Granted, all of God's intelligent creatures ascribe blessing, honor, glory and power to the Lamb (the Son of God) in Revelation. But such glory and honor is imputed to him within a context where, as the Lamb qua Lamb, he approaches the throne of God and "takes" a scroll from the hand of the Father, thus proving himself worthy (after conquering this world) to open the seven seals of the scroll since he bought persons for God out of every tribe, tongue and nation (Rev. 5:8-10).
The context is one of kingly investiture: the Lamb is honored and glorified because he is God's appointed King. Just as Jehovah's ancient people performed divinely approved acts of obeisance to God and the Judean King (1 Chronicles 29:20), so all of God's intelligent creatures honor the One upon whom YHWH has bestowed honor, glory, might and power (Heb. 2:7-9). See also Dan. 2:37 (LXX) for a similar ascription of praise to a ruler whose kingship is said to have been derived from God's sovereignty or permissive will, as it were; notice, however, that John never explicitly tells us the Lamb is worshiped. After noting that the Christusbild constructed of the Lamb in Rev. 5:13-14 "almost approaches deity," P.M. Casey provides these enlightening comments:
"This is almost heavenly worship, but it does not have to be perceived as such. Here, as always, the lamb is carefully distinguished from God, and he is not said to be divine. He does have other exalted functions. It is as a lamb that Jesus is victorious over the kings of the earth (17.14), and he shepherds the victorious martyrs (7.17) . . . Yet God is precisely what this figure is not, and this illustrates the social nature of the restraining factor of monotheism" (P.M. Casey, From Jewish Prophet to Gentile God, page 142).
Jn. 17:5 certainly does not teach that the Son shares the Father's glory; rather, Christ subsisted alongside the Father in a state of matchless glory prior to becoming flesh. The Gospel of John, as is the case with the book of Revelation, limits "worship" in the strong and proper sense to God the Father alone:
"The four and twenty elders fall down before him that sat on the throne, and worship him that liveth for ever and ever, and cast their crowns before the throne, saying, Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created" (Rev. 4:10-11).
Some textual variants (as found in the TR) actually read ZWNTI EIS TOUS AIWNAS TWN AIWNWN in Rev. 5:14, thereby pointing to the Father as the rightful object of reverence, devotion, adoration and praise. Even if this is a scribal addition, it is solidly based on texts such as Rev. 4:9-11; 10:6; 15:7. See also Rev. 11:15-17; 15:4; 19:4.
Thursday, September 03, 2015
Wednesday, September 02, 2015
Articles in Irish Biblical Studies
It seems that the journal Irish Biblical Studies is going to make all of its past articles available online, pending the authorization of its writers. See http://polumeros.blogspot.com/2015/09/rob-bradshaw-has-announced-that-irish.html
Monday, August 31, 2015
2 Corinthians 4:3-4 (The Referent?)
A reader has asked me to watch a video, then offer some comments on it. My time is tight now. But I did view this video and might have some thoughts prepared by Wednesday. I've heard the argument before that Satan is not the referewnt of 2 Cor 4:4, but it's really God (Jehovah).
Personally, I don't have strong feelings about the issue, but my current position is that Satan is being discussed in this context. Yet I want to weigh and present evidence for what I say. So I post the YT link for now and will let my readers decide if this subject interests them.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0lu_-JyhAtw
Personally, I don't have strong feelings about the issue, but my current position is that Satan is being discussed in this context. Yet I want to weigh and present evidence for what I say. So I post the YT link for now and will let my readers decide if this subject interests them.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0lu_-JyhAtw
Metaphoric Language for the Divine (the Son's Birth and Kingly Rule)
I want to avoid undue speculation here, but it's possible that events which Scripture reports transpiring in the spirit realm are usually metaphorically tinged. I desire to avoid the position, however, that says one can never speak literally about God. Nevertheless, when Jehovah "speaks" to His spirit sons while convening the heavenly council, which is reported in 1 Kings 22:19-23, the description probably should not be taken literally. In other words, God cannot have a voice in the same way that humans have voices since "He" is not human (Num. 23:19), lacks a larynyx (etc.) and there is evidently no way for sound waves to travel in the spirit realm because it is more than likely devoid of matter or atmospheric conditions which makes vocal sounds possible. John Sanders also seems to make an excellent point when he notes:
"When God is said to be a husband, father and friend, these metaphors depend on the reality of God's being a personal agent" (The God Who Risks, page 26).
The point I want to extract from Sander's comment is that when the Bible speaks about God being a husband, father or friend, it is employing metaphorical language. God doesn't literally have a wife and He is not a friend to me in the same way that my human friends are. The same principle applies to my relationship with Jehovah as Father or when it comes to His relationship with Jerusalem above (Gal. 4:26)--his figurative wife.
Having said the foregoing, however, I want to make it clear that I think it is still possible to speak literally (i.e., non-metaphorically) about certain spiritual realities. A medieval thinker named Duns Scotus set forth the possibility that we can speak univocally about God and creatures. The late William Alston did work in our time on this same question.
One example of metaphorical uses in Scripture might be Col. 1:15. PRWTOTOKOS is possibly a metaphor that is not to be construed literally: (1) For according to Scripture, Christ was not really born, but he was created since John calls him, the ARXH THS KTISEWS (Rev. 3:14). The term "born" (and its derivatives or cognates) is used metaphorically in the Hebrew Scriptures to describe the divine act of bringing forth a contingent entity. Ps. 90:2 refers to the "birth" of mountains actually created by God. Isa. 66:7-8 depicts Zion giving birth to sons and a land in one day. But the context shows that God is the one who causes Zion to bring forth sons in a figurative sense. He too produces the land spoken of in this verse in that He is responsible for the repatriation of Judah and causes her to teem. By returning Judah to her homeland, God "creates" a new heaven and a new earth (Isa. 65:17ff). However, the prophet also employs birth language to delineate this event.
BDB Hebrew and English Lexicon likewise shows that God figuratively becomes a Father to the Son in that He installs His anointed one upon Zion, His holy mountain (Ps. 2:7). Even in its Messianic sense, the term "Son" in the second psalm only has reference to the king's function; it does not convey the thought of a divine generatio but rather "an investiture with royal dignity." Artur Weiser points out that the OT rejects the notion of God literally procreating a kingly human son (Ps. 89:26). The psalmist, he observes, excludes the view of God physically generating the Israelite king by employing the word "today" and the familiar adoption formula "you are my son" in connection with the generative language of Ps. 2:7. The King consequently becomes God's Son through the process of enthronement. He is thus YHWH's vice-regent and figurative royal offspring; the language in the second psalm turns out to be metaphorical.
"When God is said to be a husband, father and friend, these metaphors depend on the reality of God's being a personal agent" (The God Who Risks, page 26).
The point I want to extract from Sander's comment is that when the Bible speaks about God being a husband, father or friend, it is employing metaphorical language. God doesn't literally have a wife and He is not a friend to me in the same way that my human friends are. The same principle applies to my relationship with Jehovah as Father or when it comes to His relationship with Jerusalem above (Gal. 4:26)--his figurative wife.
Having said the foregoing, however, I want to make it clear that I think it is still possible to speak literally (i.e., non-metaphorically) about certain spiritual realities. A medieval thinker named Duns Scotus set forth the possibility that we can speak univocally about God and creatures. The late William Alston did work in our time on this same question.
One example of metaphorical uses in Scripture might be Col. 1:15. PRWTOTOKOS is possibly a metaphor that is not to be construed literally: (1) For according to Scripture, Christ was not really born, but he was created since John calls him, the ARXH THS KTISEWS (Rev. 3:14). The term "born" (and its derivatives or cognates) is used metaphorically in the Hebrew Scriptures to describe the divine act of bringing forth a contingent entity. Ps. 90:2 refers to the "birth" of mountains actually created by God. Isa. 66:7-8 depicts Zion giving birth to sons and a land in one day. But the context shows that God is the one who causes Zion to bring forth sons in a figurative sense. He too produces the land spoken of in this verse in that He is responsible for the repatriation of Judah and causes her to teem. By returning Judah to her homeland, God "creates" a new heaven and a new earth (Isa. 65:17ff). However, the prophet also employs birth language to delineate this event.
BDB Hebrew and English Lexicon likewise shows that God figuratively becomes a Father to the Son in that He installs His anointed one upon Zion, His holy mountain (Ps. 2:7). Even in its Messianic sense, the term "Son" in the second psalm only has reference to the king's function; it does not convey the thought of a divine generatio but rather "an investiture with royal dignity." Artur Weiser points out that the OT rejects the notion of God literally procreating a kingly human son (Ps. 89:26). The psalmist, he observes, excludes the view of God physically generating the Israelite king by employing the word "today" and the familiar adoption formula "you are my son" in connection with the generative language of Ps. 2:7. The King consequently becomes God's Son through the process of enthronement. He is thus YHWH's vice-regent and figurative royal offspring; the language in the second psalm turns out to be metaphorical.
Sunday, August 30, 2015
Hypothetical Syllogism Regarding the Trinity (Falsifiability)
1) If the Trinity doctrine can neither be proved nor disproved, then it is not falsifiable.
2) If the Trinity doctrine is not falsifiable, then it is neither true nor false.
3) Therefore, if the Trinity doctrine can neither be proved nor disproved, then it is neither true nor false.
Proof here refers to rational argumentation (a logical demonstration) as opposed to proving the doctrine from biblical texts or from creation, although reasoning is also used when one attempts to make a case from scripture for one doctrine or another.
Karl Popper is known for advocating falsification when it comes to scientific hypotheses. He evidently thought: "The adherents of a pseudo-science are able to cling to its hypotheses no matter how events turn out, because the hypotheses are not testable." So if the Trinity doctrine is not logically testable or falsifiable, that would seem to make us question its overall truth-value or its claims pertaining to deity.
2) If the Trinity doctrine is not falsifiable, then it is neither true nor false.
3) Therefore, if the Trinity doctrine can neither be proved nor disproved, then it is neither true nor false.
Proof here refers to rational argumentation (a logical demonstration) as opposed to proving the doctrine from biblical texts or from creation, although reasoning is also used when one attempts to make a case from scripture for one doctrine or another.
Karl Popper is known for advocating falsification when it comes to scientific hypotheses. He evidently thought: "The adherents of a pseudo-science are able to cling to its hypotheses no matter how events turn out, because the hypotheses are not testable." So if the Trinity doctrine is not logically testable or falsifiable, that would seem to make us question its overall truth-value or its claims pertaining to deity.
Saturday, August 29, 2015
2 Corinthians 5:19 (V.P. Furnish's Commentary)
I found a valuable discussion of 2 Corinthians 5:19 in V.P. Furnish's Anchor Bible Commentary on 2 Corinthians. The discussion spans about three pages (pp. 317-319), so I will merely sum up some of the main points here.
ὡς ὅτι: The Latin Vulgate gives this phrase a causal sense, treating it like ὅτι. It renders ὡς ὅτι as QUONIAM QUIDEM ("since" or "because").
Others think that ὡς ὅτι (in 2 Cor. 5:19) is epexegetical and that it should be rendered "namely that" or "that is."
Kasemann construes the ὡς in this passage as transitional: he thinks that ὅτι introduces a quotation. Furnish concurs and therefore suggests the translation for ὡς ὅτι: "As it is said."
Concerning θεὸς ἦν ἐν Χριστῷ κόσμον καταλλάσσων ἑαυτῷ, Furnish makes the following points:
(1) One may read the verb ἦν independently of the participle ("God was in Christ, reconciling").
(2) The construction in 2 Cor. 5:19 could be periphrastic.
(3) θεὸς could be a predicate nominative rather than the subject of the verb ἦν.
Furnish prefers (2) and translates thus: "God, in Christ, was reconciling."
He sets his rendering off by commas "to make it clear that 'God-in-Christ' is not intended as an incarnational formula here [in 2 Cor. 5:19]. Nor does the phrase in Christ have the full eschatological meaning present in v. 17. Rather, as observed already by Chrysostom (NPNF, 1st Ser. XII:333), it is equivalent to through Christ in v. 18" (Furnish 318).
There is much more, so I encourage you to reference Furnish's treatment of 2 Cor 5:19ff.
ὡς ὅτι: The Latin Vulgate gives this phrase a causal sense, treating it like ὅτι. It renders ὡς ὅτι as QUONIAM QUIDEM ("since" or "because").
Others think that ὡς ὅτι (in 2 Cor. 5:19) is epexegetical and that it should be rendered "namely that" or "that is."
Kasemann construes the ὡς in this passage as transitional: he thinks that ὅτι introduces a quotation. Furnish concurs and therefore suggests the translation for ὡς ὅτι: "As it is said."
Concerning θεὸς ἦν ἐν Χριστῷ κόσμον καταλλάσσων ἑαυτῷ, Furnish makes the following points:
(1) One may read the verb ἦν independently of the participle ("God was in Christ, reconciling").
(2) The construction in 2 Cor. 5:19 could be periphrastic.
(3) θεὸς could be a predicate nominative rather than the subject of the verb ἦν.
Furnish prefers (2) and translates thus: "God, in Christ, was reconciling."
He sets his rendering off by commas "to make it clear that 'God-in-Christ' is not intended as an incarnational formula here [in 2 Cor. 5:19]. Nor does the phrase in Christ have the full eschatological meaning present in v. 17. Rather, as observed already by Chrysostom (NPNF, 1st Ser. XII:333), it is equivalent to through Christ in v. 18" (Furnish 318).
There is much more, so I encourage you to reference Furnish's treatment of 2 Cor 5:19ff.
Thursday, August 27, 2015
Did the Early Scribes Corrupt the NT (Daniel Wallace Video Lecture)
See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wiWKifMu6f8
Regards,
Edgar
Wednesday, August 26, 2015
Herodotus and the Greek Word γενέσθαι (for Sean)
ἀπικόμην δὲ καὶ ἐς Θάσον, ἐν τῇ εὗρον ἱρὸν Ἡρακλέος ὑπὸ Φοινίκων ἱδρυμένον, οἳ κατ᾽ Εὐρώπης ζήτησιν ἐκπλώσαντες Θάσον ἔκτισαν: καὶ ταῦτα καὶ πέντε γενεῇσι ἀνδρῶν πρότερα ἐστὶ ἢ τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος Ἡρακλέα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι γενέσθαι. (The Histories 2.44.4)
Then I went to Thasos, too, where I found a temple of Heracles built by the Phoenicians, who made a settlement there when they voyaged in search of Europe; now they did so as much as five generations before the birth of Heracles the son of Amphitryon in Hellas. (A.D. Godley translation, 1920)
See Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.21.147.
Picture courtesy of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Herodotos_Met_91.8.jpg
In the public domain.
Then I went to Thasos, too, where I found a temple of Heracles built by the Phoenicians, who made a settlement there when they voyaged in search of Europe; now they did so as much as five generations before the birth of Heracles the son of Amphitryon in Hellas. (A.D. Godley translation, 1920)
See Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.21.147.
Picture courtesy of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Herodotos_Met_91.8.jpg
In the public domain.
Tuesday, August 25, 2015
Theocentrism in Revelation (Revelation 11:15ff)
"The seventh angel blew his trumpet, and there were loud voices in heaven saying: The kingdom of the world has become the kingdom of our Lord and of His Messiah, and He will reign forever and ever!" (Holman Christian Standard Bible)
The "He" who will reign forever and ever is God the Father. He is the "Lord God Almighty" mentioned above. Compare Revelation 1:4-8; 11:6-17.
"The radical theocentrism of John's revelation is not heard more clearly than here. The antecedent of he will reign for ever and ever is God rather than either Christ or both God and Christ" (Robert W. Wall, Revelation, page 153).
The "He" who will reign forever and ever is God the Father. He is the "Lord God Almighty" mentioned above. Compare Revelation 1:4-8; 11:6-17.
"The radical theocentrism of John's revelation is not heard more clearly than here. The antecedent of he will reign for ever and ever is God rather than either Christ or both God and Christ" (Robert W. Wall, Revelation, page 153).
Sunday, August 23, 2015
Demas (2 Timothy 4:10)
In 2 Timothy 4:10, Paul tells Timothy that Demas forsook him because Demas "loved the present age." Just exactly what this phrase means has been hotly debated. Gordon Fee writes that apostasy is signified by the phrase AGAPHSAS TON NUN AIWNA (1 & 2 Timothy, Titus [New International Biblical Commentary], Page 299).
Yet Thomas D. Lea avers: "Paul's words [in 2 Tim. 4:10] did not picture him [Demas] as an utter apostate but reflected disappointment at his self-interest" (1 & 2 Timothy, Titus [New American Commentary], Page 252).
My question: does the use of AGAPH here or anything contained in the syntax of this Pauline account suggest that Demas was an apostate? Or could it be that he simply left off sharing in Paul's ministry, which shows something about his spiritual state, but does not mean he became an apostate? Lastly, if Demas was "saved" and did in fact defect from the apostle and (more importantly) the Lord Jesus Christ--it would seem that a genuine Christian can apostatize after experiencing God's unparalleled XARIS.
Yet Thomas D. Lea avers: "Paul's words [in 2 Tim. 4:10] did not picture him [Demas] as an utter apostate but reflected disappointment at his self-interest" (1 & 2 Timothy, Titus [New American Commentary], Page 252).
My question: does the use of AGAPH here or anything contained in the syntax of this Pauline account suggest that Demas was an apostate? Or could it be that he simply left off sharing in Paul's ministry, which shows something about his spiritual state, but does not mean he became an apostate? Lastly, if Demas was "saved" and did in fact defect from the apostle and (more importantly) the Lord Jesus Christ--it would seem that a genuine Christian can apostatize after experiencing God's unparalleled XARIS.
Saturday, August 22, 2015
Epiphanius
1 John 5:21 reads: Τεκνία, φυλάξατε ἑαυτὰ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδώλων.
The ancient Christians (first century) diligently endeavored to uphold this basic tenet expressed in the Johannine Epistle and elsewhere in Holy Writ. But one such person who later claimed to be a follower of Christ was Epiphanius of Salamis: he is an illuminating study in early "Christian" attitudes on idolatry and his story can be found among other places in Patrology (Vol. III) by historian Johannes Quasten.
