Faith and Reason (John Locke)

Both faith and reason are important: they are not per force antithetical, but might be deemed complementary. When faith is combined with reason, one has a faith that is neither blind nor credulous. As John Locke states:

"Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true: no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper object of faith: but whether it be a divine revelation or no, reason must judge; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge and certainty" (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Chapter XVIII.10).

He also insists: "Nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of faith" (Ibid.).

My observation on Locke's remarks: I would say that reason and the consistent witness of Scripture must determine whether a given datum constitutes divine revelation. We also need the Christian ecclesia to guide our thinking on divine revelation. However, like Locke, I would maintain that nothing which conflicts with "the clear and self-evident dictates of reason" should be considered or taught as a matter of faith.

Some reply that it's not always easy to determine what counts as a lucid and self-evident teaching that is rational, but the criterion for self-evidence in logic is fairly straightforward. Furthermore, it's not that hard to spot faulty reasoning or invalid and unsound arguments. But what some view as irrational may not be considered irrational by others. Yet logic does provide controls for what does or does not count as rationality. So we do not have to make subjective decisions about what teachings are rational or irrational since objective controls exist.

Isaiah 23 and 24: The Greater Context

Eschatology is the doctrine of the end times or the "last things." Eschatological subjects include the resurrection from the dead, Armageddon, and the millennial reign of Christ. I would not say that there are no strict eschatological prophecies in Isaiah, but I cannot yet think of one undisputed example. Most of the texts found in the prophetic book have at least two possible fulfillments rather than a singular eschatological fulfillment.

As a test case, we might observe that Isaiah 24 seems to be nested within a historical context that discusses Jehovah's adverse judgment upon Israel's enemies. Isa. 23 speaks about God's execution of judgement on Tyre, but evidently Tyre is not the only city that will taste the bitter contents of Jehovah's figurative cup (see Isa. 24:17, 21). Whenever Isa. 24:1 foretells the desolation of the earth or "the land," it apparently has reference to Judah's destruction in view of Isa. 24:2, 23. However, even if Isa. 24 were strictly eschatological in its focus, this would not mean that we should interpret or construe Isa. 34:1-10 in a strict eschatological manner like some want to do.

While the text of Isa. 24:2 does not mention Judah, verse 24:23 does and this passage indicates that God will fulfill His purpose to make Jerusalem the capital city of the world. Isaiah 24 not only uses a word that often means "earth," but it also employs a term that could signify "world" (TBL: 24:4).

[Jean] No, it is possible that it [Isaiah 34] has a temporal fulfillment. There has been no fulfillment of verse 2-4, however. I do not remember any memorable day of Edom's total destruction that upheld the cause of Zion and ended the nation (v. 8 and context).

Thomas Aquinas on Lying (Summa Theologica II-II.110)

Here is a passage from ST (Second part of the second part, question 110):

"As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to
charity, through being told with the purpose of
injuring God, and this is always a mortal sin, for it
is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one's
neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good
name, and this also is a mortal sin, since it is a
mortal sin to injure one's neighbor, and one sins
mortally if one has merely the intention of committing
a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary
to charity, neither will the lie, considered under
this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a
jocose lie, where some little pleasure is intended, or
in an officious lie, where the good also of one's
neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be
contrary to charity by reason of scandal or any other
injury resulting therefrom: and thus again it will be
a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not deterred
through scandal from lying publicly."

Proverbs 8:22ff (Midrash): Torah Created First?

The Midrash on Proverbs: Translated from the Hebrew with an Introduction and Annotations by Burton L. Visotzky (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 46, claims that the divine Wisdom mentioned in Proverbs 8:22ff is the Torah which God created before he brought forth anything else:

"R. Nehemiah said: Come and see what a good thing God has created in His world even before He created the universe. What may this be? It is the Torah!."

We also read:

"What [is the scriptural proof for] Torah? The Lord created me at the beginning of his course, As the first of His works of old (Prov 8:22) . . . At first Torah was in heaven, as it is said, I was with Him as a confidant (Prov 8:30). Later on Moses arose and brought it down to earth to give it to humanity, as it is said, Rejoicing in his inhabited world, Finding delight with mankind (Prov 8:31)."

According to this Midrash on Proverbs, the Torah was "created" prior to the cosmos: it was preexistent. Compare Ecclesiasticus 1:1-4.

What Is "Divine Nature"? An Old Post on the Subject

Some prefer to use the nebulous term, "nature" when referring to the demons and their godship or lack thereof. And that is fine, as long as we clarify what we mean by the word--"nature."

While trinitarians often like to make a demarcation between person and nature, John L. McKenzie writes that the apostle John was not aware of any such distinction. Indeed, prior to the fourth century--OUSIA and hUPOSTASIS were employed as synonyms (they semantically overlapped). It was this linguistic phenomenon that caused great confusion in the Christological controversies surrounding Arius. So certain church fathers saw fit to differentiate between OUSIA and hUPOSTASIS, so as not to speak heretically of God. But in the first century world of thought, the distinction between God's nature and person did not exist. McKenzie humorously says that the apostles did not know the word consubstantiality and could not even spell it. To speak of God and His Son in terms of a consubstantial relationship is therefore anachronistic and completely erroneous.

But there are other words that can be used to describe the nature of a thing. Aristotle used MORFH, FUSIS, and OUSIA to delineate the nature of a thing (RES). When constructing his hylomorphic theory of matter and form, Aristotle employed MORFH to describe the form of a RES (e.g., the matter of a table is wood, but its form is tableness). In other words, he utilized MORFH as a synonym for OUSIA. But his use of MORFH differed from the apostle Paul's first-century utilization of the term (where it means the "external shape" of a RES).

The Greek Scriptures express the concept of "nature" by employing FUSIS (instead of MORFH or OUSIA). The "divine nature" is QEIAS FUSEWS in 2 Pet. 1:4. What does Peter mean when he speaks of the "divine nature" that God's anointed would share in upon being resurrected to heaven?

FUSIS comes from FUW (to puff or blow, i.e. to swell up) and refers to growth, having an implied sense of genus or sort, native disposition or constitution (Complete Word Study: New Testament).

Thayer defines FUSIS as "nature," but goes on to point out a number of different usages for the term. They are as follows:

1. The nature of things, the force, laws or order of nature.
2. Birth, physical origin.
3. A mode of feeling and acting which by long nature has become habit.
4. The sum of innate properties and powers by which one person differs from another (See James 3:7 and 2 Pet. 1:4).

The entry FUSIS in BAGD also demands a careful study, so that one can ascertain what we mean by "nature."

In short, when I speak of the angels being gods by nature, I am using the word "nature" in the sense delineated by (4) in Thayer. Therefore, I am not speaking about the whatness of the angels when I say that they are divine by nature; I am talking about the "sum of innate properties and powers" that make them differ from humans. When describing the nature of beasts, Thayer refers to the "natural strength, ferocity and intractibility" that sets them apart from humans. This is not a delineation of their OUSIA (their whatness), but of their peculiar properties and innate powers that make them stand out from humans.

Addendum: I would now qualify the last statement above, but I'll let the post stand as written.

Son of God = Possessing the Nature of God?

I first encountered this type of theological reasoning when reading the works of Charles Ryrie. It seemed "fishy" to me then and it appears highly suspect now. Can anyone provide solid lexical data that buttresses the claim that the phrase "Son/son of God = possessing the nature of God?

For instance, the Bible calls angels "sons of God," but do they possess the nature of deity, as this nomenclature is defined by Trinitarians?

Secondly, BDB Hebrew-English Lexicon supplies an example where the expression "son of" most certainly does not mean "possessing the nature of X." Take the idiom, "sons of the prophets" (1 Kings 20:35). Are we to assume that it denotes: "possessing the nature of a prophet"? Not according to BDB. Moreover, the phrase "son of a messenger" most clearly does not mean "possessing the nature of a messenger." That is why I am requesting those who take this stand to produce lexical evidence that supports this claim.

Another pertinent example is Ephesians 2:2. The Greek there reads: TOIS hUIOIS THS APEIQEIAS. This linguistic formula or construction does not signify: "possessing the nature of disobedience." It could simply refer to "disobedient [ones]" or "disobedient sons."

"hUIOI THS AP. Hebr. those given to disobedience" (Zerwick's A Grammatical Analysis of the GNT, p. 581).

For more details, see sections 42-44 of Zerwick's Biblical Greek Illustrated by Examples.

NET Bible Footnote: "sn Sons of disobedience is a Semitic idiom that means 'people characterized by disobedience.' However, it also contains a subtle allusion to vv. 4-10: Some of those sons of disobedience have become sons of God."

Some argue that the expression "Son of Man" supports the notion that "Son of God" = "possessing the nature of God." Again, it appears that theology and not lexical semantics is controlling this discussion. Why should the title "Son of Man" have to mean "possessing the nature of a man"? As the Complete Word Study: Old Testament points out, the OT nomenclature "son of man" simply denotes "a man" or "an individual." One could also understand the terminology to connote a "mortal being of flesh." But "Son of Man" (in some contexts) also has "Messianic overtones" (Daniel 7:13-14). That is the way in which the Gospels primarily make use of the title or formula. Son of Man identifies Christ as the Messiah without needing to cart in a "possessing the nature of X" theory.

Hippolytus of Rome's "Exegetical Fragments"--Michael the Archangel

Here are some thoughts from Hippolytus of Rome:

"And lo, Michael." Who is Michael but the angel assigned to the people? As (God) says to Moses, "I will not go with you in the way, because the people are stiff-necked; but my angel shall go with you."

And after a little He says to him: "Do you know wherefore I come unto you? And now will I return to fight with the prince of Persia. But I will show you that which is noted in the Scripture of truth: and there is none that holds with me in these things but Michael your prince, and I left him there. For from the day that you gave your countenance to be afflicted before the Lord your God, your prayer was heard, and I was sent to fight with the prince of Persia: "for a certain counsel was formed not to send the people away: "that therefore your prayer might be speedily granted, I withstood him, and left Michael there."

And who was he that spoke, but the angel who was given to the people, as he says in the law of Moses: "I will not go with you, because the people is stiff-necked; but my angel shall go before along with you? " This (angel) withstood Moses at the inn, when he was bringing the child uncircumcised into Egypt. For it was not allowed Moses, who was the eider (or legate) and mediator of the law, and who proclaimed the covenant of the fathers, to introduce a child uncircumcised, lest he should be deemed a false prophet and deceiver by the people. "And now," says he, "will I show the truth to you." Could the Truth have shown anything else but the truth?

