2 Thessalonians 2:16-17 (Omar)

See footnote 20 for the first image.

A Thesis on the Greek Article (Link)

This work is by Ronald Dean Peters, who has since published his work. It constitutes some of the most recent work done on the Greek article, although I've read biting criticisms of the book that's based on his thesis.

See https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/15578/1/Peters%20Ronald.pdf

Holy Spirit and Pneuma (Swete on the GNT Usage)

This entry is designed to post the outlines of what Henry Barclay Swete writes (The Holy Spirit in the New Testament) concerning the anarthrous πνεῦμα ἅγιον. You might find his comments worthwhile, although I believe there are some examples that do not bear out his general thesis. His comments can be found on pp. 396-97 of The Holy Spirit.

I will summarize his argument, then provide scriptural references for each claim:

(1) The anarthrous πνεῦμα ἅγιον may be accounted for by the "strong tendency" of NT writers to "drop the article after a preposition." See Matthew 1:18; 3:11; Mark 1:8; Luke 2:25-26; Ephesians 5:18.

(2) An anarthrous construction may also occur when a writer uses the instrumental dative without a preposition. See Romans 8:14; Galatians 5:16, 18. (Wallace, GGBB, 165-166).

(3) Swete believes that when the spirit is described as "a gift or manifestation of the Spirit in its relation to the life of man," the NT employs πνεῦμα ἅγιον. Cf. Acts 2:38. However, compare Acts 10:38.

(4) Ellicott (on Galatians 5:5) wants to treat πνεῦμα ἅγιον as a proper name along the lines of "Lord" and "God." Yet Swete disagrees with this view and examples in Scripture likewise counter Ellicott's suggestion.

I hope this summary is helpful.

BDF Greek Grammar on The Article and Proper Names

See Section 260 of BDF here: https://nicksdata.files.wordpress.com/2008/12/bdf-a-greek-grammar-of-the-new-testament-and-other-early-christian-literature.pdf

Regards,

Edgar

Colossians 2:4, Rabshakeh, and Logic

One thing that strikes me about Rabshakeh (2 Kings 18:26-35) is that he uses tactics similar to Job's three comforters (Job 3). He takes veracious statements and draws unwarranted inferences from them. His arguments are, in a word, irrelevant (another logical fallacy). Rabshakeh could have written a textbook on how not to do logic: he was a sophist, pure and simple. Furthermore, like Job's buddies, such "plausible talk" defamed the name of the only true God by misrepresenting Jehovah's purpose for Judah.

I also checked James D.G. Dunn's commentary on Colossians (NIGTC) to see if he could shed any additional light on πιθανολογία (Colossians 2:4). He observes that πιθανολογία and its cognates signify: "the persuasiveness and plausibility particularly of popular speakers" (133). However, Dunn adds that Plato makes a vital distinction between πιθανολογία and ἀπόδειξις, with the latter word being a terminus technicus in rhetoric that denotes: "a compelling conclusion drawn from accepted premises" (ibid). See Theaetetus 162E; Ethica Nicomachea 1.3.4 and Philo's De Cherubim 9.

πιθανολογία, in contrast to ἀπόδειξις ("demonstration") thus comes to mean "plausible discourse" (Rotherham), "specious arguments" (NJB) or "fine-sounding arguments" (NIV).

Themes in Exodus (Memorial and Feast)

Ex 3:15: "And God saith again unto Moses, 'Thus dost thou say unto the sons of Israel, Jehovah, God of your fathers, God of Abraham, God of Isaac, and God of Jacob, hath sent me unto you; this is My name -- to the age, and this My memorial, to generation -- generation." (YLT)

Ex 12:14: "This day shall be for you a memorial day, and you shall keep it as a feast to the Lord; throughout your generations, as a statute forever, you shall keep it as a feast." (ESV)

Ex 32:5: "And when Aaron saw it, he built an altar before it; and Aaron made proclamation, and said, To morrow is a feast to the LORD." (KJV)

Ex 32:5: "And Aaron seeth, and buildeth an altar before it, and Aaron calleth, and saith, 'A festival to Jehovah -- to-morrow;'" (YLT)

See Exodus 10:9; 13:6, 9; 17:14; 23:15-18; 28: 12, 29; 30:16; 34:18, 22, 25; 39:7.

Translating Boule (Acts 2:23; 4:28)

On the subject of how βουλὴ (boule) should be translated in Acts 2:23; 4:28, please keep in mind that I don't believe "plan" is wrong. It's just that translating the Greek in that fashion is not the optimal choice for these passages. LSJ (which I realize is a classical Greek lexicon) offers these definitions for βουλὴ:

"will, determination, esp. of the gods," "counsel, design," "generally, counsel, advice," and "deliberation" or "decree." But it's clear that context must determine which definition fits best. BDAG does not seem to advocate "plan" either although that lexicon demonstrates that "plan" is within the term's lexical range. However, I would submit that the meaning does not fit the verses in Acts.

The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament (Rogers and Rogers) states that βουλὴ (Acts 2:23) evidently means (has the sense): "purpose, decision, counsel."

The Expositor's Greek Testament:

βουλῇ: Wendt compares the Homeric διὸς δʼ ἐτελείετο βουλή. The phrase βουλή τοῦ θ. is used only by St. Luke; once in his Gospel, Acts 7:30, and three times in Acts 13:36; Acts 20:27 (whilst βουλή is used twice in the Gospel, eight times in the Acts, and only three times elsewhere in the N.T., 1 Corinthians 4:5, Ephesians 1:2, Hebrews 6:17), but cf. Wisdom of Solomon 6:4; Wisdom of Solomon 9:13, and often ἡ βουλή κυρίου in LXX.

We could add Joseph Alexander's commentary on Acts where he writes: "The word translated counsel properly means will, as appears both from etymology and usage" (p. 70). compare Job 38:2; 42:3 Isa 5:19; 9:6; 46:10 (LXX).

Finally, Robertson's Word Pictures on Acts 2:23:

"By the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God (τηι ωρισμενηι βουληι και προγνωσηι του τεου — tēi hōrismenēi boulēi kai prognōsēi tou theou). Instrumental case. Note both purpose (βουλη — boulē) and foreknowledge (προγνωσις — prognōsis) of God and 'determined' (ωρισμενη — hōrismenē perfect passive participle, state of completion). God had willed the death of Jesus (John 3:16) and the death of Judas (Acts 1:16), but that fact did not absolve Judas from his responsibility and guilt (Luke 22:22). He acted as a free moral agent."

Ancient House Ecclesiae and The Present Ecclesia

Written 4/8/2009 and slightly edited 5/24/16.

I'm not faulting the house church model, so much as I'm stating that it appears to have been a temporary necessity in the Christian congregation's history. Daniel Harrington writes: "The house church was a necessary but transitional step in the history of the early church." His comments pertain strictly to the first century. So, in the first century, 40-50 Christians might have gathered in one of the city house churches. But I have also read--in Witherington, I believe--that certain households (like Philemon's) could hold 100 people for Christian worship. So the first-century gatherings might not have been confined to 30, 40 or 50 people. And I would say that socio-economic conditions necessitated the early house churches. I tend to agree with Harrington that the house churches should not be romanticized or necessarily viewed as models for today. Now I am not suggesting that small gatherings should be disbanded, but something had to be done with the book study/Bible study arrangement. Sorry to say that socio-economic factors partly necessitated that the GB adjust one of the meetings. Family Worship is another factor. I would submit that a larger gathering is in keeping with the notion of a universal ecclesia, a notion which we encounter in Ephesians.

Thomistic Souls Versus Cartesian Souls

Thomas Aquinas considers the soul to be subsistent, but not in the Cartesian sense. Kevin Corcoran quotes Summa Contra Gentiles II.69 to demonstrate this point: "body and soul are not two actually existing substances; instead, one actually existing substance arises from these two" (See Rethinking Human Nature, 38). So it's the human person (body and soul) that constitutes one thing or two incomplete substances for Aquinas and those who follow in his wake.

Porter, Et Al. on the Greek Article

Galatians 2:15-16 (EAN MH)

The basic issue in Gal. 2:15-16 is whether ἐὰν μὴ is adversative
('but') or exceptive ('except' or 'but only'). The NWT treats it as
exceptive and, admittedly, I had never stopped to verify this reading
until someone brought up the question. But I am familiar with the
construction ἐὰν μὴ (εἰ + ἄν) in Attic texts and, with those texts in
mind, I have never thought that the NWT handling of this passage was
problematic:

"We who are Jews by birth, and not sinners from the nations,
recognize that a man is declared righteous, not by works of law,
but only through faith in Jesus Christ. So we have put our faith in Christ Jesus, so that we may be declared righteous by faith in Christ and not by works of law, for no one will be declared righteous by works of law."

However to make sure that my theological presuppositions are not
unduly affecting my reading of this Pauline passage, I checked a few
commentaries on Galatians and here are my findings.

Ernest De Witt Burton (A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the
Epistle to the Galatians, pp. 120-121) writes that ἐὰν μὴ (Gal.
2:16) "is properly exceptive, not adversative." But what part of the text
does the construction except? Burton explains that it might be
the "preceding statement taken as a whole" or "the principal part of
it," but in the final analysis, he opts for ἐὰν μὴ excepting οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος only. He thus understands Paul to mean that we cannot be justified by works of Law at all. In order to make the English translation intelligible though, Burton suggests the reading "but only."

Ben Witherington III (Grace in Galatia: A Commentary on St Paul's
Letter to the Galatians, pp. 178-179) concurs with Burton. He
supplements Burton's observations, however, by noting that even an
adversative construal of the operative phrase would still rightly
yield the translation "but only." Witherington thinks that ἐὰν μὴ
is unequivocally exceptive, and he argues that this treatment
of the construction makes the best sense of the words in the context of Paul's letter. Even if one opts for the adversative sense here, Witherington insists, we should still understand Paul to mean "but only."

He writes:

"It is hardly believable that Paul would have said to the Galatians that 'works of law' plus faith in Christ could justify. Indeed, it is precisely this sort of combination that he is arguing against in the remainder of his letter!" See page 179 of Witherington's commentary.

On the other hand, Frank J. Matera (Sacra Pagina Series) gives an interesting Catholic perspective. He seems to favor the adversative sense and he of course indicates that one can be justified by works of Law accompanied by faith in Christ. However, this reading might conflict with Paul's letter as a whole and it possibly does not do justice to Paul's well established antithesis between works of the Law and faith. So we have options for translating ἐὰν μὴ in Gal. 2:15-16, but it's also instructive how theology informs one's understanding of Greek syntax.