The story of Epiphanius is too lengthy to recount in detail here. Therefore, it would be wise to see Quasten's work as well as the valuable five-volume series written by the late and eminent ecclesiastical historian Jaroslav Pelikan. But I now offer a few details about Epiphanius.
He was a bishop of Constantia (Salamis), who was born circa 315 CE. Epiphanius presided forty years as bishop, during which time he vehemently waged intellectual and doctrinal warfare against Origen of Alexandria and John Chrysostom as well as those who supported Origenist "heretical" notions. Yet Epiphanius seems to be especially known for his iconoclastic stance. So shocking are some of his indictments against idols that a number of scholars have tried to prove that some works containing Epiphanius' name are really forgeries; however, such scholarly claims have been adequately rebuffed and it appears that Epiphanius truly did oppose the use of idols in the church during his fourth-century tenure (until 403 CE when he died).
Today, his views can be found in the Epistles of Epiphanius and in his treatises, and pamphlet against images. Interested ones should also consult his Letter to the Emperor Theodosius I and a work known as The Testament or A Last Will and Testament. His letter to Emperor Theodosius explicitly declares that all images should be removed from churches having them since neither Scripture nor our Lord Jesus Christ ever approved of such veneration. I think you will find his works interesting and enlightening to peruse.
Source Material: http://www.amazon.com/Patrology-4-Set-Johannes-Quasten/dp/0870611410/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1439651629&sr=1-1&keywords=9780870611414
https://www.academia.edu/1619327/_What_Did_Epiphanius_Write_to_Emperor_Theodosius_with_the_edition_of_the_text_in_an_appendix_
https://books.google.com/books?id=fyjRwj4q2j0C&pg=PA11&lpg=PA11&dq=letter+to+the+emperor+theodosius+epiphanius&source=bl&ots=iO96yVIZAC&sig=56Ikz9mPhE29x2UQFqgAj4Vg564&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CEAQ6AEwBmoVChMIlPqE79a6xwIVwT0-Ch1jQgeB#v=onepage&q=letter%20to%20the%20emperor%20theodosius%20epiphanius&f=false
The ancient Christians (first century) diligently endeavored to uphold this basic tenet expressed in the Johannine Epistle and elsewhere in Holy Writ. But one such person who later claimed to be a follower of Christ was Epiphanius of Salamis: he is an illuminating study in early "Christian" attitudes on idolatry and his story can be found among other places in Patrology (Vol. III) by historian Johannes Quasten.
The story of Epiphanius is too lengthy to recount in detail here. Therefore, it would be wise to see Quasten's work as well as the valuable five-volume series written by the late and eminent ecclesiastical historian Jaroslav Pelikan. But I now offer a few details about Epiphanius.
He was a bishop of Constantia (Salamis), who was born circa 315 CE. Epiphanius presided forty years as bishop, during which time he vehemently waged intellectual and doctrinal warfare against Origen of Alexandria and John Chrysostom as well as those who supported Origenist "heretical" notions. Yet Epiphanius seems to be especially known for his iconoclastic stance. So shocking are some of his indictments against idols that a number of scholars have tried to prove that some works containing Epiphanius' name are really forgeries; however, such scholarly claims have been adequately rebuffed and it appears that Epiphanius truly did oppose the use of idols in the church during his fourth-century tenure (until 403 CE when he died).
Today, his views can be found in the Epistles of Epiphanius and in his treatises, and pamphlet against images. Interested ones should also consult his Letter to the Emperor Theodosius I and a work known as The Testament or A Last Will and Testament. His letter to Emperor Theodosius explicitly declares that all images should be removed from churches having them since neither Scripture nor our Lord Jesus Christ ever approved of such veneration. I think you will find his works interesting and enlightening to peruse.
Source Material: http://www.amazon.com/Patrology-4-Set-Johannes-Quasten/dp/0870611410/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1439651629&sr=1-1&keywords=9780870611414
https://www.academia.edu/1619327/_What_Did_Epiphanius_Write_to_Emperor_Theodosius_with_the_edition_of_the_text_in_an_appendix_
https://books.google.com/books?id=fyjRwj4q2j0C&pg=PA11&lpg=PA11&dq=letter+to+the+emperor+theodosius+epiphanius&source=bl&ots=iO96yVIZAC&sig=56Ikz9mPhE29x2UQFqgAj4Vg564&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CEAQ6AEwBmoVChMIlPqE79a6xwIVwT0-Ch1jQgeB#v=onepage&q=letter%20to%20the%20emperor%20theodosius%20epiphanius&f=false
Wednesday, August 19, 2015
2 Corinthians 5:20 (Question from a Reader)
A blog reader has submitted an interesting query. I pose this issue to the group first before offering some thoughts myself. Thank you, brother, for reading my blog and sending this question:
READER: "Hey there Brother. I am enjoying your blogs here a lot. I am new to this site and am not sure how to contact you through a comment. If you don't mind I would like to ask you a question that has come up in the ministry. To me it really isn't an issue. A tempest in a teacup if you ask me but the question is in reference to 2 Corinthians 5:20. The NWT uses the word Substitute. Apparently this word does not appear in any other translation. I understand it to mean that the role of an ambassador is taking place of the said King or Government.
The person I am in contact with is trying to say that because of this verse we are of the opinion that the faithful and discreet slave are to be looked at as a substitutes for Christ. I have explained that the slave does not replace Christ but represent him. Do you have any thoughts as to why we have the word Substitute in the NWT while no other bible uses the word. Thanks and I certainly understand if you are too busy to answer."
READER: "Hey there Brother. I am enjoying your blogs here a lot. I am new to this site and am not sure how to contact you through a comment. If you don't mind I would like to ask you a question that has come up in the ministry. To me it really isn't an issue. A tempest in a teacup if you ask me but the question is in reference to 2 Corinthians 5:20. The NWT uses the word Substitute. Apparently this word does not appear in any other translation. I understand it to mean that the role of an ambassador is taking place of the said King or Government.
The person I am in contact with is trying to say that because of this verse we are of the opinion that the faithful and discreet slave are to be looked at as a substitutes for Christ. I have explained that the slave does not replace Christ but represent him. Do you have any thoughts as to why we have the word Substitute in the NWT while no other bible uses the word. Thanks and I certainly understand if you are too busy to answer."
Monday, August 17, 2015
Evidence Vs. Proof in Science
Karl Popper seems to make a distinction between evidence and proof in science. I am also reminded of one professor I had in undergrad studies, who said that no hypothesis can be proved in science: it can only be supported or refuted by evidence.
From http://www.loyno.edu/~folse/Popper.html
"Popper's main point is the extremely elementary logical point that if one takes the business of science as deducing observational consequences from statements of laws and theories and initial conditions, no amount of particular positive observational outcomes will ever prove (or verify) the truth of universal hypotheses or laws, for all such attempted inferences commit the well-known fallacy of affirming the consequent. However, even a single negative observational consequence allows us to validly infer that the conjunction of laws and initial conditions from which it is deduced cannot all be true."
From http://www.loyno.edu/~folse/Popper.html
"Popper's main point is the extremely elementary logical point that if one takes the business of science as deducing observational consequences from statements of laws and theories and initial conditions, no amount of particular positive observational outcomes will ever prove (or verify) the truth of universal hypotheses or laws, for all such attempted inferences commit the well-known fallacy of affirming the consequent. However, even a single negative observational consequence allows us to validly infer that the conjunction of laws and initial conditions from which it is deduced cannot all be true."
Swinburne Omniscience
"A person P is omniscient at a time t if and only if he knows of every true proposition about t or an earlier time that it is true and also he knows of every true proposition about a time later than t, such that what is [sic] reports is physically necessitated by some cause at t or earlier, that it is true. (Swinburne, 1977, 175)"
See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/eternity/
After reviewing this definition from Swinburne, I believe it only describes part of what divine omniscience might be.
See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/eternity/
After reviewing this definition from Swinburne, I believe it only describes part of what divine omniscience might be.
1 Timothy 6:15-16 (God the Father or Christ Jesus?)
[Edited for this blog]
Dear blog readers,
Someone asked me off-list about 1 Tim 6:15-16 and I want to share my thoughts on the passage with the entire group and hopefully get some input.
Most commentaries and lexicons that I have consulted say that Paul (or the writer of this epistle) is talking about God (the Father) when he speaks of the blessed and only Potentate (DUNASTHS). But I currently take the position that 1 Tim 6:15-16 is focusing on the resurrected and glorified Christ--the reasons for my conclusions are listed below:
(1) The immediate context deals with Christ. Paul writes about "the fine public declaration" that Christ made "before Pontius Pilate" (1 Tim 6:13 NWT). 1 Tim 6:14 also references the "manifestation of our Lord Jesus Christ."
(2) Additionally, the title "King of kings and Lord of lords" is applied to Jesus in the NT (Rev 17:14; 19:16). While similar titles are used of YHWH (Jehovah) in the OT/Tanakh, I'm not sure that the exact title, King of kings and Lord of lords is ever applied to the Father (YHWH).
(3) 1 Tim 6:16 is evidently comparing the happy and only Potentate to those who rule as kings and lords. In contrast to these men, Christ is the "one alone having immortality." However, God the Father is not the only immortal being, since Christ assumed immortality when resurrected by God; moreover, those who share in the first resurrection are also granted the gift of immortal life (Rom 6:9; 1 Cor 15:50-54; Heb 7:16).
(4) According to Acts of the Apostles, Christ dwells in "unapproachable light" since his glorification. The apostle Paul beheld the glory of the resurrected Christ and he was blinded by the unique and awesome spectacle (Acts 26:12-13). Jesus assured his apostles that humans would behold him no more, but his disciples would, because he lives and they live through him (Jn 14:19). How appropriate the words of 1 Tim 6:16 describe the exalted Christ.
Conversely, one might apply the language contained in 1 Tim 6:15-16 to God the Father. One could point to Paul's use of DUNASTHS in this text and look at its use elsewhere in Greek literature. A student of the scriptures could also point to Paul's use of MAKARIOS and MONOS as well. But I think the context and Paul's phraseology favors the interpretation advanced here. Yet I am open to other suggestions.
Dear blog readers,
Someone asked me off-list about 1 Tim 6:15-16 and I want to share my thoughts on the passage with the entire group and hopefully get some input.
Most commentaries and lexicons that I have consulted say that Paul (or the writer of this epistle) is talking about God (the Father) when he speaks of the blessed and only Potentate (DUNASTHS). But I currently take the position that 1 Tim 6:15-16 is focusing on the resurrected and glorified Christ--the reasons for my conclusions are listed below:
(1) The immediate context deals with Christ. Paul writes about "the fine public declaration" that Christ made "before Pontius Pilate" (1 Tim 6:13 NWT). 1 Tim 6:14 also references the "manifestation of our Lord Jesus Christ."
(2) Additionally, the title "King of kings and Lord of lords" is applied to Jesus in the NT (Rev 17:14; 19:16). While similar titles are used of YHWH (Jehovah) in the OT/Tanakh, I'm not sure that the exact title, King of kings and Lord of lords is ever applied to the Father (YHWH).
(3) 1 Tim 6:16 is evidently comparing the happy and only Potentate to those who rule as kings and lords. In contrast to these men, Christ is the "one alone having immortality." However, God the Father is not the only immortal being, since Christ assumed immortality when resurrected by God; moreover, those who share in the first resurrection are also granted the gift of immortal life (Rom 6:9; 1 Cor 15:50-54; Heb 7:16).
(4) According to Acts of the Apostles, Christ dwells in "unapproachable light" since his glorification. The apostle Paul beheld the glory of the resurrected Christ and he was blinded by the unique and awesome spectacle (Acts 26:12-13). Jesus assured his apostles that humans would behold him no more, but his disciples would, because he lives and they live through him (Jn 14:19). How appropriate the words of 1 Tim 6:16 describe the exalted Christ.
Conversely, one might apply the language contained in 1 Tim 6:15-16 to God the Father. One could point to Paul's use of DUNASTHS in this text and look at its use elsewhere in Greek literature. A student of the scriptures could also point to Paul's use of MAKARIOS and MONOS as well. But I think the context and Paul's phraseology favors the interpretation advanced here. Yet I am open to other suggestions.
Saturday, August 15, 2015
Friday, August 14, 2015
Chrysostom on John 1:1c (A Dialogue)
Edgar: Contrary to popular belief, EN ARXH (John 1:1a) does not necessarily mean that the LOGOS is eternal. The complexities of understanding the Greek words in the opening verse of the Johannine Prologue are demonstrated by Origen in his notable Commentary on John. If the apostle John had in mind Genesis 1:1 (LXX) when using this construction, then it is almost certain that John 1:1a is not saying that the LOGOS is eternal or co-eternal with God. Rather, as articulated by Origen and the Shepherd of Hermas, the Word is "the most ancient of all creation" (Contra Celsum 5.37). The Greek there in Contra Celsum is PRESBUTATON PANTWN TWN DHMIOURGHMATWN. See Proverbs 8:22; Revelation 3:14.
Interlocutor Quoting Chrysostom: "for that you may not, when you hear 'In the beginning was the Word,' suppose Him to be Eternal, and yet imagine the life of the Father to differ from His by some interval and longer duration, and so assign a beginning to the Only-Begotten, he adds, 'was in the beginning with God'; so eternally even as the Father Himself, for the Father was never without the Word, but He was always God with God, yet Each in His proper Person.(1)"
MY RESPONSE: Chrysostom (like other Trinitarians) goes beyond Scripture when asserting that God has always been Father and Son. Psalm 90:2 states that YHWH is God (not Father) from eternity to eternity. Tertullian makes a similar point in Adversus Hermogenem 3.4 Waszink Latin text) by arguing that there was a time when God was neither Father nor Judge. And even though Novatian writes that God is always "Father," he feels the need to contend that the Father is "prior" to the Son in some sense or to some degree (De Trinitate 31). It is possible that Novatian has in mind causal or even temporal priority when discussing the relationship between God and his Word:
"He, then, when the Father willed it, proceeded from the Father, and He who was in the Father came forth from the Father; and He who was in the Father because He was of the Father, was subsequently with the Father, because He came forth from the Father, that is to say, that divine substance whose name is the Word, whereby all things were made, and without whom nothing was made. For all things are after Him, because they are by Him. And reasonably, He is before all things, but after the Father, since all things were made by Him, and He proceeded from Him of whose will all things were made" (De Trinitate 21).
Interlocutor Still Quoting Chrysostom: "how then, one says, does John assert, that He was in the world, if He was with God? Because He was both(2) with God and in the world also. For neither Father nor Son are limited in any way. Since, if 'there is no end of His greatness' (Ps. cxlv. 3), and if 'of His wisdom there is no number' (Ps. cxlvii. 5), it is clear that there cannot be any beginning in time(3) to His Essence. Thou hast heard, that 'In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth' (Gen. i. 1); what dost thou understand from this 'beginning'? clearly, that they were created before all visible things. So, respecting the Only-Begotten, when you hear that He was 'in the beginning,' conceive of him as before all intelligible things,(4) and before the ages."
MY RESPONSE: There are two problematic assertions that Chrysostom makes here. The first is that the LOGOS was both in the world and with God at the same time. Athanasius makes a similar argument in his work on the Incarnation. Yet, where does the Bible say that Christ simultaneously was with God and on earth? Where are we even led to believe that Christ was infinite or limitless while he dwelled on earth and in the flesh? Second, the belief that God is timeless has been seriously challenged on biblical and logical grounds. The biblical text certainly does not suggest that God is timeless.
Interlocutor Quoting Chrysostom: "for that you may not, when you hear 'In the beginning was the Word,' suppose Him to be Eternal, and yet imagine the life of the Father to differ from His by some interval and longer duration, and so assign a beginning to the Only-Begotten, he adds, 'was in the beginning with God'; so eternally even as the Father Himself, for the Father was never without the Word, but He was always God with God, yet Each in His proper Person.(1)"
MY RESPONSE: Chrysostom (like other Trinitarians) goes beyond Scripture when asserting that God has always been Father and Son. Psalm 90:2 states that YHWH is God (not Father) from eternity to eternity. Tertullian makes a similar point in Adversus Hermogenem 3.4 Waszink Latin text) by arguing that there was a time when God was neither Father nor Judge. And even though Novatian writes that God is always "Father," he feels the need to contend that the Father is "prior" to the Son in some sense or to some degree (De Trinitate 31). It is possible that Novatian has in mind causal or even temporal priority when discussing the relationship between God and his Word:
"He, then, when the Father willed it, proceeded from the Father, and He who was in the Father came forth from the Father; and He who was in the Father because He was of the Father, was subsequently with the Father, because He came forth from the Father, that is to say, that divine substance whose name is the Word, whereby all things were made, and without whom nothing was made. For all things are after Him, because they are by Him. And reasonably, He is before all things, but after the Father, since all things were made by Him, and He proceeded from Him of whose will all things were made" (De Trinitate 21).
Interlocutor Still Quoting Chrysostom: "how then, one says, does John assert, that He was in the world, if He was with God? Because He was both(2) with God and in the world also. For neither Father nor Son are limited in any way. Since, if 'there is no end of His greatness' (Ps. cxlv. 3), and if 'of His wisdom there is no number' (Ps. cxlvii. 5), it is clear that there cannot be any beginning in time(3) to His Essence. Thou hast heard, that 'In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth' (Gen. i. 1); what dost thou understand from this 'beginning'? clearly, that they were created before all visible things. So, respecting the Only-Begotten, when you hear that He was 'in the beginning,' conceive of him as before all intelligible things,(4) and before the ages."
MY RESPONSE: There are two problematic assertions that Chrysostom makes here. The first is that the LOGOS was both in the world and with God at the same time. Athanasius makes a similar argument in his work on the Incarnation. Yet, where does the Bible say that Christ simultaneously was with God and on earth? Where are we even led to believe that Christ was infinite or limitless while he dwelled on earth and in the flesh? Second, the belief that God is timeless has been seriously challenged on biblical and logical grounds. The biblical text certainly does not suggest that God is timeless.
Monday, August 03, 2015
Older Book Review of Daniel Cronn-Mills' Study About Jehovah's Witnesses
I now wish to present my review of Daniel Cronn-Mills' work A Qualitative Analysis of the Jehovah's Witnesses: The Rhetoric, Reality and Religion in the Watchtower Society (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999). This monograph is 198+ pp. including the bibliography and index. The copy that I reviewed cost approximately $109.00 retail. Some outlets, however, sell the book at a lower rate.