See http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0502.htm

The Possible Meaning of "Torment" in Revelation 11:1-6 & 20:10

There are a number of factors that we must not ignore when treating Rev. 20:10. For one thing, its quite possible that torment in Rev. 20:10 does not mean literal torture (the infliction of physical or mental pain). It could either refer to imprisonment or denote a subjection to punitive measures (Matt. 18:34). It is the figurative imprisonment or testing of the Devil and his cohorts that could occur both day and night. Furthermore, if the beast and the false prophet are not sentient beings per se but representative of symbolic entities, then it makes no sense to speak of their torment anymore than someone might speak about tormenting death and hell in a literal sense (Rev. 20:14-15).

Robert W. Wall points out that Revelation's description of the two witnesses could very well be symbolic of the church's faithful testimony in the face of its enemies (Wall, Revelation, 145ff). The terminology "two witnesses" might be an example of synecdoche; therefore, the imagery could aptly represent the faithful (anointed) conquerors who overcome the wild beast by means of their faith. Notice that the prophets (witnesses) dress in sackcloth, are described as having powers akin to Moses and Elijah, they are killed and their dead bodies remain unburied for three and a half days as those on the earth exult (temporarily) over their unjust death. In view of the overall literary features of Revelation and the context of Rev. 11:10, I suggest that the two witnesses symbolically depict some kind of Christian testimony reminiscent of the ancient Jewish prophets.

Another Interpretation of Aquinas' John 14:28 Explanation

Revelation's Symbols and Eternal Torment

Revelation often uses numerals in a symbolic manner. John mentions four angels holding back the four winds of the earth (Rev. 7:1-4). Is this depiction literal or figurative? Four angels release a calvary from the great river Euphrates and a woman in heaven is seen with a crown of twelve stars on her forehead (Rev. 9:13-19; 12:1ff). Are these references literal? They are apparently symbols in light of Rev. 1:1 and other passages like Rev. 12:1 which explicitly identify some references as signs. Individual persons are employed at times to signify groups of people or inanimate entities in the Bible. For example, it's possible that the woman in 12:1 symbolizes a group of persons and not an individual woman in heaven. We also read about four living creatures and 24 elders (Rev. 4:1-11) in the so-called "throne-room vision."

However, I concede the point that not everything in Revelation is symbolic. What one views as literal or symbolic is often governed by his or her theology although context should also be a strong determining factor. While I may believe that Satan's torment is symbolic, others understand his torment to be literal, but then inconsistently claim that Rev. 20:14-15 and its mention of death and hades being cast into the lake of fire is at least partly--if not completely--symbolic. In the final analysis, I would submit that Scripture as a whole and our understanding of God's nature must also govern our understanding of Revelation.

The Bible indicates that Satan and all those who follow him will be eternally destroyed or annihilated (Matt. 7:13, 14; 2 Thess. 1:9; Rev. 17:8). Furthermore, I wonder how a God of love could torment sentient and rational beings for all eternity (1 John 4:8). Additionally, if we construe a number of the symbols literally in Revelation, then it seems to makes nonsense of the book and possibly makes a liar out of John.

GRB Murray said it best in his commentary on Revelation, when he noted that John writes: "with parables and symbols which point to ideas beyond their verbal expression" (Murray 299). Therefore, we have to be careful when we conclude that God is going to torture people in a literal lake of fire for all eternity. Other verses show that God will bring evildoers to a fitting end by annihilating them forever (Ps. 145:20; Isa. 66:24).

Free Will, Predestination and Necessity

Jehovah foresees that certain events will happen or God knows that He will bring about particular occurrences in history. He therefore announces these events in His Word (the Bible), thereby binding Himself to the fulfillment of such prophesied events (Isa. 55:10-11). If God foresees the future acts of volitional agents, then it seems they will necessarily happen, but these acts are supposed to take place within the parameters of creaturely freedom. We cannot rightly infer that God necessarily causes that which He foresees. For example, God does not cause the rebels mentioned in Rev. 20:8 to rebel--yet they willexercise their free volition and rebel against God according to the prophecy.

Boethius provides a way out of this apparent dilemma by employing Aristotle's distinction between simple and conditional (hypothetical) necessity. De Consolatione Philosophiae (Book V) uses the example: "Necessarily, all men are mortal." This proposition is an example of simple necessity, which issues from a thing ut natura. On the other hand, knowing that if S is walking, then it is necessary that S is walking is an example of hypothetical necessity. We could also say: "If Socrates is sitting, then it is necessary that he is sitting." Yet it would not be correct to infer from this proposition: "Necessarily, Socrates is sitting." See Aristotle, Physics 2.9.

Theologians call the distinctions made above de re and de dicto modalities: what is true de re might not be true de dicto and vice versa. "Necessarily, Socrates is sitting" is a de re utterance (modality) but "If Socrates is sitting, then it is necessary that he is sitting" is de dicto. Everything depends on what the modal operator modifies or which utterances fall within the scope of the modal operator.

Applying this example to Cyrus the Great, we can say that there is a difference between the proposition: "It is necessary that Cyrus the Great will overthrow Babylon" and "If Cyrus overthrows Babylon, then he will necessarily overthrow Babylon."

Boethius writes: "Without doubt, then, all things which God foreknows do come to pass, but certain of them proceed from free will."

I obviously disagree with Boethius in a number of ways, but the Aristotelian distinction between simple and hypothetical necessity might be helpful for understanding how events necessarily happen without implying fatalism.

Hebrews 2:14 (A Dialogue)

[Edgar]
Under the entry for KATARGEW, BDAG has "to cause [something] to come to an end or to be no longer in existence, abolish, wipe out, set aside . . . TON TO KRATOS EXONTA TOU QANATOU destroy the one who has power over death Heb. 2:14" (page 525). This understanding of KATARGEW is consonant with Paul's words in Rom. 16:10 as well (note his use of SUNTRIYEI there and the part that Christians will play in the said "crushing" of the Devil).

[Jean] Why do you not mention the first meaning listed in BAGD for KATARGEW: "make ineffective, powerless, idle"? The fact that KATARGEW can mean "abolish" does not necessarily mean that Heb 2:14 automatically implies the destruction of the devil, although it may. According to LSJ the verb KATARGEW means "leave unemployed or idle." Other glosses includes: 1) make useless, cumber (the ground), 2) cause to be idle, hinder. LSJ also mentions as a second large category of meaning the idea to "make of no effect."

[Edgar]
I did not mention the first definition because you had already alluded to it in your comments earlier. Secondly, BDAG lists Heb. 2:14 under the second definition (not the first one). While the significance attached to KATARGEW by BDAG is surely not definitive just because the lexicon construes KATARGEW in this manner, I think that BDAG's comments on KATARGEW in Heb. 2:14 certainly deserve consideration because we must not only ask what a word means: we must ask what a certain signifier denotes in a particular context. Based on other Scriptures that talk about the Devil, I believe that it makes more sense to group KATARGEW under the second definition found in BDAG (Gen. 3:15; Rom. 16:20).

LSJ is fine and its unequalled in the information that it provides. But we must keep in mind the priority that synchronic definitions have over diachronic ones. BDAG lists a number of Bible passages where KATARGEW seems to denote destruction or annihilation. This defintion seem apropos vis-a'-vis Heb. 2:14.

Another Discussion on the Lake of Fire/Second Death

[Edgar]
Lastly, the language dealing with "torment" evidently does not refer to literal pain or torture. The term is commonly utilized in a figurative manner throughout the book of Revelation (Rev. 11:10).

[Jean]
I do not know why you conclude that the torment in Rev 11:10 cannot refer to literal pain or torture. I admit that much of the affliction will evidently be on the spiritual level. But the two witnesses have power to send fire from their mouths (perhaps the idea is "power to send fire at their command") and consume their enemies. Their enemies will be killed in this way (Rev 11:5). They also have power to shut up heaven so that there is no rain upon the earth during the days of their prophecy, those days lasting three-and-a-half years. They have further authority to turn the water into blood. Additionally, they can smite the earth with every kind of plague as often as they wish (11:6). So the conclusion that the "torment" in Rev 11:10 is merely figurative seems quite likely to be incorrect.

[Edgar]
I base part of this understanding on what the new BDAG says under the entry for BASANIZW: "of prophetic testimony as source of annoyance Rv 11:10.--9:5; 14:10; 20:10; GPt; Hv 3, 7, 6; s 6, 4, 1f; 4; 6, 5, 3f; 6" (Page 168). Furthermore, the context of Rev. 11:10 shows that the two prophets use their powers to kill and devour their enemies. How could such powerful feats literally torment all those who dwell upon the earth? It is more likely that the testimony of the witnesses serves as an annoyance [figuratively] for those who live upon the earth (Cf. C.H. Giblin, "Revelation 11:1-13: Its Form, Function and Contextual Integration." NTS 30 (1984) 433-59.)

[Jean]
What is interesting to me about the Rev 14:9-11 passage is that the text mentions the absence of rest after speaking of the smoke of their torment going up:

Rev. 14:11 and the smoke of their torment goeth up for ever and ever; and they have no rest day and night, they that worship the beast and his image, and whoso receiveth the mark of his name.

The text implies that the smoke of their torment goes up forever because they have no rest from their suffering day or night.

[Edgar]
Well, the verse says that the smoke of their torment ascends forever. It does not say that the "smoke" results from their toil and suffering. And what is more, the pain inflicted on those worshiping the beast could be symbolic.

Who Is the Ruler of the World? (Johannine Texts)

"Now is the judgment of this world: now shall the prince of this world (νῦν ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου) be cast out" (John 12:31)

"Hereafter I will not talk much with you: for the prince of this world cometh (ἔρχεται γὰρ ὁ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρχων), and hath nothing in me"(John 14:31).

"Of judgment, because the prince of this world is judged (ὅτι ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου κέκριται)." (John 16:11).

All biblical quotes from the KJV.

Do these texts have any bearing on our understanding of 2 Corinthians 4:4?

Another Catholic Reference That Seems to Argue John 14:28 Applies to the Human Nature of Christ (David)

Hi David, again I'm not saying that your understanding of Aquinas is not viable, but Levering seems to understand Aquinas' position on John 14:28 like I do. But he may qualify these statements elsewhere. https://books.google.com/books?id=_zf-AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA42&dq=aquinas+father+greater+than+i+john+14:28&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjJysHhoKbMAhXHJCYKHV9oDPYQ6AEIIjAB#v=onepage&q=father%20greater%20than%20i%20john%2014%3A28&f=false

See pages 42 and 269.

