Etymology: An Overview and Caveat

Etymology: An Overview

The term "etymology" may refer to the branch of linguistics that deals with word formations (origins): etymologists customarily trace a signifier's development through time since they primarily want to know the diachronic aspects of a word as opposed to its synchronic facets. However, this project does not mean that etymologists know nothing about synchrony. It's just that etymological studies naturally let diachrony take precedence over synchrony.

Yet linguists generally recognize that language is not static--it changes over time and morphic substances (words) thus acquire new meanings as they come to signify varying concepts or referents. For instance, the English word "salary" derives from the Latin salarium. The Latin term once referred to "money allowed to Roman soldiers for the purchase of salt" (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology). Today, the word signifies a form of pay (a stipend) without denoting what salarium once meant.

We can make the same claim for the Greek word μῦθος. At one time, μῦθος simply denoted a "word," "speech," "tale," or "story" without any necessary connotations of falsehood (cf. Classical Mythology by Mark P.O. Morford and Robert J. Lenardon). In Homer, μῦθος clearly has reference to a truthful account (a trustworthy report) of eagerly anticipated details. By the first century BCE-CE, however, μῦθος starts to be employed pejoratively by both Philo of Alexandria and the Christian-Greek scriptural writers (2 Peter 1:16ff). We also note a semantic shift vis-à-vis other Greek words such as ἁμαρτία and μορφή. Therefore, it should not take us aback if we find that ἁρπαγμός also underwent change per its lexicality.

At this point, I would encourage the reader not to conclude that etymology (the study of primary word forms) is never helpful: such thinking is far from accurate. Besides, understanding how compound signifiers work can be useful when learning Greek vocabulary, and etymology also comes in handy when one is trying to decipher an unfamiliar English word. The person who knows the origins of adjectives like "doxastic," "alethic," "logocentric" and "heliocentric" can easily decode such esoteric speech; this blog post is thus not meant to downgrade all types of etymologizing. But one must use caution when undertaking word studies. Etymology can be a blessing if used aright--it can also be a misleading when employed otherwise.

For instance, D.A. Carson gives some pertinent examples of what he calls "the root fallacy" on pp. 28-33 of his Exegetical Fallacies (Second Edition). Some common instances of the root fallacy are popular explanations that we find for the etymological derivation of the words ἀπόστολος, ὑπηρέτης, ἀγαπάω, and I will add, ἐκκλησία.

One often hears that ἐκκλησία means "called out ones." That is an explanation given based on the word's etymology, but it's not what ἐκκλησία signifies in the Christian-Greek Scriptures (GNT). The word denotes an "assembly" or "congregation." It does not refer to those called out per se, nor does the word signify a building in the GNT. Etymology and/or semantic anachronism can deceive us in this case, if we let diachrony take precedence over synchrony.

The Trinity Is Not a Triplicity (John Burnaby)

Trinitarians normally do not say that the Father, Son, or the Holy Spirit are "parts" of the God since the Almighty is supposed to be non-complex or absolutely simple. Describing the Augustinian conception of the Trinity, John Burnaby writes: "The Trinity is not a 'triplicity,' an organism of parts: the equality of the 'Persons' means that each possesses the whole substance of Godhead" (Burnaby 22).

Porneia (A Brief Diachronic and Synchronic Exercise)

LSJ Greek-English Lexicon provides the definitions "fornication" or "prostitution" for the Greek noun PORNEIA. While I do not take exception to LSJ's treatment of PORNEIA in toto, one problem is the issue of synchronicity over against diachronicity. In other words, we need to focus on how the word(s) in question were used in the first century and honestly examine such usages in the NT and in secular first-century writings to ascertain their possible meanings in a determinate usus loquendi. For instance, Timothy George observes that PORNEIA originally denoted "prostitution" (cf. the terms PORNH and PERNHMI), but by the mid-first century CE, PORNEIA came to mean (potentially and generally) "sexual immorality or irregularity" (George, Galatians, 392). I think that Matt. 5:32 and Jude 7 demonstrate the accuracy of George's construal.

Louw-Nida makes this comment on PORNEIA: "To engage in sexual immorality of any kind, often with the implication of prostitution-'to engage in illicit sex, to commit fornication, sexual immorality, fornication, prostitution" (88.71). Though no examples are given of this usage, L-N also says that PORNEIA may refer to incest in the NT. (Sed vide 1 Cor. 5:1ff.)

While I would not restrict PORNEIA to homosexual activity, it seems that that the term encompasses such activity (based on Jude 7). For ARSENOKOITHS, the new BDAG gives the following information: "a male who engages in sexual activity w. a pers. of his own sex, pederast 1 Cor 6:9." Cf. Soph. Lex.

Philippians 2:7-8 and LABWN

There are four instances of the aorist participle that appear in Phil. 2:7-8, namely, λαβών, γενόμενος, εὑρεθεὶς, and a second occurrence of γενόμενος. Donald Mastronarde points out that the aorist participle "conveys the aspect of the aorist stem, that is, simple occurrence or completion of an action" and "most often refers to an action antecedent to that of the main verb of the sentence and is usually translated in English by a past participle." So in the case of the four aorist participles presently under discussion, they would literally be rendered in English: 'having taken,' 'having become,' having been found,' and 'having become.' λαβών would thus possibly refer to an action antecedent to the main verb ἐκένωσεν--hence, it would not describe the instrumentality of the "emptying" delineated in Phil. 2:7.

Moises Silva also makes the same observation in his commentary on Philippians, when he writes: "If we were to press this rule [for aorist participles], we would need to translate each clause [in Phil. 2:7-8] somewhat woodenly: for example, 'having taken (or, after he had taken) the form of a servant' " (Silva 120). But Silva then goes to say that this rule has many exceptions and he is right (see Mastronarde 199ff). But I think that he is possibly wrong when he goes on to insist that the best way to handle the aorist participles λαβών and γενόμενος in Phil. 2:7 is to treat them as participles of means. It seems that both Silva and Daniel B. Wallace primarily favor the participle of means in Phil. 2:7 (outside of theological considerations) because of the supposed "poetic quality" of Philippians. Yet this "quality" is questionable since this verse might not be derived from an older hymn as commonly supposed.

Furthermore, construing λαβών as a participle of means does not do justice to ἐκένωσεν, which normally denotes an act of negation (subtraction), not the act of addition (as even Wallace admits). So the NWT rendering seems to make the most sense out of the context and it is well within the parameters of Greek grammar when it translates Phil. 2:7: "No, but he emptied himself and took a slave's form and came to be in the likeness of men."

"No, but he emptied himself and took a slave's form and became human" (2013 Revision).


"But himself emptied, taking a servant's form" (Rotherham).

At one time, I favored the antecedent view for the participle λαβών in Phil 2:7. After talking with a friend and studying Stanley Porter's Idioms, however, I must concede that λαβών may be referring to consequent action or, more likely, subsequent action. At any rate, it is by no means certain that the aorist verbal adjective here is a participle of means. While categorizing Phil 2:7 as an instance of the instrumental participle (i.e., participle of means), Brooks and Winbery admit that λαβών and γενόμενος "may indicate manner rather than means" (Syntax of NT Greek, 150). To be fair, they also say that there's little difference between a participle of manner and one of means.

It also just dawned on me that NWT renders 2:7 polysyndetically, but Rotherham and some others, render the verse asyndetically.

Meaning of "Spirit" in 1 Corinthians 2:11 (David Hill)

"At 1 Cor. 2:11 'spirit' connotes something like 'human consciousness,' the organ of self-knowledge. A similar use is evidenced at Rom. 8:16--'The Spirit of God beareth witness to (or, with) our spirit that we are the children of God'--where the human spirit is considered as that part of man which receives spiritual knowledge" (Greek Words and Hebrew Meanings: Studies in the Semantics of Soteriological Terms, page 284).

Is There A Possible Connection Between Daniel 8:10 (LXX) and Revelation 12:4?

Henry Alford makes a comparison between Daniel 8:10 and Revelation 12:4:

καὶ ἐμεγαλύνθη ἕως τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρων, καὶ συνεπάτησαν αὐτά (Daniel 8:10 LXX)

καὶ ἡ οὐρὰ αὐτοῦ σύρει τὸ τρίτον τῶν ἀστέρων τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ἔβαλεν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν γῆν. καὶ ὁ δράκων ἕστηκεν ἐνώπιον τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς μελλούσης τεκεῖν, ἵνα ὅταν τέκῃ τὸ τέκνον αὐτῆς καταφάγῃ. (Revelation 12:4 Nestle)

Irenaeus and John 14:28

"For if any one should inquire the reason why the
Father, who has fellowship with the Son in all things,
has been declared by the Lord alone to know the hour
and the day [of judgment], he will find at present no
more suitable, or becoming, or safe reason than this
(since, indeed, the Lord is the only true Master),
that we may learn through Him that the Father is above
all things. For 'the Father,' says He, 'is greater
than I.' The Father, therefore, has been declared by
our Lord to excel with respect to knowledge; for this
reason, that we, too, as long as we are connected with
the scheme of things in this world, should leave
perfect knowledge, and such questions [as have been
mentioned], to God, and should not by any chance,
while we seek to investigate the sublime nature of the
Father, fall into the danger of starting the question
whether there is another God above God" (Irenaeus, Adv. Haer.
2.28.8).

Divine APAQEIA and DEUS SIMPLICITAS

I think the question of God's apathy or lack thereof is highly significant. The holy writings of ancient Judaism and Christianity do not seem to describe a God who is utterly unchangeable or unmoved by events in the world. To the contrary, the God of the Bible is distressed when His people are distressed (Isa 63:9) and hurt when He beholds humans engaging in courses of action that are self-destructive (2 Pet 2:12-13). The God of the Bible (as the apostle John tells his first-century readers) is love (1 Jn 4:8). A loving person is usually moved by the plight of another.

One objection that has been submitted against the doctrine of divine passibility is the notion that God is A SE ESSE and thus does not depend on anyone. As Karl Barth worded matters, God is absolute freedom (Cf. Ps 36:9; Dan 4:35; Jn 5:26ff; 2 Cor 3:17-18).

The present writer thinks that the doctrine of aseity
can be formulated in a way that does not render the
divine One impassible. God's aseity does not mean that
He cannot be moved by distressing or heartening
terrestrial events. For if I am moved by the sight of
a child, who has been struck by a car and who now lies
in the street helplessly waiting for an ambulance as
he or she vigorously fights for his/her precious life, in what
way am I dependent on the child who is almost
devoid of life? Similarly, I fail to see how God becomes
dependent on His creatures simply because He is moved
by our individual plights.

