1 Corinthians 5:1 Interpretation

Back in 1999, I discussed 1 Cor. 5:1ff with a couple of interlocutors on a public forum. One suggested that 1 Cor. 5:11-13 refers to the Lord's Supper. Here is my reply: I must admit that a reference to the Lord's Supper is a possibility (1 Cor. 11:23ff), but my analysis rules out that conclusion for the following reasons. In 1 Cor. 5:1, Paul describes a Christian brother's sin in Corinth. The brother was cohabiting with his father's wife, thus living incestuously. Even worse, the older men of Corinth--part of the EKKLESIA--were tolerating this immoral conduct. Paul laments that the Corinthians are "puffed up" rather than mourning over the abhorrent deeds of the immoral brother in their midst. In 1 Cor. 5:3-5, the "apostle to the nations" recommends that the one practicing sin be "delivered up to the adversary." This act is done in order to destroy the sinful "flesh" and preserve the spirit of the believer "in the day of the Lord." Next, Paul continues to explain why the sinning believer must be turned over to the Devil. By allowing him to remain in the midst of the congregation, the EKKLESIA will suffer corruption and will not be able to rightly observe the antitypical passover: "for even our Paschal Lamb, Christ, was sacrificed" (Emphatic Diaglott). Therefore, the congregation of God must take the action prescribed in 1 Cor. 5:9-13. What is the thrust of this counsel? What action is the EKKLESIA urged to take? 1 Cor. 5:11 says: "NUNI DE EGRAYA hUMIN MH SUNANAMIGNUSQAI EAN TIS ADELFOS ONOMAZOMENOS hH PORNOS . . ." The phrase that really catches my attention here is NUNI DE EGRAYA hUMIN MH SUNANAMIGNUSQAI. This part of the verse indicates that Paul is not simply talking about ceasing to share "the meal" [i.e. Lord's Supper] with a brother who practices sin--although clearly the congregation should take this action as well. The present infinitive middle SUNANAMIGNUSQAI tells me that all association should cease with this person (not just the Lord's evening meal). Elsewhere we are told, "do not receive him into your house nor wish him success" (2 John 10, 11). If you want to discuss the applicability/inapplicability of 2 John 2:7, we can examine that verse too. In sum, I would say that 1 Cor. 5:11 is talking about general association (i.e., "don't even eat lunch with this man"!). For now, I am inclined to agree with the words of Kathleen Callow concerning 1 Cor. 5:6-8: "In this unit Paul urges the expulsion (EKKAQARATE, v. 7a) in the light of the effect of evil on their fellowship as a whole, and of their own status as AZOUMOI--a purified community" (See Linguistics and NT Interpretation, edited by DA Black, page 202).

Are There Three "I Think's" in God?

The following quote is taken from John J. O'Donnell's The Mystery of the Triune God. This snippet convincingly demonstrates the problem with viewing the TRES PERSONAE TRINITATIS as three separate centers of consciousness.

"In contemporary parlance, person is spontaneously identified as centre
of consciousness and freedom. However, if we bring these pre-reflective
categories to theology, we are immediately confronted with a problem.
For if we say that God is one being in three persons, and if we
understand by person centres of consciousness and freedom, then God
becomes three centres of consciousness and there are three I think's in
God. But such an understanding is the same as tritheism" (O'Donnell
103).

Can We Get To "Know" God By Reading Scripture?

The following is a dialogue that occurred publicly on another forum. I have left the discussion in its original form. This post was originally written in 1999 when I was an undergrad at Lenoir-Rhyne College. I would now characterize it as a dialogue about religious epistemology. My responses are outside the quotation marks after the post begins.

Hi George

I'm glad we got all the details worked out about polemics, etc.

George writes:

From: Edgar Foster

"OIDAMEN DE hOTI hO hUIOS TOU QEOU hHKEI KAI DEDWKEN
hHMIN DIANOIAN hINA GINWSKOMEN TON ALHQINON."

"True, John does write that our DIANOIA comes from
the Son of God. This verse is in harmony with John 1:18, where we read
that the Son of God came and explained (exegeted) the Father, thus
revealing Him to humanity in a way not hitherto experienced.
Nevertheless, I must ask--where do we find the words and deeds of the
Son of God? Is it not in the written Word of God? Does not the Bible
report God's revelatory activities?"

[George]
"Of course it does. It is a report ABOUT God. It is
NOT God. It is written by men who are inspired DIA TON QEON."

Not only is it a report ABOUT God: it is a report BY God. God speaks to
us DIA His written Word.

DESPOTA SU hO POIHSAS TON OURANON KAI THN GHN KAI THN QALASSAN KAI
PANTA TA EN AUTOIS hO TOU PATROS hHMWN DIA PNEUMATOS hAGIOU STOMATOS
DAUEID PAIDOS SOU (Acts 4:24, 25).

"I am noticing the three levels of our 'knowing' in the above passage:
OIDAMEN is a visionary term of perception here, imho.

DIANOIA is the understanding [through mind] we are given when the Son
of God comes to us and gives it to us. I take this 'giver' to be the
"Spirit of Truth" [PARAKLEITOS] GINWSKAMEN is the actual knowing in the
fullest sense, the identity of self, mind, and God. When one knows in this way, there is no need of other "proof", because ANY proof rests upon IT. This is the goal of our study of scripture, and not the proofs that we are so convinced that we 'know'..."

I hate to be the bearer of bad news, but that is not the teaching of
the GNT [Greek New Testament]. At least, not at its surface level. :-)

It is very difficult to prove that we come to know God solely through
the inward mediation of the Spirit, and not by [means of] Scripture (Cf. Acts
18:24-28). 1 John 5:20 (in its first century context) does not say that
the Spirit of truth has given/gives us DIANOIAN. John is talking about
a historical event in the past: "EKEINOS EXHGHSATO" (that one unfolded
our understanding of the Father).

hOUTOS ESTIN hO ELQWN DI' hUDATOS KAI hAIMATOS IHSOUS XRISTOS (1 John
5:6).

The tenor of the entire first Epistle of John is historical. Jesus came
and provided us with DIANOIAN--the capacity to understand the Father.
He came and taught us how to love others by dying PRO NOBIS (1 John
3:16). He CAME and bore witness to God, glorifying Him and zealously
announcing His heavenly kingdom in fulfillment of the numerous
prophecies that bore witness to him. All of these historical events are
recorded in the GNT. John even wrote:

POLLA MEN OUN KAI ALLA SHMEIA EPOIHSEN hO IHSOUS ENWPION TWN MAQHTWN hA
OUK ESTIN GEGRAMMENA EN TWi BIBLIWi TOUTWi TAUTA DE GEGRAPTAI hINA
PISTEUHTE hOTI IHSOUS ESTIN hO XRISTOS hO hUIOS TOU QEOU KAI hINA
PISTEUONTES ZWHN EXHTE EN TWi ONOMATI AUTOU (John 20:30, 31).

[George quoting Edgar]
"When the Beroeans came to know the true one, was it not through their
dilligent study of the Scriptures?"

[George]
"Their diligent study brought them to the 'EIDOMEN'
level, in terms of the above passage, and from there came the Son, etc.
[I am guessing here, because in my scriptural ignorance I have not even
heard of the Beroeans before!]"

Beroea was about fifty miles from Thessalonica. It lay on the eastern
slopes of Mt. Vermion in the Olympian mountain range (See Pohill "Acts"
363).

The Beroeans are reported to have carefully examined the Scriptures
everyday to determine whether Paul and Silas were speaking the truth to
them. This search resulted in 'many Jews' becoming believers. I would
say they were past the point of OIDAMEN. They entered into a
relationship with the Most High God and His Son. They were at the level
of GINWSKW via their study of the Scriptures. (IMHO) Knowledge in a
Biblical sense is not only "head knowledge": it is relational
knowledge.

"The point here is that we do not KNOW God through
study of scripture, but only through God. There are tons of folks who
can read and study scripture till their eyes wear out and still not
know God! Reading God's Word does not give us KNOWLEDGE of God, in the
GINWSKW meaning of knowledge, but only in the EPISTHMH sense... Which
is knowing ABOUT God, you see..."

In view of Matt. 22:29-32, I would respectfully disagree. In this
Matthean pericope, Jesus offers a stinging rebuke to the Sadducees. He
informs them that that [sic] the reason they misunderstand the resurrection
of the dead is because of their Scriptural ignorance: "You know neither
the Scriptures nor the power of God."

"As regards the resurrection of the dead, did you not read what was
spoken to you hUPO QEOU LEGONTOS" (Matt. 22:31, 32).

Then Jesus references the account of the thornbush in Ex. 6. He
concludes that God is a God of the living, and not of the dead. How
does he arrive at this conclusion? By reflecting on the grammar of the
written record. This indicates that we can come to know God through a
careful reading of the Scriptures. I will concede your point, however.
There are many folks that read the Bible diligently and do not
understand [or know] God. This fact doesn't mean that one can't obtain knowledge of
God by reading Scripture (John 5:39ff).

[George quoting Edgar]
"Whenever Paul participated in his ministerial work, he reasoned with
people from the Scriptures, proving to them by references that Jesus is the Christ
(Acts 17:3, 4). I believe that he set an example for us, in this regard."

[George]
"No question about that, and what we overlook so
often is that he "came to them EN DUNAMIN..." His scriptural proofs
and reasonings would have had no impact at all without that power of the Spirit of the risen Christ actively supporting his efforts."

I agree 100%.

Take Care, George.

Edgar Foster
Classics Major
Lenoir-Rhyne College

Remarks on Stephen Hawking's New Book from the Pertinacious Papist

See http://pblosser.blogspot.com/2010/09/stephen-hawking-god-did-not-create.html

Luke 2:22

Certain scholars have claimed that Luke made a mistake when he spoke of the purification of "them" (αἱ ἡμέραι τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ αὐτῶν) in accordance with the Law of Moses (Luke 2:22). Should one conclude that Luke the doctor-cum-historian was mistaken in speaking of the need for "them" to be purified rather than "her" (i.e., Mary, the mother of Jesus)?

The KJV translates this portion of the verse with "her purification" rather than alluding to the purification of "them." The interpretive or textual problem is that we know of only one Greek MS which reads αὐτῇ as opposed to αὐτῶν (a twelfth-century text). This change was probably made because of the supposed difficulties with the Lukan account, but the textual evidence dating from the fourth century onwards is that the αὐτῶν is the preferred reading. Yet, the Law of Moses only prescribed that the mother of a male child needed to make purification for herself (Leviticus 12:1-8). How then, can one account for Luke's wording of this account?