"My Father" (John 5:18)

Regarding Jn. 5:18, Christ was not making himself equal to God by claiming the Divine One as his Father. Contrariwise, the context shows that Jesus' remarks were egregiously misinterpreted by those listening to him. Such confusion often happens in the Fourth Gospel. The Expositor's GT is correct about the reasoning of the Jews in John 5:

"The Jews found in hO PATHR MOU [Jn 5:17] and the implication in KAGW ERGAZOMAI a claim to some peculiar and exclusive (IDION) sonship on the part of Jesus; that He claimed to be Son of God not in the sense in which other men are, but in a sense which involved equality with God" (1:738).

While the Jews were justified inferring that Christ viewed himself as a/the unique Son of God, they were mistaken to assume that he was thereby claiming ontological equality with his Father:

"Since the discourse that follows [John 5:18] denies the 'Jewish' understanding of the equality of the Father and the Son, is the 'Jewish' charge that Jesus had broken the sabbath to be taken seriously? I suggest that in John's view the 'Jews' are wrong both in their understanding of the equality of the Father and the Son and of Jesus as a sabbath breaker."

See Herold Weiss, "The Sabbath in the Fourth Gospel," Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 110, No. 2. (Summer, 1991): 311-321.

Compare James F. McGrath, "A Rebellious Son? Hugo Odeberg and the Interpretation of John 5:18," New Testament Studies 44 (1998): 470-473.

Leon Morris and John 6:51ff (Remnants of a Dialogue)

"I am the living bread that came down from heaven. If anyone eats of this bread he will live forever. The bread that I will give for the life of the world is My flesh" (John 6:51 HCSB).

Eucharist-"The name given to the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar in its twofold aspect of sacrament and Sacrifice of Mass, and in which Jesus Christ is truly present under the appearances of bread and wine" (Catholic Encyclopedia).

Leon Morris presents some excellent objections to viewing John 6:51ff as eucharistic. He explains: "The objections already urged [against a eucharistic interpretation] remain. The very strength of the language is against it. The eating and drinking spoken of are the means of bringing eternal life (v. 54), and they are absolutely unqualified. Are we to say that the one thing necessary for life is to receive the sacrament? Again, 'flesh' is not commonly used with reference to the sacrament. In every other New Testament passage referring to 'flesh,' the Scriptures use the word 'body'" (John, 376-377).

Morris thus concludes: "I am not contending that there is no application to the sacrament. But I very strongly doubt whether this is the primary meaning. It seems much better to think of the words as meaning first of all the appropriation of Christ" (Morris, Leon. John [The New ICC], 377).

He continues to point out in footnote 122 (on page 377) that other scholars see the terminology "flesh and blood" as applicable to "the demand for faith in [the enfleshed] Christ" and the words may further apply to his death. A suggestion I would also make is that its quite possible the wilderness motif (found in Exodus) is applicable in John 6:51ff too. A symbolic "feeding" and "drinking" would be quite appropriate in that case. For instance, the apostle Paul wrote: "our forefathers were all under the cloud and all passed through the sea and all got baptized into Moses by means of the cloud and of the sea; and all ate the same spiritual food and all drank the same spiritual drink. For they used to drink from the spiritual rock-mass that followed them, and that rock-mass meant the Christ" (1 Cor. 10:1-4). Cf. John 6:31-34, 41-51.

[Betty]
If you will forgive my saying that does, to me at least, seem a eucharistic formula. So I would suggest that the Greek does indicate that the eucharist is under consideration as is confirmed by the question in verse 52. Jesus answer is that truly his flesh and blood are food and drink, and where else is this association found? Only in the eucharist I would suggest.

[Edgar]
I think you're missing a very important point here. Jesus is clearly using metaphorical language here as we see by the words: "I am the living bread that came down from heaven . . . the bread that I shall give is my flesh in behalf of the life of the world" (John 6:51).

Jesus was not literal bread and he was not going to offer up literal or physical bread as he plainly demonstrated by his utterance in 6:51. Notice too that Jesus uses SARX in this account whereas in Matthew 26:26 and other related discourses, he employs SWMA. Jesus' use of SARX in 6:51 undoubtedly points back to John 1:14 where John tells us the Word became flesh (SARX) and dwelled among us. The evidence for a eucharistic interpretation seems to be lacking.

G. R. B. Murray writes in his "Theology in the Fourth Gospel" concerning John 6:51-58:

"The concept of Jesus as the Bread of Life can be related not alone to Jewish thought but to other cultures of the nearer and remoter East. The most remarkable parallel to John 6, however, is found in an utterance of Rabbi Hillel, son of Gamaliel III . . . He astonished his contemporaries by saying, 'there shall be no Messiah for Israel, for they have already eaten him in the days of Hezekiah' " (See Page 98).

Interestingly, as Murray points out, Jewish translations of the Talmud into English render the language for "have eaten" as "enjoy." So John 6:51-58 must be viewed in the proper context to be rightly understood.

I conclude with an observation from Johannine scholar Gerald Borchert:

"The means to life, accordingly, is not eating and drinking communion elements, but believing is the means of inwardly accepting the suffering death of the Passover Lamb who gave his life for the sin of the world" (Borchert, John 1-11, 272).

For additional information, see http://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2015/04/john-656-57-eucharist-and-sons-present.html

What the Son Knows-Final Part of a Dialogue with Barnabas

[Barnabas]
"and you raise the question, on what is supposedly, the ignorance of Jesus on certain things. Let's first of all understand that Jesus' knowledge was never on a level as our own limited awareness, people seem to just look at what Jesus appears not to know, and ignore what He does know. He knew an individual's undisclosed past (John 1:47; 4:29), and the thoughts of His enemies (Luke 6:8) and friends (Luke 9:47), which is a sole attribute of God (Acts 15:8; 2
Chron. 6:29; 1 Kings 8:38). And Jesus understood the Old Testament Scriptures in an unprecedented manner (Matt 22:29; 26:54-56; Luke 24;27).

[Edgar]
The Son of God certainly knew what was in the heart of humans (Jn 2:25). The question is, how did he know it? Was he omniscient? Alternatively, did God's spirit and his pre-existence as the first creature of God allow him to know the interior life of humans? The Scriptures answer that Jesus of Nazareth was anointed with God's spirit and power. Because of this fact, he was able to go through the land of Palestine doing good (Acts 10:38). The prophet Isaiah (11:1-3) foretold that the Messiah would be filled with "a spirit of wisdom and of understanding, a spirit of counsel and of strength, a spirit of knowledge and of fear of the LORD [YHWH], and his delight shall be the fear of the LORD [YHWH]" (NAB).

[Barnabas]
"in fact Jesus even says this about Himself, "no one knows the Son except the Father. Nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and the one to whom the Son will reveal Him" (Matt. 11:27). From this passage, both the omniscience and
incomprehensibility of Christ are declared by Himself. He who knows the Father is omniscient, and He who is known only by the Father is incomprehensible, we get glimpse of the divine nature only as Jesus will reveal."

[Edgar]
Again, I think you're reading far too much into this text, rather than extracting meaning from it, as one should do. If the Son fully knowing the Father and vice versa functions as proof of Christ's "omniscience and incomprehensibility," then what about the latter part of the passage? When Jesus reveals the Father to one of his disciples and the enlightened disciple comes to "fully know" the Father and Son, would you say that he/she then becomes omniscient or incomprehensible? Notice that OUDEIS (in Mt 11:27) is qualified by KAI hWi EAN BOULHTAI hO hUIOS APOKALUYAI.

[Barnabas]
"christ omniscience is further expressed in the fact that He hears and answers the prayers of His people (John 14:14). This ability to hear and answer the prayers of His disciples is a claim to omniscience. To be able to hear each prayer of His disciples—offered up to him night and day, day in and day out throughout the centuries—keep each request infallibly related to its petitioner, and answer each one in accordance with the divine mind and will, would require Him to be omniscient!"

[Edgar]
Jn 14:14 neither teaches that we should pray to Christ nor does it prove that he hears prayers. We are instructed to pray to God the Father through the Son in the spirit. Jesus taught us to pray, "Our Father in the heavens, let your name be sanctified" (Mt 6:9 NWT). He did not encourage or exhort his disciples to offer prayers to him. Asking the Father for something in Jesus' name does not mean that we pray to Christ.

[Barnabas]
"but why does it show that Jesus didn't know certain things? Why for example, when His friend Lazarus died He knew about it without being told and set off for Bethany, but when He got there He asked where Lazarus had been laid (John 11)? The answer is quite simple. Just as in Genesis 18:20-21 and 22:12 where it is clear that God chooses to know and not know certain things, Jesus chooses not to know certain thing, that is He chooses not to exercising His omniscience. And so if we were to use the same line of reasoning that you employ that deny Jesus' Deity because it appears He has limited knowledge of certain things, then from Genesis 18:20-21 we can assume that Yahveh has limited knowledge and is not omniscient also."

[Edgar]
The two situations that you mention are not analogous. In the case of YHWH in the OT, we are told in no uncertain terms that He is "perfect in knowledge" (Job 37:16); no explicit statement of this sort is posited with respect to Christ. Furthermore, if your theory corresponded to reality, then one would expect that if the Father knows the day and hour, then the Son, if he is Almighty God, would also know the day and hour, which only the Father knows (Mt 24:36). To argue that the Son can choose not to know what the Father knows--yet they are supposedly hOMOOUSION--implies
that the Son has a different divine consciousness than the Father does, which implies tritheism rather than trinitarianism.

[Barnabas]
"my friend it seems that it is your theology that is getting in your way of understanding the scriptures; for only one that has a poor grasp of the idiom of certain phrases would read into the passage of Rev 3:14 that the subject was created."

[Edgar]
Evidently, BDAG Greek-English Lexicon also is controlled by the editor's theology and he also must have a poor grasp of the idiom in Rev 3:14 since this magisterial source states that the meaning "first created" for ARXH is "linguistically probable" which was upgraded from the older BAGD, which said this meaning is "linguistically possible."

Another Response to the Son = "Nature of X" Argument

Interlocutor:

"I gathered my 'data' on the matter from a wide range of sources, over many years, here are a few; New Bible Dictionary (second edition) says, 'Son' is commonly used in Semitic languages to denote membership of a class, as 'son of Israel' for 'Israelite,' 'son of might' for 'valorous.' 'Son of God' in Hebrew means 'God.'"