At any rate, in an online article, Dr. Kelly James
Clark (an advocate of divine impassibility) admits
that the ecclesiastical reasons for affirming an
impassible God have generally been Platonic or
neo-Platonic and, I might add, Aristotelian. The
Church (according to Clark) has basically determined
that Almighty God is impassible for the following five
reasons:

(1) The absolute Cause of the transitory realm of
becoming must be a changeless Being.

(2) God does not depend on any external source AD
EXTRA; He only depends on Himself (A SE ESSE).

(3) God cannot change, since any change would be a
change for better or worse. Since God is perfect, He
cannot change for the better and He clearly cannot
change for the worst. Ergo, He does not change at all.

(4) God is DEUS SIMPLICITAS. That is, He is
un-compounded or non-composite. Since only composite
things change, God is incapable of change.

(5) God is ACTUS PURUS and thus has no potential for
change. Consequently He cannot change.

While Clark does evidently affirm a number of these
principles that early Church councils employed to
shape their notion of God, even he has to concede the
following: "Some conciliar pronouncements are based on
philosophical assumptions that are not binding on the
church." He subsequently goes on to note:

"Although the church has prima facie obligation to
treat seriously the philosophical presuppositions of
the councils, it has a right to reconsider such a
pronouncement if the philosophical commitment violates
their understanding of Scripture, religious experience
or intuitions."

While I cannot completely concur with Clark's
statement as it stands, I think he does show that a
Christian is not bound to accept the philosophical
presuppositions of any church council. One may even
ask if a Christian should cloud his or her theological
perspective with philosophical presuppositions at all
(Col 2:8).

But putting aside that issue for now, my point is that
church councils have often relied on philosophy when
making pronouncements instead of the Bible. When
councils have depended on Plato or Aristotle rather than
Holy Writ, is a Christian theologically bound to a
council's decision? Furthermore, if (as Kelly James
Clark writes) a council makes logical errors and thus
presents unsound or invalid arguments, it certainly
makes one wonder whether a Christian should place his
or her unqualified trust in such putative infallible
decisions. May the reader make an informed decision in
the light of Jehovah's wise and everlasting counsels.

Boethius on God, Time and Foreknowledge

According to Boethius (De Consolatio 5), there is no such thing as "divine forevision" or foreknowledge on the metaphysical level:

"If you will weigh the foresight with which God discerns all things, you will rightly esteem it to be the knowledge of a never fading instant rather than a foreknowledge of the 'future.' It should therefore rather be called provision than prevision because, placed high above all things, it looks out over all as from the loftiest mountain top."

While humans may rightly call God's knowledge of that which is future "foreknowledge," in reality (from the perspective of ultimate reality), it is not foreknowledge, but an intimate awareness of the present qua nunc aeterna.

But why would a Catholic thinker be tempted to make this move? There are at least two reasons that readily spring to mind. Firstly, Boethius believes that if God actually foresees future events or states, then He might also cause them (i.e., foreknowledge stems from foreordination). Secondly, Boethius reasons: "Without doubt . . . all things which God foreknows do come to pass, but certain of them proceed from free will."

So libertarian free will only seems possible if God does not "foreknow" future free actions. The way out of this problem for Boethius is to posit an atemporal deity.

Nevertheless, De Consolatio 5 also maintains that something known "cannot be otherwise than it is known to be," such as God knowing a future free act. Free actions remain free IN SE even though God foreknows them--they "do not lose the perfect freedom of their nature" just because of divine foreknowledge (William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 7). That seems to be the position of Boethius.

Thomas Aquinas writes in support of what Boethius contends:

"Hence what is known by us must be necessary even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes" (ST I.14.13, Reply to Obj. 3. See also Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 10).

Notice that Aquinas likewise escapes the possible dilemmas that may arise from positing divine foreknowledge by appealing to the notion of God's eternal present (NUNC AETERNAE). But if God subsists in timeless eternity (above and beyond time), which both Boethius and Aquinas believe, then He doesn't really see future events or behold future states before they occur, but rather as they occur.

Does The World Ensemble Postulation Harmonize with Ockham's Razor? (WL Craig)

Not that I desire to fully explore this issue now, but I wanted to post the video while time permitted:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5R0EFPRlr_8

1 Thessalonians 5:10ff (Sweet Sleep)

οἱ γὰρ καθεύδοντες νυκτὸς καθεύδουσιν, καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι νυκτὸς μεθύουσιν· (1 Thessalonians 5:7)

τοῦ ἀποθανόντος περὶ ἡμῶν ἵνα εἴτε γρηγορῶμεν εἴτε καθεύδωμεν ἅμα σὺν αὐτῷ ζήσωμεν. (1 Thessalonians 5:10)

BAGD and Thayer understand Paul to be discussing literal death in 1 Thess. 5:10. Additionally, Ralph Earle writes:

"The verb GRHGOREW means 'to be awake,' as well as 'watch.' In view of the previous part of the verse--'Therefore let us not sleep, as do others'--it seems evident that the best translation here [in v. 6] is 'keep awake' (RSV). The same verb is translated 'wake' in verse 10, where it means 'alive,' not sleeping in death" (Earle, ,372).

So it appears that Earle understands καθεύδω in v. 10 to denote the literal death condition of those in Christ.

David J. Williams also insists: "It is inconceivable that Paul should suggest that whether we are morally alert or moribund will make no difference in the end. KAQEUDO is here synonymous with KOIMAW in 4:13ff (for this sense of KAQEUDW as physcial death, cf. Mark 5:39; also LXX Ps. 87:6; Dan. 12:2; for similar statements concerning Christ's death and its outcome, see Rom. 14:8f; 2 Cor. 5:15, 21; Gal. 1:4; 2:20). Paul ends as he began the section by assuring the Thessalonians that in whatever their physical condition at the Parousia, whether dead or alive, they will not be disadvantaged" (Williams 91).

We also have these comments from Henry Alford:

who died for us, that whether we wake or sleep (in what sense? surely not in an ethical sense, as above: for they who sleep will be overtaken by Him as a thief, and His day will be to them darkness, not light. If not in an ethical sense, it must be in that of living or dying, and the sense as Romans 14:8. (For we cannot adopt the trifling sense given by Whitby, al.,—‘whether He come in the night, and so find us taking our natural rest, or in the day when we are waking.’) Thus understood however, it will be at the sacrifice of perspicuity, seeing that γρηγορεῖν and καθεύδειν have been used ethically throughout the passage. If we wish to preserve the uniformity of metaphor, we may (though I am not satisfied with this) interpret in this sense: that our Lord died for us, that whether we watch (are of the number of the watchful, i.e. already Christians) or sleep (are of the number of the sleeping, i.e. unconverted) we should live, &c. Thus it would = ‘who died that all men might be saved:’ who came, not to call the righteous only, but sinners to life. There is to this interpretation the great objection that it confounds with the λοιποί, the ἡμᾶς who are definitely spoken of as set by God not to wrath but to περιποίησιν σωτηρίας. So that the sense live or die, must, I think, be accepted, and the want of perspicuity with it. The construction of a subjunctive with εἴτε … εἴτε is not classical: an optative is found in such cases, e.g. Xen. Anab. ii. 1. 14, καὶ εἴτε ἄλλο τι θέλοι χρῆσθαι εἴτʼ ἐπʼ Αἴγυπτον στρατεύειν.… See Winer, edn. 6, § 41, p. 263, Moulton’s Engl. transl. 368, note 2.

ἅμα] all together: not to be taken with σύν, see reff.

For another viewpoint, see M. Lautenschlage in ZNW 81 (1-2, 1990), pp. 39-59.

Just Musing About Categorical Syllogisms: Nothing Overly Serious

While discussing categorical syllogisms today in medieval class, I made the statement that the major premise "All humans are mortal" technically contains an adjective in the predicate slot (i.e., "mortal") although this adjective is capable of functioning as a noun. But it doesn't seem to be functioning as a noun (substantivally) in this example, and indeed, the dictionaries confirm that when mortal is used this way in the predicate slot, then it's functioning adjectivally. Yet categorical syllogisms or categorical statements are supposed to name categories or classes, not qualities. So why does the world's most famous major premise have an adjective in the predicate position rather than a noun?

Pronouncing Greek Words

More on pronouncing Greek words:

"There are different systems in use for deciding which syllable of a word is to be stressed. It is best simply to take care to pronounce each syllable clearly (particularly to be careful to distinguish the long and short vowels), and then let stress take care of itself" (J.W. Wenham, Elements of NT Greek, p. 23).

Donald Mastronarde gives the following examples of accentuation in Attic Greek:
ἀγαθός- "Short U[ltima] accented with acute, in isolation (no mora) follows the contonation on U[ltima]."

A "mora" is the so-called standard "length of a short vowel" such as A, E, I, O, U and final AI and OI in most cases (p. 17-18).

ψυχή-"Long U accented with acute, in isolation (no mora follows the contonation on U)" (Mastronarde, p. 18).

For what it is worth, I was taught that pronouncing accents is not an exact science. We are so far removed from Koine or Attic Greek that there is no way to be sure just how the syllables were stressed (pace Caragounis). Like Wenham, I'm inclined to say that one should place stress on Greek syllables, as best he or she can. Nevertheless, I must say that it is somewhat fun to read Greek poetry metrically.

In my Greek poetry undergrad class, we used to scan meter and that really helped us to stress syllables precisely, but it was difficult to me. The exercises we did were akin to breaking down English words like to-day or diff-i-cult and then marking these signifiers with stress marks before saying these words to a timed beat. This exercise was invaluable for helping me pronounce Greek, Latin or English terms (e.g., the famed Kittel is pronounced Kitt-el/Kit-l, not Kit-tel). In closing, I'll just say that D.A. Carson also has a useful book on accents that can be found at amazon.com

WL Craig on the Trinity

"The ontological Trinity concerns God as He is in Himself, unrelated to the world, while the economic Trinity concerns God as He stands in relation to creatures. Ontologically, the three persons, being underived and perfectly equal, do not stand in any relations of subordination. But in relation to creatures, for the sake of our salvation the second person of the Trinity submits to the first, taking on a human nature, and the third person acts in the place of the second, continuing the ministry of the Son between his ascension and return. So in the economic Trinity there are relations of subordination among the persons of the Trinity.