Ralph Earle offers three possible explanations for the use of αὐτῶν:

(1) The pronoun could refer to Joseph and Mary; (2) it could reference the Jews (i.e. "Jewish" purification); (3) Luke may have "run together the cleansing of the mother and the offering of the child" (Word Meanings in the NT, 55).

Rogers and Rogers New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek NT suggests that the genitive plural AUTWN possibly refers to Mary and Joseph (indicating family solidarity) "or it may refer to the purification of Mary and to the redemption of the
firstborn" (112).

I. Howard Marshall writes (after examining different factors): "It is most likely that Luke has run together the cleansing of the mother and the offering of the child . . ." into one act" (see The Gospel of Luke: A Commentary on the Greek Text).

Thomas Aquinas on Ecclesiastes 3:19 and 12:7 (SCG 2.79)

Aquinas on Eccl 12:7 (from Summa Contra Gentiles 2.79)

"Hereby is banished the error of the impious in whose person it is said: We were born out of nothingness, and hereafter we shall be as though we had never been (Wisd. ii, 2); in whose person again Solomon says: One is the perishing of man and beast, and even is the lot of both: as man dies, so do beasts die: all breathe alike, and man hath no advantage over beasts (Eccles iii, 19): that he does not say this in his own person, but in the person of the ungodly, is clear from what he says at the end, as it were drawing a conclusion: Till the dust return to the earth, from whence it came; and the spirit go back to the God who gave it (Eccles xii, 7)."

What a way to explain Ecclesiastes 3:19.

Regards,

Edgar

My Amazon Review of S.M. Baugh's "A First John Reader"

Baugh's reader is about 150 pages in length. It is a unique work that I think will be of value to anyone who wishes to learn Greek in a fun and orderly manner.

What makes Baugh's work unique is how he teaches Greek to the neophyte. By the time that the beginning Greek student has progressed through Baugh's book, he or she will have acquired a solid foundation in the Greek language and will also have worked his or her way through the entire book of 1 John. That is no little accomplishment for the beginning Greek student.

In my humble opinion, Baugh's method is much more effective than simply
learning paradigms and morphological forms by rote memorization. His approach provides a methodological way to learn Greek that is simultaneously educative and
stimulating. Baugh also sets forth penetrating exegetical questions as the student
works his or her way through the reader, thus prompting the beginner to
continue in the hopes of finding grammatical or exegetical treasure.

Some Examples

Each section of Baugh's reader deals with some particular grammatical issue
(the Greek article, pronouns, cases, and tenses). Instead of just discussing
these matters abstractly, however, Baugh provides numerous examples from the
book of 1 John. On p. 3, Baugh points out that hO is "repeated four times in
[1 John 1:1] at the beginning of the first four clauses (and once in v. 3)."
But why does John keep employing hO in this passage? Baugh answers this
question in his reader and gives supplementary information buttressing his
stand vis-a'-vis the Johannine use of hO.

On p. 50, Baugh also has a very insightful discussion about Greek aspect and
its relationship to 1 John 3:9. He concludes that the standard interpretation of
3:9 is probably the best one. When exegeting the passage, Baugh skillfully
interacts with the views of D. Wallace and S. Smalley who do not espouse the
habitual sin view of 1 John 3:9 which Baugh advocates. This interaction is
appreciated, because it helps the student to make up his or her own mind
about 1 John 3:9 and Greek aspect.

The same cannot be said for other parts of Baugh's grammar. Overall I like his reader and do not regret that I purchased it. Nevertheless, there are some places where I have "quibbles" with his presentation.

When discussing 1 John 3:2, Baugh talks about the dative of respect (hOMOIOI
AUTWi), but never says to whom the dative of respect might apply. Does it possibly apply to the Father or to the Son? Granted, he writes concerning 1 John 3:1b that "the quality of God's love is John's focus.". But the author does not say whom Christians will be like, when commenting on 1 John 3:2c. Also, when speaking about 1 John 5:20, Baugh asks--"Who is the antecedent of hOUTOS? Jesus, the Son of God? Is this not an unambiguous statement of his deity?" Personally I think this section would have been better if Baugh asked the question and left it at that or offered grammatical possibilities. The student must decide who the antecedent of hOUTOS is, not the teacher. The instructor can guide, help, and point out little details here and there, but instruction is much more effective when a professor sets forth possibilities before students and lets them make grammatical decisions.

I am not just taking Baugh to task because I disagree with him theologically at a number of different points. Rather, I just feel that his reader could have been more effective had he not pushed certain viewpoints at particular junctures in his work. Since I thrive intellectually from examining conflicting views and arriving at a conclusion that I believe is theologically and grammatically warranted, I can read Baugh's book and derive great benefit from it in spite of my "quibbles." In the final analysis, I give it 4 stars and would recommend this reader to those who are interested in learning ancient Greek. Baugh's work is valuable in its own way.

You can find Baugh's Reader at http://www.amazon.com/First-John-Reader-Intermediate-Reading/dp/0875520952/ref=cm_rna_own_review_prod

Edgar G. Foster

More Scholarly Information on Ancient Jewish Monotheism

In his work Old Testament Theology, theologian Ralph Smith writes:

"In line with the thought of Deuteronomy 32:8, God had given the welfare of
the other nations into the hands of these subordinate divine beings, but they
failed to establish justice and righteousness in the earth among the nations"
(page 231).

The "subordinate divine beings" Smith references are the angels as shown by his earlier comments on Israelite monotheism (see page 231). These angels (according to this OT theologian), surround the throne of YHWH and loyally
serve Him in the capacity of seraphs, cherubs, and messengers. While I do not agree with Smith's treatment in toto (especially some of his comments concerning Deut. 32:8)--one cannot help but note the propriety of calling the angels (as Smith does), "subordinate divine beings."

Smith concludes by quoting G.E. Wright, who contends that the term monotheism "has always been used to define Judaism and Christianity in which the angelic host has survived and has been elaborated." Furthermore, D.S. Russell notes:

"There is ample evidence to show that [the OT] conception of monotheism was held in conjunction with a belief in a spiritual world peopled with supernatural and superhuman beings who, in some ways, shared the nature, though not the being, of God" (The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, page 235).

Maurice Casey on the Term "God" in Second Temple Judaism

Greetings,

Casey writes:

"Some beings [in 2nd Temple Judaism] seem to be of
almost divine status. At Wisdom of Solomon 7:21ff,
Wisdom is described in such terms. In 11Q Melchizedek,
Old Testament passages containing two of the words for
God (EL at Ps 7:8-9 and ELOHIM at Ps 82:1) are
interpreted of Melchizdek. Both ELIM and ELOHIM are
used with reference to angels in 4Q Shir Shabb. Philo
describes Moses as 'God and king of the whole nation'
(Life of Moses I, 158), and the LOGOS as 'the second
God' (Qu in Gen II, 62). At 3 Enoch 12:3-5, God crowns
Metatron, who is enthroned in heaven, and calls him
'The lesser YHWH'" (From Jewish Prophet to Gentile
God: The Origins and Development of New Testament
Christology. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John
Knox Press, 1991), p. 79.


ERRWSO,
Edgar Foster

Augustine of Hippo on "Better" and "Greater"

I found this quote in Augustine's writings that I'm still mulling over. Augustine says: "In things in which greatness goes not by bulk, being greater means being better" (De Trinitate Vi, 9).

Could this passage constitute a response to those Trinitarians who contend that "greater" does not mean "better" in John 14:28?

Regards,

Edgar

Revisting Lightfoot and "Ut Deo"

Previously on this blog, we discussed the saying by Pliny which Tertullian also quotes in his apology regarding Christ, namely, "ad canendum Christo et Deo" or as Bishop Lightfoot has suggested "ut Deo."

While my investigations on this subject are not completed yet, one thing that I have been trying to ascertain is Lightfoot's rationale for his emendation of Tertullian's text; particularly, his suggestion that we should read "ut" rather than the Latin conjunction "et." Granted, we could just chalk everything up to Lightfoot's bias (which may be the case), but I would like to know his stated reasons for choosing the emendation "ut" over against "et." And it is also of interest that G.A.T. Davies writes:

"as Lightfoot observes (op. cit. i 57, note), there can be no question that the correct reading is ut." See http://www.tertullian.org/articles/davies_tert_pliny.htm

At http://books.google.com/books?id=ZqcQAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA537&dq=lightfoot+and+christo+ut+deo&hl=en&ei=msszTMmhFcT48Aap9NnMCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=false

one can find Lightfoot's three stated reasons for preferring the reading "ut" to "et" in Tertullian's Apology. Check out page 537. One thing that does not make sense to me in this debate is why Lightfoot would insist on "ut" rather than "et" to uphold Trinitarian belief. One could still argue that "ut" does not necessarily support a Trinitarian reading of Tertullian's work.

Lightfoot appears to be basing his suggested emendation on Eusebius' reading of Tertullian which is TON CRISTON QEOU DIKHN hUMNEIN.

If you want to see Lightfoot's text, you can also click on the title of this blog entry.

Regards,

Edgar

Gunnar Samuelsson and the STAUROS of Christ

See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/religion/7849852/Jesus-did-not-die-on-cross-says-scholar.html

Origen of Alexandria (On Prayer 10)

It remains, accordingly, to pray to God alone, the Father of All, not however apart from the High Priest who has been appointed by the Father with swearing of an oath, according to the words He hath sworn and shall not repent, "You art a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek." In thanksgiving to God, therefore, during their prayers, saints acknowledge His favors through Christ Jesus.

Just as the man who is scrupulous about prayer ought not to pray to one who himself prays but to the Father upon whom our Lord Jesus has taught us to call in our prayers, so we are not to offer any prayer to the Father apart from Him. He clearly sets this forth himself when He says, "Verily, verily, I tell you, whatsoever you may ask of my Father He shall give you in my house. Until but now you have not asked aught in my name. Ask and you shall receive, that your joy may be fulfilled."

He did not say, "Ask of me," nor yet simply "Ask of the father," but "Whatsoever you may ask of the Father, He will give you in my name." For until Jesus taught this, no one had asked of the Father in the name of the Son. True was the saying of Jesus, "Until but now you have not asked aught in my name"; and true also the words, "Ask and you shall receive, that your joy may be fulfilled." Should anyone, however who believes that prayer ought to be made to Christ himself, confused by the sense of the expression make obeisance, confront us with that acknowledged reference to Christ in Deuteronomy, "Let all God's angels make obeisance to Him," we may reply to him that the church, called Jerusalem by the prophet, is also said to have obeisance made to her by kings and queens who become her foster sires and nurses, in the words, "Behold, I lift up my hand upon the nations, and upon the isles will I lift up my sign: and they shall bring your sons in their bosom and your daughters they shall lift up on their shoulders; and kings shall be your foster sires, their queens they nurses: to the face of the earth shall they make obeisance to you, and the dust of your feet shall they lick: and you shall know that I am the Lord and shall not be ashamed."