In reviewing Cronn-Mills' publication, I will first give an overview of the book, then I will examine the strengths and then deal with what I perceive to be weaknesses of the study.
I. An Overview of A Qualitative Analysis of the Jehovah's Witnesses
A Qualitative Analysis of the Jehovah's Witnesses contains 16 chapters devoted to examining the role that rhetoric supposedly plays in the religious society of Jehovah's Witnesses. By rhetoric, Cronn-Mills has in mind the social construction of reality through communicative or verbal methods that utilize persuasion as a tool. It is Cronn-Mills' contention that Jehovah's Witnesses, being one of the most persecuted groups on earth, respond to religious persecution by constructing a reality characterized by numerous dualities (Satan/God or dark/light or us/them). Furthermore, Witnesses purportedly erect figurative bridges by means of questions that lead "interested ones" from Satan's world to Jehovah's organization. That is, according to Cronn-Mills, Witnesses try appealing to non-Witnesses by portraying themselves as the ones with answers to questions raised by those in "Satan's world."
He avers that three WTBTS books, Questions Young People Ask, Reasoning from the Scriptures, and You Can Live Forever "are replete with questions and answers" (Cronn-Mills, 144) that function as a "gateway" to Jehovah's earthly organization. Cronn-Mills thus contends: "The social reality of Jehovah's Witnesses provides a bright light for those wishing to cross from Satan's world through Witness' World to Jehovah's World" (ibid., 144).
Note the threefold distinction that Cronn-Mills makes regarding the worlds supposedly constructed by Jehovah's Witnesses. We will address this point later in the review. For now, let's discuss the positive aspects of his work.
II. Strengths of A Qualitative Analysis
Cronn-Mills' study is commendable in many respects. He is a fomer Catholic, who no longer seems to have use for organized religion. Furthermore, his interest in Jehovah's Witnesses appears to be primarily scientific; he does not appear to have an axe to grind in this study at all. Cronn-Mills himself writes: "My purpose is to provide a description, analysis, and interpretation of the social construction of reality of Jehovah's Witnesses" (Cronn-Mills, 4).
So he decided to analyze and provide a descriptive social-scientific account of Jehovah's Witnesses because the Witnesses are devoted to preaching about God's Kingdom in a variety of ways. Whether they are going from door to
door, sending letters to those needing scriptural comfort or witnessing to those whom they encounter in medical offices or at the workplace, Jehovah's Witnesses seem determined to reach out to those whom they believe need comfort, solace, and guidance from God's Word in these troubled times.
Yet another reason that Cronn-Mills selected Jehovah's Witnesses for his study, however, is that "Jehovah's Witnesses have been identified by researchers as one of the most persecuted religious groups in history and the most persecuted Christian organization in the twentieth century" (ibid., 6). This persecution, Cronn-Mills theorizes, leads the Witnesses to construct a social reality that is characterized by dualities and manifested by means of discursive practices. The study found in _A Qualitative Analysis_ thereby purports to contribute to the author's understanding of the Witness response to religious persecution.
In order to discern how Witnesses respond to persecution, Cronn-Mills evidently approached the presiding overseer at a local congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and asked for his permission to interview certain members of the congregation. The overseer agreed and Cronn-Mills subsequently interviewed 43 Witnesses, finding them to be friendly,
honest and willing to share their beliefs with him (28-32). But the author did not stop at interviewing the Witnesses he later wrote about. In addition to interviewing 43 Witnesses of Jehovah, he also attended the weekly meetings at the local Kingdom Hall and went to the district convention with the Witnesses in his area. Finally, he attended the Memorial of Christ's death. In the end, Cronn-Mills seemed to be impressed at the trust that the Witnesses manifested toward a scholar, who was willing to actively participate in theocratic activities with them over a period of time.
I thus conclude that Cronn-Mill's approach to obtaining information from the Witnesses is a sign of his attempt to approach the subject somewhat objectively and it is a strong point of his book. His ability to delineate, in painstaking detail, the categories he is working with as well as his use of the scientific method is also impressive. Nevertheless, there are some weaknesses in Cronn-Mills' monograph that need to be discussed.
III. Weak Points of A Qualitative Analysis
While there are commendable aspects of A Qualitative Analysis, there are some surprising weaknesses contained in the book as well. While I can overlook Cronn-Mills' imprecise and not wholly accurate explanation of the Witnesses' pneumatology in the following terms, "The Spirit is merely Jehovah's power, force, or energy" (44), I find it much more
difficult to ignore other errors. For instance, he writes that the Witnesses believe that "Lucifer" was created by Jehovah through "Michael" to watch over the Garden of Eden until he began to nurture and eventually acted on a desire to have his own worshipers. Cronn-Mills continues: "So, while Jehovah slept on the seventh day, Lucifer found and capitalized on Adam and Eve's fatal flaw--free will" (44).
I think that most Witnesses of Jehovah reading the aforesaid comments would quickly and immediately discern errors in Cronn-Mills' presentation. There are other slips, but I will resist the urge to nit-pick. Yet, before closing, we must mention the threefold distinction discussed in A Qualitative Analysis that Witnesses putatively advocate or teach. That is, the threefold division of Satan's world, the Witness world, and Jehovah's world (i.e., the new world order). I think that many Witnesses (probably most) would take issue with this portrayal of our beliefs. We do not make a sharp distinction between a so-called "Witness world" and Jehovah's world. Cronn-Mills needs to reanalyze and rework this explanation of Witness belief.
In conclusion, I would like to point out that Cronn-Mills' work is worth reading, if one is interested in rhetorical and social-scientific issues as they appertain to religion. His attempt to be fair is noble--his scientific research is also sound in many respects. But some of the theological details are inadequately explained. Furthermore, there are a number of typos in the book and the writing style employed in the study is at times hard to decipher.
I am not talking about technical language as such but the writer's style of communication. Then again, he may
not be a native English speaker or writer. That would account for some textual idiosyncrasies in A Qualitative Analysis. Finally, the issues of social interactionism and groups constructing their own reality through discursive pratices or rhetoric are questions that could be treated in another essay or monograph. Suffice it to say that Cronn-Mills' "construction of reality" theory needs to be approached with a "hermeneutics of suspicion" by the Christian who endeavors to be faithful to Jehovah, His written Word, and the very reality of God.
In reviewing Cronn-Mills' publication, I will first give an overview of the book, then I will examine the strengths and then deal with what I perceive to be weaknesses of the study.
I. An Overview of A Qualitative Analysis of the Jehovah's Witnesses
A Qualitative Analysis of the Jehovah's Witnesses contains 16 chapters devoted to examining the role that rhetoric supposedly plays in the religious society of Jehovah's Witnesses. By rhetoric, Cronn-Mills has in mind the social construction of reality through communicative or verbal methods that utilize persuasion as a tool. It is Cronn-Mills' contention that Jehovah's Witnesses, being one of the most persecuted groups on earth, respond to religious persecution by constructing a reality characterized by numerous dualities (Satan/God or dark/light or us/them). Furthermore, Witnesses purportedly erect figurative bridges by means of questions that lead "interested ones" from Satan's world to Jehovah's organization. That is, according to Cronn-Mills, Witnesses try appealing to non-Witnesses by portraying themselves as the ones with answers to questions raised by those in "Satan's world."
He avers that three WTBTS books, Questions Young People Ask, Reasoning from the Scriptures, and You Can Live Forever "are replete with questions and answers" (Cronn-Mills, 144) that function as a "gateway" to Jehovah's earthly organization. Cronn-Mills thus contends: "The social reality of Jehovah's Witnesses provides a bright light for those wishing to cross from Satan's world through Witness' World to Jehovah's World" (ibid., 144).
Note the threefold distinction that Cronn-Mills makes regarding the worlds supposedly constructed by Jehovah's Witnesses. We will address this point later in the review. For now, let's discuss the positive aspects of his work.
II. Strengths of A Qualitative Analysis
Cronn-Mills' study is commendable in many respects. He is a fomer Catholic, who no longer seems to have use for organized religion. Furthermore, his interest in Jehovah's Witnesses appears to be primarily scientific; he does not appear to have an axe to grind in this study at all. Cronn-Mills himself writes: "My purpose is to provide a description, analysis, and interpretation of the social construction of reality of Jehovah's Witnesses" (Cronn-Mills, 4).
So he decided to analyze and provide a descriptive social-scientific account of Jehovah's Witnesses because the Witnesses are devoted to preaching about God's Kingdom in a variety of ways. Whether they are going from door to
door, sending letters to those needing scriptural comfort or witnessing to those whom they encounter in medical offices or at the workplace, Jehovah's Witnesses seem determined to reach out to those whom they believe need comfort, solace, and guidance from God's Word in these troubled times.
Yet another reason that Cronn-Mills selected Jehovah's Witnesses for his study, however, is that "Jehovah's Witnesses have been identified by researchers as one of the most persecuted religious groups in history and the most persecuted Christian organization in the twentieth century" (ibid., 6). This persecution, Cronn-Mills theorizes, leads the Witnesses to construct a social reality that is characterized by dualities and manifested by means of discursive practices. The study found in _A Qualitative Analysis_ thereby purports to contribute to the author's understanding of the Witness response to religious persecution.
In order to discern how Witnesses respond to persecution, Cronn-Mills evidently approached the presiding overseer at a local congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and asked for his permission to interview certain members of the congregation. The overseer agreed and Cronn-Mills subsequently interviewed 43 Witnesses, finding them to be friendly,
honest and willing to share their beliefs with him (28-32). But the author did not stop at interviewing the Witnesses he later wrote about. In addition to interviewing 43 Witnesses of Jehovah, he also attended the weekly meetings at the local Kingdom Hall and went to the district convention with the Witnesses in his area. Finally, he attended the Memorial of Christ's death. In the end, Cronn-Mills seemed to be impressed at the trust that the Witnesses manifested toward a scholar, who was willing to actively participate in theocratic activities with them over a period of time.
I thus conclude that Cronn-Mill's approach to obtaining information from the Witnesses is a sign of his attempt to approach the subject somewhat objectively and it is a strong point of his book. His ability to delineate, in painstaking detail, the categories he is working with as well as his use of the scientific method is also impressive. Nevertheless, there are some weaknesses in Cronn-Mills' monograph that need to be discussed.
III. Weak Points of A Qualitative Analysis
While there are commendable aspects of A Qualitative Analysis, there are some surprising weaknesses contained in the book as well. While I can overlook Cronn-Mills' imprecise and not wholly accurate explanation of the Witnesses' pneumatology in the following terms, "The Spirit is merely Jehovah's power, force, or energy" (44), I find it much more
difficult to ignore other errors. For instance, he writes that the Witnesses believe that "Lucifer" was created by Jehovah through "Michael" to watch over the Garden of Eden until he began to nurture and eventually acted on a desire to have his own worshipers. Cronn-Mills continues: "So, while Jehovah slept on the seventh day, Lucifer found and capitalized on Adam and Eve's fatal flaw--free will" (44).
I think that most Witnesses of Jehovah reading the aforesaid comments would quickly and immediately discern errors in Cronn-Mills' presentation. There are other slips, but I will resist the urge to nit-pick. Yet, before closing, we must mention the threefold distinction discussed in A Qualitative Analysis that Witnesses putatively advocate or teach. That is, the threefold division of Satan's world, the Witness world, and Jehovah's world (i.e., the new world order). I think that many Witnesses (probably most) would take issue with this portrayal of our beliefs. We do not make a sharp distinction between a so-called "Witness world" and Jehovah's world. Cronn-Mills needs to reanalyze and rework this explanation of Witness belief.
In conclusion, I would like to point out that Cronn-Mills' work is worth reading, if one is interested in rhetorical and social-scientific issues as they appertain to religion. His attempt to be fair is noble--his scientific research is also sound in many respects. But some of the theological details are inadequately explained. Furthermore, there are a number of typos in the book and the writing style employed in the study is at times hard to decipher.
I am not talking about technical language as such but the writer's style of communication. Then again, he may
not be a native English speaker or writer. That would account for some textual idiosyncrasies in A Qualitative Analysis. Finally, the issues of social interactionism and groups constructing their own reality through discursive pratices or rhetoric are questions that could be treated in another essay or monograph. Suffice it to say that Cronn-Mills' "construction of reality" theory needs to be approached with a "hermeneutics of suspicion" by the Christian who endeavors to be faithful to Jehovah, His written Word, and the very reality of God.
Sunday, July 19, 2015
William Lane Craig on the Logical Basis of Morality
William Lane Craig maintains: "God's moral nature is the paradigm of goodness; what is good or bad is determined by conformity or lack thereof to His nature." Just as a live orchestra is the determinant of what constitutes "high fidelity," so God (his moral nature) is the standard for what constitutes good or bad. And since the divine one instantiates his nature by means of his divine commands, Craig reasons: "Things are right or wrong insofar as they are commanded or forbidden by God."
See http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-euthyphro-dilemma-once-more.
On the other hand, Craig believes that there can be valid reasons for divine commands. They aren't simply given willy-nilly or arbitrarily.
See http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-euthyphro-dilemma-once-more.
On the other hand, Craig believes that there can be valid reasons for divine commands. They aren't simply given willy-nilly or arbitrarily.
Owen Thomas' Explanation of the Trinity Doctrine
Professor Owen Thomas endeavors to articulate what the Trinity is and is not:
Quote taken from Thomas' work Introduction to Theology. Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse, 1994. Page 71.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trinity#/media/File:Shield-Trinity-Scutum-Fidei-English.svg
The result of the analysis of the biblical testimony in the light of the tradition of the church is that the distinctions Father, Son and Spirit do not refer to persons in the modern sense [i.e., as separate centers of consciousness] or parts of God; each refers to the whole of the Godhead. They do not refer to aspects, qualities, or attributes of God, because all of these apply equally to each of the "persons." They do not refer to functions or types of activity of God, because each of the "persons" is involved in each activity of God. They are not simply ways in which God is revealed or ways in which we experience God but rather essential or immanent distinctions in the godhead. The names Father, Son and Holy Spirit refer to modes of being of God, distinctions in the way in which God is God, distinctions in the form, pattern, order, or structure of all of God's activities.
Quote taken from Thomas' work Introduction to Theology. Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse, 1994. Page 71.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trinity#/media/File:Shield-Trinity-Scutum-Fidei-English.svg
Friday, July 17, 2015
Using Greek-English Lexicons: Caveat Lector
Written 4/23/2004 & edited 7/17/2015:
S. M. Baugh ("A First John Reader") recommends that one consult BAGD (now BDAG) when he/she undertakes a study of a particular Greek word: "This should be your first stop--and for most words, your last stop--for every Greek word study"
(page 128).
Those of us who own BDAG no doubt (HAUD DUBIE) concur with Baugh. For most Greek words, BDAG *is* the last stop, but neither Baugh nor EGF recommends the uncritical employment of BDAG. Baugh has his own criticisms of the BDAG lexicon, but I'm sure he would admit that these quibbles in no way diminish its value.
One problem that Baugh had with BAGD when he wrote his book was that it contained "glosses" rather than "word meanings." That is, the older lexicon formerly known as BAGD would give readers/students the rough approximate meaning of a word in English rather than saying what the word meant in ancient Greek. But the new BDAG is miles ahead of the older lexicon in this respect. For instance, BDAG has the following for the entry APODEIXIS:
"a pointing away to [something] for the purpose of demonstration, proof."
Anna Wierzbicka has argued that words are better defined sententially as opposed to being defined by one word "glosses." That is why the new BDAG is a vast improvement over Strong's and the old BAGD.
Another important point to keep in mind is that context often helps us determine how a term is being used by a writer or speaker. Words have semantic domains or semantic fields. The referent and context of a term surely determine how a writer is using it. BDAG is also helpful here.
Lastly, I would issue a warning concerning J.H. Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon. Thayer's work was produced before lexicographers began to utilize the ancient Greek papyri in word studies. Now that the papyrological evidence has been examined, assessed and published, the fruits of this research now appear in works like BDAG. You can also consult the text "Vocabulary of the Greek Testament" by J.H. Moulton and G. Milligan. But I think this work is also in the process of being updated or has been superseded by now.
For more information about BDAG, please see https://books.google.com/books?id=hd7bZxvlbFsC&dq=german%20bauer%20lexicon&source=gbs_similarbooks
S. M. Baugh ("A First John Reader") recommends that one consult BAGD (now BDAG) when he/she undertakes a study of a particular Greek word: "This should be your first stop--and for most words, your last stop--for every Greek word study"
(page 128).
Those of us who own BDAG no doubt (HAUD DUBIE) concur with Baugh. For most Greek words, BDAG *is* the last stop, but neither Baugh nor EGF recommends the uncritical employment of BDAG. Baugh has his own criticisms of the BDAG lexicon, but I'm sure he would admit that these quibbles in no way diminish its value.
One problem that Baugh had with BAGD when he wrote his book was that it contained "glosses" rather than "word meanings." That is, the older lexicon formerly known as BAGD would give readers/students the rough approximate meaning of a word in English rather than saying what the word meant in ancient Greek. But the new BDAG is miles ahead of the older lexicon in this respect. For instance, BDAG has the following for the entry APODEIXIS:
"a pointing away to [something] for the purpose of demonstration, proof."
Anna Wierzbicka has argued that words are better defined sententially as opposed to being defined by one word "glosses." That is why the new BDAG is a vast improvement over Strong's and the old BAGD.
Another important point to keep in mind is that context often helps us determine how a term is being used by a writer or speaker. Words have semantic domains or semantic fields. The referent and context of a term surely determine how a writer is using it. BDAG is also helpful here.
Lastly, I would issue a warning concerning J.H. Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon. Thayer's work was produced before lexicographers began to utilize the ancient Greek papyri in word studies. Now that the papyrological evidence has been examined, assessed and published, the fruits of this research now appear in works like BDAG. You can also consult the text "Vocabulary of the Greek Testament" by J.H. Moulton and G. Milligan. But I think this work is also in the process of being updated or has been superseded by now.