What's important to understand is that subordination does not imply inferiority. The Son and the Father are in every respect co-equal, but out of love for us and for the sake of our salvation, the Son submits to the Father. The Trinity thus provides a beautiful model of the family, in which the wife, though co-equal with her husband, willingly submits to him. Feminists who denounce such submission on grounds of inequality have failed to understand that functional submission need not spring from inferiority but can be undertaken among equals for the sake of some overriding aim."

See http://www.reasonablefaith.org/subordination-of-god-the-son-to-the-father

Thomas Aquinas and the Incarnation--Could the Father or the Holy Spirit Have Become Flesh?

From Summa Theologica (also known as Summa Theologiae) Part Three, Question 3, Article 5, Response:

"I answer that, As was said above (1,2,4), assumption implies two things, viz. the act of the one assuming and the term of the assumption. Now the principle of the act is the Divine power, and the term is a Person. But the Divine power is indifferently and commonly in all the Persons. Moreover, the nature of Personality is common to all the Persons, although the personal properties are different. Now whenever a power regards several things indifferently, it can terminate its action in any of them indifferently, as is plain in rational powers, which regard opposites, and can do either of them. Therefore the Divine power could have united human nature to the Person of the Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the Person of the Son. And hence we must say that the Father or the Holy Ghost could have assumed flesh even as the Son."

1 Cor 15:54 (Death swallowed up in victory)

"Now when this perishable puts on the imperishable, and this mortal puts on immortality, then the saying that is written will happen,

'Death has been swallowed up in victory.'"(1 Corinthians 15:54 NET Bible)

I cannot help but wonder what went through the minds of early Greeks in Corinth or Athens when Paul proclaimed the message that humans would one day "put on" immortality (ἀθανασία). For recall that the Greek gods were described as "the immortals" (Ἀθάνατοι); however, now mortals would assume immortality as a gift from God.

One question I also have about this text--although I remember the answer to my own question, I think--is what text does Paul quote in this verse. Do you remember, my friends?

1 Corinthians 15:51-52 and the First Resurrection

"Behold, I tell you a mystery: We all shall not sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed" (1 Corinthians 15:51-52 ASV).

The Apostle Peter spoke of Paul's letters being "hard to understand" at certain points (2 Peter 3:16). For me, these verses have long caused the same feeling that Peter evidently had.

Paul seems to distinguish "we" (including himself?) from the dead, who shall be raised incorruptibly. Since he says that "we" shall be changed instantaneously ("at the last trump"), would it be proper to call this instant change a resurrection? Rev. 20:4-6 suggests that those surrounding God's throne in heaven (as they too sit upon thrones) are all part of the first resurrection.

Romans 12:1: "Logical" or "Spiritual"?

Paul exhorted the Christians in Rome: Παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, διὰ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν τοῦ θεοῦ παραστῆσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν θυσίαν ζῶσαν ἁγίαν τῷ θεῷ εὐάρεστον, τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν· (Romans 12:1 WH)

The operative phrase here is τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν. λογικὴν may be rendered as "spiritual" or "logical." The signifier λατρείαν references service that is offered to God. Therefore, the apostle was either telling the Roman Christians to render a "spiritual" or "logical service" to the Most High Deity; but in this context, "logical" seems to be the best choice.

Contexually, Paul is evidently contrasting the sacrifices made under the Mosaic Law with the Christian sacrifice given when a worshiper of God offers himself or herself to YHWH (Jehovah) and His beloved Son. While the animals offered by the ancient Israelites were non-rational sacrifices--the sacrifices being employed under the law of Moses could not reason and they had no choice in the matter--when we offer ourselves to God, it is capable of being and should be a rational decision. But not only should the initial offering be made on the basis of RATIO--Paul also implies that Christian worship, doctrine, and belief should be marked by the quality of rationality. How apt is Anselm's slogan, FIDES QUAERENS INTELLECTUM ("faith seeking understanding"). To put matters succinctly, faith and reason might be considered two sides of the same coin; they are possibly not dichotomous functions of the Christian intellect and will. If a belief is irrational, its validity becomes highly questionable, although we certainly must allow for transrational aspects of true worship since God's thoughts are immensely higher than our thoughts.

John 17:3 and John Behr

Dated 5/24/2002

Greetings all,

I have been perusing a book here lately by John Behr entitled The
Way to Nicaea. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001.

This monograph provides an interesting historical account of how the
Trinity dogma developed through time. Of course, the author is pro-
Trinitarian and concludes what one a priori thinks he will conclude.

But I found this passage in his work to be of interest:

"There are no applications of the term 'God' (hO QEOS) to Jesus
Christ in the Synoptics, while the Gospel according to John, on the
other hand, both categorically affirms and explicitly denies the
applicability of this term, so presenting, again, a heightened,
profound, antithetical tension. The most striking use of the
term 'God' occurs in Christ's own statement, 'this is eternal life,
that they might know you, the only true God (TON ALHQINON QEON), and
Jesus Christ, whom you have sent' (Jn 17:3). Despite associating the
knowledge of Jesus Christ with the knowledge of God in the
identification of eternal life, and how could it be otherwise when
John repeatedly affirms that there is no other way to the Father but
through the Son, nevertheless only the Father merits the title 'God'
(ho QEOS). The description of this only true God as 'Father' is
frequent in John" (page 60).

However, Behr goes on to contend that Jn 1:1c says that the Word is
fully God. But I think he makes this assumption on a faulty premise,
namely, Colwell's rule. He also appeals to Jn 1:18 which is riddled
with many textual issues as we have discussed on this list. But at
any rate, it does not appear that 1:18 is saying that the Son is
fully God in the same way that the Father is hO QEOS: he is the
unique or brought-forth god.

Finally Behr references Jn 20:28. He then writes: "This is the most
categorical and explicit affirmation of Jesus Christ as God, in the
fullest (articular) sense, in the pages of the New Testament. Yet it
must hold inseparably together with the affirmation that it is the
Father of Jesus who alone is the one true God; on this basis, it is
possible to affirm that Jesus is as divine as his Father is, and as
such can be addressed as himself God" (61).

Philippians 1:23ff: "I am torn between the two" (NIV, 2011)

συνέχομαι δὲ ἐκ τῶν δύο, τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχων εἰς τὸ ἀναλῦσαι καὶ σὺν Χριστῷ εἶναι, πολλῷ γὰρ μᾶλλον κρεῖσσον (Philippians 1:23)

"I am torn between the two: I desire to depart and be with Christ, which is better by far" (NIV 2011)

"I am torn between these two things, for I do desire the releasing and the being with Christ, which is, to be sure, far better" (NWT 2013).

συνέχομαι δὲ ἐκ τῶν δύο demonstrates the inner struggle that Paul was having as he wrote these inspired words to the Philippians. Moisés Silva observes:

"The spontaneity of Paul's writing (that bubbling forth out of the heart that Wilamowitz spoke of) sometimes find expression in anacolutha and disjointed clauses" (Silva, "Philippians," page 81).

Of course, this statement does not mean that Paul's writing is technically ungrammatical since anacoluthon is a common rhetorical device in Biblical and Classical literature. The emotional wording and the anacolutha present in 1:21-24 are not lines of evidence against the authenticity of Philippians, but rather they show: "the apostle is not making an objective, detached theological statement" (Silva 81).

On the other hand, as Gerald Hawthorne demonstrates in his commentary, Paul lays out two options in Philippians 1:21 (Ἐμοὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῇν Χριστὸς καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν κέρδος) "in a perfectly balanced construction obscured by punctuation and by most, if not all, translations" (Hawthorne, "Philippians," 48). Hawthorne then sets out the apostle's desires as follows:

depart and to be with Christ

which is a far better thing [for me]

having the desire to and

remain alive in this body

which is a more urgent need for you

In other words, Paul equally desires both living and dying (or being with Christ); he cannot decide which option to choose. The context thus lends support to the rendering of Philippians 1:22 as "Now if I am to live on in the flesh, this is a fruitage of my work; yet what I would choose, I do not make known" (NWT) or maybe "but if to live in flesh [is my lot], this is for me worth the while: and what I shall choose I cannot tell" (Darby).

Hawthorne concludes: "there is no good reason to translate [γνωρίζω in Phil. 1:22 as] 'I do (not) know' " (47). But to be fair, this view does not lead him to suggest a third possibility in 1:23 besides life or death (i.e., being with Christ).

Dale Tuggy on Latin and Social Trinitarianism

Dale Tuggy and the Trinity Doctrine

Edgar Foster
Jan 6, 2003

There is a young philosophy scholar named Dale Tuggy, who evidently has taken an avid interest in Social and Latin Trinitarianism (ST and LT). This professor claims that there are serious logical difficulties with ST and LT. One problem that Tuggy says exist with ST is mentioned below.

In the manner of Richard Cartwright, he lists six propositions which do not seem to cohere logically. These propositions are:

1. God is divine.
2. The Father of Jesus Christ is divine.
3. The Son, Jesus Christ, is divine.
4. The Holy Spirit is divine.
5. The Father is not the Son is not the Holy Spirit is not God.

That is, these four - Father, Son, Holy Spirit, God - are numerically distinct persons.

Tuggy then contends that (5) can be broken into two parts:

5a. These three are numerically distinct: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

5b. God is numerically distinct from any of these: Father, Son, Holy Spirit.

5a-b are then followed by the proposition:

6. Whatever is divine is identical to at least one of these: the Father, the Son, or the
Holy Spirit.

Tuggy is working with a particular definition of "divine" that he makes clear at the outset of his study. Tuggy observes that there are two senses of the adjective "divine," but he is working with the primary adjectival sense in his study:

"The word 'divine' has primary and secondary uses. In
the primary sense, the word 'divine' refers to the
property of being a divinity or being a god, some sort
of supernatural personal being. In secondary senses,
'divine' is used to describe things somehow related to
or associated with things which are 'divine' in the
primary sense. Thus the church, the scriptures,
angels, and various people may be called 'divine'.
According to the biblical writers, God is divine in
the primary sense. Thus, if we accept their testimony,
we must accept 1, understanding 'divine' in this way."

However, when discussing LT, Tuggy reworks (5). Since the claims of LT differ significantly from ST, Tuggy now introduces what he calls 5I in order to adequately
delineate LT.

LT posits:

5I. The Father is identical to God, the Son is
identical to God, and the Holy Spirit is identical to
God, but the Father is not identical to the Son, the
Son is not identical to the Holy Spirit, and the
Holy Spirit is not identical to the Father.