And how does it not accord with Him who said, "Why callest you me good? None is good save One—God the Father" to suppose that He would say, "Why pray you to me? To the Father alone ought you to pray, to whom I also pray, as indeed you learn from the holy Scriptures. For you ought not to pray to one who has been appointed high priest for you by the Father and has received it from the Father to be advocate, but through a high priest and advocate able to sympathize with your weaknesses, having been tried in all points like you but, by reason of the Father's free gift to me, tried without sin.

Herman Bavinck on the Tetragrammaton

On page 105 of The Doctrine of God, Herman Bavinck writes regarding Exodus 3:14:

"God does not call himself 'the One who is' in the abstract. He gives no explanation of his aseity, but he declares very explicitly what he is and what is his character. Now what is he and what is his character? This cannot be expressed in a single word, but 'he will be that he will be.' Everything is included in this expression; to be sure this qualification is general and indefinite, but for that very reason it is so rich and so full of meaning: he will be what he has been for the patriarchs, what he is now, and what he will remain: for his people he will be everything."

IS THE TRINITY AN EXPLICIT BIBLE TEACHING? (Some Revisions)

IS THE TRINITY AN EXPLICIT BIBLE TEACHING?

The foundational teaching of theology is the ontological dogma of the Trinity. Owen Thomas remarks that "in the doctrine of God the most fundamental thing we have to say is that God is self-revealed as triune, as threefold, as Father, Son and Holy Spirit" (Thomas "Intro" 59). Thomas F. Torrance concurs by stating:

"there is in fact no real knowledge of God except through his revealing or naming of himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, for the three Persons are the one true God" (Torrance "Christian Doctrine" 15). So according to Christian theology proper, humans cannot know God unless they know Him as a threefold Being. Supposedly this is the manner in which He has revealed Himself--as triune. Commenting further on the Trinity, Torrance adds: "the New Testament does not speak of the Holy Trinity in parts or in various statements, for it is his one indivisible Self that God utters in his revelation" (Torrance "Christian Doctrine" 43). This Protestant theologian concludes:

"the central focus of the Gospel upon the Deity of Christ is the door that opens the way to the understanding of God's triune self-revelation as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Quite clearly a theological interpretation of the New Testament Scriptures must be at once both Christological and trinitarian" (49).

It is manifest prima facie where Torrance stands vis-a'-vis the Trinity doctrine. He unequivocally testifies to its alleged truthfulness and avidly insists that it is a Biblical teaching. Despite Torrance's frequent appeal to Holy Writ, serious questions linger concerning the Trinity. Is the Trinity doctrine implied in the Old Testament? Is it explicit in the New Testament? Does the Bible teach that God is triune?

As with any theological question, scholars are divided. Some scholars contend that the Trinity is implicit in the Bible; others say it is not. Some theologians even claim that the Trinity is explicit in the New Testament. What should we think?

One reference work that thoroughly discusses this issue is the excellent book entitled _The Genesis Debate_. This anthology is filled with intriguing discussions based on Genesis. On every issue, two scholars take opposing viewpoints and argue either for or against a proposition. The crowning point of the book is when two Trinitarians discuss the issue--is the Trinity teaching implicit in the book of Genesis? One scholar answers affirmatively that the Trinity is implicit in the Bible (particularly in the book of Genesis). The other scholar says no, Genesis does not imply a Trinity. He further asserts the Trinity is not taught in the New Testament. How does this Trinitarian scholar come to this conclusion? Let's review his arguments.

The scholar I am referring to is Alan J. Hauser (professor of religion
and philosophy at App State). Although possessing definite views
regarding the triune Godhead, his ideas are remarkably objective. On page 110 of the book _The Genesis Debate_, professor Hauser (while debating Eugene Merrill) discusses his views of the Trinity with respect to the Biblical book of Genesis. Hauser contends that "the doctrine of the Trinity is not implied in Genesis 1." In this basic contention, Hauser is not alone. Even Thomas F. Torrance who believes the Trinity without equivocation, offers the same sentiments. After providing extensive documentation from the New Testament to support his belief in the Trinity, Torrance cautions:

"This does not imply that the New Testament presents us with explicit
teaching about the Holy Trinity, far less with a ready-made formal
doctrine of the Trinity, but rather that it exhibits a coherent witness to God's trinitarian self-revelation imprinted upon its
theological content in an implicit conceptual form evident in a whole
complex of implicit references and indications in the gospels and
epistles" (49).

So what is Torrance saying? Is the Trinity an explicit
Bible teaching, according to this theologian? No, it is not. What is
more, Torrance says that the revealed dogma of the Trinity derives from "implicit references and indications in the gospels and epistles." Is it wise, however, to base our understanding of God on "implicit references and indications" recorded in the Bible? Can it lead to an accurate understanding of Almighty God and the "Son of His love"?

Both Hauser and Torrance are trinitarians. Both scholars also admit that the Trinity is not an explicit Bible teaching. Torrance justifies his belief in the Trinity by appealing to implicit Old and New Testament references. What about Hauser, however? How does he justify his position? He explains:

"since there are so many other factors on the basis of which one can affirm or deny the doctrine of the Trinity, it should be obvious that a Christian can simultaneously affirm the doctrine and yet deny that it is implied in Genesis 1" (Hauser "Debate"
111).

These comments help us to appreciate two very significant points.
Firstly, we are not dealing with an adversary of the Trinity when we read the comments of Hauser. Secondly, Hauser admits that there are other factors which influence his decision to affirm the Trinity doctrine, whether it is an explicit Bible teaching or not. In contradistinction to this professor of religion, most Trinitarians say that the Trinity existed in seminal form in the Old Testament (like an acorn)--then it gradually grew into an oak tree in the New Testament (Merrill). It has also been asserted that the second and third century church taught the Trinity doctrine. There have been
many discussions back and forth over this matter and quite a few works
have been published to support both sides. But the evidence indicates
that "the doctrine of the Trinity is a relatively "late" development" (Hauser 111).

Charles Ryrie, Owen Thomas and Jaroslav Pelikan have all outlined the historical developments of the Trinity. All concur that the doctrine of the Trinity is a relatively "late" dogma. Ryrie states that the Trinity is implied in the writings of the early church (first century ecclesia), but it is not explicitly taught in those writings. It was not until 325 C.E. that a formulated creed was published, which "defined" and "clarified" the essential relationship between the Father and the Son. Even at that point, a full-blown doctrine of God' triunity did not exist. The Nicene Council only concluded that the Father and Son are ontologically one: it did not include the Holy
Spirit in the co-substantial relationship supposedly obtaining between the Father and Son. There was simply an implication that the Holy Spirit was in some way associated with the Godhead.
Yes there was an affirmation of belief in the Holy Spirit, but the
Nicene Creed did not put forth a triune statement about God. It would
take another fifty-six years and more "heretical" developments, before
the relationship between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit was clarified.

Although activities were predicated of the Holy Spirit that can only be predicated of God, the Trinity was still not explicitly called God.
Further addenda or adjustments would be made before the church would
explicitly state that the holy spirit was equal to the Father and the
Son.

One early witness who testifies to these early developments regarding
the Trinity doctrine is Gregory of Nazianzus. In the work _Epistles 58_ Gregory Nazianzus explained the absence of the Holy Spirit from the ancient discussions about the Godhead, by stating that "the
Old Testament proclaimed the Father manifestly, and the Son more
hiddenly. The New [Testament] manifested the Son and suggested the
deity of the Spirit. Now the Spirit himself is resident among us, and
provides a clearer explanation of himself." As late as 380, he wrote, "to be slightly in error [about the Holy Spirit] was to be orthodox." This statement too proves that the orthodox understanding of the Holy Spirit was not "clear" until 381. As a matter of fact, this statement further demonstrates that the church neither subscribed to nor affirmed the teaching of the Trinity until 381 C.E. It is clear that the "details" of the Trinity still had to be worked
out (The Christian Tradition, Jaroslav Pelikan, Vol. I, p.
213. Cf. also Gregory Nazianzus--Orations 31.5). From a brief look at
these developments, it seems warranted to conclude that the NT does not present a clear expression of the Triune Godhead. Therefore, we could reasonably conclude that neither the primitive church nor the ante-Nicene fathers taught the Trinity. Gregory Nazianzus even proclaimed that Scripture did not, "very clearly
or very often call him [the Holy Spirit] God in so many words, as it does the Father and later on the Son" (Gregory Nazianzus, Orations 31.12).

Gregory's testimony is so important because he lived at the time when the Trinity assimilated its way into Christian didache. Concerning this prominent Christian "father," Jaroslav Pelikan says: "In remarkable summary of the controversy within the orthodox camp, composed in the same year, he [Gregory Nazianzus] declared: "Of the wise men among ourselves, some have conceived of him
[the Holy spirit] as an activity, some as a creature, some as God; and some have been uncertain which to call him . . . And therefore they neither worship him nor treat him with dishonor, but take up a neutral position." He did add, however, that "of those who consider him to be God, some are orthodox in mind only, while others venture to be so with the lips also."

It was apparently not only "careful distinctions, derived from
unpractical philosophy and vain delusion" that could be blamed for this confusion, but also the undeveloped state of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in relation to the Son in the Trinity." ( The Christian
Tradition, Jaroslav Pelikan, p. 213. Cf. Gregory Nazianzus, Orations,
21.33, 31:5. Also Basil, On The Holy Spirit 3.5). Gregory Nazianzus makes it very clear that the Bible is not explicit in the matter of the Trinity. It does not call the holy spirit God "very often or clearly." In fact, German theologian Karl Rahner writes that the NT never applies the Greek term QEOS to the holy spirit. It is also of interest that Scripture never enjoins Christians that prayer should be offered to the Holy Spirit, nor are Christians ever instructed to worship the Spirit of God. These omissions and more appear strange if the Spirit is fully God. Furthermore, we read that "the liturgical usage of the church did not seem to provide instances of worship or prayer addressed to him [The Holy Spirit]" (The Christian Tradition, Vol. I, p. 212). Based on the foregoing information, it seems that one may safely conclude that Hauser's conclusions are valid when he says that the Trinity is of a relatively late origin:

"While the church eventually came to view as
heretical many of the positions presented by early
Christian writers about the nature of Christ, his
person and work, the relationship of the Father to
the Son, etc., most of these nonorthodox positions
are not specifically and unequivocally ruled out by
the New Testament itself. Many of those whose
teachings were later declared unorthodox
maintained that certain New Testament passages
supported their views and argued, sometimes
eloquently, in support of such claims. They could not
have done so if the New Testament were so clear in
delineating the doctrine of the Trinity that positions
other than those eventually spelled out by the
councils were automatically ruled out. We do well to
remember that, on balance, most heretics were not
evil persons who deliberately tried to pervert the
teachings of the New Testament. Many of them were
sincere and well-intentioned interpreters who
advocated theological positions that the Church, in
its wisdom, eventually came to view as wrong" (128).