All the best,

Edgar

"God of This Age" (Link to a Dissertation)

We've discussed 2 Corinthians 4:4 in the past and the different ways that scholars understand the passage, so I thought some blog readers might appreciate this link for a dissertation that analyzes 2 Cor. 4:4 and related verses. My suggesting this link in no way implies that I am advocating the contents or overall thesis of the author's work. I am providing this link for informational purposes only. I'll let you all decide if you'd like to check out the author's work. Please see https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/5979

It is a dissertation written by Derek R. Brown, now published. See also https://www.amazon.com/God-This-Age-Wissenschaftliche-Untersuchungen/dp/3161537084

Irreprehensible Popes or Bishops? (1 Timothy 3:1-2)

MY INTERLOCUTOR: A brief response, Edgar, As you probably already know, a pope is appointed for life. His office is not terminated by reprehensible conduct, although he obviously should be exemplifying a life of virtue and holiness. Consider King David, for example. He was guilty of gross sins (adultery with Bathsheba and plotting the murder of her husband, Uriah the Hittite), but nowhere does the OT tell us that King David had to abdicate his throne. Was his conduct reprehensible? Certainly! Did that fact invalidate his authority as king? No.

MY RESPONSE FOLLOWS:

Let's keep our eye on the ball here. Kings in the OT did not--in the strictest sense--prefigure older men and shepherds in the NT. True there may be lessons that we can learn from David in connection with congregational shepherding, but can we really contend that his life actually serves as a [strict] pattern for Christian shepherds?

It is true that David was not removed as king when he committed adultery (and had a woman's innocent husband killed!). King Mannasseh also committed unthinkable atrocities, but was in time restored to his kingship (he was removed for a time). Does this mean that if a pope or shepherd is guilty of murder or adultery, he should not be removed from his office? Even if we use your line of reasoning, the least we could say is that a pope should be removed temporarily (in the way that Manasseh was removed for a time).

Moreover, Paul did not say that a "bishop" (EPISKOPOS) could be irreprehensible if he wanted to be. 1 Tim. 3:1 says: DEI OUN TON EPISKOPON ANEPILHMPTON EINAI. In other words--it is a binding obligation placed on all shepherds: they must be irreprehensible (cf. 1 Tim. 3:7). If such shepherds do not remain blameless, they are not fit to serve God's congregation.

Are we to believe that popes are held (by God) to a lesser standard than other shepherds are? According to 1 Cor. 5:9-13, those who unrepentantly practice sin should be excommunicated from God's congregation. Do these word not apply to the "Supreme Pontiff"? Surely you would admit that there have been some reprehensible popes down through the centuries. And yet these men were allowed to remain in office because they were popes? I simply do not get it. How can popes be held to a lower standard than other members of their flock?

Origen of Alexandria's Thoughts on Colossians 1:15 (FYI)

From his Commentary on John (Book I):

19. (4) "In addition to these meanings there is that in which we speak of an arche, according to form; thus if the first-born of every creature (Colossians 1:15) is the image of the invisible God, then the Father is his arche. In the same way Christ is the arche of those who are made according to the image of God. For if men are according to the image, but the image according to the Father; in the first case the Father is the arche of Christ, and in the other Christ is the arche of men, and men are made, not according to that of which he is the image, but according to the image. With this example our passage will agree: 'In the arche was the Word.'"

22. "Not even as the Word is He the arche, for the Word was in the arche. And so one might venture to say that wisdom is anterior to all the thoughts that are expressed in the titles of the first-born of every creature. Now God is altogether one and simple; but our Saviour, for many reasons, since God (Romans 3:25) set Him forth a propitiation and a first fruits of the whole creation, is made many things, or perhaps all these things; the whole creation, so far as capable of redemption, stands in need of Him."

Ta Panta-What It Denotes at Times

τὰ πάντα ("all things") does not signify or denote "the universe as a whole" every time it appears, but some contexts suggest this meaning is sometimes operative. For example, 1 Corinthians 15:28:

ὅταν δὲ ὑποταγῇ αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, τότε καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ υἱὸς ὑποταγήσεται τῷ ὑποτάξαντι αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, ἵνα ᾖ ὁ θεὸς πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν.

There's also Romans 11:36: ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα· αὐτῷ ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας· ἀμήν.

Compare 1 Corinthians 8:6.

Hebrews 1:2 does not employ ta panta, but rather, pantwn.

See Hebrews 11:3 to shed light on 1:2.

Origen's Understanding of Psalm 45:6-7 (Contra Celsum 1.56)

But attend carefully to what follows, where He is called God: "For
Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: a sceptre of righteousness is
the sceptre of Thy kingdom. Thou hast loved righteousness, and hated
iniquity: therefore God, even Thy God, hath anointed Thee with the oil
of gladness above Thy fellows." And observe that the prophet, speaking
familiarly to God, whose "throne is for ever and ever," and "a sceptre
of righteousness the sceptre of His kingdom," says that this God has
been anointed by a God who was His God, and anointed, because more
than His fellows He had loved righteousness and hated iniquity. And I
remember that I pressed the Jew, who was deemed a learned man, very
hard with this passage; and he, being perplexed about it, gave such an
answer as was in keeping with his Judaistic views, saying that the
words, "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: a sceptre of
righteousness is the sceptre of Thy kingdom," are spoken of the God of
all things; and these, "Thou hast loved righteousness and hated
iniquity, therefore Thy God hath anointed Thee," etc., refer to the
Messiah (Contra Celsum 1.56).

Πρόσχες δ' ἐπιμελῶς τοῖς ἑξῆς, ἔνθα θεὸς εἴρηται· «Ὁ θρόνος σου», γάρ φησιν, «ὁ θεός, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος, ῥάβδος εὐθύτητος ἡ ῥάβδος τῆς βασιλείας σου. Ἠγάπησας δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἐμίσησας ἀνομίαν· διὰ τοῦτο ἔχρισέ σε ὁ θεὸς ὁ θεός σου ἔλαιον ἀγαλλιάσεως παρὰ τοὺς μετόχους σου.» Καὶ κατανόει ὅτι θεῷ ὁμιλῶν ὁ προφήτης, οὗ «ὁ θρόνος» ἐστὶν «εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος», καὶ «ῥάβδος εὐθύτητος ἡ ῥάβδος τῆς βασιλείας» αὐτοῦ, τοῦτον τὸν θεόν φησι κεχρῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃς ἦν αὐτοῦ θεός· κεχρῖσθαι δέ, ἐπεὶ «παρὰ τοὺς μετόχους» αὐτοῦ οὗτος ἠγάπησε «δικαιοσύνην» καὶ ἐμίσησεν «ἀνομίαν». Καὶ μέμνημαί γε πάνυ θλίψας τὸν Ἰουδαῖον νομιζόμενον σοφὸν ἐκ τῆς λέξεως ταύτης· ὃς πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀπορῶν εἰπεῖν τὰ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἰουδαϊσμῷ ἀκόλουθα, εἶπε πρὸς μὲν τὸν τῶν ὅλων θεὸν εἰρῆσθαι τὸ «Ὁ θρόνος σου, ὁ θεός, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος, ῥάβδος εὐθύτητος ἡ ῥάβδος τῆς βασιλείας σου», πρὸς δὲ τὸν Χριστὸν τὸ «Ἠγάπησας δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἐμίσησας ἀνομίαν· διὰ τοῦτο ἔχρισέ σε ὁ θεὸς ὁ θεός σου» καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς.]

See http://khazarzar.skeptik.net/books/origenes/cc/gr/

One Supreme Being Argument from Descartes (A Reconstruction of Meditation 1, 3)

As far as I can tell, Rene Descartes makes this kind of argument in Mediation 1 of his work Meditations on First Philosophy.

1. A supremely good being does not create humans such that they are continually deceived.

2. God is a/the supremely good being.

3. God did not create humans such that they (we) are continually deceived.

4. It is possible that God would not allow humans to be deceived even occasionally. (premise)

5. However, humans are occasionally deceived. (negation of 4)

6. So either it is possible that God allows us to be deceived even occasionally or it is possible that God does not exist. (disjunctive syllogism of 4, 5)

7. Assume God does not exist (by denial of the second disjunct in 6, which is done for the sake of argument)

8. However, if God does not exist, then chance, fate, or some long causal chain of events account for my existence.

9. But these causes are clearly less perfect than God.

10. It is more likely that we are deceived if some imperfect cause accounts for our existence than if God explains our existence.

11. Therefore, it is possible that God exists and that he allows us to be deceived even occasionally.

One can then reason that if God's existence is possible, then it's actual. Descartes also makes the point that our chances of being continually deceived are greatly lessened by the existence of God, who is supremely good and perfect.

The Lake of Fire Understood as the Second Death (A Dialogue)-Part 1

[Edgar]
In fact, the lake of fire is said to represent the second death (indicating that the lake of fire is symbolic).

[Jean]
I do not know if your conclusion can be safely drawn. Scripture says about the lake of fire: "this is the second death, the lake of fire." The text does not say that the lake of fire is symbolic, though that may be the case. Nor does it say that it merely represents the second death. It says that the lake of fire is the second death. This may mean that the lake of fire as an experience is the second death. To be in the lake of fire is to experience the second death.

[Edgar]
Admittedly, the actual wording of verses like Rev. 21:8 is as follows: hO ESTIN hO QANATOS hO DEUTEROS (Cf. Rev. 20:14b). But ESTIN can carry the meaning "represents" or "signifies" as it does elsewhere in Scripture (Matt. 13:38). In fact, the very first passage found in Revelation indicates that the book is filled with symbolisms. As John reports: KAI ESHMANEN APOSTEILAS DIA TOU AGGELOU AUTOU TWi DOULWi AUTOU IWANNHi.

The verb SHMAINEIN can mean "to indicate clearly" (Louw-Nida) or more likely in this context, it conveys the thought, 'to communicate a message that is enigmatic in nature and difficult to interpret' (Aune, Revelation, Volume 52A:15). So ESTIN in Rev. 21:8 could mean "represents." Therefore, based on Rev. 1:1, the lake of fire may very well be symbolic. In view of other Scriptures concerning the eschaton, it would be fitting if the lake of fire served as a symbol of everlasting annihilation (2 Thess. 1:9).

[Edgar Continued]
Furthermore, death and hell are cast into the lake of fire along with Satan and the wild beast and the false prophet (Rev. 20:13-15). Do you think that death and hell and Satan and the wild beast and the false prophet will literally be tormented day and night for all eternity in the lake of fire?

[Jean]
When Scripture says that death and hades are thrown into the lake of fire, the meaning is difficult to grasp. It seems to be saying that there will be no more death and hades, since their conditions will be supplanted by the lake of fire. Yes, I think that Satan, the beast, the false prophet, and those who are thrown into the lake of fire will be tormented day and night for all eternity.