Tuggy then writes:

"All of 1-6 can't be true because 5I is a
contradiction, and so a necessary falsehood. By its
very structure, it is false, because the identity
relation (=) is transitive. For any a, b, and c
whatever, if a=b, and b=c, then a=c. By this rule of
inference, it follows from 5I that the Father is the
Son, the Son is the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit
is the Father, all of which are expressly denied in
5I. In other words, 5I is equivalent to this
statement: 'The Father, Son, Holy Spirit, and God are
just one thing, and they are not.'"

What do you think of Tuggy's argument against LT? Does LT wind up positing that a=b, and b=c, therefore a=c?

1 Timothy 3:16--How It Should Read

The Western Church tradition has never overly relied on 1 Tim. 3:16 as a proof-text for the Trinity. In fact, the Catholic NAB reads: "who was manifested in the flesh, vindicated in the spirit, seen by angels, proclaimed to the Gentiles, believed in throughout the world, taken up in glory."

Footnote from NAB on 1 Tim. 3:16: "Who: the reference is to Christ, who is himself 'the mystery of our devotion.' Some predominantly Western manuscripts read 'which,' harmonizing the gender of the pronoun with that of the Greek word for mystery; many later (eighth/ninth century on), predominantly Byzantine manuscripts read 'God,' possibly for theological reasons.

Here is how the Douay-Rheims and Vulgate handle the passage:

"And evidently great is the mystery of godliness, which was manifested in the flesh, was justified in the spirit, appeared unto angels, hath been preached unto the Gentiles, is believed in the world, is taken up in glory" (DR).

"Et manifeste magnum est pietatis sacramentum, quod manifestatum est in carne, justificatum est in spiritu, apparuit angelis, praedicatum est gentibus, creditum est in mundo, assumptum est in gloria" (Vg).

Gordon D. Fee reports: "This reading ["God"] came to predominate in the Greek church (never in the West, since the translation into Latin happened before the variant arose)."

See his NIB Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, Page 95.

NET Bible: "He was revealed in the flesh, vindicated by the Spirit, seen by angels, proclaimed among Gentiles, believed on in the world, taken up in glory."

See the long note (24) in NET Bible here: https://net.bible.org/#!bible/1+Timothy+3

Wolfhart Pannenberg Discusses Using Divine Love as Proof of the Trinity

The Trinitarian argument from love is straightforward and familiar. Many who affirm the existence of a triune God claim:

(1) God is love.
(2) In order for love to obtain, there must exist love and a lover as well as an object of love (a beloved).
(3) Therefore, God must be tripersonal with the Father as lover (subject), the Son as beloved (object) and the Holy Spirit as the bond of love obtaining between Father and Son.

However, German theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg (who is also a Trinitarian) rejoins:

Any derivation of the plurality of trinitarian persons from the essence of the one God, whether it be viewed as spirit or love, leads into the problems of either modalism on the one hand [i.e., as in the case of Karl Barth] or subordinationism on the other. Neither, then, can be true to the intentions of the trinitarian dogma. The derivation from love is closer to the Christian concept of God and the doctrine of the Trinity than is derivation from the idea of divine self-consciousness, since it leaves more room for a plurality of persons in the unity of the divine life. Yet this plurality cannot be deduced from an idea of love without relapse into a pretrinitarian monotheism, that of the subjectivity of the one God as the one who generates the other persons. In the concept of divine love it can find only their comprehensive unity (Systematic Theology, 1:298).

Pannenberg would rather believe that God as a whole is love (1 John 4:8)--Almighty God does not simply love or have love in his estimation. This approach eradicates any notions (Pannenberg argues) of one divine subject loving a divine object or one divine person being the love that obtains between the Father and the Son. It seems Pannenberg wants to argue that the whole Godhead is love; hence, he appears to take exception to the line of argumentation employed by Augustine of Hippo or Richard of Saint Victor. Moreover, he appears to mention the Father generating the other divine persons in a less than commendatory way.

But the Father is the referent of ὁ θεὸς in 1 John 4:8: let's not forget that point. For example, 1 John 4:9 reads: "This is how God showed his love among us: He sent his one and only Son into the world that we might live through him" (NIV). The "God" (ὁ Θεὸς) mentioned in that verse who sent his Son is the Father, not the Son or the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the whole argument from love approach is ill-fated for yet another reason.

For a sound Trinitarian critique of the eternal generation idea, see John Feinberg's work No One Like Him.

More on Trinitarians and a Single Consciousness in God

The orthodox Trinitarian works that I've read all deny that there are three "I thinks" in God. Granted, the Trinity doctrine may allow room for the "God-man" Jesus Christ to possess a human consciousness and a divine consciousness simultaneously, but if we prescind from the Incarnation, then I think you'll find that Trinitarians generally do not believe there are three consciousnesses in the Godhead. This belief would normally constitute tritheism:

"The philosophical input from Descartes, Kant, and John Locke (1632-1704) led to the emergence of a (but not THE) typically modern notion of person as the subject of self-awareness and freedom--in brief, person as a conscious and autonomous self ('I think and am free, therefore I am a person'). This notion, when applied to the doctrine of the Trinity, readily produces what looks suspiciously like tritheism: three autonomous subjects living and working together in a quasi-social unity" (Gerald O'Collins, The Tripersonal God, 155-156).

"In contemporary parlance, person is spontaneously identified as centre of consciousness and freedom. However, if we bring these pre-reflective categories to theology, we are immediately confronted with a problem. For if we say that God is one being in three persons, and if we understand by person centres of consciousness and freedom, then God becomes three centres of consciousness and there are three I think's in God. But such an understanding is the same as tritheism" (John J. O'Donnell, The Mystery of the Triune God, 103).

So O'Donnell attempts to effect a synthesis between the differing trinitarian notions of person. He observes that trinitarians have either viewed the tres personae as distinct subsistent relations (Karl Rahner), or interpreted the "persons" as separate centers of consciousness. As an alternative to the previous accounts, he suggests viewing the triune God as "one divine consciousness . . . shared by three persons" (110). Analogically, this means that "whereas in human experience, person and community are not identical, in God they are" (110).

While O'Donnell's analogical language does make some distinctions not hitherto made by trinitarians in the past, its shortcomings are that it seems to employ meta-experiential and meta-rational methods to accomplish its task. If, as O'Donnell intimates, community and individuality are the same thing in God--is there truly an analogy of being (analogia entis) between God and man?

Addendum: of course, there is debate regarding whether there is one or there are three consciousnesses in the Godhead, but I often find that the one consciousness view wins out, for the most part.

John 20:28-Further Reflections

[Written a number of years ago, but somewhat edited now]

Maybe Jesus did not correct Thomas in John 20:28ff because the apostle did not render "worship" to him, but rather just acknowledged him as God's Shaliach (in so many words). While it is possible that John used a nominative Ὁ Κύριός and ὁ Θεός for the vocative forms κύριε and θεέ, Max Zerwick observes that the construction Ὁ Κύριός μου καὶ ὁ θεός μου is "nom. w. art. for voc. sec. 34; if not rather an exclamation" (A Grammatical Analysis of the Greek New Testament)

While I have traditionally tended to view Ὁ Κύριός μου καὶ ὁ θεός μου as an example of one NT writer employing nominatives for vocatives, I now think that there is good evidence for possibly understanding this construction as a nominative of exclamation. Firstly, out of the approximately 88 times that Jesus is addressed as "Lord" in Scripture, the vocative form κύριε is utilized. Never is Κύριός used when Jesus is addressed--Jn 20:28 would be the only exception. Moreover, the papyrological evidence also tends to favor the nominative of exclamation idea. Κύριός (as a nominative of address) is not used in the papyri, as far as I know, when one person is addressing another. Even if Thomas called Jesus "my God and Lord" though, the text still does not present a genuine problem for Jehovah's Witnesses in view of how ELOHIM/QEOS is used elsewhere in Scripture and extra-biblical writings.

Quick Post on Luke's Quality of Greek

Scholars are usually agreed that Luke's Greek is quite refined at times. I don't believe it's correct to view it as non-standard Greek.

See http://www.mycrandall.ca/courses/ntintro/luke.htm

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/religion/story/luke.html

Bonaventure's View of the Triune God

"If then God is perfect spirit, He has memory, intelligence, and will; and He has both the begotten Word and spirated Love. These are necessarily distinguished, since one is produced from the other--distinguished, not essentially or accidentally, but personally. When therefore the mind considers itself, it rises through itself as through a mirror to the contemplation of the Blessed Trinity--Father, Word, and Love--three persons coeternal, coequal, and consubstantial; so that each one is in each of the others, though one is not the other, but all three are one God" (Journey of the Mind to God 3.5).

See https://www.crossroadsinitiative.com/library_article/666/Journey_of_the_Mind_into_God_St_Bonaventure.html

What Do Trinitarians Mean By A Divine "Person"? (Quotes)

Here are some statements from Trinitarians that
illustrate the tension obtaining between modalism,
Trinitarianism and tritheism.

"For, in truth, as the Father is not the Son, and the
Son is not the Father, and that Holy Spirit who is
also called the gift of God is neither the Father nor
the Son, certainly they are three. And so it is said
plurally, 'I and my Father are one.' For He has not
said, 'is one,' as the Sabellians say; but, 'are one.'
Yet, when the question is asked, What three? human
language labors altogether under great poverty of
speech. The answer, however, is given, three
'persons,' not that it might be [completely] spoken,
but that it might not be left [wholly] unspoken"
(Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity 5.9).

"It is generally admitted that the word 'person' is
but an imperfect expression of the idea. In common
parlance it [the word "person"] denotes a separate
rational and moral individual, possessed of
self-consciousness, and conscious of his identity amid
all changes. Experience teaches that where you have a
person, you also have a distinct individual essence.
Every person is a distinct and separate individual, in
whom human nature is individualized. But in God there
are no three individuals alongside of, and separate
from, one another, but only personal self-distinctions
within the Divine essence, which is not only
generically, but also numerically, one" (Louis
Berkhof, Systematic Theology. London: Banner of Truth,
1971. Page 87).

"But to say nothing more of words, let us now attend
to the thing signified. By person, then, I mean a
subsistence in the Divine essence, - a subsistence
which, while related to the other two, is
distinguished from them by incommunicable properties.
By subsistence we wish something else to be understood
than essence. For if the Word were God simply and had
not some property peculiar to himself, John could not
have said correctly that he had always been with
God.When he adds immediately after, that the Word was
God, he calls us back to the one essence. But because
he could not be with God without dwelling in the
Father, hence arises that subsistence, which, though
connected with the essence by an indissoluble tie,
being incapable of separation, yet has a special mark
by which it is distinguished from it" (John Calvin,
Institutes of the Christian Religion 1.13.6).