Lest it be concluded from the above-quoted material that Hauser
denounces non-Trinitarian Christians, note the following:

"There is an excellent example in Mark 15:33-36 of the way in which
different people will place the same words in different contexts . . .
The evangelist, writing for a Christian audience, leads his readers to
understand Jesus' words as an expression of the spirit of affliction
described in Psalm 22. Those standing by the cross, however, understand the same words in the context of their suspicion that Jesus was a messianic revolutionary who planned a rebellion against Rome and conclude that Jesus still expects help from Elijah . . .Thus the same words are understood in two different ways by persons who place them in different contexts of meaning" (128).


Hauser further asseverates that neither John 1, Colossians 1 nor
Hebrews 1 explicitly spell out the doctrine of the Trinity. These
verses "are only individual statements and ideas, which were later
incorporated into the church's doctrine"
(129).

Further evidence is thus provided that the Trinity evidently is not a clear Bible teaching. We must therefore pose the query, should we put faith in a doctrine that does not have explicit Bible support?

Continuing with Hauser's analysis of the explicitness or lack thereof
vis-a'-vis the Trinity, we now turn to the book of Genesis and what it
has to say about the triune Godhead. Genesis 1:2 is one verse invoked
by some who believe that the Old Testament implies the Trinity. This
verse (according to the RSV) reads: "the earth was a formless void and
darkness covered the face of the deep, while a wind from God swept over the face of the waters" (NAB reads similarly).

One of the significant terms in this Scriptural passage is "wind". The Hebrew word translated "wind" is ruach. Some translations render ruach as "spirit" or "active force." Either translation is philologically acceptable. Based on the context of Genesis 1:2, however, Hauser opts for ruach meaning "wind" in this case. He bases his conclusions on the use of ruach in Genesis 6:17; 7:15; 7:22. In early church usage, it seems that there was an extensive debate about how ruach should be translated. Hauser relates: "a number of early church fathers favored 'spirit'; Tertullian vacilated; Epharaem and Theodoret favored 'wind.'" See W.H. McClellan, "The Meaning of Ruah 'Elohim in Gen. 1:2," Biblica 15 (1936) 519-20. H.M. Orlinsky, "The Plain Meaning of RUAH in Gen. 1:2," Jewish Quarterly Review 48, 174-80, cites numerous commentators . . . who argue for "wind" (129).

It is also good to note that ruach is translated "breath" in Psalm
18:15 with reference to the "breath" of God. Concerning God's "breath," Hauser explains:

"unlike the breath of all flesh, the breath (ruach) of God is clearly a powerful force, one that can shake the cosmos. Combined in the idea of the "breath of God" are the analogies of breath (as in human breath) and of a powerful wind" (114).

God is therefore said to possess "breath" in both the Old Testament and the New Testament. In actuality, God does not have "breath". This is a Biblical analogy that helps us to appreciate Jehovah's possession of an irresistible, potent, awesome invisible force through which He accomplishes His inexorable sovereign will. This "force" can "shake the cosmos" and I believe that it was employed by God to shape the universe (Ps. 33:6). Genesis does not portray this "breath" (ruach) as a persona, but rather as the active force of God the Father.


This point is suggested by a further analysis of the word ruach in Genesis and the rest of the Old Testament canon. The OT utilizes ruach to denote not only symbolic "breath" but a literal "force" (wind) as well. It is used in this manner in Genesis 8:1 (Cf. also Numbers 11:31). God is also said to walk through the Garden
of Eden in the 'breezy' part of the day. These texts show the manner in which ruach can be translated or understood. Hauser thus concludes
that "wind" (not "spirit") is the best translation of ruach in Genesis 1:2. He bases this understanding on the meaning of ruach as well as the context of Genesis 1.

Can we make a definite assertion about what the ruach is in Genesis 1:2? Was it just "wind" or the ruach Hakodesh of Yahweh? I must admit that I lean toward the idea that the ruach mentioned in Genesis 1:2 refers to God's Holy Spirit. My views are based primarily on Psalm 33:6 and 104:24ff. Although I part ways with Hauser as to what the ruach is in Genesis 1:2, I can agree that there is no implication of a Trinity in Genesis. While the ruach may belong to God, this doesn't mean that the Holy Spirit exists as some third "person" in a triune Godhead. To the contrary, God's Spirit is likened to the "breath of his mouth" in Psalm 33:6. True, God does not literally depend upon some type of "breath" to keep His life sustained--He is completely self existent, with God is the source of life, by light from Him we live and see light (Psalm 36:9)--it is therefore not literal breath discussed in Psalm 33:6, the Bible is simply using analogous language. Yet the analogy teaches us that God's Spirit is not a Person: it is a force. 1 Corinthians 2:11 seems to buttress this notion when it compares the holy spirit to the self-consciousness of God. The appearance of ruach in Genesis 1:2 thereby provides no proof for the Trinity doctrine.

Another significant word we need to analyze is Elohim. Genesis 1:2
associates Elohim with ruach. Some therefore point to the use of Elohim as proof that ruach in Genesis 1:2 denotes God's Spirit (i.e., the supposed third Person of the Trinity). Hauser insists that this is erroneous thinking for two primary reasons: 1)Elohim doesn't always mean "God." At times it can evidently mean, "awesome" or "powerful." WE RUACH ELOHIM would thus denote "a powerful wind sent from God." (Hauser, 117) This definition would harmonize with the thoughts in Hosea 13:15 and Job 30:22. At any rate, no proof would exist for calling the Spirit of God a person. To further elucidate this point, let us notice Hauser's line of
reasoning:

"Let us briefly examine the use of 'spirit of God' in the Old
Testament. The first part of the phrase, 'spirit of,' is commonly used
in the construct state in Hebrew to denote the motivating force or
dynamic power of a person or of God. In 2 Chronicles 36:22 we are told
that 'the Lord stirred up the spirit of Cyrus king of Persia' to issue
a proclamation allowing worshipers of Israel's God to rebuild His
temple (cf. Ezra 1:1). In 1 Chronicles 5:26 God stirs up 'the spirit of Pul king of Assyria - that is, the spirit of Tiglath-Pileser king of Assyria' to carry away some of the tribes of Israel" (118, 119).

Additionally:

"In these instances 'spirit of' does not denote an
entity in any way separate from the person but rather
the active, forceful power of that person (cf. also
Gen. 45:27; 2 Kings 2:15; 1 Sam. 30:12; Hag. 1:14).
Why should we presume that it is different when the
object of the phrase 'spirit of' is God? When we are
told in Judges 14:6 that the 'spirit of the LORD
came mightily upon' Samson, and that Samson tore
apart the lion, does this mean that the Holy Spirit
seized Samson? What is meant instead is that
God's power came upon Samson and gave him
strength (see also, for example, Judg. 6:34, 11:29).
There is *no hint* of a separate person within the
Godhead from the Father acting upon the individual .
. . see, for example, 2 Kings 2:16; 1 Sam. 10:6;
11:6) (119).

Thus Hauser summarizes his view of Genesis 1:2 by demonstrating very
thoroughly that the Old Testament concept of the Spirit of God is not
synonymous with the Trinitarian concept of the Holy Spirit as God. In this evaluation and analysis he is supported by P.K. Jewett who believes that the Holy Spirit (as recorded in the Old Testament) never refers to "a Person distinct from the Father and the Son," but rather "the divine nature viewed as vital energy" (Jewett qtd. by Ryrie 346). While Genesis 1:2 does not provide support for a triune God, there are other passages that scholars turn to in Holy Writ to buttress the Trinity doctrine. In particular, some Trinitarians appeal to Elohim passages.

One of these verses is Genesis 1:26. The ancient lawgiver Moses there
recorded "And God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our
likeness.'" To support their position, Trinitarians often invoke this
verse as proof that God is triune. Does the fact that Genesis 1:26 uses the word "us," and also employs the plural
possessive pronoun "our" mean that Genesis 1:26 endorses or adumbrates the ontological dogma of the Trinity? Before we hastily conclude that this is the case, please note the comments of Charles Ryrie:

"We have . . . suggested that the plural
name for God, Elohim, denotes God's unlimited greatness and supremacy. To conclude plurality of Persons from the name itself is dubious. However, when God speaks of Himself with plural pronouns (Gen. 1:26, 3:22; 11:7; Isa. 6:8) and plural verbs . . . it does seem to indicate distinctions of Persons, though only plurality, not specifically Trinity" (51).

Hauser expands on this argument. He does not think that the use of the
Elohim in Genesis 1:26 proves that Genesis teaches God's triunity. One reason that Hauser concludes this has to do with the Hebrew
word Elohim. Granted, Elohim is morphologically plural as are "us" and "our." But these words, while they might seem to indicate plurality, definitely do not suggest triunity. It must also be kept in mind that in Hebrew it is common for the plural noun to cause the verb to be plural (Cf. Genesis 20:13, 35:7). E.A Speiser therefore renders Genesis 1:26 as follows: "The God said, 'I will make man in my image, after my likeness.'"


Commenting on Deuteronomy 6:4 and its use of Elohim, Baptist seminarian president John. D.W. Watts reports that Elohim conveys "to the Semitic ear the idea of the total sum of divine attributes and powers . . . 'One Lord' conveys the essential idea. He is unique, different, exclusive. He is not many, but one . . . Yahweh is a single unified person. In no sense is he to be understood as represented in diverse forms and appearances in different
places as Baal and other nature deities were" (The Broadman Bible
Commentary, Vol. 2, p. 214).

