesday, September 18, 2007
The Immortal Soul in Ancient Pre-Nicene Thought
An interlocutor once asked me,
"Dear Prof. Foster,
I'd like to know when the concept of immortal soul was adopted by early christians and which Church-Father rejected it."
My reply:
The concept of the immortal soul appears rather early in the second century CE writings of pre-Nicene writers. One of the most notable delineations of this teaching is found in Letter to Diognetus 6. There, we read:
"To sum up all in one word-what the soul is in the body, that are Christians in the world. The soul is dispersed through all the members of the body, and Christians are scattered through all the cities of the world. The soul dwells in the body, yet is not of the body; and Christians dwell in the world, yet are not of the world. The invisible soul is guarded by the visible body, and Christians are known indeed to be in the world, but their godliness remains invisible."
Justin Martyr, Melito, Athenagoras, Methodius, Irenaeus, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Lactantius and Tertullian all affirmed the immortality of the soul (see Divinae institutiones 7.20ff for statements from Lactantius). Tertullian thinks that the soul is corporeal, though not constituted of gross matter or flesh. See his work De Anima.
It seems that the teaching of the immortal soul was consistently believed and taught in the early church, though an early Assyrian apologist named Tatian, posited an interesting theory in his Oration to the Greeks 13, namely, that the soul "is not in itself immortal . . . but mortal. Yet it is possible for it not to die."
In other words, the human soul (according to Tatian) is not inherently immortal. Eternal or everlasting life is only possible, provided one has a good relationship with God, who can cause the soul to subsist forever by investing it with the gift of immortality. It is no wonder that Jaroslav Pelikan (The Christian Tradition 1:30) speaks of the immortal soul teaching as a "standard element in [early] Christian teaching" since the pre-Nicene and post-Nicene church uniformly affirmed this doctrine.
"Dear Prof. Foster,
I'd like to know when the concept of immortal soul was adopted by early christians and which Church-Father rejected it."
My reply:
The concept of the immortal soul appears rather early in the second century CE writings of pre-Nicene writers. One of the most notable delineations of this teaching is found in Letter to Diognetus 6. There, we read:
"To sum up all in one word-what the soul is in the body, that are Christians in the world. The soul is dispersed through all the members of the body, and Christians are scattered through all the cities of the world. The soul dwells in the body, yet is not of the body; and Christians dwell in the world, yet are not of the world. The invisible soul is guarded by the visible body, and Christians are known indeed to be in the world, but their godliness remains invisible."
Justin Martyr, Melito, Athenagoras, Methodius, Irenaeus, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Lactantius and Tertullian all affirmed the immortality of the soul (see Divinae institutiones 7.20ff for statements from Lactantius). Tertullian thinks that the soul is corporeal, though not constituted of gross matter or flesh. See his work De Anima.
It seems that the teaching of the immortal soul was consistently believed and taught in the early church, though an early Assyrian apologist named Tatian, posited an interesting theory in his Oration to the Greeks 13, namely, that the soul "is not in itself immortal . . . but mortal. Yet it is possible for it not to die."
In other words, the human soul (according to Tatian) is not inherently immortal. Eternal or everlasting life is only possible, provided one has a good relationship with God, who can cause the soul to subsist forever by investing it with the gift of immortality. It is no wonder that Jaroslav Pelikan (The Christian Tradition 1:30) speaks of the immortal soul teaching as a "standard element in [early] Christian teaching" since the pre-Nicene and post-Nicene church uniformly affirmed this doctrine.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)