"If these [i.e. the three persons] are taken as three
separate centers of consciousness in an
individualistic way, as some modern thought seems to
do, then one would end up with tritheism, a denial of
the Trinity. Equally, one can overemphasize the unity
to the detriment of the persons" (John Thompson,
Modern Trinitarian Perspectives. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994. Page 6).

"We have employed the term 'person' and must
unavoidably do so, but hopefully we have indicated
that this word should be used of Father, Son, and
Spirit with full awareness of the analogous nature of
this predication, therefore with stress on the radical
distinctiveness of 'person,' not just differentiating
divine from human personhood, but distinguishing the
reality of personhood as it applies to Father, Son,
and Spirit" (Bernard Cooke, Beyond Trinity. Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1969. Page 58).

See also http://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/search?q=o%27donnell

Bowing Down to the Lamb in Revelation 5

Granted, all of God's intelligent creatures ascribe blessing, honor, glory and power to the Lamb (the Son of God) in Revelation. But such glory and honor is imputed to him within a context where, as the Lamb qua Lamb, he approaches the throne of God and "takes" a scroll from the hand of the Father, thus proving himself worthy (after conquering this world) to open the seven seals of the scroll since he bought persons for God out of every tribe, tongue and nation (Rev. 5:8-10).

The context is one of kingly investiture: the Lamb is honored and glorified because he is God's appointed King. Just as Jehovah's ancient people performed divinely approved acts of obeisance to God and the Judean King (1 Chronicles 29:20), so all of God's intelligent creatures honor the One upon whom YHWH has bestowed honor, glory, might and power (Heb. 2:7-9). See also Dan. 2:37 (LXX) for a similar ascription of praise to a ruler whose kingship is said to have been derived from God's sovereignty or permissive will, as it were; notice, however, that John never explicitly tells us the Lamb is worshiped. After noting that the Christusbild constructed of the Lamb in Rev. 5:13-14 "almost approaches deity," P.M. Casey provides these enlightening comments:

"This is almost heavenly worship, but it does not have to be perceived as such. Here, as always, the lamb is carefully distinguished from God, and he is not said to be divine. He does have other exalted functions. It is as a lamb that Jesus is victorious over the kings of the earth (17.14), and he shepherds the victorious martyrs (7.17) . . . Yet God is precisely what this figure is not, and this illustrates the social nature of the restraining factor of monotheism" (P.M. Casey, From Jewish Prophet to Gentile God, page 142).

Jn. 17:5 certainly does not teach that the Son shares the Father's glory; rather, Christ subsisted alongside the Father in a state of matchless glory prior to becoming flesh. The Gospel of John, as is the case with the book of Revelation, limits "worship" in the strong and proper sense to God the Father alone:

"The four and twenty elders fall down before him that sat on the throne, and worship him that liveth for ever and ever, and cast their crowns before the throne, saying, Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created" (Rev. 4:10-11).

Some textual variants (as found in the TR) actually read ZWNTI EIS TOUS AIWNAS TWN AIWNWN in Rev. 5:14, thereby pointing to the Father as the rightful object of reverence, devotion, adoration and praise. Even if this is a scribal addition, it is solidly based on texts such as Rev. 4:9-11; 10:6; 15:7. See also Rev. 11:15-17; 15:4; 19:4.

Articles in Irish Biblical Studies

It seems that the journal Irish Biblical Studies is going to make all of its past articles available online, pending the authorization of its writers. See http://polumeros.blogspot.com/2015/09/rob-bradshaw-has-announced-that-irish.html

2 Corinthians 4:3-4 (The Referent?)

A reader has asked me to watch a video, then offer some comments on it. My time is tight now. But I did view this video and might have some thoughts prepared by Wednesday. I've heard the argument before that Satan is not the referewnt of 2 Cor 4:4, but it's really God (Jehovah).

Personally, I don't have strong feelings about the issue, but my current position is that Satan is being discussed in this context. Yet I want to weigh and present evidence for what I say. So I post the YT link for now and will let my readers decide if this subject interests them.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0lu_-JyhAtw

Metaphoric Language for the Divine (the Son's Birth and Kingly Rule)

I want to avoid undue speculation here, but it's possible that events which Scripture reports transpiring in the spirit realm are usually metaphorically tinged. I desire to avoid the position, however, that says one can never speak literally about God. Nevertheless, when Jehovah "speaks" to His spirit sons while convening the heavenly council, which is reported in 1 Kings 22:19-23, the description probably should not be taken literally. In other words, God cannot have a voice in the same way that humans have voices since "He" is not human (Num. 23:19), lacks a larynyx (etc.) and there is evidently no way for sound waves to travel in the spirit realm because it is more than likely devoid of matter or atmospheric conditions which makes vocal sounds possible. John Sanders also seems to make an excellent point when he notes:

"When God is said to be a husband, father and friend, these metaphors depend on the reality of God's being a personal agent" (The God Who Risks, page 26).

The point I want to extract from Sander's comment is that when the Bible speaks about God being a husband, father or friend, it is employing metaphorical language. God doesn't literally have a wife and He is not a friend to me in the same way that my human friends are. The same principle applies to my relationship with Jehovah as Father or when it comes to His relationship with Jerusalem above (Gal. 4:26)--his figurative wife.

Having said the foregoing, however, I want to make it clear that I think it is still possible to speak literally (i.e., non-metaphorically) about certain spiritual realities. A medieval thinker named Duns Scotus set forth the possibility that we can speak univocally about God and creatures. The late William Alston did work in our time on this same question.

One example of metaphorical uses in Scripture might be Col. 1:15. PRWTOTOKOS is possibly a metaphor that is not to be construed literally: (1) For according to Scripture, Christ was not really born, but he was created since John calls him, the ARXH THS KTISEWS (Rev. 3:14). The term "born" (and its derivatives or cognates) is used metaphorically in the Hebrew Scriptures to describe the divine act of bringing forth a contingent entity. Ps. 90:2 refers to the "birth" of mountains actually created by God. Isa. 66:7-8 depicts Zion giving birth to sons and a land in one day. But the context shows that God is the one who causes Zion to bring forth sons in a figurative sense. He too produces the land spoken of in this verse in that He is responsible for the repatriation of Judah and causes her to teem. By returning Judah to her homeland, God "creates" a new heaven and a new earth (Isa. 65:17ff). However, the prophet also employs birth language to delineate this event.

BDB Hebrew and English Lexicon likewise shows that God figuratively becomes a Father to the Son in that He installs His anointed one upon Zion, His holy mountain (Ps. 2:7). Even in its Messianic sense, the term "Son" in the second psalm only has reference to the king's function; it does not convey the thought of a divine generatio but rather "an investiture with royal dignity." Artur Weiser points out that the OT rejects the notion of God literally procreating a kingly human son (Ps. 89:26). The psalmist, he observes, excludes the view of God physically generating the Israelite king by employing the word "today" and the familiar adoption formula "you are my son" in connection with the generative language of Ps. 2:7. The King consequently becomes God's Son through the process of enthronement. He is thus YHWH's vice-regent and figurative royal offspring; the language in the second psalm turns out to be metaphorical.

Hypothetical Syllogism Regarding the Trinity (Falsifiability)

1) If the Trinity doctrine can neither be proved nor disproved, then it is not falsifiable.
2) If the Trinity doctrine is not falsifiable, then it is neither true nor false.
3) Therefore, if the Trinity doctrine can neither be proved nor disproved, then it is neither true nor false.

Proof here refers to rational argumentation (a logical demonstration) as opposed to proving the doctrine from biblical texts or from creation, although reasoning is also used when one attempts to make a case from scripture for one doctrine or another.

Karl Popper is known for advocating falsification when it comes to scientific hypotheses. He evidently thought: "The adherents of a pseudo-science are able to cling to its hypotheses no matter how events turn out, because the hypotheses are not testable." So if the Trinity doctrine is not logically testable or falsifiable, that would seem to make us question its overall truth-value or its claims pertaining to deity.

2 Corinthians 5:19 (V.P. Furnish's Commentary)

I found a valuable discussion of 2 Corinthians 5:19 in V.P. Furnish's Anchor Bible Commentary on 2 Corinthians. The discussion spans about three pages (pp. 317-319), so I will merely sum up some of the main points here.

ὡς ὅτι: The Latin Vulgate gives this phrase a causal sense, treating it like ὅτι. It renders ὡς ὅτι as QUONIAM QUIDEM ("since" or "because").

Others think that ὡς ὅτι (in 2 Cor. 5:19) is epexegetical and that it should be rendered "namely that" or "that is."

Kasemann construes the ὡς in this passage as transitional: he thinks that ὅτι introduces a quotation. Furnish concurs and therefore suggests the translation for ὡς ὅτι: "As it is said."

Concerning θεὸς ἦν ἐν Χριστῷ κόσμον καταλλάσσων ἑαυτῷ, Furnish makes the following points:

(1) One may read the verb ἦν independently of the participle ("God was in Christ, reconciling").

(2) The construction in 2 Cor. 5:19 could be periphrastic.

(3) θεὸς could be a predicate nominative rather than the subject of the verb ἦν.

Furnish prefers (2) and translates thus: "God, in Christ, was reconciling."

He sets his rendering off by commas "to make it clear that 'God-in-Christ' is not intended as an incarnational formula here [in 2 Cor. 5:19]. Nor does the phrase in Christ have the full eschatological meaning present in v. 17. Rather, as observed already by Chrysostom (NPNF, 1st Ser. XII:333), it is equivalent to through Christ in v. 18" (Furnish 318).

There is much more, so I encourage you to reference Furnish's treatment of 2 Cor 5:19ff.

Did the Early Scribes Corrupt the NT (Daniel Wallace Video Lecture)

See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wiWKifMu6f8

Regards,

Edgar

Herodotus and the Greek Word γενέσθαι (for Sean)

ἀπικόμην δὲ καὶ ἐς Θάσον, ἐν τῇ εὗρον ἱρὸν Ἡρακλέος ὑπὸ Φοινίκων ἱδρυμένον, οἳ κατ᾽ Εὐρώπης ζήτησιν ἐκπλώσαντες Θάσον ἔκτισαν: καὶ ταῦτα καὶ πέντε γενεῇσι ἀνδρῶν πρότερα ἐστὶ ἢ τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος Ἡρακλέα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι γενέσθαι. (The Histories 2.44.4)

Then I went to Thasos, too, where I found a temple of Heracles built by the Phoenicians, who made a settlement there when they voyaged in search of Europe; now they did so as much as five generations before the birth of Heracles the son of Amphitryon in Hellas. (A.D. Godley translation, 1920)

See Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.21.147.