There is also another probable explanation for Genesis 1:26 and its use of "us" for God. The Hebraic expert Gesenius described the Hebrew word for "us" as a "plural of self-deliberation." Both Gesenius and C. Westermann have upheld this view and classed Isaiah 6:3 in the same category. In other words, what Gesenius says is that God could have been talking or 'deliberating' with Himself at Gen. 1:26. While this is a grammatical possibility, I personally concur with the view which holds that the Father (Jehovah) was addressing His Son at Genesis 1:26 when he said "us" and "our." The New Testament would also appear to support such a conclusion (Col. 1:15-17). At any rate, if God spoke to His Son, this still would not prove the Trinity. Only two persons would be involved, not three. The view that God was "self-deliberating", however, cannot be easily discounted and seems less problematic.

From all these points, what are we to conclude? The weight of the
scholarly and Biblical evidence is that Genesis does not imply a
Trinity. The ruach mentioned at Genesis 1:2 is ambiguous and the plural pronouns found in Genesis 1:26 also don't per se indicate a Trinity, but possibly a plurality. The O.T. does not contain the Trinity in seminal form, but teaches about a God who is truly ONE--the God of the Shema, whose name is Jehovah.

Regards,

Edgar

A Link for Sir Isaac Newton's Work on 1 John 5:7 and 1 Timothy 3:16

See http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=cIoPAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA1&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Reliability of God's Word

Frederic G. Kenyon is noted for observing that the "last foundation for any doubt that the Scriptures have come down to us substantially as they were written has now been removed."

Kenyon's statement seems to be correct: Scripture has substantially come down to us as it was written. Despite the attempts to change, alter or corrupt the written Word of God, the Most High Deity Jehovah has protected or guarded His Word, as He duly promised in Holy Writ.

For example, in ancient times, the famed Johannine Comma was added to the first Epistle of John (1 John 5:7). However, many noted scholars (themselves Trinitarians) have produced mounds of evidence showing that the Comma Johanneum should not be included in the Bible. Granted, some may still contend that the Comma belongs in Scripture, but the preponderance of evidence is certainly not in their favor.

Somewhat more innocuously, we find examples of textual variants in the book of Philippians. Philippians 3:21 (in the Majority Text) reads:

EIS TO GENESQAI AUTO SUMMORFON.

But this reading does not appear earlier than the seventh century CE.

The Majority Text also adds XRISTWi in Phil 4:13.
Moises Silva points out nonetheless that while this variant is
attested as early as the fourth century CE, "the omission
has much wider and stronger attestation" (Philippians,
236). All the same, I don't find either reading
particularly problematic for my faith.

Finally, we have 1 Timothy 3:16, which has QEOS in some
texts rather than hOS. But If one seriously examines this
matter, he/she will find that the reading
QEOS appears no earlier than the eighth or ninth
century CE. Metzger demonstrates the superior status of
the lectio hOS over QEOS in 1 Tim 3:16, something even Isaac Newton discerned years prior to Metzger and
other textual critics.

In closing, I'd also like to refer you to a book
written by Neil Lightfoot entitled "How We Got the
Bible." Lightfoot's work is accessible but scholarly.
He convincingly demonstrates that we can put trust in
the 66 holy books that we have in our
possession today. He also shows how claims about
textual variations have often been exaggerated. For
instance, let us suppose that we have 1000 copies of a
work and 500 copies contain one clausal variant. That
is, there is one clause in 500 copies of the book that
differs from the other 500 books that have the same identical
clause in each of them. In this kind of situation,
how many variant readings might one be justified in
saying there are in the 500 books? Would there be one clausal
variant that occurs 500 times or 500 clausal variants altogether?

Some who (wittingly or unwittingly) desire to magnify
biblical variants would probably--in fact, many times
are--be inclined to say that there were 500 different
readings in the scenario presented above. But why
could we not say that there is simply one variant that
occurs 500 times? My point is that sometimes disparate
readings are counted where there is really no need to
do so. Lightfoot discusses this point and provides a
lucid account of why it is wrong-headed to tabulate
repeats of a distinct reading as additional
occurrences of the said variant.

Agape,
Edgar

F.C. Conybeare on 1 John 5:7

See http://www.1john57.com/conybeare.htm or just click on the title of this blog entry.

Regards,

Edgar

Tentative Outline for a Book on Divine Property instantiation

1. What is a PROPERTY?

a. Concreta
b. Abstracta
c. Monadic
d. Polyadic
e. Relational
f. Functional
g. first-order
h. second-order

2. The Problem of Universals

a. Plato
b. Difficulties with Platonism
c. Aristotle and Hylomorphism
d. Philo
e. Augustine of Hippo
f. Medieval Scholasticism
g. Ockham, Aquinas and Scotus
h. Peter Abelard

3. Divine Property Instantiation

a. Which Properties might God instantiate?
b. Scriptural testimony to divine property instantiation.
c. How Divine Property Instantiation May Provide a Coherent Account of Universals
d. Addressing a Possible Kantian Objection to the Approach Used in this Work

Elizabeth Anscombe on Murder

What is murder? How should we define the word?

Elizabeth Anscombe argues that the central idea of murder is the "unjust killing of humans" (see p. 8 of her work Ethics, Religion and politics). Murder is thus not simply a legal concept. For instance, think about the horrific acts that were committed during the Nazi regime. Whether there was a written law against the Holocaust or not, one could still rightly contend that Hitler and his forces murdered other human beings on a grand scale. Anscombe points out that if we restrict "murder" to a legal concept, we will end up committing the error of Thrasymachus, namely, legal positivism.

Interesting Quote from John the Damascene on God and Time

Before the world was formed, when there was as yet no sun dividing day from night, there was not an age such as could be measured, but there was the sort of temporal motion and interval that is co-extensive with eternity. And in this sense there is but one age, and God is spoken of as AINIOS and PROAIWNIOS, for the age or æon itself is His creation. For God, Who alone is without beginning, is Himself the Creator of all things, whether age or any other existing thing. And when I say God, it is evident that I mean the Father and His Only begotten Son, our Lord, Jesus Christ, and His all-holy Spirit, our one God (John the Damascene, De Fide 2.1).

I included the part about the one God being the tripersonal God in order that I could not be accused of clipping the quote or taking it out of context.

Best regards,

Edgar

Loren Johns on the Rhetoric of Revelation

Some of you might be interested in this piece by Dr. Loren Johns on the non-violent ethic and rhetoric of John's Apocalypse.

http://www.ambs.edu/ljohns/LambRPAJ.htm

Best regards,

Edgar

Gerald Bray on Tertullian's "Trinitarianism"

Church historian Gerald Bray writes:

"In his counterblast to Praxeas, Tertullian came as
near as he could to trinitarianism, without abandoning
his fundamentally monotheistic and, to our minds,
unitarian position. The Father always remained God in
a way which did not apply to the other two persons,
however much he might share his power and authority
with them."

See Bray's _The Doctrine of God_, pages 130-131_ for the full
details. Similar points are mentioned in my work on
Tertullian.

Figurative Language Regarding God in the Early Fathers

I am often amazed at the part that figurative language and metaphor played in the early church. For example, note how Melito of Sardis interprets the scriptural language about YHWH and his Son:

See http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf08.x.v.xvi.html#x.v.xvi-p48.1%20Melito

More on the Anonymous God Issue

Greetings,

I am posting the following in response to some information that has been posted on this blog regarding the pre-Nicenes and God's personal name. I have written more on this subject and, if time permits, I'll be posting more on this forum. I do appreciate your thoughts. Interesting material on God's name has been submitted here:

The pre-Nicenes are in general agreement that God does
not have a personal name other than DEUS. At any rate,
Lactantius and other early ecclesiastical writers
certainly do not appear to use "Father" as a proper
designation for God. Rather, Lactantius professes that
the supreme deity is the anonymous God and Father of
all. The only NOMEN PROPRIUM that he needs is God:
"Because God is unique, his proper name is God"
(Divinae institutiones 1.6.5). The Corpus Hermetica
(5.34) supplies a similar portrait of the divine: "And
for this cause He has all Names, because He is the One
Father; and therefore He has no Name, because He is
the Father of all." Moreover, one cannot forget the
familiar testimony of Justin Martyr regarding the
anonymous God and Father of all: "To the Father of
all, no name is given; for anyone who has been given a
name has received the name from someone older than
himself. Father and God and Creator and Lord and
Master are not names but appellations derived from his
benefices and works" (2 Apology 6).

According to Justin, humans do not have a name for the
deity. Words that appear to be divine NOMINA are
nothing more than vehicles delineating God's functions
PRO NOBIS (Marsh, Triune God, 189); they are also ways
of invoking God based on his interpersonal revelatory
activity. In order to appreciate Justin’s doctrine of
God’s innominability, it is necessary to make a
distinction between names (ONOMATA) and forms of
address (PROSRHSEIS)). Terms such as PATER or DOMINUS,
according to Justin Martyr, are not ONOMATA but
PROSRHSEIS. He views God as someone to whom one may
speak but of whom one may not speak. God is known as
"thou" never as "he." For Justin, not even the term
QEOS is a name since it has neither a cognoscible nor
an incognoscible meaning: "His [Justin's] use of the
word PROSRHSEIS is much more perceptive than Clement's
account that the mind uses these deific titles as a
form of support or prop (EPEPEIDESQAI TOUTOIS)." God
is strictly anonymous and innominable in Justin's
estimation. Justin thinks that not even God (QEOS) is
his name.

Regards,

Edgar

Revelation 1:18 Translation

There has been some discussion on another forum regarding Revelation 1:18. I now want to report what I have found pertaining to the translation of 1:18 and I would like to retrieve some input. How might one render ἐγενόμην νεκρὸς καὶ ἰδοὺ ζῶν εἰμι?

The Greek Text: καὶ ὁ ζῶν, καὶ ἐγενόμην νεκρὸς καὶ ἰδοὺ ζῶν εἰμι εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων καὶ ἔχω τὰς κλεῖς τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ ᾅδου (UBS5).

Some translations of the verse:

"I am the Living One; I was dead, and behold I am alive for ever and ever!"
(NIV)

"and the living one. I died, and behold I am alive forevermore" (ESV)

"and the living one: and I became dead, and behold, I am living to the ages of
ages" (Darby)

"He that liveth, and was dead" (People's NT of 1891)

"and he who is living, and I did become dead, and, lo, I am living to the ages of the ages" (YLT)

"I am he who lives, I have been dead" (Lattimore)

"and the Living one; and I was dead, and behold, I am alive for evermore, and I have the keys of death and of Hades" (ERV).