My Response:

So, are you now saying that one who is called or identified as a "Son of God" is a member of the "class" God?

BDAG states that when hUIOS is followed by the genitive of the thing, it denotes "one who shares in [the thing named] or who is worthy of it [i.e., the thing named in the genitive], or who stands in some other close relation to it, oft[en] made clear by the context; this constr[uction] is prob[ably] a Hebraism in the main . . ." (p. 1025).

One example of this usage provided by BDAG is Lk 16:8: hOI hUIOI TOU AIWNOS TOUTOU. Also, hUIOS POLEWS, both of which refute your [earlier] "possessing the nature of X" suggestion.

Interlocutor:

"Vine's Expository Dictionary says, 'huios primarily signifies the relation of offspring to parent…It is often used metaphorically of prominent moral characteristics…the word `Son' is used sometimes (a) of relationship, sometimes (b) of the expression of charater [sic]."

My Response:

This source, at least, as you quoted it, does not say that a "son" (hUIOS) in the Hebraic idiom "sons of" (followed by the genitive of the thing) necessarily possesses the nature of the thing named (i.e., of X).

Interlocutor:

"niv Bible Dictionary, 'Son… Another very common biblical use of this word is in combination with another word to express something about the individual or individuals described…'Son of perdition' is used of Judas.' Nelson's New Illustrated Bible Dictionary, "The word "son" is also used in a figurative sense in the Bible." Many good theological dictionaries and word books will also explain it for you.>>

My Response:

First, I own and have consulted "many good theological dictionaries and word books," Barnabas. Second, what you have cited here does not support your previous assertion about "son" referring to one "possessing the nature of X." Are we to believe that Jesus meant Judas possessed the nature of destruction, after his defection from the Son of God (Jn 17:12). Rather, was not Jesus pointing out that Judas was given to destruction or intimately related to it, as suggested by BDAG and Zerwick?

Interlocutor:

"Friend, an angel is NEVER defined as "a son of God" like you say (see Hebrews 1:5), they are termed thusly in the plural only. It is interesting that when used with reference to creatures, whether men or angels, the phrase is always in the plural (sons of God), the singular with the definite article is only used of Jesus. To equate the Sonship of Jesus with the plural used elsewhere would be to deny the plain truth of the Bible."

My Response:

Who is "equating the Sonship of Jesus with the plural used elsewhere," my friend? I have not seen anyone here doing that. Besides, your argument that the plural usage "sons of God" somehow differs in meaning from the singular "son of God" is just wrong-headed from a logical or lexical semantic standpoint.

Interlocutor:

jesus is more than one of God's chosen people, more than one of the heavenly messengers, more than one who rules on God's behalf on earth. Even a casual reading of the verses where Jesus is called the Son of God will show the difference in both quality and extent from the other uses in the plural, read them and see. When applied to Jesus it is a title of nature, the plural form is of office.

My Response:

(1) I agree that Jesus is the unique Son of God. No argument there.

(2) It seems that you've now changed the direction of your argument, now wanting to make a distinction between the plural denoting one's "office" and the singular "son" denoting Jesus' "nature," whereas previously you said that the "nature" of the sons mentioned in Eph 2:2 was being delineated. Have you thus adjusted your understanding of the plural "sons of" construction?

(3) Your distinction does not seem to hold water when we actually take the time to look at real examples of the construction "sons of" in the relevant texts or literature. hUIOI most certainly does not refer to an office in Lk 20:36 or in Mt 5:9 or in 2 Thess 2:3.

Interlocutor:

"in 2 Kings 20:35 [1 Kings 20:35], "a certain man of the sons of the prophet" means that the man is a prophet, as the rest of the verse verifies…everything that makes a prophet a prophet is what this man was."

My Response:

"Actually, according to BDB, the Hebrew word BEN here (used in the plural) refers to one who is a member in a guild or certain order. It does not mean that the man possesses every quality that a prophet has or should have. In fact, the NAB translates this verse, "One of the guild prophets was prompted by the LORD to say to his companion . . ."

Interlocutor:

"Interestingly, one definition entry in my BDB for ben has "sons (as characterisation, i.e. sons of injustice [for un-righteous men]…"

My Response:

This definition does not help your argument at all, considering how you define the term "nature" in relation to Jesus, the Son of God.

Interlocutor:

"on Ephesians 2:2, I agree that 'the sons of disobedience' means nothing more than 'disobedience ones' or 'those that are disobedient,' the characteristic of these ones is of a disobedient nature, but you would be stretching the idiom to mean 'disobedient sons,' for the term, as the context shows, is not referring to offspring.>>

My Response:

The terminology "sons" is most certainly being employed metaphorically in Eph 2:2, just as we find in 1 Thess. 5:5 or Lk 16:8. And since we evidently have an instance of the descriptive genitive in Eph 2:2, why can we not render the construction "disobedient sons"? [The Greek word is also hUIOI in Eph. 2:2 which would most naturally be rendered "sons" contra my interlocutor's suggestion. See ASV and Darby's translation.]

My Interlocutor:

"jesus used the term 'Son of man' for Himself to indicated that He was Himself human, lets remember how He carefully guarded His identity that He was the Messiah (Matt 16:20; Luke 4:41), so it would be quite contrary for Him to go about, using the term Son of man in that sense you claim when you say that that was the way Christ 'primarily made use of the title or formula.'"

My Response:

There are places in the Gospels, which if we accept them as historical texts, seem to verify Jesus' use of the title "Son of Man" as a way to identify him as the Messiah (Jn 5:26-27). Let us assume that he did not utilize this expression as a title. Does this mean that he was merely indicating that he was human by his use of these words? Not necessarily, since Geza Vermes and E.P. Sanders (among others) have pointed out that Christ could have been availing himself of an Aramaic idiom, "that man," which was really a circumlocution for the first-person singular pronoun, "I." I consider this as a good possibility in light of the findings made by both Vermes and Sanders. But see BDAG under the entry hUIOS.

Addendum: While I no longer think the explanation of Vermes or Sanders is likely, although it's possible, the overall position advanced in this dialogue remains the same.

Campbell, Aspect, and John 17:3

Hebrews 1:4 (ONOMA)

In Heb. 1:4, it's possible that the "name" (ONOMA) refers to the increased privileges of the resurrected and elevated Messiah. Isa. 9:6 prophesied that the Messiah's name would be 'Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God, Eternal Father, and Prince of Peace." Interestingly, the prophet writes that all of these titles or descriptions constitute one name. The "name" mentioned by the writer of Hebrews is pretty much co-extensive with the description listed in Isa. 9:6.

Cf. Rev. 19:11-13.

George Buchanan also writes (in the Anchor Bible commentary on Hebrews) that "since his [Christ's] inheritance was associated with his sonship, which name he inherited, he was evidently made Son, heir, apostle, and high priest (1:2; 3:1; 5:10) all at once" (Buchanan, Hebrews, 9).

Daniel Wallace lists the phrase KREITTWN GENOMENOS TWN AGGELWN as a genitive of comparison and in addition to this construction in the passage, the datival form of hOSOS (hOSWi) indicates that Jesus became better than the angels since he inherited ('to the degree that he inherited') a name superior to their name. See the entry for hOSOS in BAGD 586.

Paul Ellingworth calls attention to the fact that ONOMA is anarthrous here and its reference is vague. He suggests that the name (ONOMA) in this context might be "Son," but he suggests that it might also refer to the exaltation of the "eternal Son" (The Epistle to the Hebrews, 106). At any rate, one should not place too much emphasis on the anarthrousness of ONOMA (see BDF 254.2).

For 1:4, the RSV reads: "having become as much superior to angels as the name he has inherited is more excellent than theirs."

Blasphemy in the First Century CE (Darrell Bock)

What exactly constituted blasphemy in the first
century has been a cause of much debate among NT
scholars. One of the most thorough and helpful studies
I've read on this subject is Darrell Bock's Blasphemy
and Exaltation in Judaism: The Charge against Jesus in
Mark 14:53-65.

Bock reports that one form of blasphemy (according
to m Sanh 6.4; 7.5) was improperly using the divine name (YHWH)
or pronouncing it at all(p. 234). But other acts
constituting blasphemy were acts of idolatry and
wanton disrespect for God and His chosen
representatives. With this historical data in mind,
Bock explains:

"Jesus' blasphemy [in Mk 14:53-65] operated at two
levels. 1) There was a claim to possess comprehensive
authority from the side of God. Though Judaism might
contemplate such a posiiton for a few, the teacher
from Galilee was not among the luminaries for whom
such a role might be considered. As a result, his
remark would have been seen as a self-claim, that was
an affront to God's presence. 2) He also attacked the
leadership, by implicitly claiming to be their future
judge (or by claiming a vindication by him). This
would be seen as a violation of Exod 22:27, where
God's leaders are not to be cursed" (p. 236).

Admittedly, Bock seems to think that the claims of
Christ in the Gospel of Mark differed from other
exalted figures of Judaism since Mark records that the Son
of Man would come "seated at the right hand of power
and coming with the clouds of heaven." Nevertheless, I
believe his discussion illustrates that the charge of
blasphemy was not as narrow as some imply.

Isaiah 53 As a Test Case for Isaiah DSS (Hebrew Steams)

See http://www.hebrew-streams.org/works/qumran/isaiah-53-qumran.pdf

Murray J. Harris and Colossians 1:16 (Quote from An "Exegetical Guide" FYI)

This quote falls within the fair use law, and I by no means endorse all of what he writes, but I find the quote informative:

εἴτε θρόνοι εἴτε κυριότητες εἴτε ἀρχαὶ εἴτε ἐξουσίαι “Things invisible” are now defined in a typical but not exhaustive list (“ everything . . . including . . . , CEV; “invisible orders . . . such as . . . ,” Cassirer) of four classes of supernatural powers or spiritual beings, each class being introduced by the particle εἴτε, used here as a copulative (cf. T 333). By metonymy θρόνοι (“ the enthroned,” BDAG 460c) are probably angelic occupants of heavenly thrones, although Wilson (141) suggests “all the powers of heaven, both good and evil,” while κυριότητες (nom. pl. of κυριότης, -ητος, ἡ, “ruling power/ force, dominion”; cf. BDAG 579b), ἀρχαί (“rulers,” NRSV, HCSB, ESV; Wilson 123), and ἐξουσίαι (“ authorities,” NASB ², HCSB, ESV; Dunn 83) are supernatural potentates who exercise (respectively) “dominion,” “rule,” and “authority” in heavenly realms. Wilson, however, finds a twofold chiastic sequence here so that thrones and dominions belong to the invisible heavenly realm, while rulers and powers belong to the visible earthly realm (140). See further Turner, Words 28–32, 115–16, 348–49, 448–49; For Further Study 27, “Principalities and Powers in Paul (2:10, 15).”