Picture courtesy of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Herodotos_Met_91.8.jpg

In the public domain.

Theocentrism in Revelation (Revelation 11:15ff)

"The seventh angel blew his trumpet, and there were loud voices in heaven saying: The kingdom of the world has become the kingdom of our Lord and of His Messiah, and He will reign forever and ever!" (Holman Christian Standard Bible)

The "He" who will reign forever and ever is God the Father. He is the "Lord God Almighty" mentioned above. Compare Revelation 1:4-8; 11:6-17.

"The radical theocentrism of John's revelation is not heard more clearly than here. The antecedent of he will reign for ever and ever is God rather than either Christ or both God and Christ" (Robert W. Wall, Revelation, page 153).

Demas (2 Timothy 4:10)

In 2 Timothy 4:10, Paul tells Timothy that Demas forsook him because Demas "loved the present age." Just exactly what this phrase means has been hotly debated. Gordon Fee writes that apostasy is signified by the phrase AGAPHSAS TON NUN AIWNA (1 & 2 Timothy, Titus [New International Biblical Commentary], Page 299).

Yet Thomas D. Lea avers: "Paul's words [in 2 Tim. 4:10] did not picture him [Demas] as an utter apostate but reflected disappointment at his self-interest" (1 & 2 Timothy, Titus [New American Commentary], Page 252).

My question: does the use of AGAPH here or anything contained in the syntax of this Pauline account suggest that Demas was an apostate? Or could it be that he simply left off sharing in Paul's ministry, which shows something about his spiritual state, but does not mean he became an apostate? Lastly, if Demas was "saved" and did in fact defect from the apostle and (more importantly) the Lord Jesus Christ--it would seem that a genuine Christian can apostatize after experiencing God's unparalleled XARIS.

Epiphanius

1 John 5:21 reads: Τεκνία, φυλάξατε ἑαυτὰ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδώλων.

The ancient Christians (first century) diligently endeavored to uphold this basic tenet expressed in the Johannine Epistle and elsewhere in Holy Writ. But one such person who later claimed to be a follower of Christ was Epiphanius of Salamis: he is an illuminating study in early "Christian" attitudes on idolatry and his story can be found among other places in Patrology (Vol. III) by historian Johannes Quasten.

The story of Epiphanius is too lengthy to recount in detail here. Therefore, it would be wise to see Quasten's work as well as the valuable five-volume series written by the late and eminent ecclesiastical historian Jaroslav Pelikan. But I now offer a few details about Epiphanius.

He was a bishop of Constantia (Salamis), who was born circa 315 CE. Epiphanius presided forty years as bishop, during which time he vehemently waged intellectual and doctrinal warfare against Origen of Alexandria and John Chrysostom as well as those who supported Origenist "heretical" notions. Yet Epiphanius seems to be especially known for his iconoclastic stance. So shocking are some of his indictments against idols that a number of scholars have tried to prove that some works containing Epiphanius' name are really forgeries; however, such scholarly claims have been adequately rebuffed and it appears that Epiphanius truly did oppose the use of idols in the church during his fourth-century tenure (until 403 CE when he died).

Today, his views can be found in the Epistles of Epiphanius and in his treatises, and pamphlet against images. Interested ones should also consult his Letter to the Emperor Theodosius I and a work known as The Testament or A Last Will and Testament. His letter to Emperor Theodosius explicitly declares that all images should be removed from churches having them since neither Scripture nor our Lord Jesus Christ ever approved of such veneration. I think you will find his works interesting and enlightening to peruse.

Source Material: http://www.amazon.com/Patrology-4-Set-Johannes-Quasten/dp/0870611410/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1439651629&sr=1-1&keywords=9780870611414

https://www.academia.edu/1619327/_What_Did_Epiphanius_Write_to_Emperor_Theodosius_with_the_edition_of_the_text_in_an_appendix_

https://books.google.com/books?id=fyjRwj4q2j0C&pg=PA11&lpg=PA11&dq=letter+to+the+emperor+theodosius+epiphanius&source=bl&ots=iO96yVIZAC&sig=56Ikz9mPhE29x2UQFqgAj4Vg564&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CEAQ6AEwBmoVChMIlPqE79a6xwIVwT0-Ch1jQgeB#v=onepage&q=letter%20to%20the%20emperor%20theodosius%20epiphanius&f=false

2 Corinthians 5:20 (Question from a Reader)

A blog reader has submitted an interesting query. I pose this issue to the group first before offering some thoughts myself. Thank you, brother, for reading my blog and sending this question:

READER: "Hey there Brother. I am enjoying your blogs here a lot. I am new to this site and am not sure how to contact you through a comment. If you don't mind I would like to ask you a question that has come up in the ministry. To me it really isn't an issue. A tempest in a teacup if you ask me but the question is in reference to 2 Corinthians 5:20. The NWT uses the word Substitute. Apparently this word does not appear in any other translation. I understand it to mean that the role of an ambassador is taking place of the said King or Government.
The person I am in contact with is trying to say that because of this verse we are of the opinion that the faithful and discreet slave are to be looked at as a substitutes for Christ. I have explained that the slave does not replace Christ but represent him. Do you have any thoughts as to why we have the word Substitute in the NWT while no other bible uses the word. Thanks and I certainly understand if you are too busy to answer."

Evidence Vs. Proof in Science

Karl Popper seems to make a distinction between evidence and proof in science. I am also reminded of one professor I had in undergrad studies, who said that no hypothesis can be proved in science: it can only be supported or refuted by evidence.

From http://www.loyno.edu/~folse/Popper.html

"Popper's main point is the extremely elementary logical point that if one takes the business of science as deducing observational consequences from statements of laws and theories and initial conditions, no amount of particular positive observational outcomes will ever prove (or verify) the truth of universal hypotheses or laws, for all such attempted inferences commit the well-known fallacy of affirming the consequent. However, even a single negative observational consequence allows us to validly infer that the conjunction of laws and initial conditions from which it is deduced cannot all be true."

Swinburne Omniscience

"A person P is omniscient at a time t if and only if he knows of every true proposition about t or an earlier time that it is true and also he knows of every true proposition about a time later than t, such that what is [sic] reports is physically necessitated by some cause at t or earlier, that it is true. (Swinburne, 1977, 175)"

See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/eternity/

After reviewing this definition from Swinburne, I believe it only describes part of what divine omniscience might be.

1 Timothy 6:15-16 (God the Father or Christ Jesus?)

[Edited for this blog]

Dear blog readers,

Someone asked me off-list about 1 Tim 6:15-16 and I want to share my thoughts on the passage with the entire group and hopefully get some input.

Most commentaries and lexicons that I have consulted say that Paul (or the writer of this epistle) is talking about God (the Father) when he speaks of the blessed and only Potentate (DUNASTHS). But I currently take the position that 1 Tim 6:15-16 is focusing on the resurrected and glorified Christ--the reasons for my conclusions are listed below:

(1) The immediate context deals with Christ. Paul writes about "the fine public declaration" that Christ made "before Pontius Pilate" (1 Tim 6:13 NWT). 1 Tim 6:14 also references the "manifestation of our Lord Jesus Christ."

(2) Additionally, the title "King of kings and Lord of lords" is applied to Jesus in the NT (Rev 17:14; 19:16). While similar titles are used of YHWH (Jehovah) in the OT/Tanakh, I'm not sure that the exact title, King of kings and Lord of lords is ever applied to the Father (YHWH).

(3) 1 Tim 6:16 is evidently comparing the happy and only Potentate to those who rule as kings and lords. In contrast to these men, Christ is the "one alone having immortality." However, God the Father is not the only immortal being, since Christ assumed immortality when resurrected by God; moreover, those who share in the first resurrection are also granted the gift of immortal life (Rom 6:9; 1 Cor 15:50-54; Heb 7:16).

(4) According to Acts of the Apostles, Christ dwells in "unapproachable light" since his glorification. The apostle Paul beheld the glory of the resurrected Christ and he was blinded by the unique and awesome spectacle (Acts 26:12-13). Jesus assured his apostles that humans would behold him no more, but his disciples would, because he lives and they live through him (Jn 14:19). How appropriate the words of 1 Tim 6:16 describe the exalted Christ.

Conversely, one might apply the language contained in 1 Tim 6:15-16 to God the Father. One could point to Paul's use of DUNASTHS in this text and look at its use elsewhere in Greek literature. A student of the scriptures could also point to Paul's use of MAKARIOS and MONOS as well. But I think the context and Paul's phraseology favors the interpretation advanced here. Yet I am open to other suggestions.

SN 1995K Is Evidence for An Expanding Universe

Chrysostom on John 1:1c (A Dialogue)

Edgar: Contrary to popular belief, EN ARXH (John 1:1a) does not necessarily mean that the LOGOS is eternal. The complexities of understanding the Greek words in the opening verse of the Johannine Prologue are demonstrated by Origen in his notable Commentary on John. If the apostle John had in mind Genesis 1:1 (LXX) when using this construction, then it is almost certain that John 1:1a is not saying that the LOGOS is eternal or co-eternal with God. Rather, as articulated by Origen and the Shepherd of Hermas, the Word is "the most ancient of all creation" (Contra Celsum 5.37). The Greek there in Contra Celsum is PRESBUTATON PANTWN TWN DHMIOURGHMATWN. See Proverbs 8:22; Revelation 3:14.

Interlocutor Quoting Chrysostom: "for that you may not, when you hear 'In the beginning was the Word,' suppose Him to be Eternal, and yet imagine the life of the Father to differ from His by some interval and longer duration, and so assign a beginning to the Only-Begotten, he adds, 'was in the beginning with God'; so eternally even as the Father Himself, for the Father was never without the Word, but He was always God with God, yet Each in His proper Person.(1)"

MY RESPONSE: Chrysostom (like other Trinitarians) goes beyond Scripture when asserting that God has always been Father and Son. Psalm 90:2 states that YHWH is God (not Father) from eternity to eternity. Tertullian makes a similar point in Adversus Hermogenem 3.4 Waszink Latin text) by arguing that there was a time when God was neither Father nor Judge. And even though Novatian writes that God is always "Father," he feels the need to contend that the Father is "prior" to the Son in some sense or to some degree (De Trinitate 31). It is possible that Novatian has in mind causal or even temporal priority when discussing the relationship between God and his Word:

"He, then, when the Father willed it, proceeded from the Father, and He who was in the Father came forth from the Father; and He who was in the Father because He was of the Father, was subsequently with the Father, because He came forth from the Father, that is to say, that divine substance whose name is the Word, whereby all things were made, and without whom nothing was made. For all things are after Him, because they are by Him. And reasonably, He is before all things, but after the Father, since all things were made by Him, and He proceeded from Him of whose will all things were made" (De Trinitate 21).