Commentators:

Wilfrid J. Harrington (Sacra Pagina Commentary on Revelation) prefers the rendering "I am the first and the last, the living one who was dead." Concerning this treatment of the verse, he writes:

"Charles (1:31) rightly maintains that the text should be rendered as given in our translation" (See Harrington, Revelation, page 51).

Alford writes: "and I was (not HN, but EGENOMHN, ----I became: it was a state I passed into) dead, and behold I am alive for evermore" (see The Greek Testament by Henry Alford, IV:559)

Robertson's Word Pictures: "And I was dead (KAI EGENOMHN NEKRO[S]). 'And I became dead' (aorist middle participle of GINOMAI as in John 1:9 John 1:10, definite reference to the Cross)."

Jamison, Fausset and Brown: "and was--Greek, 'and (yet) I became.'"

Bengel's Gnomon: Ἐγενόμην νεκρὸς, I became dead) It might have been said, ἀπέθανον, I died: but in this passage with singular elegance it is said, I became dead, to denote a difference of times, and of the events in them.

What do you think?

John Hick and the Incarnation

In his book The Metaphor of God Incarnate (p. 69-71), John Hick quotes Frank Weston (1871-1924), a Trinitarian bishop who served in Africa. Weston asks: "How can the Logos as self-limited be the subject of the passion, the agony, the desolation and death upon the cross, and yet at the same moment be the living and life-giving Son of God?"

Weston's own answer is: "No one has answered the question, no one can answer it."

Why did Weston continue to affirm the Incarnation in light of his own admission? He writes that those who believe in the Incarnation of Christ "wisely refuse to limit the divine power by the measure of what is possible to man. And with them we may well pause; fortifying our faith by the contemplation of the Father's love and omnipotence, in the face of the supreme mystery of redemption."

In other words, Weston appeals to divine mystery rather than try to understand the Incarnation in the light of unaided or natural reason. Admittedly, he does try to set forth analogies that may show the plausibility of the divine mystery; nevertheless, Weston faithfully adhered to his view that the Incarnation is a divine mystery. Hick points out that Weston is not alone in this regard.

Lightfoot and Tertullian's Mention of Pliny in Apology I.2

See http://tertullian.org/articles/davies_tert_pliny.htm

One quote from this link says: "The first of these 'errors' [in Tertullian's Apology] is the reading Christo et Deo, given by most of the MSS of the Apology, while Pliny (see above) writes Christo quasi Deo.

Prof. Merrill does well to place little weight on this discrepancy, for, as Lightfoot observes (op. cit. i 57, note), there can be no question that the correct reading is ut. Oehler indeed accepted et, and protested against Scaliger's emendation (followed by Havercamp) as 'contra librorum optimorum et paene omnium fidem.' But the only passage which he adduces in support of the reading which he retains is De Spectac. 25 ἐἰς αἰῶνας ἀπ' αἰῶνος alii omnino dicere nisi Deo et Christo', and here the reversed order is surely decisive against a parallelism."

Joseph Priestley and Dr. Magee on the Trinity

Hi all,

I've often enjoyed reading Leonard Hodgson's Croall
Lectures (1942-1943) which eventually became a book
_The Doctrine of the Trinity_ (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1944). Hodgson proposed and advocated
a social version of the Trinity, yet he included
comments from Unitarians in his work, persons who
obviously took issue with Trinitarian dogma. On p.
219, Hodgson's work contains these quotes, which some
here might find of interest:

"It must be universally true, that three things to
which the same definition applies can never make only
one thing to which the same definition applies . . .
If, therefore, the three persons agree in this same
circumstance, that they are each of them perfect God,
though they may differ in other respects, and have
peculiar relations to each other and to us, they must
still be three Gods; and to say that they are only one
God is as much a contradiction, as to say that three
men, though they differ from one another as much as
three men do, are not three men, but only one man"
(Joseph Priestley).

"If ideas are attached to the words employed,
Trinitarianism is, in reality, either Tritheism or
Sabellianism" (The Right Reverend Dr. Magee, Bishop of
Raphoe).

Cheers,

Edgar

Did the Early Christians Offer Prayers to Jesus Christ?

Dear Lady,

You write:

"Dear Prof. Foster,
Which are the first episodes of prayers addressed to Christ?"

In answering your question, I will assume that prayer to Christ was not a first century practice. Even certain systematic theologians like Owen Thomas have pointed out that traditional Christian prayer follows the schema of "to the Father, through the Son and in [i.e. through] the holy spirit." See Thomas' _Theological Questions: Analysis and Argument_ (Wilton, Connecticut: Morehouse-Barlow, 1983. P. 71).

Ignatius of Antioch, who was martyred between the years 98-117 CE, may possibly indicate that Christians invoked Jesus Christ in his time (To the Ephesians 20). However, one could no doubt understand his words as a reference to believers praying to the Father through the Son qua High Priest and Intercessor. While the middle recension of the Ignatian letters evidently does not contain the reading that explicitly speaks of praying to God through Christ, another recension does speak of the Son interceding for worshipers of God in his capacity as High Priest. At any rate, Ignatius of Antioch may well have advocated or espoused prayer to Christ.

Some slightly ambiguous evidence is also available for us in the Epistles of Pliny the Younger, who is known for writing to the Roman Emperor Trajan in 112/113 CE regarding Christians in Asia Minor, who would sing psalms to the Lord Jesus Christ quasi Deo. Did such hymns also include prayers to the Son of God? It is possible that this may have been the case, though I don't think one can say for certain, based on Pliny's letters alone (see the letters of Pliny X.96.7).

Origen too addresses the subject of prayer in De Oratione 15.1. There, he insists that, properly speaking, prayer should be addressed to "God the Father alone," although he also invokes Christ, "the very Logos himself." Nevertheless, in Contra Celsum 5.4, Origen demonstrates that he does not believe prayer in the absolute sense should be directed toward God's Son. See Jaroslav Pelikan's _The Christian Tradition_ 1:198-199.

You might also want to reference Arnobius of Sicca's Adversus nationes 1.36.

I hope these thoughts are helpful.

Best regards,

Professor Foster

Justin Martyr on the Soul

Greetings all!

Someone has written to me as follows:

"I reached the conviction Justyn [sic] believed in a anthropological concept constituted by three elements:

- body
- soul
- spirit

The first two are subjected to the death.

Could you please tell me if my vision of this matter can be considered wrong? If so, why?"

I reply:

First, I would say that when one reads Justin's Dialogue, he or she must distinguish between the words of Justin, those of Trypho and those of the man who helped to convert Justin to Christianity. Second, as I read Justin, he does seem to espouse a tripartite anthropological theologia. However, he clearly appears to argue that the soul is able to survive death and subsist for all eternity.

In 1 Apology 20, Justin contends that Christians in his day affirmed that "the souls of the wicked, being endowed with sensation even after death, are punished, and that those [souls] of the good being delivered from punishment spend a blessed existence" in eternity.

Also, in 1 Apology 44, we read:

"And whatever both philosophers and poets have said concerning the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of things heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such suggestions from the prophets as have enabled them to understand and interpret these things. And hence there seem to be seeds of truth among all men; but they are charged with not accurately understanding [the truth] when they assert contradictories."

In the Dialogue with Trypho, Justin does indicate that he rejected the Platonic immortality of the soul doctrine, as did Tatian. Nevertheless, there seems to be no doubt that he thought the soul survives the death of the body.

Finally, in the Fragments of the Lost Work of Justin on the Resurrection 10, there is this fateful passage:

"The resurrection is a resurrection of the flesh which died. For the spirit dies not; the soul is in the body, and without a soul it cannot live. The body, when the soul forsakes it, is not. For the body is the house of the soul; and the soul the house of the spirit. These three, in all those who cherish a sincere hope and unquestioning faith in God, will be saved."

Best regards,

Professor Edgar Foster

Origen of Alexandria on XARAKTHR in Hebrews 1:3

Taken from Peri Archon (De Principiis) I.2.8:

'But since He is called by the apostle not only the brightness of His glory, but also the express figure of His person or subsistence, it does not seem idle to inquire how there can be said to be another figure of that person besides the person of God Himself, whatever be the meaning of person and subsistence. Consider, then, whether the Son of God, seeing He is His Word and Wisdom, and alone knows the Father, and reveals Him to whom He will (i.e., to those who are capable of receiving His word and wisdom), may not, in regard of this very point of making God to be understood and acknowledged, be called the figure of His person and subsistence; that is, when that Wisdom, which desires to make known to others the means by which God is acknowledged and understood by them, describes Himself first of all, it may by so doing be called the express figure of the person of God. In order, however, to arrive at a fuller understanding of the manner in which the Saviour is the figure of the person or subsistence of God, let us take an instance, which, although it does not describe the subject of which we are treating either fully or appropriately, may nevertheless be seen to be employed for this purpose only, to show that the Son of God, who was in the form of God, divesting Himself (of His glory), makes it His object, by this very divesting of Himself, to demonstrate to us the fullness of His deity. For instance, suppose that there were a statue of so enormous a size as to fill the whole world, and which on that account could be seen by no one; and that another statue were formed altogether resembling it in the shape of the limbs, and in the features of the countenance, and in form and material, but without the same immensity of size, so that those who were unable to behold the one of enormous proportions, should, on seeing the latter, acknowledge that they had seen the former, because it preserved all the features of its limbs and countenance, and even the very form and material, so closely, as to be altogether undistinguishable from it; by some such similitude, the Son of God, divesting Himself of His equality with the Father, and showing to us the way to the knowledge of Him, is made the express image of His person: so that we, who were unable to look upon the glory of that marvellous light when placed in the greatness of His Godhead, may, by His being made to us brightness, obtain the means of beholding the divine light by looking upon the brightness. This comparison, of course, of statues, as belonging to material things, is employed for no other purpose than to show that the Son of God, though placed in the very insignificant form of a human body, in consequence of the resemblance of His works and power to the Father, showed that there was in Him an immense and invisible greatness, inasmuch as He said to His disciples, "He who sees Me, sees the Father also;" and, "I and the Father are one." And to these belong also the similar expression, "The Father is in Me, and I in the Father."'

Michael V. Fox on Proverbs 8:22ff

Greetings:

"The word's [QANAH] lexical meaning, the semantic content it brings to context, is 'acquire,' no more than that. But one way something can be acquired is by creation. English 'acquire' implies that the object was already in existence, but this is not the case with QANAH. To avoid misunderstanding, the better translation in context is 'created.'