He adds:

Thus “the whole universe” (REB) (τὰ πάντα, a synonym for πᾶσα κτίσις, v. 15 [Barth-Blanke 199]) has an ongoing relationship to Christ. ̓́ Εκτισται is thus a prelude to συνέστηκεν (see comments on v. 17b).

Harris, Murray J. (2010-06-01). Colossians and Philemon (Exegetical Guide to the Greek New Testament) (Kindle Locations 1701-1703). B&H Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Harris, Murray J. (2010-06-01). Colossians and Philemon (Exegetical Guide to the Greek New Testament) (Kindle Location 1687). B&H Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Harris, Murray J. (2010-06-01). Colossians and Philemon (Exegetical Guide to the Greek New Testament) (Kindle Locations 1680-1687). B&H Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Harris, Murray J. (2010-06-01). Colossians and Philemon (Exegetical Guide to the Greek New Testament) (Kindle Locations 1676-1680). B&H Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Faith and Reason (John Locke)

Both faith and reason are important: they are not per force antithetical, but might be deemed complementary. When faith is combined with reason, one has a faith that is neither blind nor credulous. As John Locke states:

"Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true: no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper object of faith: but whether it be a divine revelation or no, reason must judge; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge and certainty" (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Chapter XVIII.10).

He also insists: "Nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of faith" (Ibid.).

My observation on Locke's remarks: I would say that reason and the consistent witness of Scripture must determine whether a given datum constitutes divine revelation. We also need the Christian ecclesia to guide our thinking on divine revelation. However, like Locke, I would maintain that nothing which conflicts with "the clear and self-evident dictates of reason" should be considered or taught as a matter of faith.

Some reply that it's not always easy to determine what counts as a lucid and self-evident teaching that is rational, but the criterion for self-evidence in logic is fairly straightforward. Furthermore, it's not that hard to spot faulty reasoning or invalid and unsound arguments. But what some view as irrational may not be considered irrational by others. Yet logic does provide controls for what does or does not count as rationality. So we do not have to make subjective decisions about what teachings are rational or irrational since objective controls exist.

Isaiah 23 and 24: The Greater Context

Eschatology is the doctrine of the end times or the "last things." Eschatological subjects include the resurrection from the dead, Armageddon, and the millennial reign of Christ. I would not say that there are no strict eschatological prophecies in Isaiah, but I cannot yet think of one undisputed example. Most of the texts found in the prophetic book have at least two possible fulfillments rather than a singular eschatological fulfillment.

As a test case, we might observe that Isaiah 24 seems to be nested within a historical context that discusses Jehovah's adverse judgment upon Israel's enemies. Isa. 23 speaks about God's execution of judgement on Tyre, but evidently Tyre is not the only city that will taste the bitter contents of Jehovah's figurative cup (see Isa. 24:17, 21). Whenever Isa. 24:1 foretells the desolation of the earth or "the land," it apparently has reference to Judah's destruction in view of Isa. 24:2, 23. However, even if Isa. 24 were strictly eschatological in its focus, this would not mean that we should interpret or construe Isa. 34:1-10 in a strict eschatological manner like some want to do.

While the text of Isa. 24:2 does not mention Judah, verse 24:23 does and this passage indicates that God will fulfill His purpose to make Jerusalem the capital city of the world. Isaiah 24 not only uses a word that often means "earth," but it also employs a term that could signify "world" (TBL: 24:4).

[Jean] No, it is possible that it [Isaiah 34] has a temporal fulfillment. There has been no fulfillment of verse 2-4, however. I do not remember any memorable day of Edom's total destruction that upheld the cause of Zion and ended the nation (v. 8 and context).

Thomas Aquinas on Lying (Summa Theologica II-II.110)

Here is a passage from ST (Second part of the second part, question 110):

"As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to
charity, through being told with the purpose of
injuring God, and this is always a mortal sin, for it
is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one's
neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good
name, and this also is a mortal sin, since it is a
mortal sin to injure one's neighbor, and one sins
mortally if one has merely the intention of committing
a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary
to charity, neither will the lie, considered under
this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a
jocose lie, where some little pleasure is intended, or
in an officious lie, where the good also of one's
neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be
contrary to charity by reason of scandal or any other
injury resulting therefrom: and thus again it will be
a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not deterred
through scandal from lying publicly."

Proverbs 8:22ff (Midrash): Torah Created First?

The Midrash on Proverbs: Translated from the Hebrew with an Introduction and Annotations by Burton L. Visotzky (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 46, claims that the divine Wisdom mentioned in Proverbs 8:22ff is the Torah which God created before he brought forth anything else:

"R. Nehemiah said: Come and see what a good thing God has created in His world even before He created the universe. What may this be? It is the Torah!."

We also read:

"What [is the scriptural proof for] Torah? The Lord created me at the beginning of his course, As the first of His works of old (Prov 8:22) . . . At first Torah was in heaven, as it is said, I was with Him as a confidant (Prov 8:30). Later on Moses arose and brought it down to earth to give it to humanity, as it is said, Rejoicing in his inhabited world, Finding delight with mankind (Prov 8:31)."

According to this Midrash on Proverbs, the Torah was "created" prior to the cosmos: it was preexistent. Compare Ecclesiasticus 1:1-4.

What Is "Divine Nature"? An Old Post on the Subject

Some prefer to use the nebulous term, "nature" when referring to the demons and their godship or lack thereof. And that is fine, as long as we clarify what we mean by the word--"nature."

While trinitarians often like to make a demarcation between person and nature, John L. McKenzie writes that the apostle John was not aware of any such distinction. Indeed, prior to the fourth century--OUSIA and hUPOSTASIS were employed as synonyms (they semantically overlapped). It was this linguistic phenomenon that caused great confusion in the Christological controversies surrounding Arius. So certain church fathers saw fit to differentiate between OUSIA and hUPOSTASIS, so as not to speak heretically of God. But in the first century world of thought, the distinction between God's nature and person did not exist. McKenzie humorously says that the apostles did not know the word consubstantiality and could not even spell it. To speak of God and His Son in terms of a consubstantial relationship is therefore anachronistic and completely erroneous.

But there are other words that can be used to describe the nature of a thing. Aristotle used MORFH, FUSIS, and OUSIA to delineate the nature of a thing (RES). When constructing his hylomorphic theory of matter and form, Aristotle employed MORFH to describe the form of a RES (e.g., the matter of a table is wood, but its form is tableness). In other words, he utilized MORFH as a synonym for OUSIA. But his use of MORFH differed from the apostle Paul's first-century utilization of the term (where it means the "external shape" of a RES).

The Greek Scriptures express the concept of "nature" by employing FUSIS (instead of MORFH or OUSIA). The "divine nature" is QEIAS FUSEWS in 2 Pet. 1:4. What does Peter mean when he speaks of the "divine nature" that God's anointed would share in upon being resurrected to heaven?

FUSIS comes from FUW (to puff or blow, i.e. to swell up) and refers to growth, having an implied sense of genus or sort, native disposition or constitution (Complete Word Study: New Testament).

Thayer defines FUSIS as "nature," but goes on to point out a number of different usages for the term. They are as follows:

1. The nature of things, the force, laws or order of nature.
2. Birth, physical origin.
3. A mode of feeling and acting which by long nature has become habit.
4. The sum of innate properties and powers by which one person differs from another (See James 3:7 and 2 Pet. 1:4).

The entry FUSIS in BAGD also demands a careful study, so that one can ascertain what we mean by "nature."

In short, when I speak of the angels being gods by nature, I am using the word "nature" in the sense delineated by (4) in Thayer. Therefore, I am not speaking about the whatness of the angels when I say that they are divine by nature; I am talking about the "sum of innate properties and powers" that make them differ from humans. When describing the nature of beasts, Thayer refers to the "natural strength, ferocity and intractibility" that sets them apart from humans. This is not a delineation of their OUSIA (their whatness), but of their peculiar properties and innate powers that make them stand out from humans.

Addendum: I would now qualify the last statement above, but I'll let the post stand as written.

Son of God = Possessing the Nature of God?

I first encountered this type of theological reasoning when reading the works of Charles Ryrie. It seemed "fishy" to me then and it appears highly suspect now. Can anyone provide solid lexical data that buttresses the claim that the phrase "Son/son of God = possessing the nature of God?

For instance, the Bible calls angels "sons of God," but do they possess the nature of deity, as this nomenclature is defined by Trinitarians?

Secondly, BDB Hebrew-English Lexicon supplies an example where the expression "son of" most certainly does not mean "possessing the nature of X." Take the idiom, "sons of the prophets" (1 Kings 20:35). Are we to assume that it denotes: "possessing the nature of a prophet"? Not according to BDB. Moreover, the phrase "son of a messenger" most clearly does not mean "possessing the nature of a messenger." That is why I am requesting those who take this stand to produce lexical evidence that supports this claim.

Another pertinent example is Ephesians 2:2. The Greek there reads: TOIS hUIOIS THS APEIQEIAS. This linguistic formula or construction does not signify: "possessing the nature of disobedience." It could simply refer to "disobedient [ones]" or "disobedient sons."

"hUIOI THS AP. Hebr. those given to disobedience" (Zerwick's A Grammatical Analysis of the GNT, p. 581).

For more details, see sections 42-44 of Zerwick's Biblical Greek Illustrated by Examples.

NET Bible Footnote: "sn Sons of disobedience is a Semitic idiom that means 'people characterized by disobedience.' However, it also contains a subtle allusion to vv. 4-10: Some of those sons of disobedience have become sons of God."

Some argue that the expression "Son of Man" supports the notion that "Son of God" = "possessing the nature of God." Again, it appears that theology and not lexical semantics is controlling this discussion. Why should the title "Son of Man" have to mean "possessing the nature of a man"? As the Complete Word Study: Old Testament points out, the OT nomenclature "son of man" simply denotes "a man" or "an individual." One could also understand the terminology to connote a "mortal being of flesh." But "Son of Man" (in some contexts) also has "Messianic overtones" (Daniel 7:13-14). That is the way in which the Gospels primarily make use of the title or formula. Son of Man identifies Christ as the Messiah without needing to cart in a "possessing the nature of X" theory.

