Sunday, June 14, 2015

Free Will and Foreknowledge (A Draft)

I'm thinking out loud here. So none of what I write below should be viewed as definitive or conclusive.

Let S = a rational or moral subject (a doer)
Let T = a given time
Let A = an action performed by S

Assume that "acting freely" is being used in a libertarian sense where S has the power to perform A or has the power to refrain from performing A.

William Lane Craig criticizes those who believe that God's prior knowledge of what S will freely do at T2 implies fatalism. He thinks that whoever infers fatalism from God's foreknowledge of what S will do at T2 has committed the so-called "modal fallacy." But I believe that my argument is rather in the form of a reductio ad absurdum:

1) It is impossible for God to hold a false belief (divine omniscience).
2) God knows at T1 that S will freely do A at T2.
3) So S will freely do A at T2.
4) But if S is able to act freely, then S can do A or refrain from doing A at T2.
5) If S refrains from doing A at T2, then God's belief at T1 will be falsified.
6) Either it's possible for God to hold a false belief at T1 or it's possible for S to do or refrain from doing A at T2.
7) God cannot hold a false belief at T1.
8) Therefore, it's not possible for S to refrain from doing A at T2.

Or maybe what I want to argue is:

1) Either it's possible for God to hold a false belief at T1 or it's possible that S can either do A or refrain from doing A at T2.

2) It's not possible for God to hold a false belief at T1.

2) God believes at T1 that S will do A at T2.

3) Therefore, it's not possible that S can either do A or refrain from doing A at T2.

Conclusion: If God believes at T1 that S will do A at T2, then S cannot do otherwise than A at T2.

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