While both 'created' and acquired' are legitimate contextual translations of this verb, 'possessed' (Vul, KJV) is not. Though this mutes the theologically difficult implication that prior to creation God did not have wisdom, it does not really fit the context. The verbs in vv 22-25 relating to Wisdom's genesis describe a one-time action, whereas possession is continuous. Subsequent possession may be assumed, though prior possession is indeed excluded. God acquired/created wisdom as the first of his deeds. Wisdom was 'born' (vv 24, 25) at that time. She did not exist from eternity. Wisdom is therefore an accidental attribute of godhead, not an essential or inherent one" (Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 1-9: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. The Anchor Bible. New York and London: Doubleday, page 279).

Regards,
Edgar

Thomas Aquinas on the Trinity in relation to Natural Reason

"The truths that we confess concerning God fall under two modes. Some things true of God are beyond all the competence of human reason, as that God is Three and One. Other things there are to which even human reason can attain, as the existence and unity of God, which philosophers have proved to a demonstration under the guidance of the light of natural reason" (SCG 1.3).

The Problematic Nature of the Trinity Doctrine (A Paper in the Works)

The Problematic Nature of the Trinity Doctrine

Trinitarians and non-trinitarians alike have noted the problematic
nature of the Trinity doctrine. In the Aquinas lectures of 1969,
Bernard Cooke stated his disapproval of the arbitrary abstractness of
the Trinity, saying: "one must ask whether the revelation of Father,
Son, and Spirit can then be fitted into the formalities of thought set
up by such [philosophical] reflection" (16). The philosophical
reflection that Cooke references is the learned cogitation of men like
Thomas Aquinas and Anselm of Canterbury. In the writings of Aquinas,
the unicity of God is so neatly distinguished from the triunity of God,
Cooke worried that the divine nature might be viewed as "an infinite
neutrality" (16). This thought world, exclaims Cooke, is very different
from the Weltanschauung of the apostle John.

Cooke is not the only theologian to worry about deep-seated problems of
the Trinity. Cyril C. Richardson has also expressed his personal
reservations about the doctrine of God's triunity. According to
Richardson, the Trinity is "an artificial construct" (Richardson 148).
It arbitrarily tries to resolve the perennial problem of God's
simultaneous absoluteness and relatedness to the world, by formulating
a doctrine of necessary threeness in the Godhead. In fact, Richardson
writes: "there is no necessary threeness in the Godhead" (149). He
concedes that there are immanent distinctions in the godhead; but the
Trinity does not exhaust all of the distinctions that need to be made,
nor does it resolve the numerous antinomies associated with the
absoluteness and relatedness of God. Richardson asserts that this has
been true of every Trinitarian theory ever formulated. Is Richardson
correct? Does an analysis of the Trinity doctrine show that there are
insoluble difficulties connected with it? Is it indeed possible to
postulate a coherent statement of God's supposed threefoldness? The
purpose of this essay is to provide an answer to these questions, and
carefully analyze both terminological and logical problems related to
the Trinity. After scrutinizing the doctrine, I will briefly evaluate
the arguments on both sides and state my thoughts regarding the
Trinity.

The question of how to refer to the three persons (tres personae)
united in one divine substance (substantia) has been an ongoing debate
in Christian theology for centuries. Normally, when we moderns think of
a person, we envision reasoning, responsible, thinking centers of
consciousness--distinct and individuated from other centers of
consciousness. Nevertheless, if we apply such terminology to the three
persons of the Godhead, ineluctable conundrums result. The idea of God
subsisting as three centers of consciousness in one substance is a
notion repugnant to most Trinitarians. Karl Rahner writes, "this is the
very thing which is excluded by the dogmatic teaching on the single and
unique essence of God" (135). That is, the three persons cannot be
three separate centers of consciousness because: "this unicity of
[God's] essence implies and includes the unicity of one single
consciousness and one single freedom" that is determined by the
"mysterious threeness" of the triune Godhead (135). While this approach
eliminates the threat of tritheism, however, other problems ominously
hover above the orthodox dogma of the Trinity.
Not only have most modern theologians been disturbed by the implication
of the term "person," with reference to the Father, Son and Holy
Spirit; the word "person" also bothered Augustine of Hippo.
Consequently, the famed bishop formulated a psychological model of the
Trinity, likening the divine substantia to human memory, imagination
and will. Furthermore, Augustine wrote that the whole of the Godhead
resided in each persona. Thus, the Father is fully God, the Son is
fully God, and the Holy Spirit is fully God. Yet, there are not three
gods, but one God. While Augustine's model obviates the threat of
tritheism, Rahner suggests that his formulation is deficient because it
does not sufficiently explain the Father's begettal of the Son, or the
spiration of the Holy Spirit. Additionally, Augustine's analogy does
not give enough weight to the "historical and salvific experience of
the Son and of the Spirit" (135). It woefully fails to explain the
Trinity's relation to God's dealings within history (His economic
dealings). This renders the doctrine incomprehensible from an economic
(oikonomia) standpoint.

A third criticism of Rahner's is that Augustine's metaphor fails to
teach us that the God revealed in the oikonomia, is the same God of the
ontological Trinity. Consequently, if the ontological Trinity (God as
He is in Himself) is not equivalent to the economic Trinity, we can not
assume that God has disclosed Himself in the person of Jesus Christ (a
conclusion radically at odds with the revelation deposited in the New
Testament). Rahner thus concludes that interpretations of the Trinity
like Augustine's are gnostic in nature: they put forth the idea of a
God "behind" the God that Jesus Christ "explained" (exegesato). In an
effort to solve problems associated with the psychological analogy of
the Trinity, Rahner proposes viewing the persons of the Godhead in
terms of relations. However, does this positing of three "relations,"
as opposed to three persons, really solve the problematic implications
that attend the triune doctrine of God? For the following reasons, we
must answer 'no'.

For one, from Rahner's frame of reference, to think of the Trinity
numerically (one nature, etc.) is ipso facto not to think of God's
triunity at all! Rahner further insists that "the three persons are not
three distinct things per se but are three distinct things only in and
through their relations with each other" (Davis 139). He frequently
employs such terms as "relative realities" or 'mere and opposed
relations' to describe the personae of the Godhead, all the while
insisting that the Trinity is a "unity of three divine persons"
subsisting in "three distinct manners of subsisting" (qt. In Davis
139). The tres personae "are identical to the Godhead but only
virtually distinct from each other" (Davis 139). In this regard,
Stephen Davis comments:

Rahner calls relations 'the most unreal of realities' but insists that
they are absolutely real as other determinations. But I do not see how
this helps. There is nothing in my experience that helps me understand
the concepts Rahner is working with; thus they do not help me
understand the doctrine of the Trinity (140).

Novatian's De Trinitate 7 and Metaphoric God-talk

Greetings,

"But when the Lord says that God is a Spirit, I think
that Christ spoke thus of the Father, as wishing that
something still more should be understood than merely
that God is a Spirit. For although, in His Gospel, He
is reasoning for the purpose of giving to men an
increase of intelligence, nevertheless He Himself
speaks to men concerning God, in such a way as they
can as yet hear and receive; although, as we have
said, He is now endeavouring to give to His hearers
religious additions to their knowledge of God. For we
find it to be written that God is called Love, and yet
from this the substance of God is not declared to be
Love; and that He is called Light, while in this is
not the substance of God" (De Trinitate 7).

Notice that propositions such as "God is love" or "God is light" are not metaphysical pronouncements (according to this passage), which is to say, Novatian thinks that they do not speak to the divine essence in se. One can find similar reasoning in orthodox writers belonging to the ancient and medieval period.

XAIREIN KAI ERRWSQAI,

Edgar Foster

Lactantius on the "Brightness" of Divine Truth

Hello all,

This is taken from Divine Institutes 1.5.1 (Numbering based on Anthony Bowen and Peter Garnsey's
Translation):

"the effect of the actual truth is too strong for even
a blind man not to see divine brightness when it
forces itself on his eyes."

Regards,
Edgar

Andrei Orlov on Metatron (the lesser YHWH)

Dr. Orlov is pretty good about making some of his works available online:

http://www.marquette.edu/maqom/metatronyhwh.html

Bavinck on the Proper Name of God

"By means of proper names, especially by means of the name Jehovah, God made himself known unto Israel. Through the Mal'akh in whom his name abides, Ex. 23:20, he revealed himself to Israel" (Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God, 84).

Alexander R. Pruss on the Absolute Divine Simplicity of God

I am going to be editing this post, but I wanted to go ahead and submit it to my blog. It has been my contention that without the doctrine of divine simplicity being presupposed, the Trinity doctrine falls. Conversely, other Trinitarians have argued that it is difficult to make sense of the Trinity doctrine if one presupposes or believes in a simple or non-mereological deity. But it seems to me that without the presupposition or belief that God is simple while also being three persons in one God (one divine substance), what one has with the doctrine of God's triunity is really tritheism or modalism (depending on the respective formulation of the dogma). In any event, a number of thinkers have taken issue with the simplicity doctrine. One of these individuals is Dr. Alexander R. Pruss. You can reference his entire discussion at http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/On3ProblemsOfDivineSimplicity.html

Pruss' first objection to the divine simplicity doctrine is that it does not seem to allow for a meaningful predication of those attributes which distinctly characterize God. Let A = "God's perfect justice" and B = "God's perfect mercy." If the divine simplicity doctrine is correct, then A is ontologically identical with B such that it appears that it is not meaningful to discourse about God's perfect justice or perfect mercy since the two attributes would be identical in this case.

Clement of Alexandria on 1 John 3:2

These remarks are taken from Cassiodorus' Latin translation of the Fragmenta from Clemens Alexandrinus. Cassiodorus lived in the sixth century CE, whereas Clemens lived approximately 150-215 CE.

'“Beloved,” says he, “now are we the sons of God,” not by natural affection, but because we have God as our Father. For it is the greater love that, seeing we have no relationship to God, He nevertheless loves us and calls us His sons. “And it hath not yet appeared what we shall be;” that is, to what kind of glory we shall attain. “For if He shall be manifested,”—that is, if we are made perfect,—“we shall be like Him,” as reposing and justified, pure in virtue, “so that we may see Him” (His countenance) “as He is,” by comprehension.'

Regards,
Edgar

Reply to Jason on Matthew 12:5ff

Hi Jason,

You write:

"Edgar, how does one account for the words 'not lawful' in Matt. 12:4 and 'profane' or 'desecrate' in Matt. 12:5, if Jesus was in fact arguing that His disciples were not breaking the sabbath, instead of arguing that He has the authority to dispense them from the obligation of keeping the sabbath?"