Hippolytus of Rome's "Exegetical Fragments"--Michael the Archangel

Here are some thoughts from Hippolytus of Rome:

"And lo, Michael." Who is Michael but the angel assigned to the people? As (God) says to Moses, "I will not go with you in the way, because the people are stiff-necked; but my angel shall go with you."

And after a little He says to him: "Do you know wherefore I come unto you? And now will I return to fight with the prince of Persia. But I will show you that which is noted in the Scripture of truth: and there is none that holds with me in these things but Michael your prince, and I left him there. For from the day that you gave your countenance to be afflicted before the Lord your God, your prayer was heard, and I was sent to fight with the prince of Persia: "for a certain counsel was formed not to send the people away: "that therefore your prayer might be speedily granted, I withstood him, and left Michael there."

And who was he that spoke, but the angel who was given to the people, as he says in the law of Moses: "I will not go with you, because the people is stiff-necked; but my angel shall go before along with you? " This (angel) withstood Moses at the inn, when he was bringing the child uncircumcised into Egypt. For it was not allowed Moses, who was the eider (or legate) and mediator of the law, and who proclaimed the covenant of the fathers, to introduce a child uncircumcised, lest he should be deemed a false prophet and deceiver by the people. "And now," says he, "will I show the truth to you." Could the Truth have shown anything else but the truth?

See http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0502.htm

The Possible Meaning of "Torment" in Revelation 11:1-6 & 20:10

There are a number of factors that we must not ignore when treating Rev. 20:10. For one thing, its quite possible that torment in Rev. 20:10 does not mean literal torture (the infliction of physical or mental pain). It could either refer to imprisonment or denote a subjection to punitive measures (Matt. 18:34). It is the figurative imprisonment or testing of the Devil and his cohorts that could occur both day and night. Furthermore, if the beast and the false prophet are not sentient beings per se but representative of symbolic entities, then it makes no sense to speak of their torment anymore than someone might speak about tormenting death and hell in a literal sense (Rev. 20:14-15).

Robert W. Wall points out that Revelation's description of the two witnesses could very well be symbolic of the church's faithful testimony in the face of its enemies (Wall, Revelation, 145ff). The terminology "two witnesses" might be an example of synecdoche; therefore, the imagery could aptly represent the faithful (anointed) conquerors who overcome the wild beast by means of their faith. Notice that the prophets (witnesses) dress in sackcloth, are described as having powers akin to Moses and Elijah, they are killed and their dead bodies remain unburied for three and a half days as those on the earth exult (temporarily) over their unjust death. In view of the overall literary features of Revelation and the context of Rev. 11:10, I suggest that the two witnesses symbolically depict some kind of Christian testimony reminiscent of the ancient Jewish prophets.

Another Interpretation of Aquinas' John 14:28 Explanation

Revelation's Symbols and Eternal Torment

Revelation often uses numerals in a symbolic manner. John mentions four angels holding back the four winds of the earth (Rev. 7:1-4). Is this depiction literal or figurative? Four angels release a calvary from the great river Euphrates and a woman in heaven is seen with a crown of twelve stars on her forehead (Rev. 9:13-19; 12:1ff). Are these references literal? They are apparently symbols in light of Rev. 1:1 and other passages like Rev. 12:1 which explicitly identify some references as signs. Individual persons are employed at times to signify groups of people or inanimate entities in the Bible. For example, it's possible that the woman in 12:1 symbolizes a group of persons and not an individual woman in heaven. We also read about four living creatures and 24 elders (Rev. 4:1-11) in the so-called "throne-room vision."

However, I concede the point that not everything in Revelation is symbolic. What one views as literal or symbolic is often governed by his or her theology although context should also be a strong determining factor. While I may believe that Satan's torment is symbolic, others understand his torment to be literal, but then inconsistently claim that Rev. 20:14-15 and its mention of death and hades being cast into the lake of fire is at least partly--if not completely--symbolic. In the final analysis, I would submit that Scripture as a whole and our understanding of God's nature must also govern our understanding of Revelation.

The Bible indicates that Satan and all those who follow him will be eternally destroyed or annihilated (Matt. 7:13, 14; 2 Thess. 1:9; Rev. 17:8). Furthermore, I wonder how a God of love could torment sentient and rational beings for all eternity (1 John 4:8). Additionally, if we construe a number of the symbols literally in Revelation, then it seems to makes nonsense of the book and possibly makes a liar out of John.

GRB Murray said it best in his commentary on Revelation, when he noted that John writes: "with parables and symbols which point to ideas beyond their verbal expression" (Murray 299). Therefore, we have to be careful when we conclude that God is going to torture people in a literal lake of fire for all eternity. Other verses show that God will bring evildoers to a fitting end by annihilating them forever (Ps. 145:20; Isa. 66:24).

Free Will, Predestination and Necessity

Jehovah foresees that certain events will happen or God knows that He will bring about particular occurrences in history. He therefore announces these events in His Word (the Bible), thereby binding Himself to the fulfillment of such prophesied events (Isa. 55:10-11). If God foresees the future acts of volitional agents, then it seems they will necessarily happen, but these acts are supposed to take place within the parameters of creaturely freedom. We cannot rightly infer that God necessarily causes that which He foresees. For example, God does not cause the rebels mentioned in Rev. 20:8 to rebel--yet they willexercise their free volition and rebel against God according to the prophecy.

Boethius provides a way out of this apparent dilemma by employing Aristotle's distinction between simple and conditional (hypothetical) necessity. De Consolatione Philosophiae (Book V) uses the example: "Necessarily, all men are mortal." This proposition is an example of simple necessity, which issues from a thing ut natura. On the other hand, knowing that if S is walking, then it is necessary that S is walking is an example of hypothetical necessity. We could also say: "If Socrates is sitting, then it is necessary that he is sitting." Yet it would not be correct to infer from this proposition: "Necessarily, Socrates is sitting." See Aristotle, Physics 2.9.

Theologians call the distinctions made above de re and de dicto modalities: what is true de re might not be true de dicto and vice versa. "Necessarily, Socrates is sitting" is a de re utterance (modality) but "If Socrates is sitting, then it is necessary that he is sitting" is de dicto. Everything depends on what the modal operator modifies or which utterances fall within the scope of the modal operator.

Applying this example to Cyrus the Great, we can say that there is a difference between the proposition: "It is necessary that Cyrus the Great will overthrow Babylon" and "If Cyrus overthrows Babylon, then he will necessarily overthrow Babylon."

Boethius writes: "Without doubt, then, all things which God foreknows do come to pass, but certain of them proceed from free will."

I obviously disagree with Boethius in a number of ways, but the Aristotelian distinction between simple and hypothetical necessity might be helpful for understanding how events necessarily happen without implying fatalism.

Hebrews 2:14 (A Dialogue)

[Edgar]
Under the entry for KATARGEW, BDAG has "to cause [something] to come to an end or to be no longer in existence, abolish, wipe out, set aside . . . TON TO KRATOS EXONTA TOU QANATOU destroy the one who has power over death Heb. 2:14" (page 525). This understanding of KATARGEW is consonant with Paul's words in Rom. 16:10 as well (note his use of SUNTRIYEI there and the part that Christians will play in the said "crushing" of the Devil).

[Jean] Why do you not mention the first meaning listed in BAGD for KATARGEW: "make ineffective, powerless, idle"? The fact that KATARGEW can mean "abolish" does not necessarily mean that Heb 2:14 automatically implies the destruction of the devil, although it may. According to LSJ the verb KATARGEW means "leave unemployed or idle." Other glosses includes: 1) make useless, cumber (the ground), 2) cause to be idle, hinder. LSJ also mentions as a second large category of meaning the idea to "make of no effect."

[Edgar]
I did not mention the first definition because you had already alluded to it in your comments earlier. Secondly, BDAG lists Heb. 2:14 under the second definition (not the first one). While the significance attached to KATARGEW by BDAG is surely not definitive just because the lexicon construes KATARGEW in this manner, I think that BDAG's comments on KATARGEW in Heb. 2:14 certainly deserve consideration because we must not only ask what a word means: we must ask what a certain signifier denotes in a particular context. Based on other Scriptures that talk about the Devil, I believe that it makes more sense to group KATARGEW under the second definition found in BDAG (Gen. 3:15; Rom. 16:20).

LSJ is fine and its unequalled in the information that it provides. But we must keep in mind the priority that synchronic definitions have over diachronic ones. BDAG lists a number of Bible passages where KATARGEW seems to denote destruction or annihilation. This defintion seem apropos vis-a'-vis Heb. 2:14.

Another Discussion on the Lake of Fire/Second Death

[Edgar]
Lastly, the language dealing with "torment" evidently does not refer to literal pain or torture. The term is commonly utilized in a figurative manner throughout the book of Revelation (Rev. 11:10).

[Jean]
I do not know why you conclude that the torment in Rev 11:10 cannot refer to literal pain or torture. I admit that much of the affliction will evidently be on the spiritual level. But the two witnesses have power to send fire from their mouths (perhaps the idea is "power to send fire at their command") and consume their enemies. Their enemies will be killed in this way (Rev 11:5). They also have power to shut up heaven so that there is no rain upon the earth during the days of their prophecy, those days lasting three-and-a-half years. They have further authority to turn the water into blood. Additionally, they can smite the earth with every kind of plague as often as they wish (11:6). So the conclusion that the "torment" in Rev 11:10 is merely figurative seems quite likely to be incorrect.

[Edgar]
I base part of this understanding on what the new BDAG says under the entry for BASANIZW: "of prophetic testimony as source of annoyance Rv 11:10.--9:5; 14:10; 20:10; GPt; Hv 3, 7, 6; s 6, 4, 1f; 4; 6, 5, 3f; 6" (Page 168). Furthermore, the context of Rev. 11:10 shows that the two prophets use their powers to kill and devour their enemies. How could such powerful feats literally torment all those who dwell upon the earth? It is more likely that the testimony of the witnesses serves as an annoyance [figuratively] for those who live upon the earth (Cf. C.H. Giblin, "Revelation 11:1-13: Its Form, Function and Contextual Integration." NTS 30 (1984) 433-59.)