Interlocutor Still Quoting Chrysostom: "how then, one says, does John assert, that He was in the world, if He was with God? Because He was both(2) with God and in the world also. For neither Father nor Son are limited in any way. Since, if 'there is no end of His greatness' (Ps. cxlv. 3), and if 'of His wisdom there is no number' (Ps. cxlvii. 5), it is clear that there cannot be any beginning in time(3) to His Essence. Thou hast heard, that 'In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth' (Gen. i. 1); what dost thou understand from this 'beginning'? clearly, that they were created before all visible things. So, respecting the Only-Begotten, when you hear that He was 'in the beginning,' conceive of him as before all intelligible things,(4) and before the ages."

MY RESPONSE: There are two problematic assertions that Chrysostom makes here. The first is that the LOGOS was both in the world and with God at the same time. Athanasius makes a similar argument in his work on the Incarnation. Yet, where does the Bible say that Christ simultaneously was with God and on earth? Where are we even led to believe that Christ was infinite or limitless while he dwelled on earth and in the flesh? Second, the belief that God is timeless has been seriously challenged on biblical and logical grounds. The biblical text certainly does not suggest that God is timeless.

Older Book Review of Daniel Cronn-Mills' Study About Jehovah's Witnesses

I now wish to present my review of Daniel Cronn-Mills' work A Qualitative Analysis of the Jehovah's Witnesses: The Rhetoric, Reality and Religion in the Watchtower Society (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999). This monograph is 198+ pp. including the bibliography and index. The copy that I reviewed cost approximately $109.00 retail. Some outlets, however, sell the book at a lower rate.

In reviewing Cronn-Mills' publication, I will first give an overview of the book, then I will examine the strengths and then deal with what I perceive to be weaknesses of the study.

I. An Overview of A Qualitative Analysis of the Jehovah's Witnesses

A Qualitative Analysis of the Jehovah's Witnesses contains 16 chapters devoted to examining the role that rhetoric supposedly plays in the religious society of Jehovah's Witnesses. By rhetoric, Cronn-Mills has in mind the social construction of reality through communicative or verbal methods that utilize persuasion as a tool. It is Cronn-Mills' contention that Jehovah's Witnesses, being one of the most persecuted groups on earth, respond to religious persecution by constructing a reality characterized by numerous dualities (Satan/God or dark/light or us/them). Furthermore, Witnesses purportedly erect figurative bridges by means of questions that lead "interested ones" from Satan's world to Jehovah's organization. That is, according to Cronn-Mills, Witnesses try appealing to non-Witnesses by portraying themselves as the ones with answers to questions raised by those in "Satan's world."

He avers that three WTBTS books, Questions Young People Ask, Reasoning from the Scriptures, and You Can Live Forever "are replete with questions and answers" (Cronn-Mills, 144) that function as a "gateway" to Jehovah's earthly organization. Cronn-Mills thus contends: "The social reality of Jehovah's Witnesses provides a bright light for those wishing to cross from Satan's world through Witness' World to Jehovah's World" (ibid., 144).

Note the threefold distinction that Cronn-Mills makes regarding the worlds supposedly constructed by Jehovah's Witnesses. We will address this point later in the review. For now, let's discuss the positive aspects of his work.

II. Strengths of A Qualitative Analysis

Cronn-Mills' study is commendable in many respects. He is a fomer Catholic, who no longer seems to have use for organized religion. Furthermore, his interest in Jehovah's Witnesses appears to be primarily scientific; he does not appear to have an axe to grind in this study at all. Cronn-Mills himself writes: "My purpose is to provide a description, analysis, and interpretation of the social construction of reality of Jehovah's Witnesses" (Cronn-Mills, 4).

So he decided to analyze and provide a descriptive social-scientific account of Jehovah's Witnesses because the Witnesses are devoted to preaching about God's Kingdom in a variety of ways. Whether they are going from door to
door, sending letters to those needing scriptural comfort or witnessing to those whom they encounter in medical offices or at the workplace, Jehovah's Witnesses seem determined to reach out to those whom they believe need comfort, solace, and guidance from God's Word in these troubled times.

Yet another reason that Cronn-Mills selected Jehovah's Witnesses for his study, however, is that "Jehovah's Witnesses have been identified by researchers as one of the most persecuted religious groups in history and the most persecuted Christian organization in the twentieth century" (ibid., 6). This persecution, Cronn-Mills theorizes, leads the Witnesses to construct a social reality that is characterized by dualities and manifested by means of discursive practices. The study found in _A Qualitative Analysis_ thereby purports to contribute to the author's understanding of the Witness response to religious persecution.

In order to discern how Witnesses respond to persecution, Cronn-Mills evidently approached the presiding overseer at a local congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and asked for his permission to interview certain members of the congregation. The overseer agreed and Cronn-Mills subsequently interviewed 43 Witnesses, finding them to be friendly,
honest and willing to share their beliefs with him (28-32). But the author did not stop at interviewing the Witnesses he later wrote about. In addition to interviewing 43 Witnesses of Jehovah, he also attended the weekly meetings at the local Kingdom Hall and went to the district convention with the Witnesses in his area. Finally, he attended the Memorial of Christ's death. In the end, Cronn-Mills seemed to be impressed at the trust that the Witnesses manifested toward a scholar, who was willing to actively participate in theocratic activities with them over a period of time.

I thus conclude that Cronn-Mill's approach to obtaining information from the Witnesses is a sign of his attempt to approach the subject somewhat objectively and it is a strong point of his book. His ability to delineate, in painstaking detail, the categories he is working with as well as his use of the scientific method is also impressive. Nevertheless, there are some weaknesses in Cronn-Mills' monograph that need to be discussed.

III. Weak Points of A Qualitative Analysis

While there are commendable aspects of A Qualitative Analysis, there are some surprising weaknesses contained in the book as well. While I can overlook Cronn-Mills' imprecise and not wholly accurate explanation of the Witnesses' pneumatology in the following terms, "The Spirit is merely Jehovah's power, force, or energy" (44), I find it much more
difficult to ignore other errors. For instance, he writes that the Witnesses believe that "Lucifer" was created by Jehovah through "Michael" to watch over the Garden of Eden until he began to nurture and eventually acted on a desire to have his own worshipers. Cronn-Mills continues: "So, while Jehovah slept on the seventh day, Lucifer found and capitalized on Adam and Eve's fatal flaw--free will" (44).

I think that most Witnesses of Jehovah reading the aforesaid comments would quickly and immediately discern errors in Cronn-Mills' presentation. There are other slips, but I will resist the urge to nit-pick. Yet, before closing, we must mention the threefold distinction discussed in A Qualitative Analysis that Witnesses putatively advocate or teach. That is, the threefold division of Satan's world, the Witness world, and Jehovah's world (i.e., the new world order). I think that many Witnesses (probably most) would take issue with this portrayal of our beliefs. We do not make a sharp distinction between a so-called "Witness world" and Jehovah's world. Cronn-Mills needs to reanalyze and rework this explanation of Witness belief.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that Cronn-Mills' work is worth reading, if one is interested in rhetorical and social-scientific issues as they appertain to religion. His attempt to be fair is noble--his scientific research is also sound in many respects. But some of the theological details are inadequately explained. Furthermore, there are a number of typos in the book and the writing style employed in the study is at times hard to decipher.

I am not talking about technical language as such but the writer's style of communication. Then again, he may
not be a native English speaker or writer. That would account for some textual idiosyncrasies in A Qualitative Analysis. Finally, the issues of social interactionism and groups constructing their own reality through discursive pratices or rhetoric are questions that could be treated in another essay or monograph. Suffice it to say that Cronn-Mills' "construction of reality" theory needs to be approached with a "hermeneutics of suspicion" by the Christian who endeavors to be faithful to Jehovah, His written Word, and the very reality of God.

William Lane Craig on the Logical Basis of Morality

William Lane Craig maintains: "God's moral nature is the paradigm of goodness; what is good or bad is determined by conformity or lack thereof to His nature." Just as a live orchestra is the determinant of what constitutes "high fidelity," so God (his moral nature) is the standard for what constitutes good or bad. And since the divine one instantiates his nature by means of his divine commands, Craig reasons: "Things are right or wrong insofar as they are commanded or forbidden by God."

See http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-euthyphro-dilemma-once-more.

On the other hand, Craig believes that there can be valid reasons for divine commands. They aren't simply given willy-nilly or arbitrarily.

Owen Thomas' Explanation of the Trinity Doctrine

Professor Owen Thomas endeavors to articulate what the Trinity is and is not:

The result of the analysis of the biblical testimony in the light of the tradition of the church is that the distinctions Father, Son and Spirit do not refer to persons in the modern sense [i.e., as separate centers of consciousness] or parts of God; each refers to the whole of the Godhead. They do not refer to aspects, qualities, or attributes of God, because all of these apply equally to each of the "persons." They do not refer to functions or types of activity of God, because each of the "persons" is involved in each activity of God. They are not simply ways in which God is revealed or ways in which we experience God but rather essential or immanent distinctions in the godhead. The names Father, Son and Holy Spirit refer to modes of being of God, distinctions in the way in which God is God, distinctions in the form, pattern, order, or structure of all of God's activities.

Quote taken from Thomas' work Introduction to Theology. Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse, 1994. Page 71.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trinity#/media/File:Shield-Trinity-Scutum-Fidei-English.svg

Using Greek-English Lexicons: Caveat Lector

Written 4/23/2004 & edited 7/17/2015:

S. M. Baugh ("A First John Reader") recommends that one consult BAGD (now BDAG) when he/she undertakes a study of a particular Greek word: "This should be your first stop--and for most words, your last stop--for every Greek word study"
(page 128).

Those of us who own BDAG no doubt (HAUD DUBIE) concur with Baugh. For most Greek words, BDAG *is* the last stop, but neither Baugh nor EGF recommends the uncritical employment of BDAG. Baugh has his own criticisms of the BDAG lexicon, but I'm sure he would admit that these quibbles in no way diminish its value.

One problem that Baugh had with BAGD when he wrote his book was that it contained "glosses" rather than "word meanings." That is, the older lexicon formerly known as BAGD would give readers/students the rough approximate meaning of a word in English rather than saying what the word meant in ancient Greek. But the new BDAG is miles ahead of the older lexicon in this respect. For instance, BDAG has the following for the entry APODEIXIS:

"a pointing away to [something] for the purpose of demonstration, proof."