[Edgar]
I think you rightly admit that abstractions like death and places such as hades cannot be tormented or experience the second death in a literal way. Why, then, do you think that Satan or the beast (evidently a symbolic creature) or the "false prophet" (another symbolic entity) will undergo literal toments in an everlasting fire? Heb. 2:14, 15 indicates that the Devil will be annihilated or brought to nothing? How do you understand or interpret 2:14, 15?

Followup on Aquinas, the Trinity, and Divine Personhood

This entry is mainly addressed to David Waltz. Thanks for your interaction on this issue, David.

1) After reviewing a number of things written by Aquinas, wherein he explains in what sense the Father is greater than the Son, I have concluded that it's possible to interpret the taciturn Doctor in different ways. I understand Aquinas' application of John 14:28 to the human nature of Christ; others believe he applies the verse to both the divine and human nature of Christ, whereas yet others understand Aquinas to be saying that John 14:28 might apply to both natures.

In any event, another statement from Aquinas is found in Contra Errores Graecorum, Part One, Chapter II.:

But when Basil asserts that the Spirit is second from the Son in dignity, he appears more seriously mistaken, because he seems to posit degrees of dignity in the Trinity, whereas all three persons are equal in dignity. This statement, however, can be explained as referring, not to natural, but to personal dignity in God, just as we say that “a person is a hypostasis in virtue of a distinct property entailing dignity.” Footnote Hilary adopts this manner of speaking when he says Footnote that the Father is greater than the Son by reason of authority of origin. But by reason of oneness in substance the Son is not thereby less than the Father.

See http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/ContraErrGraecorum.htm

I would also suggest my own revised M.Th. thesis (my book about Tertullian), which contains a discussion of the pre-Nicenes and John 14:28.

2) Aquinas analyzes "person" language as well as cause and effect statements about God. See Part One, Chapter I of Contra Errores.

3) For Aquinas' definition of person, please see http://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2015/04/the-trinity-doctrine-and-personhood-my.html

The Catholic Encyclopedia contains a utile article on divine personhood too. That article can be found online for the older version of the encyclopedia.

For another discussion on the western view of divine personhood, see http://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2015/10/karl-rahner-on-trinity-qua-relations.html

Another Trinititarian Perspective on John 14:28 (Thomas Manton)

Though God be Christ’s Father, as second Person, yet they are all equal in power, dignity, and glory; 41but as Mediator, God is his Father in another respect. So it is said, John xiv. 28, ‘My Father is greater than I’—not as God, for so he was equal; ‘He thought it no robbery to be equal with God:’ Phil. ii. 6. But ‘greater than I;’ that is, consider him as man and mediator, in the state of his humiliation; for it is notable to consider upon what occasion Christ speaks these words: ‘If ye love me ye would rejoice because I said I go unto the Father; for my Father is greater than I;’ that is, You admire me and prize my company exceedingly, because you see the power which I put forth in the miracles which I do; ye would rejoice if you understood it aright; he is infinitely more glorious than I appear in this state of abasement and humiliation. Thus, with respect to Christ, God, the first Person, may be called the Father.

See http://www.ccel.org/ccel/manton/manton01.i_3.html#i_3-p21.2 for the context of this quote.

For some historical background on Manton, see http://www.ccel.org/ccel/manton

Aquinas and the Soul (Summa Theologiae I.75.2-4)

In the Summa Theologiae or Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas outlines distinct senses for the noun phrase "subsistent thing" (i.e., this particular thing). I guess that ST I.75.2, Reply to Obj. 1 touches on the question I used to have when reading Aquinas. He there maintains that "this particular thing" can be understood in two senses: a) "for anything subsistent" and b)"for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific nature." The soul (according to Aquinas) is "this particular thing" in the first sense, but evidently not in the second. So he does not conceive of the soul as subsisting in a Cartesian manner. Descartes memorably refers to himself as a "thinking thing" (res cogitans) yet it doesn't seem that Aquinas would identify the person with the soul like the French Catholic Descartes does.

Kevin Corcoran parses the topic in Rethinking Human Nature: "Here is one way to mark the difference between Aquinas and Descartes. In both views, there are two 'things.' In Descartes' view, the two things are complete substances (soul and body). In Aquinas' view, there are two incomplete substances (soul and matter) that jointly compose a complete substance (a human being)." See Corcoran, page 38.

This observation is based on ST I.75.4: "Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human species."

Question of the Day for Trinitarians

My question of the day for Trinitarians:

Some Trinitarians believe that God the Son voluntarily submitted himself to God the Father when he became incarnate or when he assumed humanity, even though he was divine.

But my question stems from the fact that the triune deity is supposed to be three persons, but only one God. Trinitarians usually say that "person" (persona in Latin) does not mean "individual center of consciousness" when applied to God. In other words, God (the triune deity) is only analogously a person, but not univocally a person. God is not a person like we are persons, they say.

However, if it's true that neither person of the Trinity is a distinct or individual center of consciousness, then how was it possible for the Son to "volunteer" to become subordinate to the Father, and assume humanity into his divinity? Would it not take consciousness for person 2 to submit to person 1? How could the Son submit to the Father if he's not a distinct mind from his Father?

Wallace, Sharp's Rule, and Jude 4 (Some Quotes)

See https://bible.org/article/sharp-redivivus-reexamination-granville-sharp-rule

Begin Quotes:

Sharp invoked dubious textual variants in four of the eight texts to support his rule (Acts 20:28; 1 Tim 5:21; 2 Tim 4:1; Jude 4).151 As well, in 1 Tim 5:21 and 2 Tim 4:1, if the almost certainly authentic reading of τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ ᾿Ιησοῦ (for τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου Χριστοῦ ᾿Ιησοῦ) is accepted, then the text can also be dispensed with, for “Christ Jesus” is surely a proper name, and thus does not fall within the limitations of Sharp’s rule. Further, two other passages seem to involve proper names. Second Thessalonians 1:12 does not have merely “Lord” in the equation, but “Lord Jesus Christ.” Only by detaching κυρίου from ᾿Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ152 could one apply Sharp’s rule to this construction.153 Ephesians 5:5 has the name “Christ” in the equation, though one would be hard-pressed to view this as less than a proper name in the epistles.154

This leaves two passages, Titus 2:13 and 2 Pet 1:1, which have escaped the difficulties of textual uncertainty155 and the charge of disqualification via proper names.156 If indeed these texts contain explicit statements of Christ’s deity, it is not without significance that they occur in epistles which are among the later books of the NT. Before we can explore more fully these texts, it is necessary to expand our horizons on the legitimacy of Sharp’s principle. That is to say, two other factors directly related to these passages should be addressed.157

Also from footnote 151 of Wallace's article:

In Jude 4 the variant θεός is found in P, Ψ, and the majority text; it is absent from ∏72, ∏78, א, A, B, C, 0251, 33, 81, 1739, al. (Without this v.l., the text still fits Sharp’s canon [τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν ᾿Ιησοῦν Χριστόν], though lacking an explicit identification of Christ with God.)

John 1:1ff (A Work in Progress)

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος (John 1:1)

So many writers have commented on the Johannine Prologue that it seems like there's nothing new to say about it. I'll mainly be exploring syntax, grammar, and reviewing what others have written about this famed part of the Fourth Gospel. I will also be progressively working on this document and adding to this entry periodically.

The first part of the verse Ἐν ἀρχῇ (the Greek preposition + the dative form) is usually understood to be definite ("in the beginning") and scholars argue that the words allude to Genesis 1:1. One of the most recent articles on the subject is by Jan Van der Watt and Chrys Caragounis. See http://www.bsw.org/filologia-neotestamentaria/vol-21-2008/a-grammatical-analysis-of-john-1-1/525/

These authors focus on why one could possibly claim that the anarthrous phrase Ἐν ἀρχῇ is definite rather than indefinite. Why not "in a beginning"?

In order to answer this question, Van der Watt and Caragounis first review what other scholars have written concerning the rationale for treating the anarthous construction in John 1:1a as definite. They quote Greek grammars and scholarly writings that give various reasons for deciding that the verse should be understood as "in the beginning." Some argue that the construction contains a monadic noun, whereas others argue that the phrase is anarthrous because of the preposition which it contains. However, after reviewing even more explanations, both authors of the journal article find their predecessors' reasons for choosing "the beginning" to be somewhat wanting. See Van der Watt and Caragounis, pages 95-97.

Caragounis and Van der Watt think "in a beginning" is nonsense. Furthermore, they argue that Ἐν ἀρχῇ can mean the same thing with or without the article, and they contend that Demotic Neohellenic allows for the construction to be definite (99-100).

Andreas Kostenberger considers intertexual factors when explaining 1:1a. He believes that John is repeating Genesis 1:1--a text that seems to speak of the absolute beginning. He reasons that the Fourth Gospel's opening words forge "a canonical link between the first words of the OT Scriptures and the present Gospel" (John, page 25). He cites four Johannine scholars, besides himself, who all favor viewing "beginning" at 1:1a as a time before the divine creation of heaven and earth (Ibid.). Possibly, John might also have meant by using Ἐν ἀρχῇ, "at the root of the universe," another meaning suggested by Morris. See Kostenberger, ibid.

Henry Alford takes this perspective on 1:1a: "ἐν ἀρχῇ = πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, ch. 17:5. The expression is indefinite, and must be interpreted relatively to the matter spoken of. Thus in Acts 11:15, it is ‘the beginning of the Gospel:’ and by the same principle of interpretation, here it is the beginning of all things, on account of the πάντα διʼ αὐτ. ἐγ. ver. 3." See http://biblehub.com/commentaries/alford/john/1.htm

While E. Haenchen links the ἀρχῇ of John 1:1, 2 with Gen. 1:1 (LXX) like G.R.Beasley-Murray does, it seems that one must analyze both the context of the passage under consideration and the semantic domain of ἀρχή, before one firmly decides that ἀρχῇ in Gen. 1:1 is the same as ἀρχῇ in John 1:1, 2.

The verb ἦν (imperfect active indicative 3rd person singular) appears three times in 1:1, but each occurrence signifies something different:

"Was [ἦν]: this verb is used three times with different meanings in this verse: existence, relationship, and predication" (Ftn. NABRE John 1:1).

So John apparently meant that the Word (ὁ λόγος) existed "in the beginning" (Ἐν ἀρχῇ) although this part of the verse raises numerous questions.

Some years ago, a person with whom I was conversing tried to argue that ἀρχῇ in John 1:1a is timeless and dimensionless because the word is anarthrous there. But what grammatical evidence do we have that ἀρχῇ, when employed anarthrously within a context like this one, has a special or unique lexical import? I don't know how you feel about the issue of Johannine authorship, but I personally believe that the apostle John wrote both the Gospels and the three Epistles. If this is so, the opening verses of the first Epistle shed illumination on the Prologue of Jn 1.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος (John 1:1).