For more information about BDAG, please see https://books.google.com/books?id=hd7bZxvlbFsC&dq=german%20bauer%20lexicon&source=gbs_similarbooks
Tuesday, July 14, 2015
Purgatory and Maccabees (Update of Earlier Material)
Regarding 2 Macc 12:44-45, the surrounding verses make it clear that a resurrection from the dead is in mind here. This passage from Maccabees is not dealing with purgatory:
"For if he were not expecting that those who had fallen would rise again, it would have been superfluous and foolish to pray for the dead. But if he was looking to the splendid reward that is laid up for those who FALL ASLEEP in godliness, it was a holy and pious thought. Therefore he made atonement for the dead, so that they might be delivered from their sin" (2 Macc 12:44-45 RSV).
The Catholic NAB, in the footnote to 2 Macc 12:42-46, says:
"This is the earliest statement of the doctrine that prayers (v 42) and sacrifices (v 43) for the dead are beneficial. The statement is made here, however, only for the purpose of proving that Judas believed in the resurrection of the just (2 Mc 7, 9, 14, 23, 36). That is, he believed that expiation could be made for certain sins of otherwise good men--soldiers who had given their lives for God's cause. Thus, they could share in the resurrection. His belief was similar to, but not quite the same as, the Catholic doctrine of purgatory."
Concerning 1 Cor 3:15, the New Jerusalem Bible notes:
"Purgatory is not directly envisaged here, but this text is one of those on the basis of which the Church has made this doctrine explicit."
"While interpreters (particularly Roman Catholics) of another era attempted occasionally to relate these verses to purgatory, almost no scholar working today would make that connection, regardless of confessional persuasion or background" (Marion Soards, 1 Corinthians, p. 78).
The picture is from https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fe/Carracci-Purgatory.jpg/512px-Carracci-Purgatory.jpg
"For if he were not expecting that those who had fallen would rise again, it would have been superfluous and foolish to pray for the dead. But if he was looking to the splendid reward that is laid up for those who FALL ASLEEP in godliness, it was a holy and pious thought. Therefore he made atonement for the dead, so that they might be delivered from their sin" (2 Macc 12:44-45 RSV).
The Catholic NAB, in the footnote to 2 Macc 12:42-46, says:
"This is the earliest statement of the doctrine that prayers (v 42) and sacrifices (v 43) for the dead are beneficial. The statement is made here, however, only for the purpose of proving that Judas believed in the resurrection of the just (2 Mc 7, 9, 14, 23, 36). That is, he believed that expiation could be made for certain sins of otherwise good men--soldiers who had given their lives for God's cause. Thus, they could share in the resurrection. His belief was similar to, but not quite the same as, the Catholic doctrine of purgatory."
Concerning 1 Cor 3:15, the New Jerusalem Bible notes:
"Purgatory is not directly envisaged here, but this text is one of those on the basis of which the Church has made this doctrine explicit."
"While interpreters (particularly Roman Catholics) of another era attempted occasionally to relate these verses to purgatory, almost no scholar working today would make that connection, regardless of confessional persuasion or background" (Marion Soards, 1 Corinthians, p. 78).
The picture is from https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fe/Carracci-Purgatory.jpg/512px-Carracci-Purgatory.jpg
Monday, July 13, 2015
Cows, Perceptions, and Conceptions
One interlocutor writes about non-human animals:
"[they] recognize and remember certain objects, shapes, predators, etc., and know how to respond. But none of this requires or involves the apprehension of common natures of things, which would require a categorial jump from sensed particulars to general ideas that involve no residue of sensible matter, as do images generated by the memory and imagination in the brain."
MY REPLY:
It's difficult for us to say what animals experience when they assimilate sensory impressions. Nonetheless, the human apprehension and neural representation of sensate elements is not exactly analogous to the process whereby animals sense things and remember them. The human brain is capable of representing images in a way that differs markedly from cats or dogs. What makes our representations so different? We form concepts by means of natural languages and information derived from distal and proximal stimuli. Furthermore, while I believe that we form concepts by means of sensory experience in the way I've outlined, I don't necessarily buy into the "common natures" assumption. Concept-formation can be explained without appealing to non-physical factors like Platonic/Aristotelian Forms or immaterial souls.
But I am not arguing that perceptions are conceptions. What I am suggesting is that conceptions are possible representations of percepts by dint of natural language and neural networks in the human brain. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (based on the work of Eleanor Rosch) have argued that we categorize things (e.g., birds, chairs, tables, and teapots) according to fuzzy prototypical characteristics (cf. Metaphors We Live By). However, the prototypes by means of which we classify various objects emanate from somatic experiences. For example, although I had never seen a Highland Cow until the year 2002, I knew that it was a cow upon first sight. Yet the Highland Cow was unlike any cow I had ever seen before. Lakoff and Johnson might say that I was able to associate the Scottish cow with my prototype of such animals based on past somatic experiences. Yet my concept of cowness is nothing more than the result of what I've perceived with my sense organs (inter alia) and how my brain represents the usual properties of cows which it derives from distal and proximal stimuli.
"[they] recognize and remember certain objects, shapes, predators, etc., and know how to respond. But none of this requires or involves the apprehension of common natures of things, which would require a categorial jump from sensed particulars to general ideas that involve no residue of sensible matter, as do images generated by the memory and imagination in the brain."
MY REPLY:
It's difficult for us to say what animals experience when they assimilate sensory impressions. Nonetheless, the human apprehension and neural representation of sensate elements is not exactly analogous to the process whereby animals sense things and remember them. The human brain is capable of representing images in a way that differs markedly from cats or dogs. What makes our representations so different? We form concepts by means of natural languages and information derived from distal and proximal stimuli. Furthermore, while I believe that we form concepts by means of sensory experience in the way I've outlined, I don't necessarily buy into the "common natures" assumption. Concept-formation can be explained without appealing to non-physical factors like Platonic/Aristotelian Forms or immaterial souls.
But I am not arguing that perceptions are conceptions. What I am suggesting is that conceptions are possible representations of percepts by dint of natural language and neural networks in the human brain. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (based on the work of Eleanor Rosch) have argued that we categorize things (e.g., birds, chairs, tables, and teapots) according to fuzzy prototypical characteristics (cf. Metaphors We Live By). However, the prototypes by means of which we classify various objects emanate from somatic experiences. For example, although I had never seen a Highland Cow until the year 2002, I knew that it was a cow upon first sight. Yet the Highland Cow was unlike any cow I had ever seen before. Lakoff and Johnson might say that I was able to associate the Scottish cow with my prototype of such animals based on past somatic experiences. Yet my concept of cowness is nothing more than the result of what I've perceived with my sense organs (inter alia) and how my brain represents the usual properties of cows which it derives from distal and proximal stimuli.
Friday, July 10, 2015
Scientia and Scripture (Stream-of-consciousness Mentation)
Our "paltry knowledge" of sensibles is all that we have in terms of natural scientia. It is somewhat difficult to go beyond our phenomenal experience and know whether light is anything other than waves or particles. God might be light in a manner that transcends our ability to grasp, but we have no way of knowing whether he is transcendently light or not apart from revelation. We certainly cannot apprehend this datum from experience of what Kant calls "phenomena." What I do know is that ancient Greek writers employed the morpheme FWS (in similar contexts) as a Figuren der semantischen Deviation for the divine sphere. Isis is said to be FWS PASI BROTOISI and the very being of Isis is spoken of as FWS KAI ZWH (See BDAG). Compare John 1:3ff.
In the NT, Jesus also calls his followers the light of the world (Mt 5:14-16). Additionally, the context of 1 John 1:5 indicates that John is not talking about some transcendent light (analogous to light in the material cosmos) that is waveless or particleless: he is referring to truth, moral rectitude and goodness. Platonic thinking won't work here. There quite probably are not any Platonic Forms or Ideas that exceed our sensible experience such that masculinity or femininity subsist as objects of consciousness or divine properties in some celestial sphere that's characterized by noetic qualitativeness.
In the NT, Jesus also calls his followers the light of the world (Mt 5:14-16). Additionally, the context of 1 John 1:5 indicates that John is not talking about some transcendent light (analogous to light in the material cosmos) that is waveless or particleless: he is referring to truth, moral rectitude and goodness. Platonic thinking won't work here. There quite probably are not any Platonic Forms or Ideas that exceed our sensible experience such that masculinity or femininity subsist as objects of consciousness or divine properties in some celestial sphere that's characterized by noetic qualitativeness.
Tuesday, July 07, 2015
Limited Blog Activity for a Short While
Dear blog readers,
due to schedule changes and some recent events, my participation on this blog will be limited for a few weeks. We also have a convention soon--I'm looking forward to it. Thanks for checking out this blog.
All the best,
Edgar
due to schedule changes and some recent events, my participation on this blog will be limited for a few weeks. We also have a convention soon--I'm looking forward to it. Thanks for checking out this blog.
All the best,
Edgar
Monday, July 06, 2015
Revelation 1:1 and the Genitive Case
Commentators have normally observed that Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Revelation 1:1) could be a subjective genitive ("from Christ") or an objective genitive ("about Christ"). Wallace believes the construction could be either an objective genitive or a plenary genitive (both subjective and objective at the same time); A.T. Robertson also seems to favor the objective genitive for this construction. But David Aune suggests that Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is a subjective genitive since the next clause in the text is: ἣν ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ ὁ Θεός. As indicated by Aune's comment, the scripture's context must ultimately decide what type of genitive we have in Rev. 1:1.
Another factor that might have a bearing on this issue is that John refers to Jesus Christ with the datival form αὐτῷ in Rev. 1:1b. Aune thus reasons that there are a number of instances in Revelation where the indirect object is the subject of the verb in the following clause (Rev. 2:21) although he cautions us that these instances are all subordinate clauses.
Another factor that might have a bearing on this issue is that John refers to Jesus Christ with the datival form αὐτῷ in Rev. 1:1b. Aune thus reasons that there are a number of instances in Revelation where the indirect object is the subject of the verb in the following clause (Rev. 2:21) although he cautions us that these instances are all subordinate clauses.
Saturday, July 04, 2015
Translating Matthew 10:6, 28, 39; 16:25-26 ("Lost"?)-Addressing Bowman Again
Robert M. Bowman has questioned the NWT handling of Mt 10:28 for the way it renders ἀπολέσαι ("to destroy") in that verse. His exact words are:
πορεύεσθε δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ πρόβατα τὰ ἀπολωλότα οἴκου Ἰσραήλ (Mt 10:6 WH).
"Go instead to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (NET Bible).
The translation "lost" works in Mt 10:6 since the context and other parts of the NT indicate that Jesus' disciples are hunting for those who are spiritually "lost" rather than spiritually "destroyed." Yet the gathering of sheep is not under consideration in 10:28: the verse specifically mentions Gehenna along with the destruction of soul and body. Furthermore, Luke uses τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι and ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν γέενναν in the parallel account thereby indicating that the "loss" of body and soul is not the issue (Luke 12:5); the writer is concerned with divine "killing" and the possible annihilation of unfaithful ones. Being thrown into Gehenna figuratively depicts this everlasting destruction of body and soul, and not simply the death of the former or the latter.
In Mt 10:39 and 16:25-26, the rendering "lost" is appropriate in view of the contrasts set up by Matthew between "find" and "lose" or "win" and "lose." Mt 10:28 does not have this type of chiastic contrast.
Louw-Nida agrees that there are "contexts in which YUXH refers to existence beyond death" (26.4), though in such contexts "it may be referring figuratively to the person" (citing Acts 2:27 as an example). Their identification of APOLLUMI THN YUXHN as an idiom meaning "to experience the loss of life, to die" (23.114) does not prejudge the question of what happens at death. (It does, though, support my claim that APOLLUMI in this context means something more like "cause to be lost" than something like "render nonexistent.")
πορεύεσθε δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ πρόβατα τὰ ἀπολωλότα οἴκου Ἰσραήλ (Mt 10:6 WH).
"Go instead to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (NET Bible).
The translation "lost" works in Mt 10:6 since the context and other parts of the NT indicate that Jesus' disciples are hunting for those who are spiritually "lost" rather than spiritually "destroyed." Yet the gathering of sheep is not under consideration in 10:28: the verse specifically mentions Gehenna along with the destruction of soul and body. Furthermore, Luke uses τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι and ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν γέενναν in the parallel account thereby indicating that the "loss" of body and soul is not the issue (Luke 12:5); the writer is concerned with divine "killing" and the possible annihilation of unfaithful ones. Being thrown into Gehenna figuratively depicts this everlasting destruction of body and soul, and not simply the death of the former or the latter.
In Mt 10:39 and 16:25-26, the rendering "lost" is appropriate in view of the contrasts set up by Matthew between "find" and "lose" or "win" and "lose." Mt 10:28 does not have this type of chiastic contrast.
Friday, July 03, 2015
Origin of Proto-Semitic Language
I'm way out of my element here, and I'm not going to offer many comments. Duncan sent along these links:
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SyxDm67_qB8C&pg=PA121&lpg=PA121&dq=Homage+to+thee,+Horus,+mighty+king,+Bull,+conqueror+of+bulls.&source=bl&ots=QVX-y5xvW4&sig=pK-D_W63QJeYYGL4KZ-RUMaWbEU&hl=en&sa=X&ei=l5SVVZPVOMOX7QbgiLKgAg&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Homage%20to%20thee%2C%20Horus%2C%20mighty%20king%2C%20Bull%2C%20conqueror%20of%20bulls.&f=false
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=1HJxNdi5apkC&pg=PA397&lpg=PA397&dq=the+mighty+bull+that+rises+at+thebes&source=bl&ots=qPvL-6vTDg&sig=RpfcWpDOq6uyPddvGKZeKTgV5zI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=VZKVVdPuG8aI7Ab0vqv4Ag&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=the%20mighty%20bull%20that%20rises%20at%20thebes&f=false
Then he said: "Bearing in mind that protosemitic is seen as originating amongst workers in Egypt."
Good question. Just what is Proto-Semitic language, and if it existed, then who originated it? I believe that we must use Budge with extreme caution. It's the work found in these links.
See also: http://www.biblicalarchaeology.org/daily/biblical-artifacts/inscriptions/who-really-invented-the-alphabet%E2%80%94illiterate-miners-or-educated-sophisticates/
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SyxDm67_qB8C&pg=PA121&lpg=PA121&dq=Homage+to+thee,+Horus,+mighty+king,+Bull,+conqueror+of+bulls.&source=bl&ots=QVX-y5xvW4&sig=pK-D_W63QJeYYGL4KZ-RUMaWbEU&hl=en&sa=X&ei=l5SVVZPVOMOX7QbgiLKgAg&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Homage%20to%20thee%2C%20Horus%2C%20mighty%20king%2C%20Bull%2C%20conqueror%20of%20bulls.&f=false
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=1HJxNdi5apkC&pg=PA397&lpg=PA397&dq=the+mighty+bull+that+rises+at+thebes&source=bl&ots=qPvL-6vTDg&sig=RpfcWpDOq6uyPddvGKZeKTgV5zI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=VZKVVdPuG8aI7Ab0vqv4Ag&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=the%20mighty%20bull%20that%20rises%20at%20thebes&f=false
Then he said: "Bearing in mind that protosemitic is seen as originating amongst workers in Egypt."
Good question. Just what is Proto-Semitic language, and if it existed, then who originated it? I believe that we must use Budge with extreme caution. It's the work found in these links.
See also: http://www.biblicalarchaeology.org/daily/biblical-artifacts/inscriptions/who-really-invented-the-alphabet%E2%80%94illiterate-miners-or-educated-sophisticates/
Matthew 28:19-20-Following the Logic of these Verses
1) Jesus commanded his eleven disciples to go forth, and teach people (make disciples).
2) Teaching others includes providing instruction about all Jesus' teachings.
3) So the eleven disciples were to teach others how to make disciples, since the disciple-making work constitutes an important part of Jesus' teachings.
4) Therefore, all of Jesus' disciples (by imitating the original eleven to whom this commission was given) have the obligation to make disiples.
I still need to hammer out the details, but I just wanted the progression of this argument to make sense to me.
2) Teaching others includes providing instruction about all Jesus' teachings.
3) So the eleven disciples were to teach others how to make disciples, since the disciple-making work constitutes an important part of Jesus' teachings.
4) Therefore, all of Jesus' disciples (by imitating the original eleven to whom this commission was given) have the obligation to make disiples.
I still need to hammer out the details, but I just wanted the progression of this argument to make sense to me.
Monday, June 29, 2015
God, Time and Stephen T. Davis
Stephen T. Davis argues that God is temporal: "Time, perhaps, is an eternal aspect of God's nature rather than a reality independent of God" (Logic and the Nature of God, 23). He reasons that "time was not created" since it possibly exists in a manner analogous to numbers.
Nicholas Wolterstorff ("God Is Everlasting") also contends that God is temporal. He nevertheless apparently suspends judgment about whether God has always been "in time." But at the conclusion of his paper, Wolterstorff provides this summary:
There are a number of technicalities that one could get into while discussing God and time. One might consider what others have said about the A-theory of time (tensed) versus the B-theory of time (tenseless) or one could possibly make distinctions like "metaphysical time" versus space-time. But regardless of how we choose to understand divine temporality, it seems that we do not have to reject Einstein's view of time to believe that God is temporal (Ps 90:2). A theist like me would say that space-time was created, but the time wherein God has sempiternally existed need not have been made. We need to distinguish (I would humbly submit) between uncreated and created time.
Is metaphysical time (time simpliciter) merely a symbol or an abstraction of the mind? While it's clearly possible to articulate space-time in such terms, we must consider the noion that time seems to be objectively affected by gravity, suggesting that it's not just a mental abstraction. For a scientific treatment of the issue, I recommend Paul Davies' God and the New Physics; in particular, see pp. 119-134.
Relativity theory has been empirically verified in many respects. There is no need, however, to reason that Einstein's theory of time discounts the existence of metaphysical time, since his theory only accounts for material phenomena that constitute the immense and awe-inspiring cosmos.
As a closing note, it is interesting that Einstein was greatly influenced by Kantian epistemology, but the "non-scientific" intuitions which Einstein derived from the Kant's theory of knowledge actually have proved to be capable of empirical verification.
On the other hand, I would agree with those who insist that God does not dwell within the space-time continuum. However, Jehovah may subsist in absolute metaphysical time as posited by William Lane Craig. Admittedly, the Biblical evidence for God's temporality or atemporality is meager. nevertheless, Witnesses believe (based on Ps 90:2) that God is from time indefinite to time indefinite (OLAM ADH OLAM).