[Jean]
What is interesting to me about the Rev 14:9-11 passage is that the text mentions the absence of rest after speaking of the smoke of their torment going up:

Rev. 14:11 and the smoke of their torment goeth up for ever and ever; and they have no rest day and night, they that worship the beast and his image, and whoso receiveth the mark of his name.

The text implies that the smoke of their torment goes up forever because they have no rest from their suffering day or night.

[Edgar]
Well, the verse says that the smoke of their torment ascends forever. It does not say that the "smoke" results from their toil and suffering. And what is more, the pain inflicted on those worshiping the beast could be symbolic.

Who Is the Ruler of the World? (Johannine Texts)

"Now is the judgment of this world: now shall the prince of this world (νῦν ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου) be cast out" (John 12:31)

"Hereafter I will not talk much with you: for the prince of this world cometh (ἔρχεται γὰρ ὁ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρχων), and hath nothing in me"(John 14:31).

"Of judgment, because the prince of this world is judged (ὅτι ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου κέκριται)." (John 16:11).

All biblical quotes from the KJV.

Do these texts have any bearing on our understanding of 2 Corinthians 4:4?

Another Catholic Reference That Seems to Argue John 14:28 Applies to the Human Nature of Christ (David)

Hi David, again I'm not saying that your understanding of Aquinas is not viable, but Levering seems to understand Aquinas' position on John 14:28 like I do. But he may qualify these statements elsewhere. https://books.google.com/books?id=_zf-AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA42&dq=aquinas+father+greater+than+i+john+14:28&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjJysHhoKbMAhXHJCYKHV9oDPYQ6AEIIjAB#v=onepage&q=father%20greater%20than%20i%20john%2014%3A28&f=false

See pages 42 and 269.

All the best,

Edgar

"God of This Age" (Link to a Dissertation)

We've discussed 2 Corinthians 4:4 in the past and the different ways that scholars understand the passage, so I thought some blog readers might appreciate this link for a dissertation that analyzes 2 Cor. 4:4 and related verses. My suggesting this link in no way implies that I am advocating the contents or overall thesis of the author's work. I am providing this link for informational purposes only. I'll let you all decide if you'd like to check out the author's work. Please see https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/5979

It is a dissertation written by Derek R. Brown, now published. See also https://www.amazon.com/God-This-Age-Wissenschaftliche-Untersuchungen/dp/3161537084

Irreprehensible Popes or Bishops? (1 Timothy 3:1-2)

MY INTERLOCUTOR: A brief response, Edgar, As you probably already know, a pope is appointed for life. His office is not terminated by reprehensible conduct, although he obviously should be exemplifying a life of virtue and holiness. Consider King David, for example. He was guilty of gross sins (adultery with Bathsheba and plotting the murder of her husband, Uriah the Hittite), but nowhere does the OT tell us that King David had to abdicate his throne. Was his conduct reprehensible? Certainly! Did that fact invalidate his authority as king? No.

MY RESPONSE FOLLOWS:

Let's keep our eye on the ball here. Kings in the OT did not--in the strictest sense--prefigure older men and shepherds in the NT. True there may be lessons that we can learn from David in connection with congregational shepherding, but can we really contend that his life actually serves as a [strict] pattern for Christian shepherds?

It is true that David was not removed as king when he committed adultery (and had a woman's innocent husband killed!). King Mannasseh also committed unthinkable atrocities, but was in time restored to his kingship (he was removed for a time). Does this mean that if a pope or shepherd is guilty of murder or adultery, he should not be removed from his office? Even if we use your line of reasoning, the least we could say is that a pope should be removed temporarily (in the way that Manasseh was removed for a time).

Moreover, Paul did not say that a "bishop" (EPISKOPOS) could be irreprehensible if he wanted to be. 1 Tim. 3:1 says: DEI OUN TON EPISKOPON ANEPILHMPTON EINAI. In other words--it is a binding obligation placed on all shepherds: they must be irreprehensible (cf. 1 Tim. 3:7). If such shepherds do not remain blameless, they are not fit to serve God's congregation.

Are we to believe that popes are held (by God) to a lesser standard than other shepherds are? According to 1 Cor. 5:9-13, those who unrepentantly practice sin should be excommunicated from God's congregation. Do these word not apply to the "Supreme Pontiff"? Surely you would admit that there have been some reprehensible popes down through the centuries. And yet these men were allowed to remain in office because they were popes? I simply do not get it. How can popes be held to a lower standard than other members of their flock?

Origen of Alexandria's Thoughts on Colossians 1:15 (FYI)

From his Commentary on John (Book I):

19. (4) "In addition to these meanings there is that in which we speak of an arche, according to form; thus if the first-born of every creature (Colossians 1:15) is the image of the invisible God, then the Father is his arche. In the same way Christ is the arche of those who are made according to the image of God. For if men are according to the image, but the image according to the Father; in the first case the Father is the arche of Christ, and in the other Christ is the arche of men, and men are made, not according to that of which he is the image, but according to the image. With this example our passage will agree: 'In the arche was the Word.'"

22. "Not even as the Word is He the arche, for the Word was in the arche. And so one might venture to say that wisdom is anterior to all the thoughts that are expressed in the titles of the first-born of every creature. Now God is altogether one and simple; but our Saviour, for many reasons, since God (Romans 3:25) set Him forth a propitiation and a first fruits of the whole creation, is made many things, or perhaps all these things; the whole creation, so far as capable of redemption, stands in need of Him."

Ta Panta-What It Denotes at Times

τὰ πάντα ("all things") does not signify or denote "the universe as a whole" every time it appears, but some contexts suggest this meaning is sometimes operative. For example, 1 Corinthians 15:28:

ὅταν δὲ ὑποταγῇ αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, τότε καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ υἱὸς ὑποταγήσεται τῷ ὑποτάξαντι αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, ἵνα ᾖ ὁ θεὸς πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν.

There's also Romans 11:36: ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα· αὐτῷ ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας· ἀμήν.

Compare 1 Corinthians 8:6.

Hebrews 1:2 does not employ ta panta, but rather, pantwn.

See Hebrews 11:3 to shed light on 1:2.

Origen's Understanding of Psalm 45:6-7 (Contra Celsum 1.56)

But attend carefully to what follows, where He is called God: "For
Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: a sceptre of righteousness is
the sceptre of Thy kingdom. Thou hast loved righteousness, and hated
iniquity: therefore God, even Thy God, hath anointed Thee with the oil
of gladness above Thy fellows." And observe that the prophet, speaking
familiarly to God, whose "throne is for ever and ever," and "a sceptre
of righteousness the sceptre of His kingdom," says that this God has
been anointed by a God who was His God, and anointed, because more
than His fellows He had loved righteousness and hated iniquity. And I
remember that I pressed the Jew, who was deemed a learned man, very
hard with this passage; and he, being perplexed about it, gave such an
answer as was in keeping with his Judaistic views, saying that the
words, "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: a sceptre of
righteousness is the sceptre of Thy kingdom," are spoken of the God of
all things; and these, "Thou hast loved righteousness and hated
iniquity, therefore Thy God hath anointed Thee," etc., refer to the
Messiah (Contra Celsum 1.56).

Πρόσχες δ' ἐπιμελῶς τοῖς ἑξῆς, ἔνθα θεὸς εἴρηται· «Ὁ θρόνος σου», γάρ φησιν, «ὁ θεός, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος, ῥάβδος εὐθύτητος ἡ ῥάβδος τῆς βασιλείας σου. Ἠγάπησας δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἐμίσησας ἀνομίαν· διὰ τοῦτο ἔχρισέ σε ὁ θεὸς ὁ θεός σου ἔλαιον ἀγαλλιάσεως παρὰ τοὺς μετόχους σου.» Καὶ κατανόει ὅτι θεῷ ὁμιλῶν ὁ προφήτης, οὗ «ὁ θρόνος» ἐστὶν «εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος», καὶ «ῥάβδος εὐθύτητος ἡ ῥάβδος τῆς βασιλείας» αὐτοῦ, τοῦτον τὸν θεόν φησι κεχρῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃς ἦν αὐτοῦ θεός· κεχρῖσθαι δέ, ἐπεὶ «παρὰ τοὺς μετόχους» αὐτοῦ οὗτος ἠγάπησε «δικαιοσύνην» καὶ ἐμίσησεν «ἀνομίαν». Καὶ μέμνημαί γε πάνυ θλίψας τὸν Ἰουδαῖον νομιζόμενον σοφὸν ἐκ τῆς λέξεως ταύτης· ὃς πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀπορῶν εἰπεῖν τὰ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἰουδαϊσμῷ ἀκόλουθα, εἶπε πρὸς μὲν τὸν τῶν ὅλων θεὸν εἰρῆσθαι τὸ «Ὁ θρόνος σου, ὁ θεός, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος, ῥάβδος εὐθύτητος ἡ ῥάβδος τῆς βασιλείας σου», πρὸς δὲ τὸν Χριστὸν τὸ «Ἠγάπησας δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἐμίσησας ἀνομίαν· διὰ τοῦτο ἔχρισέ σε ὁ θεὸς ὁ θεός σου» καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς.]

See http://khazarzar.skeptik.net/books/origenes/cc/gr/

One Supreme Being Argument from Descartes (A Reconstruction of Meditation 1, 3)

As far as I can tell, Rene Descartes makes this kind of argument in Mediation 1 of his work Meditations on First Philosophy.

1. A supremely good being does not create humans such that they are continually deceived.

2. God is a/the supremely good being.

3. God did not create humans such that they (we) are continually deceived.

4. It is possible that God would not allow humans to be deceived even occasionally. (premise)

5. However, humans are occasionally deceived. (negation of 4)

6. So either it is possible that God allows us to be deceived even occasionally or it is possible that God does not exist. (disjunctive syllogism of 4, 5)

7. Assume God does not exist (by denial of the second disjunct in 6, which is done for the sake of argument)

8. However, if God does not exist, then chance, fate, or some long causal chain of events account for my existence.

9. But these causes are clearly less perfect than God.

10. It is more likely that we are deceived if some imperfect cause accounts for our existence than if God explains our existence.

11. Therefore, it is possible that God exists and that he allows us to be deceived even occasionally.

One can then reason that if God's existence is possible, then it's actual. Descartes also makes the point that our chances of being continually deceived are greatly lessened by the existence of God, who is supremely good and perfect.

The Lake of Fire Understood as the Second Death (A Dialogue)-Part 1

[Edgar]
In fact, the lake of fire is said to represent the second death (indicating that the lake of fire is symbolic).