Ὃ ἦν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, ὃ ἀκηκόαμεν, ὃ ἑωράκαμεν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν, ὃ ἐθεασάμεθα καὶ αἱ χεῖρες ἡμῶν ἐψηλάφησαν, περὶ τοῦ Λόγου τῆς ζωῆς (1 John 1:1).

Please notice that ἀρχῆς in the first Epistle is also anarthrous. Yet there is no indication that the writer is employing ἀρχῆς in a timeless--from a human viewpoint--sense. He goes to great lengths to locate the ἀρχῆς within history (within time). "From the beginning," the disciples "heard" "saw" "looked upon" and "handled" τοῦ Λόγου τῆς ζωῆς. There is no indication of a dimensionless ἀρχή in the Johannine Epistle. This seems significant in view of the fact that ἀρχή here [Jn 1:1a] is also anarthrous. Of course, my argument relies heavily on a literary nexus between the Johannine Gospel and Epistles, but even if different writers composed these Scriptural works, 1 John 1:1 still serves as an example of an anarthrous ἀρχή that is manifestly historical.

The same could also be said for John 1:1:

Louw-Nida says that ἀρχή (the lexical form) may denote "a point of time at the beginning of a duration." This reference work also says the following: "ἀρχή: Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος 'in the beginning was the Word' or 'before the world was created, the Word (already) existed' or 'at a time in the past when there was nothing . . . ' Jn 1:1" (67.65).

While not giving total assent to L-N here, one point I would like to stress is that ἀρχή can simply refer to "a point of time at the beginning of a duration." With that thought in mind, personally, I do not think that John clearly defines what the "beginning" denotes in 1:1, 2. Most commentators would probably be inclined to associate Gen. 1:1 with John 1:1 because of the creation setting in both accounts. Surely 1 John 1:1 does not help us much here when it declares that Ὃ ἦν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς. ἀρχή in 1 John 1:1 undoubtedly refers to the "beginning" of Jesus' ministry, not to any "absolute beginning." But there is another route we can take, which may clear up what "the beginning" signifies in 1:1, 2. Since οὗτος serves as a deictic reference at John 1:2, one may humbly submit that John appears to be emphasizing what he has already stated in 1:1.

Jude 4: τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν

In Jude 4, we read that Jesus Christ (I am aware of variant readings and interpretations) is "our only Owner and Lord" (τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ).

If Jesus is the only referent discussed in this passage, then Jude's use of "only" may prima facie be slightly problematic since (as subordinationists generally understand the matter) Jesus is not the "only" Lord (strictly speaking) for Christians.

Assuming a subordinationist understanding of matters, I would like to ask whether the word "only" excludes others from serving as lords for Christian followers of Jesus. In other words, does μόνον have to mean that there is no other Lord for the Christian congregation but Jesus Christ? The question is understandable in light of what Revelation 15:4 says about God:

τίς οὐ μὴ φοβηθῇ, κύριε, καὶ δοξάσει τὸ ὄνομά σου, ὅτι μόνος ὅσιος

Yet we also read that an "overseer" (τὸν ἐπίσκοπον) must be ὅσιον (Tit 1:8). Furthermore, Christians are exhorted to lift up "holy hands" (ὁσίους χεῖρας) in prayer to God (1 Ti 2:8).

So the doxological exclamation μόνος ὅσιος (in Rev 15:4) does not mean that others cannot be ὅσιος or live ἐν ὁσιότητι καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ (Luke 1:75). In fact, we are called to be holy as God is holy.

For the record, one dictionary defines the English word "only" in this way (obviously depending on the context):

"unquestionably the best--PEERLESS; alone in its class
or kind: SOLE "

So is Christ the only Lord for Christians? Not according to Psalm 110:1-2 and Acts 2:36. The latter verse teaches that God the Father made Christ the Lord of Christians, but the Father is the ultimate Lord (LORD) of all. The KJV renders the Hebrew letters YHWH (Yahweh or Jehovah) as LORD in Psalm 110:1 and throughout the Hebrew Bible.

Catholic View of the Soul

The online Catholic Encyclopedia makes this point regarding the soul:

"the rational soul, which is one with the sensitive and vegetative principle, is the form of the body. This was defined as of faith by the Council of Vienne of 1311; the soul is a substance, but an incomplete substance, i.e. it has a natural aptitude and exigency for existence in the body, in conjunction with which it makes up the substantial unity of human nature."

I emphasize that the Church believes the soul is a substance, but not a complete one, which is contrary to the Cartesian conception of the soul. Rene Descartes (although he was a devout Catholic) posited that the soul is a complete but dependent substance: it is a res cogitans which is nonextended spatially and able to survive the body's death in virtue of its latent immortality.

However, the language of "form" used above emanates from Aristotelian philosophy--specifically, the ancient Philosopher's thinking on metaphysics.

One Suggestion for the Magnificat (Luke 1:46): Biblical Poetry

The "Magnificat" is evidently styled along the lines of 1 Samuel (chapter 2), which contains the prayer of Hannah. So it is no surprise that it would be linked with LXX-style poetry. Craig A. Evans observes in one commentary:

"The Magnificat reads more like a warrior's song of
victory than that of a young maiden praising God for
the gift of a child. Accordingly, it has been
suggested that underlying the Magnificat is an early
Christian hymn praising God for vindicating Jesus
through his resurrection. This is possible, but again
it is quite speculative, for there is no mention of
Jesus or the resurrection. More probably the
Magnificat represents an early Christian hymn, thought
to derive from Mary, that has been enriched by
components reflecting Israel's psalms of military
celebration. Consider the following scriptural
allusions:

My soul glorifies [or magnifies] the Lord: 1 Sam. 2:1;
Ps. 69:30; 34:3; 35:9; Sir 43:31" (Luke, p. 29)."

Reflecting on the Greek notion of "poet-craft," R.G. Collingwood explains ποιητική τέχνη in this way:

"The poet is a kind of skilled producer; he produces
for consumers; and the effect of his skill is to bring
about in them certain states of mind, which are
conceived in advance as desirable states" (The
Principles of Art, p. 18).

While not everything that Collingwood says is applicable to biblical poetry, one can't help but notice the powerful effect that scriptural poetry has on its readers.

Persons and Points (Trinity Doctrine): A Thought Experiment

Imagine a straight line with three points (A, B, and C) plotted on it. Let A = the Father, B = the Son, and C = the Holy Spirit. In that case, we would have three points (with zero-dimension) that are distinct and collinear, but each point would still have something in common with the other; namely, they are all points (they all exemplify pointness) on a straight line, yet each point is distinct from the other. Would it be possible to illustrate the Trinity doctrine by using this geometrical example?

I've never seen anyone use geometrical points to illustrate the Trinity, but maybe someone who lives somewhere has done it. Thanks to Euclid and his successors. I'm just toying with possible arguments that Trinitarians might use.

After completing this post, I did find (via Google):

http://www.jstor.org/stable/685386?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/2004/PSCF6-04Williams.pdf

(A very complex article)

Jerome's Prologue to the Book of Daniel (A Quote)

Concerning which subject, leaving the judgment to the decision of the reader, I warn him Daniel is not to be found in the Prophets among the Hebrews, but among those which they titled the Hagiographa. Since indeed all of Scripture is divided by them into three parts, into the Law, into the Prophets, (and) into the Hagiographa, that is, into five and eight and eleven books, which is not (necessary) to explain at this time. And to those things of this prophet, or rather against this book, which Porphyry accused, the witnesses are Methodius, Eusebius, (and) Apollinaris, who, responding to his madness with many thousands of verses, I do not know whether they are satisfying to the interested reader. For which reason I entreat you, O Paula and Eustochium, pour out prayers for me to the Lord, so that as long as I am in this little body, I might write something pleasing to you, useful to the Church, (and) worthy to posterity. I am indeed not greatly moved by the judgments of the present, which on either side are in error either by love or by hate.

You can find the complete Prologue here: http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/jerome_preface_daniel.htm

Dating 2 Peter

J.N.D. Kelly gives 2 Peter a relatively late date (between 100-110 C.E.). The Anchor Bible Commentary provides this information: "many scholars have assigned Second Peter to a date as late as around A.D. 150. This has been done on insufficient grounds. References to Gnosticism and other movements are not conclusive, as these were already present in the first century . . . The present writer is inclined to date Second Peter about A.D. 90" (Bo Reicke, 144-145).

Norman Hillyer (New International Biblical Commentary) concludes that "2 Peter itself must have been widely accepted as authentic at an early date [in the first century], despite any later uncertainties that crept in" (Hillyer, 12). He puts paid to the notion that Peter copied from Jude. So does Bo Reicke.

I plan to wrote more on this subject.

Grammar in the Petrine Epistles and Revelation (Message to a Friend)

I'd like to recommend A. T. Robertson's big grammar (pp. 125-127) for his helpful discussion of Greek style. For instance, one feature of the Petrine epistles that makes scholars think 1 and 2 Peter have two different authors is the difference in style and vocabulary of the two compositions. Furthermore, Peter's writing is filled with vernacular speech, he can be pleonastic, the Apostle uses "picture-words," (see 1 Pet. 2:21; 4:1ff) technical speech, and may even have included ad sensum constructions or solecisms in his epistles. But the Greek is generally good in terms of its quality.

Although I've modified my view of the Greek found in Revelation, I'm inclined to believe that the jury is still out on this issue. A descriptivist approach to the work tends to read John's Apocalypse in the light of the Saussurean distinction between la langue and la parole. From this vantage-point, John's work is not ungrammatical, but fully in accord with communicative situational principles. Nevertheless, David Aune (in no uncertain terms) argues: "The Greek of Revelation is not only difficult and awkward, but it also contains lexical and syntactical features that no native speaker of Greek would have written" (Revelation, cxcix).

Granted, ancient writers such as Dionysius of Alexandria complained about the solecisms and barbarisms as well as the "inaccurate Greek" in Revelation. And modern scholars attempt to discover the reason for so-called ad sensum constructions by contending, inter alia, that Revelation was originally written in Hebrew/Aramaic or possibly the writer was bilingual and "Semitic interference" thus reared its head in the Apocalypse. Aune's discussion is quite detailed and I recommend that you at least consult pp. cc in his introduction. His comments will help you to see why Revelation is considered "translation Greek" along the lines of the LXX. See also David Aune's bibliography on pages clx-clxii. Another recommended work is S. Thompson's The Apocalypse and Semitic Syntax. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Bishops in the First Century (Continued)

Hierarchy implies rank. In normal human hierarchies, one person is usually stands a little higher on the ladder than another. However, the first-century Christian Church was not arranged in this way.