Alan Padgett develops this point quite well in a recent book on God and temporality while Craig further contends that if the A-theory of time is correct, then God must be temporal. Finally, Nelson Pike (in his classic God and Timelessness) provides scholarly evidence and rigorous argumentation that points to the following possible conclusion: God "exists in the 'age of ages', He exists prior to and through measurable times" (186). But see Stephen T. Davis' Logic and the Nature of God (9-24).
William Lane Craig's work on God and time is also instructive. Here is one of his books about the subject: http://www.newreleasetoday.com/bookdetail.php?book_id=5018
Nicholas Wolterstorff ("God Is Everlasting") also contends that God is temporal. He nevertheless apparently suspends judgment about whether God has always been "in time." But at the conclusion of his paper, Wolterstorff provides this summary:
This conclusion from our discussion turns out to be wholly in accord with that to be found in Oscar Cullmann's Christ and Time. From his study of the biblical words for time Cullmann concluded that, in the biblical picture, God's "eternity" is not qualitatively different from our temporality.
There are a number of technicalities that one could get into while discussing God and time. One might consider what others have said about the A-theory of time (tensed) versus the B-theory of time (tenseless) or one could possibly make distinctions like "metaphysical time" versus space-time. But regardless of how we choose to understand divine temporality, it seems that we do not have to reject Einstein's view of time to believe that God is temporal (Ps 90:2). A theist like me would say that space-time was created, but the time wherein God has sempiternally existed need not have been made. We need to distinguish (I would humbly submit) between uncreated and created time.
Is metaphysical time (time simpliciter) merely a symbol or an abstraction of the mind? While it's clearly possible to articulate space-time in such terms, we must consider the noion that time seems to be objectively affected by gravity, suggesting that it's not just a mental abstraction. For a scientific treatment of the issue, I recommend Paul Davies' God and the New Physics; in particular, see pp. 119-134.
Relativity theory has been empirically verified in many respects. There is no need, however, to reason that Einstein's theory of time discounts the existence of metaphysical time, since his theory only accounts for material phenomena that constitute the immense and awe-inspiring cosmos.
As a closing note, it is interesting that Einstein was greatly influenced by Kantian epistemology, but the "non-scientific" intuitions which Einstein derived from the Kant's theory of knowledge actually have proved to be capable of empirical verification.
On the other hand, I would agree with those who insist that God does not dwell within the space-time continuum. However, Jehovah may subsist in absolute metaphysical time as posited by William Lane Craig. Admittedly, the Biblical evidence for God's temporality or atemporality is meager. nevertheless, Witnesses believe (based on Ps 90:2) that God is from time indefinite to time indefinite (OLAM ADH OLAM).
Alan Padgett develops this point quite well in a recent book on God and temporality while Craig further contends that if the A-theory of time is correct, then God must be temporal. Finally, Nelson Pike (in his classic God and Timelessness) provides scholarly evidence and rigorous argumentation that points to the following possible conclusion: God "exists in the 'age of ages', He exists prior to and through measurable times" (186). But see Stephen T. Davis' Logic and the Nature of God (9-24).
William Lane Craig's work on God and time is also instructive. Here is one of his books about the subject: http://www.newreleasetoday.com/bookdetail.php?book_id=5018
λαλέω (LALEW)-A Few Remarks on Speaking
I remember seeing the verb form EIPON come up every now and again while studying Homer. The work "Homeric Vocabularies" (compiled by William B. Owen and Edgar J. Goodspeed) provides the gloss: "spoke, said" for EIPON. BDAG (as usual) also has a helpful entry for LALEW:
"In older Gk. usu[ally] of informal communication ranging from engagement in small talk to chattering and babbling, hence opp. of LEGW; in later Gk the trend, expressed esp. in the pseudepigr. and our lit., is toward equation with LEGW and broadening of earlier usage" (582).
From a historical or diachronic point of view, LALEW appears in the writings of Sophocles. In Jn 12:49, it could mean to speak or express oneself (an act), though it might refer to the content of speaking. See BDAG 583.
Moulton-Milligan also contains these comments based on the ancient papyri:
"The above exx. all bear out the usual distinction that, while LEGW calls attention to the substance of what is said, the onomatopoetic LALEW points rather to the outward utterance . . . With LALEW, 'I make known by speaking' with the further idea of EXTOLLING, as in Mt 26:13 al., cf. the inscr. with reference to a mother and brother-hWN KAI hH SWFROSUNH KATA TON KOSMON LELALHTAI (Archiv v. p. 169, No. 24:8). M Gr LALW (-EW), 'speak.'"
"In older Gk. usu[ally] of informal communication ranging from engagement in small talk to chattering and babbling, hence opp. of LEGW; in later Gk the trend, expressed esp. in the pseudepigr. and our lit., is toward equation with LEGW and broadening of earlier usage" (582).
From a historical or diachronic point of view, LALEW appears in the writings of Sophocles. In Jn 12:49, it could mean to speak or express oneself (an act), though it might refer to the content of speaking. See BDAG 583.
Moulton-Milligan also contains these comments based on the ancient papyri:
"The above exx. all bear out the usual distinction that, while LEGW calls attention to the substance of what is said, the onomatopoetic LALEW points rather to the outward utterance . . . With LALEW, 'I make known by speaking' with the further idea of EXTOLLING, as in Mt 26:13 al., cf. the inscr. with reference to a mother and brother-hWN KAI hH SWFROSUNH KATA TON KOSMON LELALHTAI (Archiv v. p. 169, No. 24:8). M Gr LALW (-EW), 'speak.'"
Sunday, June 28, 2015
KOSMOS in Classical and NT Literature (Brief Remarks)
From some material that I'm now editing:
The Greek word cosmos is often rendered "world" but that English translation results in a degree of ambiguity. What do we mean by the "world"? Is the world a section of humanity, the entire human race, the framework in which humans move and breathe? Or is there another possible referent for this expression? Cosmos may also denote the universe—the entirety of all there is. Both Pythagoras and Heraclitus use the signifier to convey this idea. In the present context, when talking about cosmological dualism, the Greek term refers to the universe. The expression "world" is not an invalid handling of cosmos, but it does produce a rather fuzzy representation of the expression. In any event, cosmological dualism is the philosophical view that asserts the world (universe) is fundamentally two things. It claims that there are two absolute metaphysical principles representative of this particular species of dualism.
See H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, ninth edition with revised supplement (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 985.
See Acts 17:24ff.
Compare this link: https://books.google.com/books?id=_JbuQ2zA8eEC&pg=PA281&dq=gospel+of+john+use+cosmos+for+universe&hl=en&sa=X&ei=azqQVbr4EMSyggTIj7PABg&ved=0CCAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=gospel%20of%20john%20use%20cosmos%20for%20universe&f=false
The discussion starts on p. 282.
The Greek word cosmos is often rendered "world" but that English translation results in a degree of ambiguity. What do we mean by the "world"? Is the world a section of humanity, the entire human race, the framework in which humans move and breathe? Or is there another possible referent for this expression? Cosmos may also denote the universe—the entirety of all there is. Both Pythagoras and Heraclitus use the signifier to convey this idea. In the present context, when talking about cosmological dualism, the Greek term refers to the universe. The expression "world" is not an invalid handling of cosmos, but it does produce a rather fuzzy representation of the expression. In any event, cosmological dualism is the philosophical view that asserts the world (universe) is fundamentally two things. It claims that there are two absolute metaphysical principles representative of this particular species of dualism.
See H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, ninth edition with revised supplement (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 985.
See Acts 17:24ff.
Compare this link: https://books.google.com/books?id=_JbuQ2zA8eEC&pg=PA281&dq=gospel+of+john+use+cosmos+for+universe&hl=en&sa=X&ei=azqQVbr4EMSyggTIj7PABg&ved=0CCAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=gospel%20of%20john%20use%20cosmos%20for%20universe&f=false
The discussion starts on p. 282.
John 5:19-Does It Teach the Impeccability of Christ?
There are some, who think Jn 5:19 proves that Jesus (God Incarnate, they say) was impeccable (not able to sin). Robert M. Bowman asserts that we should understand 5:19 to say, "I would never act independenty of my Father." Or it appears to be teaching that the Lord would never sin against his Father and that he could not sin.
Jn 5:19 is a response to two accusations: (1) Jesus broke the Sabbath; (2) the Son was calling God his Father, seemingly making himself equal to God. In reply, the Lord does not say that "he would never act independently of the Father." Rather, he utters the words, Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, οὐ δύναται ὁ υἱὸς ποιεῖν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν ἂν μή τι βλέπῃ τὸν πατέρα ποιοῦντα· ἃ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ὁμοίως ποιεῖ.
Paul N. Anderson (The Christology of the Fourth Gospel, 3, 267) observes that Jesus is asserting that he "can do nothing on his own authority" and is "totally dependent" on his Father. For Anderson, Jn 5:19 is a Johannine "subordinationist" passage. In other words, Christ is evidently stating that he does not have the ability (οὐ δύναται) or authority to act on his own initiative. He is not suggesting that he would never act on his own. Such an interpretation of 5:19 is much too strong and it misrepresents the pragmatic meaning of Jesus' words. Moreover, when the Lord insists that he does what he beholds the Father doing, the relative pronoun ἃ ("whatsoever") is delimited by the context. In particular, the things Jesus' Father does in this case regard sustaining the creation. Jn 5:17 supports this point by showing that God's ability to split seas or know all things is not the issue. Jn 5:19 is not claiming that Christ does exactly what the Father does in all respects. Robertson also offers this comment:
"Can do nothing by himself (οὐ δύναται ὁ υἱὸς ποιεῖν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν). True in a sense of every man, but in a much deeper sense of Christ because of the intimate relation between him and the Father. See this same point in Joh_5:30; Joh_7:28; Joh_8:28; Joh_14:10. Jesus had already made it in Joh_5:17. Now he repeats and defends it" (Word Pictures).
If the utterance is true (in a sense) of all humans, then how could the text prove that Jesus Christ was impeccable? The quote above certainly indicates that Robertson does not think Christ's declaration means that he could not sin, even if the famed grammarian believed in Christ's impeccability.
In conclusion, I agree with Charles Hodge (Systematic Theology 2:457) who argued that the temptations of Christ were not genuine and were ineffectual, if he was impeccable (incapable of sinning). I also believe that a free moral agent always maintains the ability to perform A or to refrain from performing A. Christ was a free moral agent: he could choose to act independently of the Father, if he had so desired. However, he would then have been powerless, and incapable of healing anyone or doing any good portentous works (Acts 2:22 NWT):
Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, οὐ δύναται ὁ υἱὸς ποιεῖν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν
Jn 5:19 is a response to two accusations: (1) Jesus broke the Sabbath; (2) the Son was calling God his Father, seemingly making himself equal to God. In reply, the Lord does not say that "he would never act independently of the Father." Rather, he utters the words, Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, οὐ δύναται ὁ υἱὸς ποιεῖν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν ἂν μή τι βλέπῃ τὸν πατέρα ποιοῦντα· ἃ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ὁμοίως ποιεῖ.
Paul N. Anderson (The Christology of the Fourth Gospel, 3, 267) observes that Jesus is asserting that he "can do nothing on his own authority" and is "totally dependent" on his Father. For Anderson, Jn 5:19 is a Johannine "subordinationist" passage. In other words, Christ is evidently stating that he does not have the ability (οὐ δύναται) or authority to act on his own initiative. He is not suggesting that he would never act on his own. Such an interpretation of 5:19 is much too strong and it misrepresents the pragmatic meaning of Jesus' words. Moreover, when the Lord insists that he does what he beholds the Father doing, the relative pronoun ἃ ("whatsoever") is delimited by the context. In particular, the things Jesus' Father does in this case regard sustaining the creation. Jn 5:17 supports this point by showing that God's ability to split seas or know all things is not the issue. Jn 5:19 is not claiming that Christ does exactly what the Father does in all respects. Robertson also offers this comment:
"Can do nothing by himself (οὐ δύναται ὁ υἱὸς ποιεῖν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν). True in a sense of every man, but in a much deeper sense of Christ because of the intimate relation between him and the Father. See this same point in Joh_5:30; Joh_7:28; Joh_8:28; Joh_14:10. Jesus had already made it in Joh_5:17. Now he repeats and defends it" (Word Pictures).
If the utterance is true (in a sense) of all humans, then how could the text prove that Jesus Christ was impeccable? The quote above certainly indicates that Robertson does not think Christ's declaration means that he could not sin, even if the famed grammarian believed in Christ's impeccability.
In conclusion, I agree with Charles Hodge (Systematic Theology 2:457) who argued that the temptations of Christ were not genuine and were ineffectual, if he was impeccable (incapable of sinning). I also believe that a free moral agent always maintains the ability to perform A or to refrain from performing A. Christ was a free moral agent: he could choose to act independently of the Father, if he had so desired. However, he would then have been powerless, and incapable of healing anyone or doing any good portentous works (Acts 2:22 NWT):
Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, οὐ δύναται ὁ υἱὸς ποιεῖν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν
Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament (Volume 3) on the Greek Word "PRO"
I'm particularly thinking about our conversation on John 17:5.
Saturday, June 27, 2015
Morphe in the Christian-Greek Scriptures (NT): Synchronism and Diachronism
I pull this quote from Christology and the Trinity to make a point about what words can mean synchonically versus what their meaning potential is diachronically.
To discern how Paul uses morphe, please note the words of Moises Silva below:
Upon closer examination, it becomes manifestly obvious that Phil 2:6-7 (by its use of morphe) does not unequivocally establish the essential deity of Christ. The employment of morphe in Philippians does not necessarily substantiate the teaching that Christ is God incarnate. To derive this conclusion from Phil 2:6 demonstrates a mistaken over-reliance on a single Greek term. Moises Silva offers further valuable comments along these lines as follows: "[Lightfoot's] claim that morphe (opposite schema) refers to unchangeable essence can be sustained by some references, but too many passages speak against it" (122). To verify this contention, Silva quotes Plato (Republic 380d) who inquires about God's ability to alter His "shape" (to autou eidos eis pollas morphas). The New Testament professor subsequently references Xenophon, Philo, Lucian and the fourth century writer, Libanius, who wrote: ouch ho tois theos tes morphen eoichos (123). All of these classical references indicate that morphe [in Phil 2:6] refers to an entity's outward appearance (not to a thing's intrinsic essence).
At this juncture, we must inform our readers that all of the foregoing information does not mean Silva denounces Trinitarianism; he surely does not concede that Phil 2:6 is dissonant with Trinitarian claims. His comments do help us to see, however, that one cannot base his or her belief in Christ's Deity on the mere occurrence of morphe vis-à-vis the preexistent Christ.
To discern how Paul uses morphe, please note the words of Moises Silva below:
If we stress the classical usage of this term [morphe], the technical sense of Aristotelian philosophy suggests itself: morphe, although not equivalent to ousia ("being, essence"), speaks of essential or characteristic attributes and thus is to be distinguished from schema (the changeable, external fashion). In a valuable essay on morphe and schema, [Lightfoot] argued along these lines and remarked that even in popular usage these respective meanings could be ascertained. The many references where morphe is used of physical appearance . . . make it difficult to maintain Lightfoot's precise distinction, though there is an important element of truth in his treatment. (Silva 113-114)
Upon closer examination, it becomes manifestly obvious that Phil 2:6-7 (by its use of morphe) does not unequivocally establish the essential deity of Christ. The employment of morphe in Philippians does not necessarily substantiate the teaching that Christ is God incarnate. To derive this conclusion from Phil 2:6 demonstrates a mistaken over-reliance on a single Greek term. Moises Silva offers further valuable comments along these lines as follows: "[Lightfoot's] claim that morphe (opposite schema) refers to unchangeable essence can be sustained by some references, but too many passages speak against it" (122). To verify this contention, Silva quotes Plato (Republic 380d) who inquires about God's ability to alter His "shape" (to autou eidos eis pollas morphas). The New Testament professor subsequently references Xenophon, Philo, Lucian and the fourth century writer, Libanius, who wrote: ouch ho tois theos tes morphen eoichos (123). All of these classical references indicate that morphe [in Phil 2:6] refers to an entity's outward appearance (not to a thing's intrinsic essence).
At this juncture, we must inform our readers that all of the foregoing information does not mean Silva denounces Trinitarianism; he surely does not concede that Phil 2:6 is dissonant with Trinitarian claims. His comments do help us to see, however, that one cannot base his or her belief in Christ's Deity on the mere occurrence of morphe vis-à-vis the preexistent Christ.
Friday, June 26, 2015
John 17:5 and EINAI
There is a YT channel known as TheTrinityDelusion. The owner had made a video on John 17:5:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=31-BQt-7_5c&feature=youtu.be
I believe that he errs by not being aware of how the Greek infinitive EINAI is sometimes used idiomatically or in certain settings. The rendering "was" is perfectly fine for John 17:5; more specifically, as A.T. Robertson writes, we should understand the passage to be saying: "'before the world was' (pro tou ton kosmon einai), 'before the being as to the world' (cf. verse John 24)."
I'm also including a link to Lesley Brown's article on EINAI in Greek philosophy.
See http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/16673/The_verb.pdf
See also https://books.google.com/books/about/Toward_a_descriptive_analysis_of_einai_r.html?id=s2UXAQAAIAAJ
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3265495?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=31-BQt-7_5c&feature=youtu.be
I believe that he errs by not being aware of how the Greek infinitive EINAI is sometimes used idiomatically or in certain settings. The rendering "was" is perfectly fine for John 17:5; more specifically, as A.T. Robertson writes, we should understand the passage to be saying: "'before the world was' (pro tou ton kosmon einai), 'before the being as to the world' (cf. verse John 24)."
I'm also including a link to Lesley Brown's article on EINAI in Greek philosophy.
