I'm thinking out loud here. So none of what I write below should be viewed as definitive or conclusive.
Let S = a rational or moral subject (a doer)
Let T = a given time
Let A = an action performed by S
Assume that "acting freely" is being used in a libertarian sense where S has the power to perform A or has the power to refrain from performing A.
William Lane Craig criticizes those who believe that God's prior knowledge of what S will freely do at T2 implies fatalism. He thinks that whoever infers fatalism from God's foreknowledge of what S will do at T2 has committed the so-called "modal fallacy." But I believe that my argument is rather in the form of a reductio ad absurdum:
1) It is impossible for God to hold a false belief (divine omniscience).
2) God knows at T1 that S will freely do A at T2.
3) So S will freely do A at T2.
4) But if S is able to act freely, then S can do A or refrain from doing A at T2.
5) If S refrains from doing A at T2, then God's belief at T1 will be falsified.
6) Either it's possible for God to hold a false belief at T1 or it's possible for S to do or refrain from doing A at T2.
7) God cannot hold a false belief at T1.
8) Therefore, it's not possible for S to refrain from doing A at T2.
Or maybe what I want to argue is:
1) Either it's possible for God to hold a false belief at T1 or it's possible that S can either do A or refrain from doing A at T2.
2) It's not possible for God to hold a false belief at T1.
2) God believes at T1 that S will do A at T2.
3) Therefore, it's not possible that S can either do A or refrain from doing A at T2.
Conclusion: If God believes at T1 that S will do A at T2, then S cannot do otherwise than A at T2.
2 comments:
Your draft explores a common tension between divine omniscience and human free will, particularly in the libertarian sense of free will, where a person has the genuine ability to choose between alternatives. However, there are several key philosophical and theological points that need to be addressed to clarify the relationship between God's foreknowledge and human freedom.
You seem to imply that if God knows at T1 that S will do A at T2, then S must necessarily do A, thereby negating free will. This is a common concern, but it is based on a confusion between necessity and certainty. Just because God knows something will happen does not mean it will happen out of necessity. There is a difference between:
Logical necessity: Something that MUST happen and cannot be otherwise.
Certainty: Something that WILL happen, but it remains a free and contingent choice.
God’s knowledge of future events is certain, but this certainty doesn’t impose necessity on the events themselves. As Boethius, Aquinas, and many others have argued, God's knowledge of future contingents (like human free actions) does not remove the freedom of those actions. They remain contingent and free in their nature, even though God knows them infallibly. This distinction is crucial and avoids the modal fallacy you are concerned with.
William Lane Craig, as you mention, criticizes the inference of fatalism from divine foreknowledge by highlighting the modal fallacy. The fallacy occurs when we confuse two types of necessity: hypothetical necessity and absolute necessity.
Hypothetical necessity: If God knows that S will do A at T2, then necessarily S will do A at T2. However, this necessity is conditional on God's knowledge, not on the nature of S's action itself. S is still free to do A or refrain from doing A at T2—God just knows which choice S will make.
Absolute necessity: If S’s doing of A at T2 were absolutely necessary, then S would not have the ability to refrain from A. But this is not the case. S remains free, even though God's knowledge is infallible.
Your argument conflates these two forms of necessity. God’s knowledge does not make the future act necessary in an absolute sense; it is only necessary in the hypothetical sense that, given God knows S will do A, it will indeed happen. However, the action remains free.
Another issue to consider is the nature of God's knowledge. According to Boethius and Aquinas, God does not experience time in a linear fashion as humans do. God's knowledge is eternal and outside of time, which means that God knows all events—past, present, and future—simultaneously in a single, timeless act. This idea is called the eternal present or NUNC STANS.
This means that God does not "foreknow" events in the same way that a human might anticipate future occurrences. Instead, God sees all moments of time as present to Him. Therefore, the knowledge God has of S doing A at T2 is not a prediction, but rather a perception of S's free choice from an eternal vantage point. God’s knowledge of free actions doesn’t determine them but simply sees them as they are: free.
Let’s revisit your argument more closely.
1. “It is impossible for God to hold a false belief (divine omniscience).” - True. God’s knowledge is infallible.
2. “God knows at T1 that S will freely do A at T2.” - True, but with the caveat that God’s knowledge is not temporal. God knows S will do A at T2 from an eternal perspective, not in a temporal sequence.
3. “So S will freely do A at T2.” - True. S will indeed do A freely at T2.
4. “But if S is able to act freely, then S can do A or refrain from doing A at T2.” - True. S has the power to choose between A and not-A. However, this does not contradict God's knowledge. God knows which choice S will make, but this knowledge does not cause or necessitate S's choice.
5. “If S refrains from doing A at T2, then God's belief at T1 will be falsified.” - This assumes that God’s knowledge is bound by time, which is not the case in classical theism. God’s knowledge is eternal, so He knows what S will freely choose. God doesn’t "predict" or "foresee" in the temporal sense.
5. “Either it's possible for God to hold a false belief at T1 or it's possible for S to do or refrain from doing A at T2.” - This presents a false dichotomy. The correct answer is that it is possible for S to choose freely at T2, and God’s knowledge is not a "belief" in the human sense but an infallible, eternal knowing.
6. “God cannot hold a false belief at T1.” - True.
7. “Therefore, it's not possible for S to refrain from doing A at T2.” - This conclusion is false. It assumes that God’s knowledge somehow removes the contingency and freedom of S’s action, but as we’ve explained, God’s knowledge doesn’t impose necessity on S’s free action. God knows that S will freely choose A at T2.
In conclusion, your draft raises important points about the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human free will, but it falls into the trap of confusing necessity with certainty. God’s knowledge is infallible and eternal, but it doesn’t cause or necessitate human choices. The free choices of moral agents remain contingent and free, even though God knows them with certainty.
A proper understanding of divine timelessness and the distinction between hypothetical and absolute necessity helps resolve the tension between foreknowledge and free will. In the classical theistic view, S remains free to choose between A and not-A, and God’s knowledge does not interfere with or negate this freedom.
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