Ignatius of Antioch may have proposed a three-point system of ecclesiastical rank, but the Primitive Christians knew of no such arrangement. Concerning EPISKOPOS, J. Rohde contends: "one is not to conclude from the [singular usage in 1 Tim. 3:2] that already a single bishop is assumed as a monarchical leader at the head of the community" (Exegetical Dictionary of the NT, Vol. 2:36).

Rohde reasons that the use of the singular in 1 Tim. 3:2 is generic and the context likely supports his view. He thus concludes:

"The monarchical bishop appears first in Ignatius. It
is not certain, however, whether Ignatius describes
existing conditions or sets up ideal requirements that
do not correspond to reality." (Ibid.)

Again, Christ taught: "The kings of the nations lord it over them, and those having authority over them are called Benefactors. You, though, are not to be that way. But let him that is the greatest among you become as the youngest, and the one acting as chief as the one ministering" (Lk. 22:25-27).

Based on these dominical utterances from our Lord, I have no problem acknowledging that there are individuals in the
congregation, who take the lead and even govern the Christian ecclesia (Hb. 13:7, 17). But I would no more call these men "leaders" than call myself the "leader" or "chieftain" of my family since my decisions are "binding" (in principle) as head of my family. But the family head is not necessarily the family "leader" (1 Cor. 11:3).

One Catholic commentator believes that the term EKKLHSIA in Mt. 18:17 has reference to the local Christian community (A.T. Robertson explains this passage in a similar fashion). The Catholic scholar writes: "The local congregation is meant, whether in formal assembly for meeting or through its board of elders" (Daniel J Harrington, The Gospel of Matthew [Sacra Pagina Series], Collegeville, The Liturgical Press, 1991, page 269).

Jehovah's Witnesses take Jesus' words seriously and try to imitate what Harrington (S.J.) calls the "Matthean community." He supplements his observation about EKKLHSIA with these words:

"Against this common Near Eastern tendency toward
social hierarchy Matthew forbids the use of titles and
the exercise of highly authoritative roles (23:8-12) .
. . The resistance to hierarchically structured roles
and emphasis on equality is typical of sects in the
first generation. All the members have begun a new
life together and are to participate fully and equally
in the emerging community" (Harrington, op. cit., page
323).

While I do not agree with Harrington's assessment of Matthew's Gospel as a whole, and while I do not accept his historical-critical presuppositions, his exegesis of Mt. 23:8-12 appears to be on target. If rejecting ecclesiastical hierarchy places me in company with the "Matthean community," then so be it!

To clarify the position set forth here, though, I have no problem with elders, ministerial servants (DIAKONOI) or different types of overseers supervising the ecclesia today.

One Final Thought on the Canon (For Now)

I'm going to post one more quote about the canonicity issue for now, then move on. I acknowledge that there are two sides to the debate, but I think Beckwith's arguments are strong and refute the view that the Apocrypha (Deuterocanonicals) should be included within the OT canon. Anyway, here's a quote that I believe constitutes fair use from the NIV Study Bible (published by Zondervan). Bibliographical details are below after the quote:

Although the evidence is sparse and open to debate, on balance it seems likely that the canon (i.e., the authoritative list of books) of the OT was closed well before the time of Jesus. While some scholars contend that the library of OT books remained fluid until the latter part of the first century AD, the earliest surviving evidence suggests that the books of the OT, or the Hebrew Bible as it is sometimes called, were viewed as an authoritative collection of writings by about 150 BC at the latest. In the prologue of Ecclesiasticus (in the Apocrypha), a Greek translation of a Hebrew book known as Sirach, the translator, writing about 132 BC, refers to the OT using the following expressions: “the Law and the Prophets and the others that followed them”; “the Law and the Prophets and the other books of our ancestors”; “the Law itself, the Prophecies, and the rest of the books.” This threefold division reflects the later Jewish custom of referring to the Hebrew Bible as the Law, Prophets, and Writings. Unfortunately, no ancient texts survive to explain how the process of canonization happened and what criteria were used to determine which books should be included. The process itself may well have occurred in stages over several centuries, and individual books were probably viewed as special long before the different sections of the canon were finally closed. Although some Christian traditions hold that various other Jewish writings should be viewed as canonical, the earliest evidence, including the authoritative testimony of the NT, suggests that only those books that comprise the Hebrew Bible are divinely inspired. On the inspiration and authority of the NT, see Introduction to the New Testament.

Zondervan (2015-08-25). NIV, Zondervan Study Bible, eBook: Built on the Truth of Scripture and Centered on the Gospel Message (Kindle Locations 1674-1675). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.

Zondervan (2015-08-25). NIV, Zondervan Study Bible, eBook: Built on the Truth of Scripture and Centered on the Gospel Message (Kindle Locations 1670-1674). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.

Zondervan (2015-08-25). NIV, Zondervan Study Bible, eBook: Built on the Truth of Scripture and Centered on the Gospel Message (Kindle Locations 1666-1670). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.

Zondervan (2015-08-25). NIV, Zondervan Study Bible, eBook: Built on the Truth of Scripture and Centered on the Gospel Message (Kindle Locations 1663-1666). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.

Biblical Canonicity and the Ancient Ecclesia

Here are two quotes that deal with biblical canonicity as it applied to the early Christian congregation:

"While the New Testament writers all used the Septuagint, to a greater or lesser degree, none of them tells us precisely what the limits of its contents were. The 'scriptures' to which they appealed covered substantially the same range as the Hebrew Bible [which did not contain the apocrypha]" (F.F. Bruce, The Canon of Scripture, pp. 50ff).

Jerome himself wrote: "Therefore as the church indeed reads Judith, Tobit and the books of Maccabees, but does not receive them among the canonical books, so let it also read these two volumes [Sirach and Parables] for the edification of the people but not for establishing the authority of ecclesiastical dogma" (Prologue to the books of Wisdom).

One Jewish perspective on the Hebrew canon is given here: http://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/creating-the-canon/

I would still recommend Roger Beckwith's 500-page+ study on this issue.

2 Timothy 3:15 (Commentary Link)

For more on the expression, "holy writings" in Timothy, see http://www.studylight.org/commentary/2-timothy/3-15.html

As an example, from Robertson's WPNT:

The sacred writings (ιερα γραμματα — hiera grammata). “Sacred writings” or “Holy Scriptures.” Here alone in N.T., though in Josephus (Proem to Ant. 3; Apion 1, etc.) and in Philo. The adjective ιερος — hieros occurs in 1 Corinthians 9:13 of the temple worship, and γραμμα — gramma in contrast to πνευμα — pneuma in 2 Corinthians 3:6.; Romans 2:29 and in John 5:47 of Moses‘ writings, in Acts 28:21 of an epistle, in Galatians 6:11 of letters (characters). In Ephesus there were Επεσια γραμματα — Ephesia grammata that were βεβηλα — bebēla (Acts 19:19), not ιερα — hiera

However, Vincent's Word Studies has a slightly different take on the verse. He applies the terminology to "the learning acquired from Scripture by the rabbinic methods, according to which the Old Testament books were carefully searched for meanings hidden in each word and letter, and especially for messianic intimations."

Flavius Josephus and the Hebrew Canon

See http://biblehub.com/library/pamphilius/church_history/chapter_x_the_manner_in_which.htm

http://www.etsjets.org/files/JETS-PDFs/29/29-1/29-1-pp037-046_JETS.pdf

http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/3259-bible-canon

2 Corinthians 5:8 and KAI

Richard Young notes: "the basic syntactic function of KAI is simply to join two coordinate elements together" (187). But KAI can also be used as a simple additive without specifying any particular relationship between two coordinate elements (see Rev. 7:12). After looking at the various uses of KAI in the NT, it seems that the KAI in 2 Cor. 5:8 is best understood as a simple additive that connects two contrasting thoughts without specifying the temporal aspect of either one. 2 Cor. 5:8 is an expressed desire, not a prophecy per se.

One of the best discussions I've run across on the utilization of KAI in the NT is Kermit Titrud's "The function of KAI in the Greek New Testament and an Application to 2 Peter" found in D.A. Black's Linguistics and NT Interpretation: Essays on Discourse Analysis. His paper will expose you to the numerous aspects of the Greek conjunction KAI.

Bishops in the First Century? (Francis Beare and H. Meyer)

The office of "bishop" apparently was non-existent in the first century. A number of sources demonstrate this datum to be the case including BDAG, but let us consult other works for now. Francis Beare writes concerning Phil. 1:1:

"The two [Greek] words translated bishops and deacons have been much debated. In the second century they became specialized in ecclesiastical usage; the bishop as the head of the local Christian community, the deacons as his assistants in whatever duties he might assign them."

Beare then adds: "Negatively, it may be said that the use of the plurals [in Phil. 1:1] rules out any possibility that the Philippian church is governed by a monarchical bishop."

After citing Polycarp and other sources, he concludes: "This passing reference [to EPISKOPOI and DIAKONOI in Phil. 1:1] does not provide us with any crumb of information about the status or function of EPISKOPOI and DIAKONOI at Philippi; and we are not entitled to read into them in this context the significance which belongs to them in later Catholic usage" (Francis Beare, Epistle to the Philippians, 1959, pp. 49-50).

So while the Primitive Congregation used such men to govern the ecclesia, it does not follow that these "offices" were hierarchically arranged or that these men were "leaders" of the Church.

Jesus Christ commanded: "Neither be called 'leaders,' [KAQHGHTAI] for your Leader [KAQHGHTHS] is one, the Christ [hO XRISTOS" (Mt. 23:10 NWT).

The term translated "Leader" can evidently mean either "leader, master, guide, teacher or professor." Certain scholars favor the sense "teachers" in this passage, but I think that "leader" is just as likely in view of Mt. 23:6-8.

The Geneva Bible of 1599 has: "Neither be ye called masters: for one is your Master, [even] Christ."

"Neither be ye called masters: for one is your master, [even] the Christ" (ASV).

"nor may ye be called directors, for one is your director -- the Christ" (YLT).

"Nor are you to be called ‘teacher,’ for you have one teacher, the Christ" (NET Bible).

The fact remains that the first century ecclesia had no human leaders: the closest the NT comes to using such language is Hb 13:7, 17. The head (KEFALH) of the congregation--the one who truly made the binding decisions under the guidance of holy spirit--was Christ (Col. 1:18). Those tending the first century ecclesia had to submit to their head and his God and Father (Eph. 1:17). Furthermore, it also seems that they were in subjection to the local congregation (ecclesia) that existed under apostolic governance. The EPISKOPOI and DIAKONOI were "individuals designated for special service within the Church and perhaps subject to the Church" (Gerald Hawthorne, Philippians, Word Series, page 8).