See http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/16673/The_verb.pdf
See also https://books.google.com/books/about/Toward_a_descriptive_analysis_of_einai_r.html?id=s2UXAQAAIAAJ
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3265495?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Thursday, June 25, 2015
QANAH (Proverbs 8:22) and BARA
Admittedly, the exact sense of QANAH in Prov. 8:22 is highly contested. But there appear to be good reasons for understanding the Hebrew word as "created" in this verse:
"Some scholars question whether the first verb mentioned in v. 22a (QANAH) means anything more than 'to acquire, possess,' but the evidence from Ugaritic, Phoenician, and Hebrew is clear that 'to create' is one of its meanings. In Ugaritic, the fivefold repeated epithet of Asherah, QNYT 'LM, can only mean 'creator of the gods.' In Phoenician, 'L QN 'RS (KAI 26.iii.18) can only mean 'El, creator of the earth.' A similar epithet appears in Gen 14:19, 22, where El Elyon is called 'creator of heaven and earth.' In Deut 32:6 QANAH is parallel to 'to make' and 'to establish.' Thus, the Hebrew verb QANAH, in addition to the meaning 'to acquire, possess,' can also mean 'to create'" (Richard J. Clifford, Proverbs: A Commentary, p. 96).
On the other hand, BARA does not necessarily convey a sense of creating something EX NIHILO. A brief search in the Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament confirms this point. See TDOT 2:242-249.
TDOT notes that the LXX translates BARA by KTIZEIN ("to create") 17 times and POIEIN ("to make") 15 times. Other Greek terms that are used to render BARA are ARXEIN ("to begin"), GENNAN ("to beget"), KATADEIKNUNAI ("to show clearly, make known, establish"), DEIKNUEIN ("to show"), GINESQAI ("to become") and KATASKEUAZEIN ("to build, create"). But KTIZEIN is evidently not used in the LXX book of Genesis, though "the Hexaplaric translations choose KTIZEIN as a technical term" (2:246).
At any rate, BARA is certainly employed in Gen. 1:27 to describe a divine creation that is not produced EX NIHILO. Ps. 104:30 also does not allude to CREATIO EX NIHILO when it speaks of God creating animals through His emanative spirit of holiness. See also 1 QH 1:7; 1 QH 4:38; 1 QS 3:17-18. These Qumranic texts use BARA in a way that does not imply divine creation from nothing (EX NIHILO).
Additionally, Clifford (whom we quoted earlier) adds:
"In Biblical Hebrew, QANAH had two distinct senses--'to possess (by far the most common meaning) and 'to create, beget'" (Clifford, 96). Clifford himself seems to prefer the latter sense for QANAH in Prov 8:22 (94-96). But see the commentary on Proverbs by Michael V. Fox.
"Some scholars question whether the first verb mentioned in v. 22a (QANAH) means anything more than 'to acquire, possess,' but the evidence from Ugaritic, Phoenician, and Hebrew is clear that 'to create' is one of its meanings. In Ugaritic, the fivefold repeated epithet of Asherah, QNYT 'LM, can only mean 'creator of the gods.' In Phoenician, 'L QN 'RS (KAI 26.iii.18) can only mean 'El, creator of the earth.' A similar epithet appears in Gen 14:19, 22, where El Elyon is called 'creator of heaven and earth.' In Deut 32:6 QANAH is parallel to 'to make' and 'to establish.' Thus, the Hebrew verb QANAH, in addition to the meaning 'to acquire, possess,' can also mean 'to create'" (Richard J. Clifford, Proverbs: A Commentary, p. 96).
On the other hand, BARA does not necessarily convey a sense of creating something EX NIHILO. A brief search in the Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament confirms this point. See TDOT 2:242-249.
TDOT notes that the LXX translates BARA by KTIZEIN ("to create") 17 times and POIEIN ("to make") 15 times. Other Greek terms that are used to render BARA are ARXEIN ("to begin"), GENNAN ("to beget"), KATADEIKNUNAI ("to show clearly, make known, establish"), DEIKNUEIN ("to show"), GINESQAI ("to become") and KATASKEUAZEIN ("to build, create"). But KTIZEIN is evidently not used in the LXX book of Genesis, though "the Hexaplaric translations choose KTIZEIN as a technical term" (2:246).
At any rate, BARA is certainly employed in Gen. 1:27 to describe a divine creation that is not produced EX NIHILO. Ps. 104:30 also does not allude to CREATIO EX NIHILO when it speaks of God creating animals through His emanative spirit of holiness. See also 1 QH 1:7; 1 QH 4:38; 1 QS 3:17-18. These Qumranic texts use BARA in a way that does not imply divine creation from nothing (EX NIHILO).
Additionally, Clifford (whom we quoted earlier) adds:
"In Biblical Hebrew, QANAH had two distinct senses--'to possess (by far the most common meaning) and 'to create, beget'" (Clifford, 96). Clifford himself seems to prefer the latter sense for QANAH in Prov 8:22 (94-96). But see the commentary on Proverbs by Michael V. Fox.
Monday, June 22, 2015
Numbers 12:8 and Exodus 33:11
I want to expand on this subject later, but for now just want to point out that the expressions "face to face" and "mouth to mouth" (how Jehovah spoke to Moses) may or may not mean the same thing. Jewish exegetes/rabbis have gone both ways on this subject, and there seems to be no conclusive way that we can decide which view is correct. However, I notice that the Hebrew term for "face" is emphasized in Exod. 33:2, 19-20 and may signify the whole person or God's divine presence in that account. The shewbread was also known as the "bread of presence" or bread of faces (Lev. 24:5-8). Paul later speaks of seeing things "face to face" in 1 Cor 13:12 in contrast to how Christians behold things in the here and now.
Sunday, June 21, 2015
Marshall and the Comma Johanneum
I. Howard Marshall writes that the Johannine Comma "appears in no reputable modern version of the Bible as the actual text; most editions adopt the same practice as in the NIV of relegating the extra words to a footnote, while some (such as the RSV and NEB) totally ignore them" (Marshall, The Epistles of John, 236).
Marshall continues: "The words in fact occur in none of the Greek manuscripts of 1 John, except for a few late and worthless ones, and are not quoted by any early church writers, not even by those who would have joyfully seized upon this clear biblical testimony to the Trinity in their attacks on heretics: they probably owe their origin to some scribe who wrote them in the margin of his copy of 1 John: later they were erroneously regarded as part of the text. Beyond any shadow of a doubt the wording of the NIV text represents what John actually wrote. We must, therefore, confine our attention to the three witnesses of whom John did write, the Spirit, the water, and the blood" (Ibid).
Lastly, Marshall writes in ftn. 19 (Ibid):
"None of the ancient versions of the New Testament contains the words, except the Latin versions."
True, Marshall does say that the three neuter nouns in 1 John 5:8 that are introduced by a clause expressed in the masculine plural is "striking." He consequently attempts to explain their presence not by saying that the Comma has been wrongfully taken out of the Bible, but Marshall insists that John regards the Spirit as personal, and this leads to his subsequent personification of the Spirit. However, Daniel B. Wallace disagrees with Marshall here and points out in essence that personification may be employed by the writer without necessarily personalizing the Spirit (Wallace, GGBB, 332).
οτι τρεις εισιν οι μαρτυρουντες (1 John 5:7 Tischendorf 8th Edition)
Marshall continues: "The words in fact occur in none of the Greek manuscripts of 1 John, except for a few late and worthless ones, and are not quoted by any early church writers, not even by those who would have joyfully seized upon this clear biblical testimony to the Trinity in their attacks on heretics: they probably owe their origin to some scribe who wrote them in the margin of his copy of 1 John: later they were erroneously regarded as part of the text. Beyond any shadow of a doubt the wording of the NIV text represents what John actually wrote. We must, therefore, confine our attention to the three witnesses of whom John did write, the Spirit, the water, and the blood" (Ibid).
Lastly, Marshall writes in ftn. 19 (Ibid):
"None of the ancient versions of the New Testament contains the words, except the Latin versions."
True, Marshall does say that the three neuter nouns in 1 John 5:8 that are introduced by a clause expressed in the masculine plural is "striking." He consequently attempts to explain their presence not by saying that the Comma has been wrongfully taken out of the Bible, but Marshall insists that John regards the Spirit as personal, and this leads to his subsequent personification of the Spirit. However, Daniel B. Wallace disagrees with Marshall here and points out in essence that personification may be employed by the writer without necessarily personalizing the Spirit (Wallace, GGBB, 332).
οτι τρεις εισιν οι μαρτυρουντες (1 John 5:7 Tischendorf 8th Edition)
Wednesday, June 17, 2015
More Ignatius of Antioch Dialogue
Bob wrote on [Ephesians] 3:3: Jesus Christ, our inseparable life, is the mind of the Father IHSOU CRISTOU TO ADIAKRITON HMEN ZHN TOU PATROS H GUWMH WS
In this passage Ignatius simply calls Jesus, the mind of God. If meant in the absolute sense, then Jesus is God in the unqualified sense. If Ignatius is being figurative, then Jesus would not be God in that sense. It seems rather hard to maintain that Ignatius was speaking figuratively because the text contains very few, if any, diagnostic indicators of symbolism or any other contextual clues to substantiate this notion.
Edgar: I think your transliteration should be GNWMH and not GUWMH. I am not being pedantic or mean but me thinks it is important that we understand Ignatius is comparing Jesus to the divine "will" of God and not to God's mind. GNWMH is at times used in Greek literature as a substitute for QELHMA. See Plutarch De def. orac. and Schoedel (page 50). Schoedel thus translates the passage: "Indeed Jesus Christ, our inseparable life, is the Father's purpose; as also the bishops appointed in every quarter, are in the purpose of Jesus Christ" (Schoedel 48).
Schoedel also points out, though he is a Trinitarian, it seems: "The theological implications of Christ as the 'purpose' of the Father are thus probably minimal" (50).
Bob: [Ephesians] 7:2-There is one only physician, of flesh and of spirit, generate and ingenerate, God in man, true life in death, Son of Mary and Son of God, first passable and then impassable, Jesus Christ our Lord EIS IATROS ESTIN SARKIKOS KAI PNEUMATIKOS GENNHTOS KAI AGENNHTOS EN ANQRWPW QEOS EN QANATW ZON ALHQINH KAI EK MARIAS KAI EK QEOU PRWTON PAQHTOS KAI TOTE APAQHS IHSOUS XRISTOS hO KURIOS HMEN.
This passage is very interesting because of its structure. It speaks of Jesus as one physician of two natures, that of flesh and of spirit. It then goes on to develop each nature. Of the flesh it diagrams Jesus as begotten, man, mortality, of Mary, first one who could suffer, Christ. Of the spirit it diagrams Jesus as unbegotten, God, true life, of God, now unable to suffer, Lord.
Edgar: Schoedel writes that the distinctions made by Ignatius above cannot apply to the "internal relations of the Godhead" but it only applies to the incarnate Christ. However, I am puzzled over how one can apply Ignatius' words to the immanent Trinity or the economic Trinity. Subsequent believers [at Nicaea] declared that the Son is begotten, not created and that the Father is unbegotten. But how does one consider Christ "unbegotten" in relation to the cosmos (humanity) that he came to save? It is no wonder that Bart Ehrman writes in The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture that theologians would later find Ignatius' formulation in Eph 7:2 "vague." It does not seem to assist the Trinitarian case at all. It therefore has no theological force.
Interestingly Cyril C. Richardson plainly writes that Christ is called hO QEOS by Ignatius and he further points out that the bishop "does not explain, he only asserts that Christ is God" (Ignatius of Antioch, page 45). But Richardson goes beyond the surface structure or prima facie meaning of Ignatius' terminology and explores "what type of picture Ignatius has in mind when he employs the signifier QEOS. His conclusion?
"Unlike Theophilus of Antioch, he has nothing to say about God as creator; His eternity and invisibility are mentioned only in Pol. 3.2, and He is never predicated with immortality, the chief attribute of the heathen 'Gods.' For Ignatius QEOS means essentially a superhuman, moral being" (45).
He adds: "There is never a hint in his writing that Christ was in any way absorbed in God or confused with Him. He always stands in a place secondary and inferior to him" (44).
Consult The Christianity of Ignatius of Antioch. New York: AMS Press, 1967.
I also recommend Brown, Milton P. The Authentic Writings of Ignatius: A Study of Linguistic Criteria. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1963 for a solid analysis of the textual issues appertaining to the Ignatian epistles and a look at how he uses QEOS.
In this passage Ignatius simply calls Jesus, the mind of God. If meant in the absolute sense, then Jesus is God in the unqualified sense. If Ignatius is being figurative, then Jesus would not be God in that sense. It seems rather hard to maintain that Ignatius was speaking figuratively because the text contains very few, if any, diagnostic indicators of symbolism or any other contextual clues to substantiate this notion.
Edgar: I think your transliteration should be GNWMH and not GUWMH. I am not being pedantic or mean but me thinks it is important that we understand Ignatius is comparing Jesus to the divine "will" of God and not to God's mind. GNWMH is at times used in Greek literature as a substitute for QELHMA. See Plutarch De def. orac. and Schoedel (page 50). Schoedel thus translates the passage: "Indeed Jesus Christ, our inseparable life, is the Father's purpose; as also the bishops appointed in every quarter, are in the purpose of Jesus Christ" (Schoedel 48).
Schoedel also points out, though he is a Trinitarian, it seems: "The theological implications of Christ as the 'purpose' of the Father are thus probably minimal" (50).
Bob: [Ephesians] 7:2-There is one only physician, of flesh and of spirit, generate and ingenerate, God in man, true life in death, Son of Mary and Son of God, first passable and then impassable, Jesus Christ our Lord EIS IATROS ESTIN SARKIKOS KAI PNEUMATIKOS GENNHTOS KAI AGENNHTOS EN ANQRWPW QEOS EN QANATW ZON ALHQINH KAI EK MARIAS KAI EK QEOU PRWTON PAQHTOS KAI TOTE APAQHS IHSOUS XRISTOS hO KURIOS HMEN.
This passage is very interesting because of its structure. It speaks of Jesus as one physician of two natures, that of flesh and of spirit. It then goes on to develop each nature. Of the flesh it diagrams Jesus as begotten, man, mortality, of Mary, first one who could suffer, Christ. Of the spirit it diagrams Jesus as unbegotten, God, true life, of God, now unable to suffer, Lord.
Edgar: Schoedel writes that the distinctions made by Ignatius above cannot apply to the "internal relations of the Godhead" but it only applies to the incarnate Christ. However, I am puzzled over how one can apply Ignatius' words to the immanent Trinity or the economic Trinity. Subsequent believers [at Nicaea] declared that the Son is begotten, not created and that the Father is unbegotten. But how does one consider Christ "unbegotten" in relation to the cosmos (humanity) that he came to save? It is no wonder that Bart Ehrman writes in The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture that theologians would later find Ignatius' formulation in Eph 7:2 "vague." It does not seem to assist the Trinitarian case at all. It therefore has no theological force.
Interestingly Cyril C. Richardson plainly writes that Christ is called hO QEOS by Ignatius and he further points out that the bishop "does not explain, he only asserts that Christ is God" (Ignatius of Antioch, page 45). But Richardson goes beyond the surface structure or prima facie meaning of Ignatius' terminology and explores "what type of picture Ignatius has in mind when he employs the signifier QEOS. His conclusion?
"Unlike Theophilus of Antioch, he has nothing to say about God as creator; His eternity and invisibility are mentioned only in Pol. 3.2, and He is never predicated with immortality, the chief attribute of the heathen 'Gods.' For Ignatius QEOS means essentially a superhuman, moral being" (45).
He adds: "There is never a hint in his writing that Christ was in any way absorbed in God or confused with Him. He always stands in a place secondary and inferior to him" (44).
Consult The Christianity of Ignatius of Antioch. New York: AMS Press, 1967.
I also recommend Brown, Milton P. The Authentic Writings of Ignatius: A Study of Linguistic Criteria. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1963 for a solid analysis of the textual issues appertaining to the Ignatian epistles and a look at how he uses QEOS.
Monday, June 15, 2015
Revelation 11:10 (βασανίζω)
BDAG says under the entry for βασανίζω: "of prophetic testimony as source of annoyance Rv 11:10.--9:5; 14:10; 20:10; GPt; Hv 3, 7, 6; s 6, 4, 1f; 4; 6, 5, 3f; 6" (Page 168).
Furthermore, the context of Rev. 11:10 shows that the two prophets use their powers to kill and devour their enemies. How could such powerful feats literally torment those who dwell on the earth? The testimony of the two witnesses vexes those who dwell upon the earth (Cf. C.H. Giblin, "Revelation 11:1-13: Its Form, Function and Contextual Integration," NTS 30 (1984): 433-59.)
Furthermore, the context of Rev. 11:10 shows that the two prophets use their powers to kill and devour their enemies. How could such powerful feats literally torment those who dwell on the earth? The testimony of the two witnesses vexes those who dwell upon the earth (Cf. C.H. Giblin, "Revelation 11:1-13: Its Form, Function and Contextual Integration," NTS 30 (1984): 433-59.)
Sunday, June 14, 2015
Free Will and Foreknowledge (A Draft)
I'm thinking out loud here. So none of what I write below should be viewed as definitive or conclusive.
Let S = a rational or moral subject (a doer)
Let T = a given time
Let A = an action performed by S
Assume that "acting freely" is being used in a libertarian sense where S has the power to perform A or has the power to refrain from performing A.
William Lane Craig criticizes those who believe that God's prior knowledge of what S will freely do at T2 implies fatalism. He thinks that whoever infers fatalism from God's foreknowledge of what S will do at T2 has committed the so-called "modal fallacy." But I believe that my argument is rather in the form of a reductio ad absurdum:
1) It is impossible for God to hold a false belief (divine omniscience).
2) God knows at T1 that S will freely do A at T2.
3) So S will freely do A at T2.
4) But if S is able to act freely, then S can do A or refrain from doing A at T2.
5) If S refrains from doing A at T2, then God's belief at T1 will be falsified.
6) Either it's possible for God to hold a false belief at T1 or it's possible for S to do or refrain from doing A at T2.
7) God cannot hold a false belief at T1.
8) Therefore, it's not possible for S to refrain from doing A at T2.
Or maybe what I want to argue is:
1) Either it's possible for God to hold a false belief at T1 or it's possible that S can either do A or refrain from doing A at T2.
2) It's not possible for God to hold a false belief at T1.
2) God believes at T1 that S will do A at T2.
3) Therefore, it's not possible that S can either do A or refrain from doing A at T2.
Conclusion: If God believes at T1 that S will do A at T2, then S cannot do otherwise than A at T2.