[Jean]
I do not know if your conclusion can be safely drawn. Scripture says about the lake of fire: "this is the second death, the lake of fire." The text does not say that the lake of fire is symbolic, though that may be the case. Nor does it say that it merely represents the second death. It says that the lake of fire is the second death. This may mean that the lake of fire as an experience is the second death. To be in the lake of fire is to experience the second death.

[Edgar]
Admittedly, the actual wording of verses like Rev. 21:8 is as follows: hO ESTIN hO QANATOS hO DEUTEROS (Cf. Rev. 20:14b). But ESTIN can carry the meaning "represents" or "signifies" as it does elsewhere in Scripture (Matt. 13:38). In fact, the very first passage found in Revelation indicates that the book is filled with symbolisms. As John reports: KAI ESHMANEN APOSTEILAS DIA TOU AGGELOU AUTOU TWi DOULWi AUTOU IWANNHi.

The verb SHMAINEIN can mean "to indicate clearly" (Louw-Nida) or more likely in this context, it conveys the thought, 'to communicate a message that is enigmatic in nature and difficult to interpret' (Aune, Revelation, Volume 52A:15). So ESTIN in Rev. 21:8 could mean "represents." Therefore, based on Rev. 1:1, the lake of fire may very well be symbolic. In view of other Scriptures concerning the eschaton, it would be fitting if the lake of fire served as a symbol of everlasting annihilation (2 Thess. 1:9).

[Edgar Continued]
Furthermore, death and hell are cast into the lake of fire along with Satan and the wild beast and the false prophet (Rev. 20:13-15). Do you think that death and hell and Satan and the wild beast and the false prophet will literally be tormented day and night for all eternity in the lake of fire?

[Jean]
When Scripture says that death and hades are thrown into the lake of fire, the meaning is difficult to grasp. It seems to be saying that there will be no more death and hades, since their conditions will be supplanted by the lake of fire. Yes, I think that Satan, the beast, the false prophet, and those who are thrown into the lake of fire will be tormented day and night for all eternity.

[Edgar]
I think you rightly admit that abstractions like death and places such as hades cannot be tormented or experience the second death in a literal way. Why, then, do you think that Satan or the beast (evidently a symbolic creature) or the "false prophet" (another symbolic entity) will undergo literal toments in an everlasting fire? Heb. 2:14, 15 indicates that the Devil will be annihilated or brought to nothing? How do you understand or interpret 2:14, 15?

Followup on Aquinas, the Trinity, and Divine Personhood

This entry is mainly addressed to David Waltz. Thanks for your interaction on this issue, David.

1) After reviewing a number of things written by Aquinas, wherein he explains in what sense the Father is greater than the Son, I have concluded that it's possible to interpret the taciturn Doctor in different ways. I understand Aquinas' application of John 14:28 to the human nature of Christ; others believe he applies the verse to both the divine and human nature of Christ, whereas yet others understand Aquinas to be saying that John 14:28 might apply to both natures.

In any event, another statement from Aquinas is found in Contra Errores Graecorum, Part One, Chapter II.:

But when Basil asserts that the Spirit is second from the Son in dignity, he appears more seriously mistaken, because he seems to posit degrees of dignity in the Trinity, whereas all three persons are equal in dignity. This statement, however, can be explained as referring, not to natural, but to personal dignity in God, just as we say that “a person is a hypostasis in virtue of a distinct property entailing dignity.” Footnote Hilary adopts this manner of speaking when he says Footnote that the Father is greater than the Son by reason of authority of origin. But by reason of oneness in substance the Son is not thereby less than the Father.

See http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/ContraErrGraecorum.htm

I would also suggest my own revised M.Th. thesis (my book about Tertullian), which contains a discussion of the pre-Nicenes and John 14:28.

2) Aquinas analyzes "person" language as well as cause and effect statements about God. See Part One, Chapter I of Contra Errores.

3) For Aquinas' definition of person, please see http://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2015/04/the-trinity-doctrine-and-personhood-my.html

The Catholic Encyclopedia contains a utile article on divine personhood too. That article can be found online for the older version of the encyclopedia.

For another discussion on the western view of divine personhood, see http://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2015/10/karl-rahner-on-trinity-qua-relations.html

Another Trinititarian Perspective on John 14:28 (Thomas Manton)

Though God be Christ’s Father, as second Person, yet they are all equal in power, dignity, and glory; 41but as Mediator, God is his Father in another respect. So it is said, John xiv. 28, ‘My Father is greater than I’—not as God, for so he was equal; ‘He thought it no robbery to be equal with God:’ Phil. ii. 6. But ‘greater than I;’ that is, consider him as man and mediator, in the state of his humiliation; for it is notable to consider upon what occasion Christ speaks these words: ‘If ye love me ye would rejoice because I said I go unto the Father; for my Father is greater than I;’ that is, You admire me and prize my company exceedingly, because you see the power which I put forth in the miracles which I do; ye would rejoice if you understood it aright; he is infinitely more glorious than I appear in this state of abasement and humiliation. Thus, with respect to Christ, God, the first Person, may be called the Father.

See http://www.ccel.org/ccel/manton/manton01.i_3.html#i_3-p21.2 for the context of this quote.

For some historical background on Manton, see http://www.ccel.org/ccel/manton

Aquinas and the Soul (Summa Theologiae I.75.2-4)

In the Summa Theologiae or Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas outlines distinct senses for the noun phrase "subsistent thing" (i.e., this particular thing). I guess that ST I.75.2, Reply to Obj. 1 touches on the question I used to have when reading Aquinas. He there maintains that "this particular thing" can be understood in two senses: a) "for anything subsistent" and b)"for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific nature." The soul (according to Aquinas) is "this particular thing" in the first sense, but evidently not in the second. So he does not conceive of the soul as subsisting in a Cartesian manner. Descartes memorably refers to himself as a "thinking thing" (res cogitans) yet it doesn't seem that Aquinas would identify the person with the soul like the French Catholic Descartes does.

Kevin Corcoran parses the topic in Rethinking Human Nature: "Here is one way to mark the difference between Aquinas and Descartes. In both views, there are two 'things.' In Descartes' view, the two things are complete substances (soul and body). In Aquinas' view, there are two incomplete substances (soul and matter) that jointly compose a complete substance (a human being)." See Corcoran, page 38.

This observation is based on ST I.75.4: "Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human species."

Question of the Day for Trinitarians

My question of the day for Trinitarians:

Some Trinitarians believe that God the Son voluntarily submitted himself to God the Father when he became incarnate or when he assumed humanity, even though he was divine.

But my question stems from the fact that the triune deity is supposed to be three persons, but only one God. Trinitarians usually say that "person" (persona in Latin) does not mean "individual center of consciousness" when applied to God. In other words, God (the triune deity) is only analogously a person, but not univocally a person. God is not a person like we are persons, they say.

However, if it's true that neither person of the Trinity is a distinct or individual center of consciousness, then how was it possible for the Son to "volunteer" to become subordinate to the Father, and assume humanity into his divinity? Would it not take consciousness for person 2 to submit to person 1? How could the Son submit to the Father if he's not a distinct mind from his Father?

Wallace, Sharp's Rule, and Jude 4 (Some Quotes)

See https://bible.org/article/sharp-redivivus-reexamination-granville-sharp-rule

Begin Quotes:

Sharp invoked dubious textual variants in four of the eight texts to support his rule (Acts 20:28; 1 Tim 5:21; 2 Tim 4:1; Jude 4).151 As well, in 1 Tim 5:21 and 2 Tim 4:1, if the almost certainly authentic reading of τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ ᾿Ιησοῦ (for τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου Χριστοῦ ᾿Ιησοῦ) is accepted, then the text can also be dispensed with, for “Christ Jesus” is surely a proper name, and thus does not fall within the limitations of Sharp’s rule. Further, two other passages seem to involve proper names. Second Thessalonians 1:12 does not have merely “Lord” in the equation, but “Lord Jesus Christ.” Only by detaching κυρίου from ᾿Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ152 could one apply Sharp’s rule to this construction.153 Ephesians 5:5 has the name “Christ” in the equation, though one would be hard-pressed to view this as less than a proper name in the epistles.154

This leaves two passages, Titus 2:13 and 2 Pet 1:1, which have escaped the difficulties of textual uncertainty155 and the charge of disqualification via proper names.156 If indeed these texts contain explicit statements of Christ’s deity, it is not without significance that they occur in epistles which are among the later books of the NT. Before we can explore more fully these texts, it is necessary to expand our horizons on the legitimacy of Sharp’s principle. That is to say, two other factors directly related to these passages should be addressed.157

Also from footnote 151 of Wallace's article:

In Jude 4 the variant θεός is found in P, Ψ, and the majority text; it is absent from ∏72, ∏78, א, A, B, C, 0251, 33, 81, 1739, al. (Without this v.l., the text still fits Sharp’s canon [τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν ᾿Ιησοῦν Χριστόν], though lacking an explicit identification of Christ with God.)

John 1:1ff (A Work in Progress)

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος (John 1:1)

So many writers have commented on the Johannine Prologue that it seems like there's nothing new to say about it. I'll mainly be exploring syntax, grammar, and reviewing what others have written about this famed part of the Fourth Gospel. I will also be progressively working on this document and adding to this entry periodically.

The first part of the verse Ἐν ἀρχῇ (the Greek preposition + the dative form) is usually understood to be definite ("in the beginning") and scholars argue that the words allude to Genesis 1:1. One of the most recent articles on the subject is by Jan Van der Watt and Chrys Caragounis. See http://www.bsw.org/filologia-neotestamentaria/vol-21-2008/a-grammatical-analysis-of-john-1-1/525/

These authors focus on why one could possibly claim that the anarthrous phrase Ἐν ἀρχῇ is definite rather than indefinite. Why not "in a beginning"?

In order to answer this question, Van der Watt and Caragounis first review what other scholars have written concerning the rationale for treating the anarthous construction in John 1:1a as definite. They quote Greek grammars and scholarly writings that give various reasons for deciding that the verse should be understood as "in the beginning." Some argue that the construction contains a monadic noun, whereas others argue that the phrase is anarthrous because of the preposition which it contains. However, after reviewing even more explanations, both authors of the journal article find their predecessors' reasons for choosing "the beginning" to be somewhat wanting. See Van der Watt and Caragounis, pages 95-97.