Heinrich Meyer likewise concludes: "We may add that placing of the officials after the church generally, which is not logically requisite, and the mere subjoining of them by SUN, are characteristic of the relation between the two [the overseers, the assistants and the flock], which had not yet undergone hierarchical dislocation" (Meyer, Philippians and Colossians, page 14).

To help list-members understand Meyer's comments concerning Phil 1:1, I post the Greek of that passage for you:

PAULOS KAI TIMOQEOS DOULOI XRISTOU IHSOU PASIN TOIS hAGIOIS EN XRISTWi IHSOU TOIS OUSIN EN FILIPPOIS SUN EPISKOPOIS KAI DIAKONOIS.

Church Tradition (PARADOSIS) and the Bible Canon

The Greek word usually rendered "tradition" is PARADOSIS (παράδοσις) which is derived from PARADIDOMI ("to surrender, intrust, transmit"). This signifier is employed in Matt. 15:2, 3, 6; Mark 7:3, 5, 8, 9, 13; 1 Cor. 11:2; Gal. 1:14; Col. 2:8; 2 Thess. 2:15, 16; 3:6.

For PARADOSIS, BAGD has "handing down or over." When considering this word in the context of tradition vis-a'-vis Scripture, I think we must avoid projecting later significations of the term back onto the writings of the NT. That is, we should not interpret Paul's use of PARADOSIS through the exegetical template of Trent (a sixteenth-century council of the Church). In 2 Thess. 2:15, Paul writes that Christian tradition requires loyal adherence whether it is oral or written. Thus we can be confident that none of the traditions Paul mentions in his Epistles lack scriptural backing, and moreover, they are not limited to what is spoken (i.e., oral tradition). None of the traditions (PARADOSEIS) Paul speaks about conflict with what we find in Scripture. Conversely, I do not think the same can be said for the present traditions held by the Catholic Church.

Anglican priest Rebecca Lyman writes the following about tradition: "Our English word 'tradition' cames from the Latin verb tradere, which means literally 'to hand on.' When we speak of tradition, we mean those things that are passed along from one generation to another as important and essential to our identity" (Early Christian Traditions, p. 4).

Stone and Duke add that PARADOSIS is both the act of handing on and subsequently that which is handed on or transmitted.

However, continuing, Lyman also notes: "Christians usually distinguish 'scripture' from 'tradition' in order to emphasize the stronger authority we give to the Bible as the word of God. Yet the Bible itself is the selection of writings chosen and revered by the faithful community" (Lyman, p. 4).

Lyman's definition and comments are helpful although I think she errs by saying that the "faithful community" chose which writings were to be revered. God ultimately decides which writings are canonical, not humans. So while Paul may
have written and known about the importance of PARADOSIS, he would have undoubtedly castigated Dom Gregory Dix when he wrote: "eucharistic worship from the outset was based not on scripture at all, but solely on tradition" (Qt. in The Principles of Christian Theology, John Macquarrie, p. 11).

Charles Ryrie more likely states the truth of the matter: "It was not necessary to wait until various councils could examine the [Bible] books to determine if they were acceptable or not. Their canonicity was inherent within them, since they came from God. People and councils only recognized and acknowledged what is true becausde of the intrinsic inspiration of the books as they were written. No Bible book became canonical by action of some church council" (Ryrie, Basic Theology, p. 105).

In a notable piece of scholarship, we also read: "the Canon of the New Testament was completed when the last authoritative book was given to any church by the apostles, and that was when John wrote the Apocalypse, about A.D. 98" (Benjamin B. Warfield, Revelation and Inspiration, pp. 455-56).

Are the Scriptures "God-breathed"? (NIV)

(Written before the advent of BDAG and slightly edited 3/18/16 and 5/19/17)

The best approach to word studies is the synchronic method; that is, one should consider what terms possibly mean at a certain time--not what they potentially denote through history. Finding the "exact meaning" of a word can be extremely challenging or elusive, but fortunately there are entries in the major NT lexica for terms, including the word θεόπνευστος.

BAGD supplies us an example from Plutarch: THS QEOPNESTOU SOFIHSLOGOS ESTIN ARISTOS. It also recommends the thorough work by B.B. Warfield "Revelation and Inspiration" 27, 229-259. Lastly, BAGD lists 2 Tim. 3:16 and then provides "inspired by God" for θεόπνευστος.

Nevertheless, one caveat needs to be made. Warfield cites the source this way:

In the unique passage, Plutarch, de placit. phil., 5, 2 (Mor. 904, 2): ‘tous oneirous tous theopneustous kat anagken ginesthai’. ‘Tous de phusikous aneidolopoioumenes psuches to sumtheron aute ktl’., it is very probably to be ascribed to the copyist, and stands, as Wyttenbach conjectures, in the place of ‘theopemptous’. Besides this it occurs in Pseudo- Phocylides, v. 121: ‘tes de theopneustou sophies logos estin aristos’— unless the whole line is, with Bernays, to be deleted as disturbing to the sense—as well as in the fifth book of the “Sibyllines,” v. 308: ‘Kume d he mora sun namasi tois theopneustois’, and v. 406, ‘Alla megan genetera theon panton theopneuston En thusiais egerairon kai hagias ekatombas’. The Psuedo-Phocylides was, however, a Hellenist, and the author of the fifth book of the “Sibyllines” was, most probably, an Egyptian Jew living in the time of Hadrian. On Christian ground we find it in II Tim. iii. 16, which is possibly the earliest written employment of it to which we can point.

I need to verify the exact wording myself, but the main point of this missive is what θεόπνευστος possibly denotes. See https://www.the-highway.com/God-Inspired-Scripture_Warfield.html

Louw-Nida has: "θεόπνευστος, ον: pertaining to a communication which has been inspired by God--inspired by God, divinely inspired" (Semantic Domain 33.261). Ralph Earle writes that the phrase "Given by inspiration" (KJV) is "one word in Greek, QEOPNEUSTOS (only here in NT). It literally means 'God-breathed'--QEOS, 'god,' and PNEW, 'breathe.' That is, God breathed His truth into the hearts and minds of the writers of Scripture. The best translation is 'God-breathed' " (NIV).

Yet Louw-Nida warn us that a dictational view of θεόπνευστος should not be adopted (33.261). So we must acknowledge that God apparently did not dictate his thoughts to men. Furthermore, as we study the Bible, we find that concepts are not limited to words: one should not confuse Wort with Begriff. For example, the book of Hosea hardly uses the word (or related terms) "love." Yet the Divine acts depicted therein give evidence of Jehovah's love even if the prophet does not employ the exact term. Linguistically speaking, one word can be used to express many different concepts (polysemy) and one concept can be expressed by many different words (synonymy or overlapping relations).

Applying this principle to θεόπνευστος, it can be observed that while the word does not mean "infallible and inerrant," we are seemingly justified inferring that when God speaks--He speaks utterances that do not contain error and untruth. If we compare 2 Pet. 1:20, 21 with 2 Tim. 3:16, we may conclude that θεόπνευστος suggests infallibility and inerrancy. As the psalmist writes: "The sayings of Jehovah are pure sayings, As silver refined in a smelting furnace of earth, clarified seven times" (Ps. 12:6, 7).

See http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0057:entry=qeo/pneustos

http://bbwarfield.com/works/inspiration/

D.A. Carson's Exact Words on KEFALH ("Head")

KEFALH = "Head"? (Duncan)

BDAG says that KEFALH, when employed metaphorically,
may denote:

(1) A being of high status (Iren. 1, 5, 3; Hippol.
Ref. 7, 23, 3).

(a) "in the case of living beings, to denote superior
rank."

BDAG lists 1 Cor 11:3; Eph 5:23a as examples of what I
have labeled 1a. Cf. Eph. 1:22; 4:15; 5:23b.

Marion Soards (1 Corinthians in the NIBC Series)
discusses the views of commentators such as G. Fee and
N. Watson, who both argue that KEFALH means "source"
in 1 Cor 11:3. But he then adds the following caveat
on page 229 of his commentary:

"Nevertheless, the interpretive debate is not settled.
J. A. Fitzmyer ('Another Look at KEFALH in 1
Corinthians 11:3,' NTS 35 [1989], pp. 503-11) examines
the LXX and Philo alongside Paul to argue 'head' could
be understood as 'authority over' another person; also
J. A. Fitzmyer, 'KEFALH in 1 Corinthians 11:3,' Int
47 (1993), pp. 52-59. In a creative interpretive
essay, S. E. McGinn ('EXOUSIAN EXEIN EPI THS KEFALHS:
1 Cor 11:10 and the Ecclesial Authority Woman,' List
31 [1996], pp. 91-104) argues that the charismatic
gift of prophecy gave the women who were endowed with
this gift an authority over their heads--the
men--because of the Spirit's presence and power at
work in their contributions to the congregation's
worship."

D. A. Carson also reports the following in Exegetical
Fallacies (2nd Edition):

"Although some of the New Testament metaphorical uses
of KEFALH . . . could be taken to mean 'source,' all
other factors being equal, in no case is that the
required meaning; and in every instance the notion of
'headship' implying authority fits equally well or
better. The relevant lexica are full of examples, all
culled from the ancient texts, in which KEFALH . . .
connotes 'authority'" (pp. 37-38).

Thomas Aquinas-"Of God and His Creatures" (Chapter XXVII)

Of the Incarnation of the Word According to the Tradition of Holy Scripture

OF all the works of God, the mystery of the Incarnation most transcends reason. Nothing more astonishing could be imagined as done by God than that the true God and Son of God should become true man. To this chief of wonders all other wonders are subordinate. We confess this wonderful Incarnation under the teaching of divine authority, John i, 14: Phil. ii, 6-11. The words of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself also declare it, in that sometimes He says of Himself humble and human things, e.g., The Father is greater than I (John xiv, 28): My soul is sorrowful even unto death (Matt. xxvi, 38): which belonged to Him in the humanity which He had assumed: at other times lofty and divine things, e.g., I and the Father are one (John x, 30): All things that the Father hath are mine (John xvi, 15): which attach to Him in His divine nature. And the actions that are recorded of Him show the same duality of nature. His being stricken with fear, sadness, hunger, death, belongs to His human nature: His healing the sick by His own power, His raising the dead and effectually commanding the elements, His casting out of devils, forgiving of sins, His rising from the dead when He willed, and finally ascending into heaven, show the power of God that was in Him.

