"God and the Nature of Time" by Garrett J. DeWeese--A Discussion (Part III)

In my last post about this book by Garrett DeWeese, I dealt with personal identity and time. As we learned, DeWeese is not impressed with the project by Schlesinger to define time and make sense of personal identity, but what about how other thinkers approach the question of God in relation to time or time itself? And, most importantly, does the Bible help to resolve these questions? These two questions are my focus in this last post about God and the Nature of Time.

Pages 212-213 discuss Nicholas Wolterstorff's argument for God being in time, that is, being infected by temporality. I will summarize Wolterstorff's line of reasoning this way:

(1) No one can know about some temporal event (E) that it is occurring except when it is occurring.

(2) Before E begins to occur, one cannot know that E is occurring, for it is not.

(3) After E ceases to occur, one cannot know that it is occurring, for it is not.

(4) Every case of knowing that E is occurring therefore seems to be infected by the temporality of E.

(5) Therefore, the act of knowing about E that it was occurring and that it is occurring and the act of knowing about E that it will be occurring are all infected by the temporality of E.

(6) God (according to Scripture) performs all of these acts of knowing since he knows what has happened, what is happening and what will happen. Hence, some of God's acts (his acts of knowing) are themselves temporal events. Consequently, God is not timeless.

DeWeese thinks Wolterstorff's argument is strongly plausible prima facie, but he suggests that an atemporalist (one who does not believe God is temporal) might counter with an offer to render the tensed propositions of Wolterstorff into tenseless statements. However, since this strategy might not work for reasons stated heretofore, DeWeese categorizes Wolterstorff's argument as "weak."

However, while characterizing Wolterstorff's argument as weak, he indicates that there might be a way to make it stronger. Maybe it is the case that God's redemptive acts are "infected with temporality." For instance, if God is first wrathful toward a sinner but then subsequently adopts the sinner as his child, Wolterstorff's argument might be salvaged. Such divine actions might be temporal and not merely relational changes (so-called Cambridge changes). It is possible that God likewise has a genuinely personal relationship with his rational creatures and being in a personal relationship with humans might necessitate that God be temporal. DeWeese concludes: "If such an argument from personality could be mounted, it would certainly be in the spirit of Wolterstorff's article" (page 213).

The book then turns toward another philosopher who thinks God is temporal, Stephen T. Davis.

He argues:

1. God creates x.
2. x first exists at T.
3. Therefore, God creates x at T.

DeWeese finds 3) to be ambiguous between 3a) God, at T, creates x and 3b) which is God creates x, and x first exists at T. I think it can readily be seen that 3b) is nothing more than the collocation of inferences from 1) and 2) above.

Ultimately, DeWeese decides that Davis' argument might need to be patched up before it's accepted, but he is basically sympathetic to the view of Davis regarding God's actions. However, any evaluative remarks directed toward Davis are postponed until later in the book.

On the other hand, Edward Wierenga launches some criticisms at Davis' argument in The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes, pages 196-198. Do his objections have probative force? The answer to that question will end up being in the beholder's eyes.

Pages 258-259 discuss the potential implications of affirming divine temporality. If God is temporal, then God is not absolutely simple: neither is God strongly immutable. DeWeese thinks these divine attributes owe much to Neoplatonism. Therefore, he does not think giving up these attributes for the sake of divine temporality fatally wounds Christian theology.

On page 273, three options concerning God's temporal status before creation are posited: 1) God's existence could have been one amorphous and temporal moment, 2) his existence could have been divided into a timeless and temporal existence (before and after creation) or 3) God could have existed from the infinite past sans creation. To really understand these distinctions, one must introduce the distinction between metaphysical and physical time. In any event, DeWeese professes that each one of these views have their own problems, but he rules in favor of divine temporality, mutatis mutandis by reckoning that it is possible for the divine temporalist to bite a smaller bullet than the divine atemporalist: DeWeese himself adopts omnitemporality which is a modification of other divine temporalist accounts.

Like William Lane Craig, DeWeese concludes that the Bible does not give a definitive answer to whether God is atemporal or temporal, and if so, in what way God might be temporal. He accordingly opts for omnitemporality, choosing to believe that God is present at all times but somehow transcends ordinary physical time. A book reviewer and academic, Marcel Sarot, summed up DeWeese's work this way though he highly praised it:

"While this book does not develop a major new theory, it is an excellent survey of the field. For a reviewer that is, in a sense, a pity: summarizing an excellent survey provides less opportunities for original arguments than criticizing a flawed survey or a highly original new theory. If, however, he has been able to convey that this is an outstanding introduction to the field, this particular reviewer is more than content."

See Sarot, M. (2007). "Review of the book God and the nature of time, G.J. DeWeese, 2004, 075463518X." Ars Disputandi: The Online Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 7(7).