I do not believe that Jesus is agreeing with his opponents, who charge the disciples with practicing what is "unlawful" on the Sabbath (Matthew 12:1-2). The Lord is replying to the baseless aspersions of the Pharisees who suggest that what the disciples of Jesus are doing on the Sabbath is unlawful or forbidden. But Christ uses the examples of David and the priests who work on the Sabbath to prove that God allows those engaged in his work to do what could be viewed as "unlawful" or could be seen as technically profaning the Sabbath. However, notice that Christ says the priests who work on the Sabbath are blameless (Matthew 12:5). A fortiori, why should not Christ's disciples also be considered blameless while they carry out God's work and pluck grain from the fields through which they walk (Matthew 12:6)?

There are some interesting observations found on this account in Aquinas' Catena Aurea. John Chrysostom states that the disciples broke the Sabbath law, but not "absolutely." They were given an "out," so to speak, because they were hungry. Jerome thinks that the disciples "broke the letter of the Sabbath," but he appears to believe that the charge of the Pharisees was false. Jerome writes:

"But the laws of God are never contrary one to another; wisely therefore, wherein His disciples might be accused of having transgressed them, He shews that therein they followed the examples of Achimelech [sic] and David; and this their pretended charge of breaking the sabbath He retorts truly, and not having the plea of necessity, upon those who had brought the accusation."

John Nolland (The Gospel of Matthew: A Commentary on the Greek Text) notes that the first mention of the Sabbath in Matthew's Gospel is found at our text in 12:1. After providing commentary that centers on what ancient Jewish writings (including the Philonic texts) stated about the Sabbath, Nolland then writes:

"a sympathetic viewpoint on the situation of the needy is likely to have treated their [the disciples'] eating in the fields on the sabbath as not constituting work that would violate the sabbath. Such was not the view of Philo or of the Pharisees we meet in the Gospels. But it clearly is the view of Jesus" (p. 482).

Commenting on Matthew 12:5, Nolland also maintains:

"Again what is established in that the non-work requirement of the sabbath is not absolute . . . Once more at best the comparison creates a space in which apparently unlawful behavior may be justified on other grounds" (p. 484).

Some Recommended Books

Armstrong, Karen. _A History of God_. New York: Ballantine, 1993.

Black, David A. _Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek: A
Survey of Basic Concepts and Applications_. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker,
1995.

Brooks, James A. and Winbery, Carlton L. _A Morphology of New Testament
Greek_. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994.

Grant, Robert M. _Heresy and Criticism: The Search for Authenticity in
Early Christian Literature_. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John
Knox, 1993.

Porkorny, Petr. _Die Entstehung der Christologie_ (The Genesis of
Christology). Edinburgh: T & T Clark Ltd., 1987.

Russell, D.S. _The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic (Old
Testament Library)_. Philadelphia, PN: Westminster, 1964.

Silva, Moises. _Philippians_ (Wycliffe Exegetical Commentary). Chicago,
Ill: Moody, 1988.

______ _Explorations in Exegetical Method: Galatians As a Test Case_.
Grand Rapids MI: Baker, 1996.

Trakatellis, Demetrius C. _The Pre-Existence of Christ in Justin Martyr:
An Exegetical Study with Reference to The Humiliation and Exaltation
Christology_. Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1976.

Young, Richard A. _Intermediate New Testament Greek: A Linguistic and
Exegetical Approach_. Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman, 1994.

The Didache on Baptism

One question that comes up with regard to the Didache is, when was it written? Is it a first or second century document? While there is no unanimous consensus on this question, a number of scholars believe that the Didache was actually produced in the second century. If so, this would comport with the observations of Origen and Tertullian regarding infant baptism taking place in their day.

Stanley Burgess observes that the Didache is "an early second century document" (The Holy Spirit: Ancient Christian Traditions, page 21).

Howard Vos simply writes that the Didache "is also believed to have originated in Alexandria (though some think it came from Syria), probably during the first decades of the second century" (Exploring Church History, Page 12).

Moreover, The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology states that the Didache "comes from the late first to mid-second century, and is more in the style of a compilation of practices for a group of churches than the work of a single theologian-author" (page 100).

But the magisterial study by W. H. C. Frend dates the Didache circa A.D. 70 (See The Rise of Christianity, page 29). So we have respected scholars from both sides offering (as usual) possible, but contrary opinions on this important matter. Personally, I think the evidence favors the second century dating. I am certain that some would heavily dispute this conclusion or question my motivation for deciding on that date. But as I said earlier, the contents belonging to the work incline me to assign second-century dating for the Didache. This factor along with what other writers say about the practice of infant baptism in antiquity influences my decision.

I think that baptism started out as the immersion of believing adults (Mt 28:18-20; Acts 8:12-13). However, in time, infants began to be baptized on what Jaroslav Pelikan calls "biblical warrants that [are] somewhat ambiguous." This famed and late ecclesiastical historian argues that "the first incontestable evidence for the practice [of infant baptism] appeared around the end of [the second] century" (Cf. The Christian Tradition 1:290-292 and 1:316-318). As is well known, Tertullian vehemently rejected the practice of infant baptism (Baptism 18.5).

So I would say that the historical evidence indicates that there were different kinds of baptism from the second century onward, though it seems that the Primitive Christians started out immersing new believers under water when they baptized them (Acts 8:34-39).

Harold O.J. Brown writes that "Although a critical reaction against its [the Didache's] significance took place in the earlier part of this century, its place as a valuable composition of the earliest of Apostolic Fathers texts is secure."

I would add that the Didache does help us to understand what was happening in second century Christianity. This does not mean, however, that all
Christians practiced infant baptism in the second century. It also seems
highly unlikely that all believers in Christ practiced sprinkling at that time (Compare Hermas, ANF Series, 2.49; Apostolic Constitutions 7.53, Tertullian ANF Series, 3.669-671).

Regards,
Edgar

Revelation 1:1 and SHMAINW

Regarding Rev 1:1: for SHMAINW, BDAG has

(1) to make known, report, communicate

(2) to intimate someth[ing] respecting the future, indicate, suggest, intimate

(3) to provide an explanation for someth[ing] that is enigmatic, mean, signify.

Rev 1:1 is categorized under (1) in this lexicon.

On the other hand, _The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament_ explains that ESHMANEN (the aor indicative active of SHMAINW) can mean "to signify." Moreover, we read that "The word strictly means to show by some sort of sign, and it is esp[ecially] used of any intimation given by the gods to men, esp[ecially] concerning the fut[ure]" (page 610).

David Aune provides substantial textual evidence that suggests the NWT (New World Translation] is most certainly on the right track in its handling of ESHMANEN at Rev 1:1. After reviewing how the Greek verb SHMAINW is employed in extra-biblical literature and the NT, he writes:

"In Rev 1:1, SHMAINEIN cannot mean 'to indicate clearly.' By using the term SHMAINEIN, the author expresses the difficulty in understanding the revelation narrated in the text that follows, and perhaps even emphasizes the necessity of informed interpretation" (Word Biblical Commentary on Revelation 52A:15).

One pivotal classic text in this regard is Plutarch's De Pyth orac which reads:

OUTE LEGEI, OUTE KRUPTEI, ALLA SHMAINEI

"[Apollo] neither declares, nor conceals but signifies."

Aune comments:

"This [text' refers to the fact that the Delphic oracle gave ambiguous advice using images and riddles and that such advice required interpretation (see Kahn, Heraclitus, 121-23)."

Quoted from Aune, ibid.

Best regards,
Edgar

Mellone on Tertullian's Christology

Sydney H. Mellone on Tertullian's Subordinationist Christology

"He [Tertullian] has not avoided a subordination not only in the order of revelation to mankind but in essential being. Even if we set aside his purely metaphorical illustrations, we find it clearly stated that the Father is the originating principle of the Son and the Spirit, and therefore holds in relation to them a certain superiority: 'The Father is wholly essential being (SUBSTANTIA): the Son is derived from the Whole as part thereof (PORTIO TOTIUS): the Father is greater than the Son, as One who begets, who sends, who acts, is greater than the One is begotten, who is sent, through whom He acts," (Leaders of Early Christian Thought, London: The Lindsey Press, 1954, Page 178).

The salient point that I wish to extract from Mellone's writing is the one that he makes about Tertullian subordinating the Son "in essential being" and not simply in the order of divine revelation. In Adversus Praxean 12 and Adversus Praxean 3, Tertullian suggests that the Father is superior to the Son in essential being, not just in the order of Heilsgeschichte.

Sydney H. Mellone (M.A., D.Sc.) was external examiner in Philosophy at the University of London.

Best regards,
Edgar

Justin Martyr and the Soul

"And whatever both philosophers and poets have said concerning the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of things heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such suggestions from the prophets as have enabled them to understand and interpret these things. And hence there seem to be seeds of truth among all men; but they are charged with not accurately understanding [the truth] when they assert contradictories" (1 Apology 44).

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See http://www.amazon.com/gp/cdp/member-reviews/A1M2WK58L35MXJ/ref=cm_pdp_rev_title_1?ie=UTF8&sort_by=MostRecentReview#R2VZML53FPQ2US

Among some of the books that I have reviewed, the most up to date review is the book written by R.M. Grant Gods and the One God. Please check out my reviews on amazon.

Best,
Edgar

Brief Thoughts on ALHQINOS/ALHQHS

Here are some brief thoughts on the ALHQINOS/ALHQHS:

Louw-Nida point out that ALHQHS and ALHQINOS may possibly denote that which pertains to actual existence, "real, really, true, truly." See John 6:55.

This source comments on John 17:3 (in semantic domain 70.3), noting that this Johannine passage could be rendered "that they may know you, the only one who is really God." We are then told that the rendering "the only one who is really God" could be understood in some languages as "the only God who exists" or "who is God and there are no other gods."

In semantic domain 72.1 of Louw-Nida, we also read ALHQHS may signify: "pertaining to being in accordance with historical fact" or "true, truth." Cf. John 4:18. Compare John's use of ALHQINHOS (ALHQINH) in John 19:35.

LSJ observes that ALHQHS (the Doric form is ALAQHS) can mean "unconcealed, true, real" with its opposite being "false" or "apparent." On the other hand, in classical Greek, ALHQINOS can mean "agreeable to truth." When used of persons, it may denote "truthful, trusty"; when employed with respect to things, "true, genuine."

I would encourage our brothers and sisters on this site to study the entry for ALHQINOS in BDAG. It is very informative, especially if one also consults the entry for MONOS in BDAG.

Your brother,
Edgar