Anna Wierzbicka has argued that words are better defined sententially as opposed to being defined by one word "glosses." That is why the new BDAG is a vast improvement over Strong's and the old BAGD.

Another important point to keep in mind is that context often helps us determine how a term is being used by a writer or speaker. Words have semantic domains or semantic fields. The referent and context of a term surely determine how a writer is using it. BDAG is also helpful here.

Lastly, I would issue a warning concerning J.H. Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon. Thayer's work was produced before lexicographers began to utilize the ancient Greek papyri in word studies. Now that the papyrological evidence has been examined, assessed and published, the fruits of this research now appear in works like BDAG. You can also consult the text "Vocabulary of the Greek Testament" by J.H. Moulton and G. Milligan. But I think this work is also in the process of being updated or has been superseded by now.

For more information about BDAG, please see https://books.google.com/books?id=hd7bZxvlbFsC&dq=german%20bauer%20lexicon&source=gbs_similarbooks

Purgatory and Maccabees (Update of Earlier Material)

Regarding 2 Macc 12:44-45, the surrounding verses make it clear that a resurrection from the dead is in mind here. This passage from Maccabees is not dealing with purgatory:

"For if he were not expecting that those who had fallen would rise again, it would have been superfluous and foolish to pray for the dead. But if he was looking to the splendid reward that is laid up for those who FALL ASLEEP in godliness, it was a holy and pious thought. Therefore he made atonement for the dead, so that they might be delivered from their sin" (2 Macc 12:44-45 RSV).

The Catholic NAB, in the footnote to 2 Macc 12:42-46, says:

"This is the earliest statement of the doctrine that prayers (v 42) and sacrifices (v 43) for the dead are beneficial. The statement is made here, however, only for the purpose of proving that Judas believed in the resurrection of the just (2 Mc 7, 9, 14, 23, 36). That is, he believed that expiation could be made for certain sins of otherwise good men--soldiers who had given their lives for God's cause. Thus, they could share in the resurrection. His belief was similar to, but not quite the same as, the Catholic doctrine of purgatory."

Concerning 1 Cor 3:15, the New Jerusalem Bible notes:

"Purgatory is not directly envisaged here, but this text is one of those on the basis of which the Church has made this doctrine explicit."

"While interpreters (particularly Roman Catholics) of another era attempted occasionally to relate these verses to purgatory, almost no scholar working today would make that connection, regardless of confessional persuasion or background" (Marion Soards, 1 Corinthians, p. 78).

The picture is from https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fe/Carracci-Purgatory.jpg/512px-Carracci-Purgatory.jpg

Cows, Perceptions, and Conceptions

One interlocutor writes about non-human animals:

"[they] recognize and remember certain objects, shapes, predators, etc., and know how to respond. But none of this requires or involves the apprehension of common natures of things, which would require a categorial jump from sensed particulars to general ideas that involve no residue of sensible matter, as do images generated by the memory and imagination in the brain."

MY REPLY:

It's difficult for us to say what animals experience when they assimilate sensory impressions. Nonetheless, the human apprehension and neural representation of sensate elements is not exactly analogous to the process whereby animals sense things and remember them. The human brain is capable of representing images in a way that differs markedly from cats or dogs. What makes our representations so different? We form concepts by means of natural languages and information derived from distal and proximal stimuli. Furthermore, while I believe that we form concepts by means of sensory experience in the way I've outlined, I don't necessarily buy into the "common natures" assumption. Concept-formation can be explained without appealing to non-physical factors like Platonic/Aristotelian Forms or immaterial souls.

But I am not arguing that perceptions are conceptions. What I am suggesting is that conceptions are possible representations of percepts by dint of natural language and neural networks in the human brain. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (based on the work of Eleanor Rosch) have argued that we categorize things (e.g., birds, chairs, tables, and teapots) according to fuzzy prototypical characteristics (cf. Metaphors We Live By). However, the prototypes by means of which we classify various objects emanate from somatic experiences. For example, although I had never seen a Highland Cow until the year 2002, I knew that it was a cow upon first sight. Yet the Highland Cow was unlike any cow I had ever seen before. Lakoff and Johnson might say that I was able to associate the Scottish cow with my prototype of such animals based on past somatic experiences. Yet my concept of cowness is nothing more than the result of what I've perceived with my sense organs (inter alia) and how my brain represents the usual properties of cows which it derives from distal and proximal stimuli.

Scientia and Scripture (Stream-of-consciousness Mentation)

Our "paltry knowledge" of sensibles is all that we have in terms of natural scientia. It is somewhat difficult to go beyond our phenomenal experience and know whether light is anything other than waves or particles. God might be light in a manner that transcends our ability to grasp, but we have no way of knowing whether he is transcendently light or not apart from revelation. We certainly cannot apprehend this datum from experience of what Kant calls "phenomena." What I do know is that ancient Greek writers employed the morpheme FWS (in similar contexts) as a Figuren der semantischen Deviation for the divine sphere. Isis is said to be FWS PASI BROTOISI and the very being of Isis is spoken of as FWS KAI ZWH (See BDAG). Compare John 1:3ff.

In the NT, Jesus also calls his followers the light of the world (Mt 5:14-16). Additionally, the context of 1 John 1:5 indicates that John is not talking about some transcendent light (analogous to light in the material cosmos) that is waveless or particleless: he is referring to truth, moral rectitude and goodness. Platonic thinking won't work here. There quite probably are not any Platonic Forms or Ideas that exceed our sensible experience such that masculinity or femininity subsist as objects of consciousness or divine properties in some celestial sphere that's characterized by noetic qualitativeness.

Limited Blog Activity for a Short While

Dear blog readers,

due to schedule changes and some recent events, my participation on this blog will be limited for a few weeks. We also have a convention soon--I'm looking forward to it. Thanks for checking out this blog.

All the best,

Edgar

Revelation 1:1 and the Genitive Case

Commentators have normally observed that Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Revelation 1:1) could be a subjective genitive ("from Christ") or an objective genitive ("about Christ"). Wallace believes the construction could be either an objective genitive or a plenary genitive (both subjective and objective at the same time); A.T. Robertson also seems to favor the objective genitive for this construction. But David Aune suggests that Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is a subjective genitive since the next clause in the text is: ἣν ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ ὁ Θεός. As indicated by Aune's comment, the scripture's context must ultimately decide what type of genitive we have in Rev. 1:1.

Another factor that might have a bearing on this issue is that John refers to Jesus Christ with the datival form αὐτῷ in Rev. 1:1b. Aune thus reasons that there are a number of instances in Revelation where the indirect object is the subject of the verb in the following clause (Rev. 2:21) although he cautions us that these instances are all subordinate clauses.

Translating Matthew 10:6, 28, 39; 16:25-26 ("Lost"?)-Addressing Bowman Again

Robert M. Bowman has questioned the NWT handling of Mt 10:28 for the way it renders ἀπολέσαι ("to destroy") in that verse. His exact words are:

Louw-Nida agrees that there are "contexts in which YUXH refers to existence beyond death" (26.4), though in such contexts "it may be referring figuratively to the person" (citing Acts 2:27 as an example). Their identification of APOLLUMI THN YUXHN as an idiom meaning "to experience the loss of life, to die" (23.114) does not prejudge the question of what happens at death. (It does, though, support my claim that APOLLUMI in this context means something more like "cause to be lost" than something like "render nonexistent.")

πορεύεσθε δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ πρόβατα τὰ ἀπολωλότα οἴκου Ἰσραήλ (Mt 10:6 WH).

"Go instead to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (NET Bible).

The translation "lost" works in Mt 10:6 since the context and other parts of the NT indicate that Jesus' disciples are hunting for those who are spiritually "lost" rather than spiritually "destroyed." Yet the gathering of sheep is not under consideration in 10:28: the verse specifically mentions Gehenna along with the destruction of soul and body. Furthermore, Luke uses τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι and ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν γέενναν in the parallel account thereby indicating that the "loss" of body and soul is not the issue (Luke 12:5); the writer is concerned with divine "killing" and the possible annihilation of unfaithful ones. Being thrown into Gehenna figuratively depicts this everlasting destruction of body and soul, and not simply the death of the former or the latter.

In Mt 10:39 and 16:25-26, the rendering "lost" is appropriate in view of the contrasts set up by Matthew between "find" and "lose" or "win" and "lose." Mt 10:28 does not have this type of chiastic contrast.

Origin of Proto-Semitic Language

I'm way out of my element here, and I'm not going to offer many comments. Duncan sent along these links:

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SyxDm67_qB8C&pg=PA121&lpg=PA121&dq=Homage+to+thee,+Horus,+mighty+king,+Bull,+conqueror+of+bulls.&source=bl&ots=QVX-y5xvW4&sig=pK-D_W63QJeYYGL4KZ-RUMaWbEU&hl=en&sa=X&ei=l5SVVZPVOMOX7QbgiLKgAg&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Homage%20to%20thee%2C%20Horus%2C%20mighty%20king%2C%20Bull%2C%20conqueror%20of%20bulls.&f=false

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=1HJxNdi5apkC&pg=PA397&lpg=PA397&dq=the+mighty+bull+that+rises+at+thebes&source=bl&ots=qPvL-6vTDg&sig=RpfcWpDOq6uyPddvGKZeKTgV5zI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=VZKVVdPuG8aI7Ab0vqv4Ag&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=the%20mighty%20bull%20that%20rises%20at%20thebes&f=false

Then he said: "Bearing in mind that protosemitic is seen as originating amongst workers in Egypt."

Good question. Just what is Proto-Semitic language, and if it existed, then who originated it? I believe that we must use Budge with extreme caution. It's the work found in these links.

See also: http://www.biblicalarchaeology.org/daily/biblical-artifacts/inscriptions/who-really-invented-the-alphabet%E2%80%94illiterate-miners-or-educated-sophisticates/

Matthew 28:19-20-Following the Logic of these Verses

1) Jesus commanded his eleven disciples to go forth, and teach people (make disciples).
2) Teaching others includes providing instruction about all Jesus' teachings.
3) So the eleven disciples were to teach others how to make disciples, since the disciple-making work constitutes an important part of Jesus' teachings.
4) Therefore, all of Jesus' disciples (by imitating the original eleven to whom this commission was given) have the obligation to make disiples.

I still need to hammer out the details, but I just wanted the progression of this argument to make sense to me.