See the Bibliographical Information Here: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/gentiles.i.html

Micah 5:2: "Ancient Days" and the First Creation of YHWH

At some point in their history, the ancient Jews apparently believed in a created being alongside YHWH, who was subsequently used to bring the sum total of reality ("all things") into existence. This belief is reflected in the rabbinic writings, but it is also latent in the Hebrew Scriptures themselves. Micah 5:2 reads: "out of you [Bethlehem] shall One come forth for Me Who is to be Ruler in Israel, Whose goings forth have been of old, from ancient days (eternity)" (Amplified Bible).

Now while it is true that the Amplified Bible and other translations render the Hebrew OLAM as "eternity"--the rendition "ancient days" seem to be preferable in this context: "'Origin' (MOSAOT, elsewhere only 2 Kings 10:27 with a quite different meaning!) echoes the verb 'come forth' (YS') and thinks of children originating in the loins of their father (BDB, YS', 1h, p. 423). Bethlehem as the 'parent' of the ruler belongs to a period now viewed as an era behind the current order and so belonging to 'ancient days' " (James Mays. Micah [Old Testament Library], pp. 115-116).

By no means do I necessarily agree with every sentiment expressed by Mays--in a sense, Bethlehem would bring forth the promised Messiah. Nevertheless, his years would stretch back to "ancient days" because he existed in heaven before coming to the earth. This does not imply that the Messiah was not created, however: he issued forth from his Father as the first creation of God and was not eternal in his preexistence (see Rev. 3:14). This point (about OLAM meaning "ancient days") is also forcefully brought out by Joseph Klausner:

"the words, 'from of old, from ancient days' indicate only the antiquity of his origin (since from the time of David to the time of Micah several centuries had passed), but nothing more" (The Messianic Idea in Israel. p. 76).

Probably supplying even more robust evidence for the idea of a created preexistent being with God is Prov. 8:22: "The Lord formed me and brought me [Wisdom] forth at the beginning of His way, before his acts of old" (Amplified Bible).

While admittedly this verse has been hotly debated, it seems most appropriate to translate QANAH as "created" instead of "possessed" as others construe this passage. In poetic contexts, QANAH is understood to mean "create" or "form" (Gen. 14:19-22; Ps. 139:13). Interestingly in Deut. 32:6, the word is parallel to ASAH ("to make") suggesting that it may have the meaning "create." Thus if the preexistent Messiah is under consideration as the figure of Wisdom in Prov. 8:22--then it would seem fitting to view him as being the first creation of Yahweh, then afterwards being used to create all things as the intermediary agent of the Most High God.

Neuroscience and the Soul: Some Reflections

Edward Feser, Stephen Barr, and Jerome M. Adler have tried to formulate theoretical accounts that confute reductive materialism. While I agree with their opposition to materialism or naturalism simpliciter, my disagreement with these thinkers stems from their belief in the rational soul. Objections can be made to hylomorphism (a theory posited by Aristotle and received by the Church in modified form) on the grounds of both reason and Scripture. Let us consider the issue of concept-formation for starters.

I am using "concept" to describe representations that are generated by neural machinery as it interacts with sensory stimuli and decodes information which initially arises from sense experience. Additionally, I deny the existence of objective universals (i.e., supersensible intelligibles) and essential natures as they are usually conceived in Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy; however, I can almost guarantee that the ability to form concepts of concepts (second-order reflection) is not precluded by a Christian materialist account of intellection. Such ideas could merely be reinterpreted especially when the materialistic/physicalistic account is understood in the light of Scripture.

For instance, a Christian physicalist could reflect on what it means for X to be a round square although round squares are logically and factually impossible. We can entertain the term "round square" in the mind via imagination and reason, although it's impossible to produce a mental image of such an object. One could also form the concept of a unicorn purely from sensory experience, reflection, abstraction and mental recombination since we do perceive horses and animals with horns. Or it is possible that the contents of a subject and predicate construction (an abstract structure) might be ontologically posterior to what we encounter through sensory experience (ontic subjects and predicates are sensed each day) and thereby such things could be parasitic and supervene on sensible instances of subjects and predicates witnessed experientially (e.g. houses and white objects).

It must be conceded that our ability to form categorical propositions like "All swans are white" or "No swans are white" is something that only rational creatures can do. But it seems that we don't need souls or intelligible substances to justify this ability. We have been gifted with language, and what makes la langue and la parole possible is the human brain (the neocortex along with Broca's and Wernicke's areas). Furthermore, la langue makes abstract categorization possible. We're able to manipulate symbols (concepts) because we are lingual beings. So concept-formation can be explained without recourse to multiplying entities beyond necessity (Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem).

Brief Note on What It Means for a Being To Be "Maximally Great"

One student of mine recently expressed astonishment that someone besides God cannot have an omniproperty in the strict sense of the word. He was under the impression that a person (S) could have the property of omnipotence (OP), for example, and still not be God. Only a being having every omniproperty would be God (in his estimation).

However, there is more than one reason why his idea of God needs to be adjusted. I mentioned some reasons to him, and they appeared to be sufficient for the time being. But the whole point of the ontological argument for God's existence is supposed to be that only a perfect being is maximally great, and only a perfect being (in the absolute sense of the word) is necessary (exists in all possible worlds), and compossibly instantiates all omniproperties.

Another way of viewing this issue logically is to say that only God could be all-knowing and maximally powerful. How could a creature ever have such properties? Nevertheless, to emphasize this point, instantiating all omniproperties seems to be a logical consequence of having one omniproperty. For a being cannot be omnipotent or omniscient without being maximally excellent, it seems.

Two other ways of handling my student's question is to reference transcendentals like "good" "beauty" and unity; God also has incommunicable properties that only God exemplifies. See http://www.theopedia.com/classification-of-the-attributes-of-god

Duns Scotus argues that God's chief attribute is infinity. So he evidently contends that all divine properties are really just an extension of divine infinity.

Pascal, Reason and Religion (Romans 12:1)

"The last function of reason is to recognize that there are an infinity of things which surpass it" (Blaise Pascal).

That being said, it must be pointed out that reason plays a significant role in Christianity. We cannot fully understand God's infinite existence; we don't fully comprehend how God has always been, without beginning (his a se esse). On the other hand, should we hold views that blatantly contradict reason and scripture?

"I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the compassions of God, to present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, [which is] your intelligent service" (Romans 12:1 DBT).

τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν could be translated "spiritual worship" (ESV), "reasonable service" (KJV, NET) or "logical service" (Aramaic Bible in Plain English).

Regardless of the translational approach to Romans 12:1, most religions agree that reason has a place in one's belief system. The question is just to what degree we should let reason influence our worship to God. Hence, we see widely divergent approaches in the Western and Eastern churches with the latter favoring a mystical approach over a more rational one.

While we need to exercise due humility before Jehovah (YHWH) and walk modestly in his sight, let us not excuse contradictory thinking or illogical reasoning by seeking refuge in divine mysteries. The Bible speaks of "mysteries" (Revelation 10:7 KJV) in the sense that we cannot know certain things until God reveals them in his proper time. But Jehovah does not contravene reason or disclose himself or his purpose in a confused or incoherent manner. Therefore, while reason will always be surpassed by an "infinity of things," those things which transcend or excel reason must never contravene it (i.e., must never go contrary to reason).

Response to Robert M. Bowman on Philippians 2:7 (Ongoing Project to Edit)

(1) Assuming a slave's form is a fitting expression of Christ's humility. Nevertheless, a fatal objection to Robert Bowman's view of the participial phrase in Phil. 2:7 is that his explanation makes KENOW refer to an act of addition--not to an act of subtraction. Yet lexical evidence for this use of KENOW is sadly lacking. One may consult BDAG, Louw-Nida, LSJ or Moulton-Milligan's and he or she will likely not find one instance where KENOW describes an act of addition. Neither in Holy Writ nor in extra-biblical literature does one find an instance of this Greek verb employed in the manner that Bowman suggests.

(2) The aorist participle LABWN, if translated woodenly, would be rendered "having taken" or "received" the form of a servant. It would thus have reference to an action that is antecedent to the main verb. But there are also times when the aorist participle has ingressive force.

At one time, I favored the antecedent view for the participle LABWN in Phil. 2:7. After talking with a friend and studying Stanley Porter's Idioms, however, I must concede that LABWN may be referring to consequent action or another possibility is subsequent action. At any rate, it is by no means certain that LABWN is a participle of means. While categorizing Phil. 2:7 as an example of the instrumental participle (i.e., participle of means), Brooks and Winbery admit that LABWN and GENOMENOS "may indicate manner rather than means" (Syntax of NT Greek, 150). To be fair, they also say that there's little difference between a participle of manner and one of means. However, the disparity between the two is significant enough to demonstrate that Bowman may only be appealing to a grammatical principle that suits his theology. For a brief (but lucid) explanation of the difference between means and manner, see Richard A. Young's Intermediate NT Greek, p. 154.

Bowman also writes:

"but there need not be an argument here at all. In Trinitarian theology it is true to say that Christ actively took this action [i.e., the kenosis], and it is also true to say that the Father sent Christ and gave him his human nature (including his body). It is not either/or; it is both/and."

My Response:

Maybe acording to Trinitarian theology, Christ actively "incarnated himself." But my concern is whether the Bible makes this claim. So far, you've offered one controversial text to support your theological view and not much else. And the lexicons I've checked so far all agree that KENOW does not refer to an act of addition. Furthermore, grammarians who are interested in scholarship (rather than propping up Trinitarian notions), also concede that the context of Phil. 2:7 possibly does not really favor LABWN being a participle of means. Construing it thus is only a convenient way to seemingly buttress your view of the Incarnation and God's putative triunity.

Matthew 23:9 and Father

καὶ πατέρα μὴ καλέσητε ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, εἷς γάρ ἐστιν ὑμῶν ὁ πατὴρ ὁ οὐράνιος·

I hate to state the obvious here, but Jesus is not discussing biological fathers: the context is a religious one. Louw and Nida (Lexical Semantics of the Greek NT. Atlanta: Scholar's Press, 1992) provide 24 examples of πατὴρ in the GNT and show that one must carefully differentiate between distinct semantic domains of πατὴρ, just as one would carefully parse between unique senses of "earth" in Scripture.

They write:

"In context 5 ('do not call anyone on earth father')
the use of PATHR is quite different from what it is in
previous contexts, since this is certainly not an
injunction against speaking about one's own father nor
is it a taboo about speaking of God as 'Father.' In
Matthew 23:9 the focus is on authority within the
believing community, and so a term appropriate to God
is not to be used in speaking about [human] persons"
(pp. 45-47).

This explanation is obvious in the context of Mt 23:9; nevertheless, some continue to insist that this Matthean verse does not rule out calling religious leaders "father."