Garrett J. DeWeese. God and the Nature of Time. Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2004.
Ludwig Wittgenstein intimated that the problems of philosophy are nothing more than the problems of language. On pages 24-25, DeWeese illustrates why language causes a multitude of difficulties when it comes to expressing temporality. For instance, Hebrew perfects are used for verbs to depict completed action but imperfects delineate incomplete action. Overlooking the fact that these categories come from non-Semitic languages, one confusing "aspect" of Hebrew perfects are used for past and future actions since once God foretells an action, it's viewed as already accomplished. James Barr brought some of these issues to the fore when he analyzed Cullmann's study of time as used in the Bible. DeWeese similarly concludes that the "tense" of verbs in the Hebrew Bible don't necessarily tell us much about the real world. Problems like these likewise arise in Greek.
Time and tense are not merely problems for Hebrew or ancient Greek: French apparently conflates time and tense by employing temps for both. Temps bears other senses as well, and despite the conflation, French has a way to tell the difference between time and tense. Yet the lesson here is that the lingual conflation of time and tense likely tells us very little about fundamental French temporal intuitions (24). DeWeese emphasizes his earlier point that language analyses without accompanying metaphysical frameworks are probably going to be fruitless in terms of what one can learn about reality and its basic structures, but when one combines ordinary language with "independent metaphysical argument," there might be a chance to disclose what is ultimately real about (in this case) God and time.
I'm going to skip ahead to more pressing matters about God and time, but I'll briefly mention that pages 24-25 and following deal with the difference between A- and B-sentences which I take to mean tensed versus tenseless sentences. An example of the former type of sentence is " A bomb will explode in the station five minutes from now," and the latter could be illustrated by "A bomb explodes in the station five minutes later than the time of this utterance." There is some debate about whether a statement that includes temporal indexical terms (presentness, futurity) can be translated into a tenseless statement. Regardless of one's position on this debate, DeWeese makes the modest assertion that language somehow links to reality--that is part of its function. Please see the pages referenced above to access his discussion of A- and B- sentences. I now turn to DeWeese's basic understanding of time.
Time appears to be dynamic: in other words, time changes, "flows," and causation apparently goes from prior to posterior probability (page 36). If time is dynamic, then an A-theory of time would be true--a theory that posits time is tensed rather than tenseless and static (a B-theory of time). DeWeese briefly outlines an argument from causation which he uses to show that time really changes: causes precede effects and there is a real past, present, and future, temporally speaking. He acknowledges that talk of time flowing is a figure of speech, not to be pressed too far. His main point is that time is dynamic and he defends a causal account of time. DeWeese is interested in both the flow of time and its direction. Therefore, he explores theories that might elucidate the matter.
For more about the dynamic and static theories of time, see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#DynaStatTheo
In the same part of this work (pages 38ff), DeWeese brings up and explores the dynamic view of George Schlesinger. He concludes that the project of Schlesinger is not successful: this view posits that time is dynamic, but the past, present, and future "all exist on equal ontological footing" (38, ftn. 68). This results in a state of affairs wherein the typing of one sentence happens in one world but the next sentence typed occurs in another world. A notable difficulty in philosophical circles is the question of personal identity across time. Schlesinger's approach exacerbates the problem of personal identity rather than resolving or easing the tension. Furthermore, it does not offer a plausible explanation for how someone or something moves from world to world while maintaining their purported actuality. DeWeese is not impressed with the project, but what about how other thinkers approach the question of time/God and time? And, most importantly, does the Bible help to resolve these questions? I will address these questions in my last post on DeWeese's book.
Wednesday, January 12, 2022
"God and the Nature of Time" by Garrett J. DeWeese--A Discussion (Part II)
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7 comments:
This is interesting, I also think that temporal causation is necessary for libertarian free will of created beings (which itself is, I believe, necessary for the problem of evil to be countered).
As to identity overtime, as I like to do, I like to go to dialectical (in the idealist sense) philosophy, i.e. identity is not a static substance, but a relation, which only exists as a relation.
I've been re-reading (for like the fifth time, I'm wrestling with this text a bit) Behr's translation and his commentary on Origen's First principles .... he has a very interesting take on temporality, i.e. time is flowing, but there also exists an absolute a-temporal eternity, which mirrors the created flowing time, but as a eternal reality. It's difficult to get my head around it, it's fascinating, but I'm not sure if I buy it .... largely for theological reasons.
Appreciate the input.
Many thinkers today like going the relational route and I've seen this tendency in the idealist tradition too. While I don't necessarily want to describe identity as a static substance, and I know there are multiple theories of identity, here we're specifically talking about personal identity. In that case, I don't understand why it has to be purely relational since I can imagine a possible world in which there exists one person in time, and that one person could potentially maintain his/her identity over time much like a piece of fruit could be the same piece of fruit at T1, T2, Tn without being related to another piece of fruit. I'm saying that's at least a possibility, not fact per se.
The way you describe the view of Behr, it sounds Platonic/Neoplatonic. I think John of Damascus also had an interesting take on time and God. At any rate, I used to like Platonism, but I eventually came to reject it. The negative spin on time is a bit much for me and the Platonic Forms seem farfetched :-)
However, Behr or Origen might not fall into that trap.
Behr is certainly NeoPlatonic ... I find his view fascinating but I think there are problems with it, but it at least provides for a more coherent view of incarnation for trinitarians who want to work it out, nevertheless it has issues.