Let S = a rational or moral subject (a doer)
Let T = a given time
Let A = an action performed by S
Assume that "acting freely" is being used in a libertarian sense where S has the power to perform A or has the power to refrain from performing A.
William Lane Craig criticizes those who believe that God's prior knowledge of what S will freely do at T2 implies fatalism. He thinks that whoever infers fatalism from God's foreknowledge of what S will do at T2 has committed the so-called "modal fallacy." But I believe that my argument is rather in the form of a reductio ad absurdum:
1) It is impossible for God to hold a false belief (divine omniscience).
2) God knows at T1 that S will freely do A at T2.
3) So S will freely do A at T2.
4) But if S is able to act freely, then S can do A or refrain from doing A at T2.
5) If S refrains from doing A at T2, then God's belief at T1 will be falsified.
6) Either it's possible for God to hold a false belief at T1 or it's possible for S to do or refrain from doing A at T2.
7) God cannot hold a false belief at T1.
8) Therefore, it's not possible for S to refrain from doing A at T2.
Or maybe what I want to argue is:
1) Either it's possible for God to hold a false belief at T1 or it's possible that S can either do A or refrain from doing A at T2.
2) It's not possible for God to hold a false belief at T1.
2) God believes at T1 that S will do A at T2.
3) Therefore, it's not possible that S can either do A or refrain from doing A at T2.
Conclusion: If God believes at T1 that S will do A at T2, then S cannot do otherwise than A at T2.
The Potential Meaning of John 1:14 (SARX)
I believe in soteriological redemption through the ransom sacrifice of Jesus Christ; John 3:16 is near and dear to my heart. Yet the idea that John 1:14 teaches that Christ assumed "human nature" is evidently an abstraction taken from the Gospel account. Maybe the abstraction is correct as Wallace argues in GGBB, but the Greek of 1:14 could easily mean "The Word became a human" rather than "The Word assumed human nature." (See BDAG under the entry for "SARX.") In other words, it's possible to understand SARX in a count noun sense at 1:14 as opposed to interpreting the signifier with a mass noun sense.
Ignatian Theology (Parts of a Dialogue)
I've tried to include the portions of the dialogue that directly bear on interpretations of Ignatius. Slight edits have been made for ease of reading, but the edited discussion is substantially identical to the original.
I've also named my interlocutor "Bob" to protect his identity. It now begins:
Bob on Magnesians 6.1: So clearly, the full meaning here is that Jesus was with the father before time even existed. To be above time, and to in fact create time is to not be bound by it. To not be bound by time and to be before the beginning is to, by definition, be God! The reason, there simply is no definition to how long (in time) Jesus existed with the Father before time even existed. It undefined [SIC].
Edgar: Ignatius' view may be that the one who became Jesus was with God before time began, however, this fact (if it is one) in no way implies that he imputes Godhood (in its fullness) to the Messiah. One thing you are overlooking is that Ignatius evidently thinks there is a divine hierarchy that is (imperfectly) reflected in the ecclesia of God on earth. His overall argument seems to be that monotheism implies that there should be a monepiscopacy (one bishop) in the church. That is no doubt why he urges his readers to submit to the bishop as if submitting to God:
"I exhort you to strive to do all things in harmony with God: the bishop is to preside in the place of God, while the presbyters are to function as the council of the Apostles, and the deacons, who are most dear to me, are entrusted with the ministry of Jesus Christ, who before time began was with the Father . . ." (Magnesians 6:1-2).
He is promoting the notion of a divine hierarchy. While I do not think this particular concept is biblical, we know that one can believe Christ is a divine being hierarchically lower than the Father per his distinct grade of being without believing that he is fully/truly God (VERE DEUS). This idea is contained in the writings of Origen, Tertullian, and Justin. And it also appears to be a part of Ignatian thinking as well.
Bob on Magnesians 8:2:
there is one God who manifested Himself through Jesus Christ His Son, who is His Word hOTI EIS QEOS ESTIN hO FANERWSAS hEAUTON DIA IHSOU CRISTOU TOU UIOU AUTOU hOS ESTIN AUTOU LOGOS
Once again Ignatius returns to the theme of the ONE TRUE GOD became evidential reality through the agency of Jesus. The
case becomes more and more overwhelming that Ignatius believed Jesus to be God in the unqualified sense more and more.
Edgar: I think you need to read this text more carefully. The "one God" who manifested Himself through the Son, according to Ignatius, is the Father. I thus do not think this passage serves as an effective prooftext for you. Please note:
"There is one God, who manifested Himself through Jesus Christ, His Son--who, being His Word, came forth out of the silence into the world and won the full approval of him whose Ambassador he was' (Magnesians 8).
Notice how the context of Magnesians 8 militates against your interpretation of this text.
Bob: 13:1 by faith and by love, in the Son and Father and in the Spirit PISTEI KAI AGAPH EN UIW KAI PATRI KAI EN PNEMATI
This passage may not be proof beyond reasonable doubt that Ignatius believed in the Trinity but it sure is a great piece of circumstantial evidence when one considers the balance of what he wrote about Jesus being God in the unqualified sense. Also, and interestingly all of Ignatius' writings are Jesus-centric.
Edgar: I am glad you recognize that just mentioning the "three" together does not mean one is affirming the Trinity. Furthermore, as I have tried to make clear in this series of posts, context is everything: each Ignatian passage must be read in context.
Bob: for the record, the name Jesus occurs 129 times in the writings of Ignatius and the Father only occurs 46 times. Additionall the tri-naming of the Son, Father, and Spirit it is the Son who's name appears first in precedence, may possibly indicting importance or relevance to the writer.
Edgar: I appreciate your submission, Bob, because it seems that you worked hard on it and you actually forced me to go back and read Ignatius again. But I think you need to be aware that the line of argumentation employed in the paragraph above is not probative in force. For instance, discourse analysts remind us that texts must be weighed, not simply counted. Sometimes folks are inclined to believe that just because a certain linguistic phenomenon [or word] occurs with relative frequency, the said phenomenon carries some kind of authoritative weight vis-a-vis the interpretation of the text. But discourse analysis has shown us that such is not the case: a text--in this case, terms--must be weighed and not counted (only).
Secondly, textual criticism teaches us the same lesson. Just because a number of manuscripts have a particular reading does not mean that the most common lectio is the preferred reading. I am sure that you have observed this principle at work when studying Scripture.
Lastly, using the Son's name so many times in no way suggests that Ignatius thinks the Son is preeminent in relation to the Father. For he consistently shows that the Son is not superior [or equal] to the Father:
"Likewise, let all respect the deacons as representing Jesus Christ, the bishop as a type of the Father, and the presbyters as God's high council and as the Apostolic college. Apart from these, no church deserves the name" (Trallians 3).
Saturday, June 13, 2015
The Problem of Universals, Christian Physicalism and Modern Neuroscience
I teach about and like to study medieval writers. One perennial debate during the Middle Ages was the "problem of universals."
Now I'm not convinced that universals in the Platonic or Aristotelian sense exist (i.e., rednesss itself, circularity, squareness or beauty as such), but let's assume that we can talk meaningfully about universals, whether they're Platonic, Aristotelian, Ockhamist or Abelardian. We might develop a scenario like the following based on modern psychology:
A) Distal stimulus: a diamond
B) Proximal stimulus: the information from the sensory object (e.g., a diamond) that reaches our sensory receptors
C) Neural networks: the brain is able to form varying representations of the distal stimulus
D) These representations constitute what philosophers have called "universals."
See Rod Plotnik's Introduction to Psychology.
In truth, there is no one answer to this question from a neuroscientific perspective but there are theories which try to explain perception and concept-formation (abstraction). Joseph LeDoux has written an interesting work on this subject entitled The Synaptic Self. I am most convinced by his neuroscientific account and Antonio Damasio's explanation of the embodied self.
Of course, one cannot be dogmatic about such matters, but my ultimate goal is to understand what the self is. How does science correlate to what we learn from Scripture? There appears to be evidence that we do not have souls, but are souls (Genesis 2:7; 1 Corinthians 15:45). While no neuroscientific theory has definitively explained the self, I also don't see a need to invoke the soul concept as an explanation for perception or abstraction.
Now I'm not convinced that universals in the Platonic or Aristotelian sense exist (i.e., rednesss itself, circularity, squareness or beauty as such), but let's assume that we can talk meaningfully about universals, whether they're Platonic, Aristotelian, Ockhamist or Abelardian. We might develop a scenario like the following based on modern psychology:
A) Distal stimulus: a diamond
B) Proximal stimulus: the information from the sensory object (e.g., a diamond) that reaches our sensory receptors
C) Neural networks: the brain is able to form varying representations of the distal stimulus
D) These representations constitute what philosophers have called "universals."
See Rod Plotnik's Introduction to Psychology.
In truth, there is no one answer to this question from a neuroscientific perspective but there are theories which try to explain perception and concept-formation (abstraction). Joseph LeDoux has written an interesting work on this subject entitled The Synaptic Self. I am most convinced by his neuroscientific account and Antonio Damasio's explanation of the embodied self.
Of course, one cannot be dogmatic about such matters, but my ultimate goal is to understand what the self is. How does science correlate to what we learn from Scripture? There appears to be evidence that we do not have souls, but are souls (Genesis 2:7; 1 Corinthians 15:45). While no neuroscientific theory has definitively explained the self, I also don't see a need to invoke the soul concept as an explanation for perception or abstraction.
Friday, June 12, 2015
How γίνομαι Is Used By Scriptural Writers
Here are some examples of γίνομαι (the aorist middle form ἐγένετο is employed in John 1:14) and brief comments about how it is utilized in each cited verse:
Matt. 4:3-used by Satan who asks Jesus to make some stones become loaves of bread: καὶ προσελθὼν ὁ πειράζων εἶπεν αὐτῷ Εἰ Υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰπὲ ἵνα οἱ λίθοι οὗτοι ἄρτοι γένωνται.
John 1:3-The Apostle writes that all things (πάντα) came into being through the LOGOS (δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο).
John 1:12-Humans who exercise faith in Jesus and receive him are given the authority "to become" (γενέσθαι) God's children (τέκνα Θεοῦ ).
John 1:14-The LOGOS became flesh: Καὶ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ Πατρός, πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας.
Heb. 11:3-τοὺς αἰῶνας came to be out of things that do not appear: Πίστει νοοῦμεν κατηρτίσθαι τοὺς αἰῶνας ῥήματι Θεοῦ, εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων τὸ βλεπόμενον γεγονέναι.
Cf. Matt. 5:45 and countless other examples.
Image from BDAG.
Matt. 4:3-used by Satan who asks Jesus to make some stones become loaves of bread: καὶ προσελθὼν ὁ πειράζων εἶπεν αὐτῷ Εἰ Υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰπὲ ἵνα οἱ λίθοι οὗτοι ἄρτοι γένωνται.
John 1:3-The Apostle writes that all things (πάντα) came into being through the LOGOS (δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο).
John 1:12-Humans who exercise faith in Jesus and receive him are given the authority "to become" (γενέσθαι) God's children (τέκνα Θεοῦ ).
John 1:14-The LOGOS became flesh: Καὶ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ Πατρός, πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας.
Heb. 11:3-τοὺς αἰῶνας came to be out of things that do not appear: Πίστει νοοῦμεν κατηρτίσθαι τοὺς αἰῶνας ῥήματι Θεοῦ, εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων τὸ βλεπόμενον γεγονέναι.
Cf. Matt. 5:45 and countless other examples.
Image from BDAG.
Tuesday, June 09, 2015
Anaphora and Holy Scripture
The SIL Glossary of Linguistic Terms defines anaphora this way:
"Anaphora is coreference of one expression with its antecedent. The antecedent provides the information necessary for the expression's interpretation. This is often understood as an expression 'referring' back to the antecedent."
The American Heritage Dictionary points out that the term "anaphora" can also refer to "The deliberate repetition of a word or phrase at the beginning of several successive verses, clauses, or paragraphs; for example, 'We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills' (Winston S. Churchill)."
Knowing about anaphora is important since Bible writers such as Paul evidently make use of this literary device (rhetorical trope) when penning their inspired letters to primitive congregations that obtained under the suzerainty of Roman rule.
The longest example of anaphora in Scripture is found at Heb. 11. There, the writer of Hebrews continually uses Πίστει to delineate the many acts of faith performed by those who lived prior to the Messiah's first-century manifestation.
Paul further utilizes anaphora in 1 Cor. 13:7; Phil. 4:8. His employment of ὅσα in the latter passage is skilled and makes the text easy to remember: his style is apparently deliberate and observably efficacious. Rhetoric, as can be seen from Paul's writings, is not always something that should be placed in a pejorative light.
Concerning ὅσα, Meyer's NT Commentary states: "nothing being excepted, expressed asyndetically six times with the emphasis of an earnest ἐπιμονή. Comp. Php 2:1, Php 3:2; Buttmann, Neut. Gr. p. 341 [E. T. 398]."
"Anaphora is coreference of one expression with its antecedent. The antecedent provides the information necessary for the expression's interpretation. This is often understood as an expression 'referring' back to the antecedent."
The American Heritage Dictionary points out that the term "anaphora" can also refer to "The deliberate repetition of a word or phrase at the beginning of several successive verses, clauses, or paragraphs; for example, 'We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills' (Winston S. Churchill)."
Knowing about anaphora is important since Bible writers such as Paul evidently make use of this literary device (rhetorical trope) when penning their inspired letters to primitive congregations that obtained under the suzerainty of Roman rule.
The longest example of anaphora in Scripture is found at Heb. 11. There, the writer of Hebrews continually uses Πίστει to delineate the many acts of faith performed by those who lived prior to the Messiah's first-century manifestation.
Paul further utilizes anaphora in 1 Cor. 13:7; Phil. 4:8. His employment of ὅσα in the latter passage is skilled and makes the text easy to remember: his style is apparently deliberate and observably efficacious. Rhetoric, as can be seen from Paul's writings, is not always something that should be placed in a pejorative light.
Concerning ὅσα, Meyer's NT Commentary states: "nothing being excepted, expressed asyndetically six times with the emphasis of an earnest ἐπιμονή. Comp. Php 2:1, Php 3:2; Buttmann, Neut. Gr. p. 341 [E. T. 398]."
Monday, June 08, 2015
Brief Notes on the Rescensions of Ignatius' Epistles
Schoedel and Lightfoot appear to speak favorably regarding the middle recension of the Ignatian epistles but the long and short recensions continue to spark controversy. For a helpful discussion of all three recensions, see W. Schoedel's Ignatius of Antioch: A Commentary on the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985.
The Syriac version of the Ignatian Epistles is also known as the short recension and it is "nothing more than an abridgement" of the epistles to Polycarp, the Ephesians and the letter to the Romans which includes a paragraph from Trallians. See Schoedel 3, and consult ftn. 15 on the same page for more details. See https://books.google.com/books?id=3UEYAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=syriac+version+ignatius&hl=en&sa=X&ei=m7V1VanDD4qTsAXOyYOwCg&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=syriac%20version%20ignatius&f=false
The Berlin papyrus for these works is dated 5th century and it contains Smyrneans 3.3-12.1.
It is also known as cod. 10581 or P. See http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/ignatius-intro.html
The Syriac version of the Ignatian Epistles is also known as the short recension and it is "nothing more than an abridgement" of the epistles to Polycarp, the Ephesians and the letter to the Romans which includes a paragraph from Trallians. See Schoedel 3, and consult ftn. 15 on the same page for more details. See https://books.google.com/books?id=3UEYAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=syriac+version+ignatius&hl=en&sa=X&ei=m7V1VanDD4qTsAXOyYOwCg&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=syriac%20version%20ignatius&f=false
The Berlin papyrus for these works is dated 5th century and it contains Smyrneans 3.3-12.1.
It is also known as cod. 10581 or P. See http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/ignatius-intro.html
F.C. Conybeare on 1 John 5:7 (Johannine Comma)-Quoted Material
In the First Epistle of John, Chap. V., vs. 7, most but not all Copies of the Latin Bible, called the Vulgate, read as follows:---
"For there are three who bear witness in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one. And there are three that bear witness on earth: the Spirit and the water and the blood: and these three are one."
In the first printed edition of the New Testament, called the Complutensian, prepared at Alcala in Spain in 1514 by Cardinal Francis Ximenes, the words here italicised were included, having been translated from the Latin text into Greek; for the Greek MSS used did not contain them. They are only found in two Greek MSS., one of the fifteenth the other of the sixteenth century. About 400 other Greek Codices from the fourth century down to the fourteenth ignore them. All MSS of the Old Latin Version anterior to Jerome lack them, and in the oldest Copies even of Jerome's recension of the Latin text, called the Vulgate, they are conspicuously absent. The first Church writer to cite the verse in such a text was Priscillian, a Spaniard, who was also the first heretic to be burned alive by the Church in the year 385. After him Vigilius, Bishop of Thapsa, cites it about 484. It is probable that the later Latin fathers mistook what was only a comment of
Cyprian Bishop of Carthage (died 258) for a citation
of the text. In any case, it filtered from them into
the Vulgate text, [1] from which, as we have seen, it
was translated into Greek and inserted in two or three
very late manuscripts.
Erasmus's first edition of the Greek Testament, in
1516, omitted the verse, as also did the second; but
in 1522 he issued a third edition containing it.
Robert Stephens also inserted it in his edition of
1546, which formed the basis of all subsequent
editions of the Greek Testament until recently, and is
known as the Received Text, or Textus Receptus.
[END QUOTE]
See Conybeare's History of NT Criticism, pages 91-98.
BDAG on TA PANTA = "All Things" (Absolute and Relative Sense)
[Taken from my personal archives]
For PANTA, BAGD gives information for an absolute sense of the word (Rom. 9:5; Eph. 1:22a; Rev. 21:5), but the Scriptures also show that PANTA (like TA PANTA, see BAGD 633) can be utilized in a relative sense as well. The context and the overall teaching of the holy writings can help us to determine when PANTA (TA PANTA) is used in an absolute or relative sense. Obviously, when Rom. 9:5 exclaims that God rules "all things," we can pretty much conclude that nothing is excluded from His suzerainty (an absolute sense). Other uses of PANTA (TA PANTA) do not seem to fit into this mold, however. Cf. 1 Cor. 3:21; 15:22, 27; Eph. 4:4-6; Phil. 3:8. This is what can properly be termed, the relative sense of PANTA. In other words, "all things" do not encompass "everything" in toto/ex toto.