Caragounis and Van der Watt think "in a beginning" is nonsense. Furthermore, they argue that Ἐν ἀρχῇ can mean the same thing with or without the article, and they contend that Demotic Neohellenic allows for the construction to be definite (99-100).

Andreas Kostenberger considers intertexual factors when explaining 1:1a. He believes that John is repeating Genesis 1:1--a text that seems to speak of the absolute beginning. He reasons that the Fourth Gospel's opening words forge "a canonical link between the first words of the OT Scriptures and the present Gospel" (John, page 25). He cites four Johannine scholars, besides himself, who all favor viewing "beginning" at 1:1a as a time before the divine creation of heaven and earth (Ibid.). Possibly, John might also have meant by using Ἐν ἀρχῇ, "at the root of the universe," another meaning suggested by Morris. See Kostenberger, ibid.

Henry Alford takes this perspective on 1:1a: "ἐν ἀρχῇ = πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, ch. 17:5. The expression is indefinite, and must be interpreted relatively to the matter spoken of. Thus in Acts 11:15, it is ‘the beginning of the Gospel:’ and by the same principle of interpretation, here it is the beginning of all things, on account of the πάντα διʼ αὐτ. ἐγ. ver. 3." See http://biblehub.com/commentaries/alford/john/1.htm

While E. Haenchen links the ἀρχῇ of John 1:1, 2 with Gen. 1:1 (LXX) like G.R.Beasley-Murray does, it seems that one must analyze both the context of the passage under consideration and the semantic domain of ἀρχή, before one firmly decides that ἀρχῇ in Gen. 1:1 is the same as ἀρχῇ in John 1:1, 2.

The verb ἦν (imperfect active indicative 3rd person singular) appears three times in 1:1, but each occurrence signifies something different:

"Was [ἦν]: this verb is used three times with different meanings in this verse: existence, relationship, and predication" (Ftn. NABRE John 1:1).

So John apparently meant that the Word (ὁ λόγος) existed "in the beginning" (Ἐν ἀρχῇ) although this part of the verse raises numerous questions.

Some years ago, a person with whom I was conversing tried to argue that ἀρχῇ in John 1:1a is timeless and dimensionless because the word is anarthrous there. But what grammatical evidence do we have that ἀρχῇ, when employed anarthrously within a context like this one, has a special or unique lexical import? I don't know how you feel about the issue of Johannine authorship, but I personally believe that the apostle John wrote both the Gospels and the three Epistles. If this is so, the opening verses of the first Epistle shed illumination on the Prologue of Jn 1.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος (John 1:1).

Ὃ ἦν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, ὃ ἀκηκόαμεν, ὃ ἑωράκαμεν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν, ὃ ἐθεασάμεθα καὶ αἱ χεῖρες ἡμῶν ἐψηλάφησαν, περὶ τοῦ Λόγου τῆς ζωῆς (1 John 1:1).

Please notice that ἀρχῆς in the first Epistle is also anarthrous. Yet there is no indication that the writer is employing ἀρχῆς in a timeless--from a human viewpoint--sense. He goes to great lengths to locate the ἀρχῆς within history (within time). "From the beginning," the disciples "heard" "saw" "looked upon" and "handled" τοῦ Λόγου τῆς ζωῆς. There is no indication of a dimensionless ἀρχή in the Johannine Epistle. This seems significant in view of the fact that ἀρχή here [Jn 1:1a] is also anarthrous. Of course, my argument relies heavily on a literary nexus between the Johannine Gospel and Epistles, but even if different writers composed these Scriptural works, 1 John 1:1 still serves as an example of an anarthrous ἀρχή that is manifestly historical.

The same could also be said for John 1:1:

Louw-Nida says that ἀρχή (the lexical form) may denote "a point of time at the beginning of a duration." This reference work also says the following: "ἀρχή: Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος 'in the beginning was the Word' or 'before the world was created, the Word (already) existed' or 'at a time in the past when there was nothing . . . ' Jn 1:1" (67.65).

While not giving total assent to L-N here, one point I would like to stress is that ἀρχή can simply refer to "a point of time at the beginning of a duration." With that thought in mind, personally, I do not think that John clearly defines what the "beginning" denotes in 1:1, 2. Most commentators would probably be inclined to associate Gen. 1:1 with John 1:1 because of the creation setting in both accounts. Surely 1 John 1:1 does not help us much here when it declares that Ὃ ἦν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς. ἀρχή in 1 John 1:1 undoubtedly refers to the "beginning" of Jesus' ministry, not to any "absolute beginning." But there is another route we can take, which may clear up what "the beginning" signifies in 1:1, 2. Since οὗτος serves as a deictic reference at John 1:2, one may humbly submit that John appears to be emphasizing what he has already stated in 1:1.

Jude 4: τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν

In Jude 4, we read that Jesus Christ (I am aware of variant readings and interpretations) is "our only Owner and Lord" (τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ).

If Jesus is the only referent discussed in this passage, then Jude's use of "only" may prima facie be slightly problematic since (as subordinationists generally understand the matter) Jesus is not the "only" Lord (strictly speaking) for Christians.

Assuming a subordinationist understanding of matters, I would like to ask whether the word "only" excludes others from serving as lords for Christian followers of Jesus. In other words, does μόνον have to mean that there is no other Lord for the Christian congregation but Jesus Christ? The question is understandable in light of what Revelation 15:4 says about God:

τίς οὐ μὴ φοβηθῇ, κύριε, καὶ δοξάσει τὸ ὄνομά σου, ὅτι μόνος ὅσιος

Yet we also read that an "overseer" (τὸν ἐπίσκοπον) must be ὅσιον (Tit 1:8). Furthermore, Christians are exhorted to lift up "holy hands" (ὁσίους χεῖρας) in prayer to God (1 Ti 2:8).

So the doxological exclamation μόνος ὅσιος (in Rev 15:4) does not mean that others cannot be ὅσιος or live ἐν ὁσιότητι καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ (Luke 1:75). In fact, we are called to be holy as God is holy.

For the record, one dictionary defines the English word "only" in this way (obviously depending on the context):

"unquestionably the best--PEERLESS; alone in its class
or kind: SOLE "

So is Christ the only Lord for Christians? Not according to Psalm 110:1-2 and Acts 2:36. The latter verse teaches that God the Father made Christ the Lord of Christians, but the Father is the ultimate Lord (LORD) of all. The KJV renders the Hebrew letters YHWH (Yahweh or Jehovah) as LORD in Psalm 110:1 and throughout the Hebrew Bible.

Catholic View of the Soul

The online Catholic Encyclopedia makes this point regarding the soul:

"the rational soul, which is one with the sensitive and vegetative principle, is the form of the body. This was defined as of faith by the Council of Vienne of 1311; the soul is a substance, but an incomplete substance, i.e. it has a natural aptitude and exigency for existence in the body, in conjunction with which it makes up the substantial unity of human nature."

I emphasize that the Church believes the soul is a substance, but not a complete one, which is contrary to the Cartesian conception of the soul. Rene Descartes (although he was a devout Catholic) posited that the soul is a complete but dependent substance: it is a res cogitans which is nonextended spatially and able to survive the body's death in virtue of its latent immortality.

However, the language of "form" used above emanates from Aristotelian philosophy--specifically, the ancient Philosopher's thinking on metaphysics.

One Suggestion for the Magnificat (Luke 1:46): Biblical Poetry

The "Magnificat" is evidently styled along the lines of 1 Samuel (chapter 2), which contains the prayer of Hannah. So it is no surprise that it would be linked with LXX-style poetry. Craig A. Evans observes in one commentary:

"The Magnificat reads more like a warrior's song of
victory than that of a young maiden praising God for
the gift of a child. Accordingly, it has been
suggested that underlying the Magnificat is an early
Christian hymn praising God for vindicating Jesus
through his resurrection. This is possible, but again
it is quite speculative, for there is no mention of
Jesus or the resurrection. More probably the
Magnificat represents an early Christian hymn, thought
to derive from Mary, that has been enriched by
components reflecting Israel's psalms of military
celebration. Consider the following scriptural
allusions:

My soul glorifies [or magnifies] the Lord: 1 Sam. 2:1;
Ps. 69:30; 34:3; 35:9; Sir 43:31" (Luke, p. 29)."

Reflecting on the Greek notion of "poet-craft," R.G. Collingwood explains ποιητική τέχνη in this way:

"The poet is a kind of skilled producer; he produces
for consumers; and the effect of his skill is to bring
about in them certain states of mind, which are
conceived in advance as desirable states" (The
Principles of Art, p. 18).

While not everything that Collingwood says is applicable to biblical poetry, one can't help but notice the powerful effect that scriptural poetry has on its readers.

Persons and Points (Trinity Doctrine): A Thought Experiment

Imagine a straight line with three points (A, B, and C) plotted on it. Let A = the Father, B = the Son, and C = the Holy Spirit. In that case, we would have three points (with zero-dimension) that are distinct and collinear, but each point would still have something in common with the other; namely, they are all points (they all exemplify pointness) on a straight line, yet each point is distinct from the other. Would it be possible to illustrate the Trinity doctrine by using this geometrical example?

I've never seen anyone use geometrical points to illustrate the Trinity, but maybe someone who lives somewhere has done it. Thanks to Euclid and his successors. I'm just toying with possible arguments that Trinitarians might use.

After completing this post, I did find (via Google):

http://www.jstor.org/stable/685386?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/2004/PSCF6-04Williams.pdf

(A very complex article)

Jerome's Prologue to the Book of Daniel (A Quote)

Concerning which subject, leaving the judgment to the decision of the reader, I warn him Daniel is not to be found in the Prophets among the Hebrews, but among those which they titled the Hagiographa. Since indeed all of Scripture is divided by them into three parts, into the Law, into the Prophets, (and) into the Hagiographa, that is, into five and eight and eleven books, which is not (necessary) to explain at this time. And to those things of this prophet, or rather against this book, which Porphyry accused, the witnesses are Methodius, Eusebius, (and) Apollinaris, who, responding to his madness with many thousands of verses, I do not know whether they are satisfying to the interested reader. For which reason I entreat you, O Paula and Eustochium, pour out prayers for me to the Lord, so that as long as I am in this little body, I might write something pleasing to you, useful to the Church, (and) worthy to posterity. I am indeed not greatly moved by the judgments of the present, which on either side are in error either by love or by hate.

You can find the complete Prologue here: http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/jerome_preface_daniel.htm