I'm not sure of Behr is interpreting Origen correctly ... Origen is a complicated wrieter, especially in his "first principles."
I really like the relational view, so perhaps a piece of fruit could be the same piece of fruit at T1 and T2 ... but could it exist AS a piece of fruit? Isn't it a piece of fruit only in relation to other things? So would would recognize it as a piece of fruit? So when I think of my own identity, I get my identity by constantly differentiating myself from the world, and having an orientation to the world and recognizing its orientation to me, I think it's this dialectic that makes my identity, had I been the only thing in existence I don't know how I would establish my identity, or how I would even be able to be a subject. Of course I'm relying on a phenomenological approach, if one approaches it analytically it may be possible.
I think Aristotle discovered numerous problems with Platonism and subsequent writers poked holes in Neoplatonism. Origin has been described as a Neoplatonist and Middle Platonist: he's certainly complicated, as you say.
I ackowledge that it's possible for a piece of fruit to only be such in relation to other things but I don't see why this is necessarily the case. If the relational view is correct, then how could the unipersonal view of God be right? That would mean God as subject needs other subjects to differentiate himself as God.
Secondly, let's assume that the first creation of a unipersonal God was an angel. The relational view would have us believe that th is spirit creature known as an angel could only be an angel if there other angels existed. Again, I don't see why this first creation couldn't be an angel because God seemed him such, even before others like him came into being.
I kind of do think God needs other subjects to differentiate himself as God, Not that God didn't exist prior to creation, but prior to creation all we can say about him is that he was pure being, or beyond being, or something the apophatic theologians might have said, ineffable maybe, or absolute, or perhaps, as Schelling might say, pure will ... and that in creating he, in a sense, determines himself as God, since he is then related to something else.
I have a paper coming out later this year, in the Journal Theology, where I try and draw the idea out, drawing from Hegel and Schelling (Schelling is the best here, he argues that God has his ground in his will, which is prior even to his own existence as a concrete being, since he determines himself as God through his will, which is his will to create). Here's a pre-pub version of the paper: https://www.academia.edu/59493951/God_as_Love_in_creation_pre_pub_draft_
So when the unipersonal God created first an angel (the Logos), at this point God would then be God, and the Logos would be other, God would be God to the angel, and the angel would be the creature of God.
I don't think you need other angels for this "angel" to be an angel ... but what you would need is other creatures, which can be differentiated from the angel (and from God himself) such that "angel" could be a meaningful category.
I suppose God could designate the first creature as angel, but this would only make sense in light of the future creation to which the first creature would BE angel, since angel is a type of creature. Outside of that light the designation of angel would be meaningless, since the only distinction would be God (creator) and creature.
Of course, it's possible that the whole model is unnecessary, and one could be what one is independent of any relation, which would mean God could be what he is entirely, and be designated as God independent of creation, the problem is I just can't see what that would mean. Of course the fact that we cannot comprehend something is not a reason to deny it, if we have good reason to affirm it, but as far as the biblical data is concerned, God always designates himself in relation to creatures, usually his people, i.e. he causes to become, he will become whatever he will become (for his people), he is the Father and God of his Son, he is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, he is the creator, etc etc etc.
Was God a deity when he was all alone, before he created the Son/Logos or other creatures? I can't fully go into the issue now but I believe the scriptures and early fathers answer that God doesn't need anyone else to be God. He is God from olam to olam (Psalm 90:2). God may have become Lord, Father, Creator and more when he made creatures (spirit and human/animal, etc) but I don't believe he became God since that's what he always was, I would submit. However, I would like to read your paper: thanks for making the prepub version available.
In Adversus Praxean, Tertullian seems to argue that God was always God but he was not always Father. Hippolytus of Rome offers a similar line of reasoning and I think Athenagoras does as well. If we define God as a maximally excellent being, we could think of this excellence in comparative terms, but if God has all perfections as the maximally excellent being, then I don't see why he could not be the infinite and eternal maximally excellent being (i.e., God). Others have argued that "Jehovah" (YHWH) is not an accidental name that God has but it's his everlasting/eternal name essentially linked with the kind of being he is.
Let me clarify that I'm using "angel" as a broad term for a spirit creature who is superhuman but a creature, less than God. I'm thinking in terms of God making a person (somewhat like himself) who is spirit. However, the spirit (angel) is possibly given a certain nature or made in such a way that an angel is what he is, ut natura.
We can't create like God but imagine that someone invents an object that hitherto did not exist like a car or computer. Okay, you may argue that the car or computer only come to be what they are in relation to things in their respective classes but I can't see why any more cars or computers have to be made before they can be identified as cars or computers. So, I'm not ruling out relationality as an explanation, yet I just don't see relationality as a necessary apparatus for defining what things are/what God is.
As for your last paragraph, we must first define "God," which is hard to do. And if we turn to the Bible, it just seems to me that YHWH is depicted as a being, who has always been what he is without the need to have creatures or the created world define him as God qua God. That doesn't mean the created world does not define him in other ways based on how he relates to the world. Or Aquinas would say the world relates to God but not vice-versa in an actual sense.
I would like to address this issue in a fuller sense one day. Thanks for the interaction.
Thank you too, all my thoughts here are still tentative, I hope to clarify them as I learn more :).
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