Now what about John 1:3? Is it possible that contra BAGD, PANTA is used in a relative sense here? Well if ARXH (John 1:1-2) is being employed in the sense of "the beginning of God's creative work overall (spirit and material world)," as it evidently is used in Prov. 8:22--then PANTA could very well appear in a relative sense at 1:3. TDNT also allows this understanding. There, Delling writes that Rev. 3:14 may denote that Jesus Christ is the 'principle and source of creation.' But TDNT goes on to say:
"Otherwise the usage reflects rabbinic usage and the Messiah is before the world, yet himself created" (TDNT 1:484, ftn. 34).
Origen also understood PANTA in John 1:3 to have a limited sense: he felt that nothing was strictly uncreated except the Father:
(From Commentary on John 2.7)
For PANTA, BAGD gives information for an absolute sense of the word (Rom. 9:5; Eph. 1:22a; Rev. 21:5), but the Scriptures also show that PANTA (like TA PANTA, see BAGD 633) can be utilized in a relative sense as well. The context and the overall teaching of the holy writings can help us to determine when PANTA (TA PANTA) is used in an absolute or relative sense. Obviously, when Rom. 9:5 exclaims that God rules "all things," we can pretty much conclude that nothing is excluded from His suzerainty (an absolute sense). Other uses of PANTA (TA PANTA) do not seem to fit into this mold, however. Cf. 1 Cor. 3:21; 15:22, 27; Eph. 4:4-6; Phil. 3:8. This is what can properly be termed, the relative sense of PANTA. In other words, "all things" do not encompass "everything" in toto/ex toto.
Now what about John 1:3? Is it possible that contra BAGD, PANTA is used in a relative sense here? Well if ARXH (John 1:1-2) is being employed in the sense of "the beginning of God's creative work overall (spirit and material world)," as it evidently is used in Prov. 8:22--then PANTA could very well appear in a relative sense at 1:3. TDNT also allows this understanding. There, Delling writes that Rev. 3:14 may denote that Jesus Christ is the 'principle and source of creation.' But TDNT goes on to say:
"Otherwise the usage reflects rabbinic usage and the Messiah is before the world, yet himself created" (TDNT 1:484, ftn. 34).
Origen also understood PANTA in John 1:3 to have a limited sense: he felt that nothing was strictly uncreated except the Father:
All, then, who have part in Him who is, and the saints have part in Him, may properly be called Beings; but those who have given up their part in the Being, by depriving themselves of Being, have become Not-beings. But we said when entering on this discussion, that Not-being and Nothing are synonymous, and hence those who are not beings are Nothing, and all evil is nothing, since it is Not-being, and thus since they are called Not-being came into existence without the Logos, not being numbered among the all things which were made through Him. Thus we have shown, so far as our powers admit, what are the "all things" which were made through the Logos, and what came into existence without Him, since at no time is it Being, and it is, therefore, called "Nothing."
(From Commentary on John 2.7)
Sunday, June 07, 2015
Asyndeton in 1 Cor 13:7
Originally dated Nov 7, 2003 (slightly edited on 6/7/15)
πάντα στέγει, πάντα πιστεύει, πάντα ἐλπίζει, πάντα ὑπομένει (1 Corinthians 13:7, Tischendorf 8th).
Notice that there are no conjunctions in the passage above--this literary device is called asyndeton. The Greek word ἀσύνδετον can mean "not bound together." The Latin historian Tacitus employs asyndeton (zero conjunctions)) in order to move a story along quickly or aid a reader's memory. As David A. Black likewise points out, a noted example of this rhetorical device reportedly comes from Julius Caesar: Veni, vidi, vici ("I came, I saw, I conquered").
Paul also uses asyndeton in Romans 1:29-32, but I find 1 Corinthians 13:7 especially easy to remember because of the stylistic device used there. For more info on asyndeton and its opposing device, polysyndeton, see D.A. Black's Linguistics for Students of NT Greek, p. 134.
πάντα στέγει, πάντα πιστεύει, πάντα ἐλπίζει, πάντα ὑπομένει (1 Corinthians 13:7, Tischendorf 8th).
Notice that there are no conjunctions in the passage above--this literary device is called asyndeton. The Greek word ἀσύνδετον can mean "not bound together." The Latin historian Tacitus employs asyndeton (zero conjunctions)) in order to move a story along quickly or aid a reader's memory. As David A. Black likewise points out, a noted example of this rhetorical device reportedly comes from Julius Caesar: Veni, vidi, vici ("I came, I saw, I conquered").
Paul also uses asyndeton in Romans 1:29-32, but I find 1 Corinthians 13:7 especially easy to remember because of the stylistic device used there. For more info on asyndeton and its opposing device, polysyndeton, see D.A. Black's Linguistics for Students of NT Greek, p. 134.
Saturday, June 06, 2015
Hell (Gehenna), Death, the Soul and Matthew 10:28
"Apply whatever torture devices you have to my body; you can't reach my will, no matter how much you wish (4 Maccabees 10:4).
The Oxford RSV notes that 4 Macc 10:4 does not occur in certain MSS: it goes on to say that this passage may be an interpolation. Furthermore, the passage may not have been written until sometime after Jesus' death (ca. 63 BCE-120 CE). Thus it may truly have no bearing on how we should understand Mt 10:28.
As for eternal torments: Neither Matthew nor Luke indicate that eternal suffering is being discussed by Jesus since Matthew writes that the soul can be "destroyed" by God "in Gehenna," while Luke notes that Jehovah "after he has killed," has the power to throw into Gehenna (Lk 12:4-5).
Furthermore, TDNT IX:646 observes:
In harmony with other OT usages, Mt 10:28 could be using YUXH in the sense of life.
Additionally, John L. McKenzie (SJ) has some interesting observations regarding YUXH and Gehenna. He writes:
"Gehenna is also mentioned frequently in the rabbinical literature where it also appears as a pit of fire, a place of punishment for the wicked. In rabbinical literature, however, the eternal fire is not surely eternal punishment. The rabbis at times see the possibility of annihilation of the wicked or even of their release after a period of punishment" (McKenzie 300).
For a text that I think has a bearing on Mt 10:28 and the use of Gehenna there, see Isa 66:24.
McKenzie also adds:
"It [Gehenna] is a place where the wicked are destroyed body and soul, which perhaps echoes the idea of annihilation (Mt 10:28)."
He also contends that the "apocalyptic imagery" contained in certain NT passages should be taken for what it is, to wit, "imagery." The pictorial nature of "torments" should not be construed as "strictly literal theological affirmation" (300).
Gehenna is evidently neither a literal geographical place (in eschatological texts) nor an eternal locus of torture: Jesus seems to use the term in a figurative way. Gehenna appears to be representative of everlasting oblivion. NT Wright's advice is sagacious in this matter:
The Oxford RSV notes that 4 Macc 10:4 does not occur in certain MSS: it goes on to say that this passage may be an interpolation. Furthermore, the passage may not have been written until sometime after Jesus' death (ca. 63 BCE-120 CE). Thus it may truly have no bearing on how we should understand Mt 10:28.
As for eternal torments: Neither Matthew nor Luke indicate that eternal suffering is being discussed by Jesus since Matthew writes that the soul can be "destroyed" by God "in Gehenna," while Luke notes that Jehovah "after he has killed," has the power to throw into Gehenna (Lk 12:4-5).
Furthermore, TDNT IX:646 observes:
"In Mt 10:28, however, the reference to God's power to destroy the YUXH and SWMA in Hades [Gehenna] is opposed to the idea of the immortality of the soul. VII, 1058, 15. For it is again apparent that man can be thought of only as a whole, both YUXH and SWMA. This view of man comes up against the undeniable fact that men are killed, e.g., in the persecution of the community. As Mk 8:35ff . . . already maintains, however, the YUXH, i.e., the true life of man as it is lived before God and in fellowship with God, is not affected by this. Only the SWMA (-----> VII, 1058, 15ff.)"
In harmony with other OT usages, Mt 10:28 could be using YUXH in the sense of life.
Additionally, John L. McKenzie (SJ) has some interesting observations regarding YUXH and Gehenna. He writes:
"Gehenna is also mentioned frequently in the rabbinical literature where it also appears as a pit of fire, a place of punishment for the wicked. In rabbinical literature, however, the eternal fire is not surely eternal punishment. The rabbis at times see the possibility of annihilation of the wicked or even of their release after a period of punishment" (McKenzie 300).
For a text that I think has a bearing on Mt 10:28 and the use of Gehenna there, see Isa 66:24.
McKenzie also adds:
"It [Gehenna] is a place where the wicked are destroyed body and soul, which perhaps echoes the idea of annihilation (Mt 10:28)."
He also contends that the "apocalyptic imagery" contained in certain NT passages should be taken for what it is, to wit, "imagery." The pictorial nature of "torments" should not be construed as "strictly literal theological affirmation" (300).
Gehenna is evidently neither a literal geographical place (in eschatological texts) nor an eternal locus of torture: Jesus seems to use the term in a figurative way. Gehenna appears to be representative of everlasting oblivion. NT Wright's advice is sagacious in this matter:
"It should of course be noted again that 'Gehenna' is the name of the smouldering rubbish-heap outside the south-west corner of Jerusalem . . . The extent to which it is used in the gospels metaphorically for an entirely
non-physical place of torment, and the extent to which, in its metaphorical use, it retains the sense of a physical conflagration such as might accompany the destruction of Jerusalem by enemy forces, ought not to be decided in advance of a full study of Jesus' meaning" (Jesus and the Victory of God, page 454-455).
Friday, June 05, 2015
Genesis 3:22 (Jeff Benner)
Duncan writes:
"Benner's note on 3:22:-
The Hebrew phrase וּנֶמִׁמַדַחאְַּכ can be translated as 'like one of us' (referring to the Elohiym, a plural word) or 'like one of him' (referring to the serpent). Compare with the words of the serpent in verse 5."
REPLY from EDGAR: Since this information does not immediately deal with aposiopesis, I started a new thread. My questions would be
1) What is the grammatical basis for rendering 3:22 with "like one of him"?
2) Why would the knowledge of good and evil be attributed to the serpent?
Gen 3:5 attributes this special knowledge to God.
Elohim could refer to the one God although it has the plural suffix.
"Benner's note on 3:22:-
The Hebrew phrase וּנֶמִׁמַדַחאְַּכ can be translated as 'like one of us' (referring to the Elohiym, a plural word) or 'like one of him' (referring to the serpent). Compare with the words of the serpent in verse 5."
REPLY from EDGAR: Since this information does not immediately deal with aposiopesis, I started a new thread. My questions would be
1) What is the grammatical basis for rendering 3:22 with "like one of him"?
2) Why would the knowledge of good and evil be attributed to the serpent?
Gen 3:5 attributes this special knowledge to God.
Elohim could refer to the one God although it has the plural suffix.
John 7:8
ὑμεῖς ἀνάβητε εἰς τὴν ἑορτήν· ἐγὼ οὔπω ἀναβαίνω εἰς τὴν ἑορτὴν ταύτην, ὅτι ὁ ἐμὸς καιρὸς οὔπω πεπλήρωται (John 7:8 WH).
The reading οὔπω in Jn 7:8 "was introduced at an early date (it is attested by P66, 75) in order to alleviate the inconsistency between ver. 8 and ver. 10" (Bruce Metzger, A Textual Commentary).
However, Ernst Haenchen in his commentary on John seems to think that οὔπω is original (See Haenchen, John 2:7).
He reasons: "If Jesus does not know when his time is fulfilled and the Father calls him to Jerusalem (to die?) then logically he cannot say 'not,' but must say, as in v 6, 'not yet.' "
Even if οὐκ ("not") is less than original, and we cannot be positively sure at this time which reading is correct, John's use of οὐκ still does not mean that Jesus lied. A.T. Robertson points out that Jesus "did not change his plans . . . He simply refused to fall in with his brothers' sneering proposal for a grand Messianic procession with the
caravan on the way to the feast" (Word Pictures in the NT).
"the more definite--and more difficult--reading, 'I am not going,' is undoubtedly the correct one. Jesus is represented as clearly refusing his brothers' proposal. He will not go to this festival at their request or initiative but only as his Father directs" (J.R. Michaels, John, 127).
Robert Mounce concurs: "The NIV follows the inferior textual tradition that reads oupō ('not yet') rather than ou ('not'), thus alleviating the apparent inconsistency with v. 10 in which Jesus does go to Jerusalem. It is better to follow the shorter text (so NASB) and understand Jesus as saying no more than he will not be going up to the Feast at that specific time (i.e., with his brothers). He is simply turning down their request— not promising that he will not go to the Feast a bit later when the time is right. Having turned down the advice of his brothers, Jesus remains for a time in Galilee."
Mounce, Robert H. John (The Expositor's Bible Commentary) (Kindle Locations 4043-4047). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.
Another Johannine scholar insists: "He refuses in the plainest terms to comply with human--and unbelieving--advice, acting with complete freedom and independence with regard to men, but in complete obedience to his Father" (Barrett, John, 313).
"That Jesus eventually goes to the festival ἐν κρυπτῷ is to be interepreted strictly in relation to [John 7:4]: he journeys quietly to Jerusalem, without making any ostentatious entry into the city or drawing attention to himself on arrival at the festival" (G. R. Beasley-Murray, John , 107).
The reading οὔπω in Jn 7:8 "was introduced at an early date (it is attested by P66, 75) in order to alleviate the inconsistency between ver. 8 and ver. 10" (Bruce Metzger, A Textual Commentary).
However, Ernst Haenchen in his commentary on John seems to think that οὔπω is original (See Haenchen, John 2:7).
He reasons: "If Jesus does not know when his time is fulfilled and the Father calls him to Jerusalem (to die?) then logically he cannot say 'not,' but must say, as in v 6, 'not yet.' "
Even if οὐκ ("not") is less than original, and we cannot be positively sure at this time which reading is correct, John's use of οὐκ still does not mean that Jesus lied. A.T. Robertson points out that Jesus "did not change his plans . . . He simply refused to fall in with his brothers' sneering proposal for a grand Messianic procession with the
caravan on the way to the feast" (Word Pictures in the NT).
"the more definite--and more difficult--reading, 'I am not going,' is undoubtedly the correct one. Jesus is represented as clearly refusing his brothers' proposal. He will not go to this festival at their request or initiative but only as his Father directs" (J.R. Michaels, John, 127).
Robert Mounce concurs: "The NIV follows the inferior textual tradition that reads oupō ('not yet') rather than ou ('not'), thus alleviating the apparent inconsistency with v. 10 in which Jesus does go to Jerusalem. It is better to follow the shorter text (so NASB) and understand Jesus as saying no more than he will not be going up to the Feast at that specific time (i.e., with his brothers). He is simply turning down their request— not promising that he will not go to the Feast a bit later when the time is right. Having turned down the advice of his brothers, Jesus remains for a time in Galilee."
Mounce, Robert H. John (The Expositor's Bible Commentary) (Kindle Locations 4043-4047). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.
Another Johannine scholar insists: "He refuses in the plainest terms to comply with human--and unbelieving--advice, acting with complete freedom and independence with regard to men, but in complete obedience to his Father" (Barrett, John, 313).
"That Jesus eventually goes to the festival ἐν κρυπτῷ is to be interepreted strictly in relation to [John 7:4]: he journeys quietly to Jerusalem, without making any ostentatious entry into the city or drawing attention to himself on arrival at the festival" (G. R. Beasley-Murray, John , 107).
Thursday, June 04, 2015
Aposiopesis as a Rhetorical Device (David A. Black)
Romans 2:17-21 and 5:12 appear to be examples of aposiopesis (ἀποσιώπησις). David A. Black explains that this particular rhetorical device "is a deliberate failure to end a sentence under the influence of a strong emotion like anger or fear, as in 'If you do this, I'll . . .' Aposiopesis is seen in Luke 19:42" (Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek, page 134).
Another well-known (possible) example of aposiopesis that comes to mind straightaway is Gen. 3:22.
See the informative page here: http://grammar.about.com/od/ab/g/aposioterm.htm
Another well-known (possible) example of aposiopesis that comes to mind straightaway is Gen. 3:22.
See the informative page here: http://grammar.about.com/od/ab/g/aposioterm.htm
Monday, June 01, 2015
John 1:1-2 and Deixis
Written 2/4/2000; edited 3/3/2018 and 2/21/2021:
By deixis, I mean what George Yule calls " 'pointing' via language" (George Yule. The Study of Language. New York: Cambridge, 1996. Page 130).
Yule maintains there are numerous deictic usages (person deixis, place deixis, and time deixis). Demonstratives also serve a deictic purpose in that--as my old classics professor likes to say--they are "finger pointers" (like "this" and "that"). Sometimes writers use the demonstrative pronoun to emphasize what has already been said: this usage is called "the deictic reference." On p. 596 (οὗτος 1.b), BAGD Greek-English Lexicon says that οὗτος may have reference "to [something] that has immediately preceded" with the implied idea--"this one." The examples given there are Lk. 1:32; Jn. 1:2; 6:71; 2 Tim. 3:6, 8; Jd. 7.
"Nothing new is added in this verse [Jn. 1:2], but two points are repeated from v. 1 and thereby given emphasis" (Morris, Leon. John [New International Commentary] p. 78).
By deixis, I mean what George Yule calls " 'pointing' via language" (George Yule. The Study of Language. New York: Cambridge, 1996. Page 130).
Yule maintains there are numerous deictic usages (person deixis, place deixis, and time deixis). Demonstratives also serve a deictic purpose in that--as my old classics professor likes to say--they are "finger pointers" (like "this" and "that"). Sometimes writers use the demonstrative pronoun to emphasize what has already been said: this usage is called "the deictic reference." On p. 596 (οὗτος 1.b), BAGD Greek-English Lexicon says that οὗτος may have reference "to [something] that has immediately preceded" with the implied idea--"this one." The examples given there are Lk. 1:32; Jn. 1:2; 6:71; 2 Tim. 3:6, 8; Jd. 7.
"Nothing new is added in this verse [Jn. 1:2], but two points are repeated from v. 1 and thereby given emphasis" (Morris, Leon. John [New International Commentary] p. 78).
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